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The disproportionate application of public health challenges in low-income countries (LICs) 
poses a significant threat to the realisation of the right of access to medicine. High price of 
patented drugs has been linked to this challenge. The exploitation of pharmaceutical patent 
protection generally and under the TRIPS Agreement, has been identified as empowering 
pharmaceutical firms to charge supra competitive prices for innovator drugs. Notably, the 
TRIPS Agreement and national Intellectual Property (IP) legislations are sensitive to the access 
gap arising from this challenge. Compulsory license flexibility in Article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement has further been recognised as one of the measures that can induce price reduction 
of patented drugs. Accordingly, the need to address how patent protection on drugs threatens 
public health, the realisation of right of access to medicine and the use of compulsory license 
to facilitate access to medicine, form the motivations and objectives of this thesis. 
Paragraph 6 objective of the 2001 Council of TRIPS Doha Declaration recognised the effect 
of patent on price of drugs and the need to promote the effective use of compulsory license by 
countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Consequently, under 
determinate circumstances, Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement permits the exportation of 
drugs that are produced under compulsory license to a needing state. Incidentally, Article 31bis 
effort has been described as ‘unworkable, impracticable and incapable of generating sufficient 
economies of scale’. This argument has therefore raised a concern that Article 31bis may be 
unable to satisfy the paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration.  
Based on the forgoing, this study embarks on the analysis of Article 31bis to determine the 
practicality towards the paragraph 6 objective. This thesis identifies four major challenges that 
confront Article 31bis. They are: the procedural requirements of Article 31bis, trade politics, 
advanced IP trade measures (TRIPS-Plus) in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and limited 
economies of scale. These challenges are respectively categorised as procedural (legal), 
political, substantive and economic challenges. Based on these challenges, this thesis asked 
this question: can Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement maximize the Doha Declaration’s 
Paragraph 6 objective, in balance of the patent holder’s right.    
To answer this question, this study embarks on a legal, socio-legal and interdisciplinary 
analysis to evaluate the patent mechanism, pharmaceutical patent protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement, the right of access to medicine, and Article 31bis. Based on the issues emerging 
from the analysis, the answer to the research question takes the form of an argument. The 
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argument is that, despite the four-fold challenges that contest Article 31bis mechanism, Article 
31bis can still exploited in the current state once the economics is right. This thesis argues that 
even though Article 31bis mechanism problematic, it is capable of satisfying the paragraph 6 
objective.  
Against the backdrop of the right economics for Article 31bis, this study considers a strategic 
use of Article 31bis in the current state. Consistent with Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, this study argues that a regional approach to compulsory license can produce the 
right economies of scale for Article 31bis. Illustrating with the existing Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) in Africa, this thesis demonstrated how a joint or regional compulsory 
license can significantly satisfy paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration in balance of 
the patent holder’s right. Significantly, Article 31bis was analysed as capable of providing legal 
and economic solutions that can bridge the gap between the right of access to medicine and 
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1.1   INTRODUCTION 
The underlying policies of Intellectual Property Protection (IPP), International trade and public 
health demonstrate a tripartite relationship. The World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
respectively, advance these policies. These policies are inextricably linked and this has resulted 
to a complex relationship. Ideally, trade and IP rules pursue increased trade, economic growth 
and innovation. On the other hand, public health is concerned with wellbeing and access to 
treatment options for diseases. Incidentally, IPP and trade policies may obstruct public health 
objectives.1 Consequently, the need for a coherent relationship has become compelling and 
continuously advanced.    
The WHO 2030 Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG) focuses on good health and wellbeing. 
Besides maternal, new born and child health issues, SDG 3 also focuses on ensuring the testing 
and treatment options for: Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(HIV/AIDS), Tuberculosis (TB), Hepatitis B/C, Malaria and general non-communicable 
diseases like cancer and chronic respiratory diseases. 2  Incidentally, one of the prominent 
challenges to the SDG goal 3 is access to the medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and medical 
devices for the treatment of diseases.3  
Limited access to medicine is a complex challenge. Poverty, corruption, poor health 
infrastructure, shortage of health professionals, import duties, domestic taxes, government 
procurement processes and the high price of drugs4 significantly contribute to this challenge. 
With respect to price of drugs, the pricing strategies of pharmaceutical firms that arise from the 
exploitation of pharmaceutical patent protection present a significant obstacle to access.5This 
is a global challenge. However, it has a disproportionate application to low-income countries 
 
1 Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Panel on Access to Medicines Report, Promoting 
Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, (2016) 7 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1a3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02cd3d4/14738900313
20/UNSG+HLP+Report+FINAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf Accessed 19/02/20 
2 World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Sustainable Development Goal 3’ 2019 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg3 Accessed on 19/02/2020 
3 Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Panel (n 1) 3 
4 Commission Report on Macroeconomics and Health: Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in the Health for 
Economic Development (WHO, 2001) 86 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42435/924154550X.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Accessed 
on 21/03/2020 
5 Ibid 87 
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(LICs). The concern is that pharmaceutical IP holding firms maintain high price for patent 
protected drugs.6    
Based on the forgoing, this thesis aims to generally explore patent protection of pharmaceutical 
inventions, the implications on public health and access to medicine and the use of compulsory 
license flexibility to facilitate access to medicine. This chapter provides the research 
background and framework for this study, research hypothesis and questions, the significance 
of this study, research methodology, research scope, research objectives and outline.   
1.2   RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Patent protection mechanism delivers real time value to the inventors and the society alike. It 
facilitates knowledge dissemination and the advancement of science and innovation.7 The 
patent system confers exclusive right to an inventor to use and sale patented inventions for a 
maximum period of 20 years.8 Within the period of protection, the inventor has the right  
exclusively commercialize and appropriate the invention to the exclusion of unauthorized 
users. This right and period of exclusive use are believed to enable patent holders to recoup the 
investment in the Research and Development (R&D) of inventions. A patent holder is further 
incentivized to reinvest in R&D. On the other hand, the public derives benefits from the 
innovation and the disclosure of the invention for further research.9 
One of the implications of patent exclusive market right is the market monopoly advantage that 
comes with it.10 The monopoly situation is believed to empower patent holders to charge supra-
competitive prices 11 above marginal cost 12 and to also delay the market entry of generic 
products, until the expiration of the patent duration.13 These implications are notably felt more 
 
6 Ibid 
7 Sisule Musungu, Susan Villanueva and Roxanna Blasetti, ‘Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health 
Protection through South-South Regional Frameworks (South Centre, 2004) 17 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.507.4179&rep=rep1&type=pdf Accessed 06/06/20 
8 Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement 1995, Articles 28 and 33  
9 Kristine Paterson, ‘On the Monopoly: Speculation, pharmaceutical markets, and intellectual property law in 
Nigeria’ (2014) 41 Journal of American Ethnologist,128,130 
10 Daniel Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, ‘Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate’ (2013) 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 
31 
11 Michael Schuster, ‘Artificial Intelligence and patent Protection Ownership’ (2018) 75 Washington and Lee Law 
Review, 1945, 1982 
12 Commission Report on Macroeconomics and Health, (n 4) 87 
13 Arti Kaur Rai, ‘Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science,’ (1999) 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 133-34.  
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in LICs, especially where the products embodying the invention have no substitute or no readily 
available substitute(s).   
The WTO was established in 1995 to liberalize, regulate, and minimize obstacles to 
international trade, through Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs). In pursuit of these trade 
objectives, the Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement was adopted 
as one of the WTO’s MTAs. As part of trade liberalization, the TRIPS Agreement standardized 
Intellectual Property Protection (IPP) rules to minimize IP impediments to international trade, 
encourage sufficient IPP and the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs).14  
Beyond securing a global protection of IPP, the TRIPS Agreement also aims to promote 
technological innovation and the dissemination of technology. In the pursuit of this objective, 
the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the rights of  patent holders to adequate protection of IPR on 
one hand and the right of access to the innovation, on the other hand.15 The TRIPS Agreement 
further recognizes a 20-year duration for patent protection 16 and the grant of product or 
pharmaceutical patent.17  
In exploiting the patent advantage generally and under the TRIPS Agreement, the need to 
sustain continued technological innovation and access to the invention is compelling. The 
incidence of high prices of drugs that arise from the exploitation of pharmaceutical patent 
protection, gives rise to limited access to medicine, especially in LICs. By establishing a 
uniform obligation for the WTO member states to recognize drug patent, the WTO is believed 
to have exacerbated the concern about the influence of patent protection of pharmaceuticals, 
on access to medicine. This is considered as an externality of the patent system 
This externality challenges states and WHO’s efforts towards making treatment options 
affordable, accessible, and available to the needing population. This is especially the case 
where the drugs are considered essential by the WHO and also included in the WHO’s Essential 
Medicine List (EML). The pursuit of access to medicine derives from human rights obligations 
under customary international law, the human right to health and life. To break this patent 
barrier and to facilitate the right of access to medicine, the United Nations’ (UN) General 
 
14 TRIPS Agreement 1995, preamble (Para.1) 
15 Ibid Article 7 
16 Ibid Article 33  
17 Ibid Article 27(1) 
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Assembly has enjoined states to adopt proactive measures to promote wider access to 
medicine.18  
Notably, the TRIPS Agreement is sensitive to this challenge and the need to balance 
innovation, IPR and public access to patented inventions. Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, provide the basis for states to adopt measures that can facilitate access to 
inventions. Consistent with these provisions, the member states of the WTO are free to adopt 
measures within the TRIPS Agreement to protect public health. To this extent, the TRIPS 
Agreement recognizes range of measures or flexibilities that can be adopted to facilitate access 
to medicine, without jeopardizing patent rights. Some of the measures within the TRIPS 
Agreements include: Parallel Import in Article 6, exclusion from patentability in Article 27.2, 
exceptions to exclusive rights in Article 30 and Compulsory licenses in Article 31/31bis. Any 
of these flexibilities can be exploited to mitigate excessive pricing of patented products to 
improve access. 
The TRIPS Agreement’s compulsory license flexibility in Article 31/31bis is isolated in this 
thesis. One of the ways to mitigate the effect of patent exclusive right on access to 
pharmaceuticals, is to induce price reduction through generic competition. Compulsory license 
mechanism is believed to possess the potentials to induce generic competition without 
jeopardizing the interest of the right holder. Consequently, this study seeks to examine whether 
or how the TRIPS Agreement compulsory license can be effectively exploited in LICs to 
facilitate access to medicine.   
1.3   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The underpinning framework for this study are pharmaceutical patent protection, access to 
medicine and compulsory license mechanism.   
 PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION 
Pharmaceutical firms ceaselessly invest in R&D for vaccines and medicines that are needed 
for treatment of diseases. Studies on the cost of developing successful medicines from research 
to market approval reveal a huge cost.19To safeguard against replicating successful outcome of 
pharmaceutical R&D investments, pharmaceutical firms largely rely on patent protection 
mechanism.20The ease of reverse engineering of pharmaceutical innovation and processes, 
 
18 See Chapter 4 on Human right and Access to medicine  
19 See chapter 2 on patents and incentives for drug innovation. pp.48-50 
20 Benjamin Roin, ‘Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability’ (2009) 87 TEX. L. REV, 503, 544-47 
5 
 
justify reliance on patent protection.21The patent mechanism guarantees the right to exclusively 
exploit the invention during the period of protection. Consequently, third party access must be 
authorised by the patent holder.22  
Despite the relevance of the patent mechanism on pharmaceutical innovation, it raises a 
concern. There is a consensus in most of the literature that pharmaceutical patent protection 
generally and under the TRIPS Agreement, exacerbate the challenge of consumer access to IP 
medicines. The patent incentive for supra competitive pricing of patented drugs, only means 
that the concerned drugs are only available to the consumers that can afford to pay the price.23 
Besides the TRIPS initial 20 years patent duration in Article 27 and the exclusive market right, 
pharmaceutical firms adopt further patent strategies and also advanced IPP mechanisms that 
are beyond the TRIPS minimum standard. These patent strategies are exploited by global 
pharmaceutical firms to maximize market value and patent monopoly.24  
Pharmaceutical R&D responds largely to the market forces of demand and supply, and this is 
recognised as integral to innovation processes.25This invariably implies that drugs are only 
available to the patients that can afford the price fixed for the drugs. Sadly, the incidence of 
low purchasing power in LICs suggests that, most patients in LICs are either priced out due to 
high price or stuck with a treatment option(s), even when the price is too high and unaffordable. 
This thesis therefore examines patent mechanism, pharmaceutical patent protection and patent 
strategies, to determine the implications on the right of access to medicine, and to also justify 
a need to adopt mitigating strategies.   
 PUBLIC HEALTH AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE CHALLENGE 
Public health challenge manifests in global disease burden. This challenge even though global, 
disproportionately affect LICs. Several factors are responsible for this challenge. However, the 
high price of patented medicines significantly adds to this challenge.  
The WHO 2017 statistics recognised that; medicines are becoming expensive and this makes 
it difficult for a significant number of people in developing countries to pay for the  drugs.26 
 
21 Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, (2016) 578 B.C.L 
Rev. 1079, 1105 
22 Roin, (n 20) 
23 Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Panel (n 1) 3. See also Commission Report on 
Macroeconomics and Health, (n 4) Hemel and Ouellette, (n 9)  
24 Schuster, (n 11) 1945, 1982 
25 Commission Report on Macroeconomics and Health, (n 4), 87 
26 WHO, World Health Statistics, (2017) 19 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/255336/1/9789241565486-
eng.pdf?ua=1 Accessed on 17/08/20 
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The 2018 WHO report highlighted the top ten common causes of morbidity rate in LICs 
between 2000-2016 as: acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, Ischaemic heart disease, 
HIV/AIDS, stroke, Malaria, Tuberculosis, Preterm birth complications, birth asphyxia and 
birth trauma and road injury.27 In view of the increasing price of drugs, one of the major 
challenges remains how to access treatment for the diseases. A collaboration between the 
WHO, WIPO and WHO noted the key role of IPR in promoting innovation, the price of drugs, 
the implication on access to medicine and the possibility of de-linking the cost of 
pharmaceutical R&D from the market value of drugs.28   
Access to medicine uses a 4A dimension to measure the accessibility of drugs. It asks the 
following questions: is a medication available, affordable, accessible, and acceptable?29 A drug 
is available where the type and quantity of drugs that are demanded are supplied. Drugs are 
affordable where the users can afford to pay the price. Whether a drug is accessible is 
determined by the differences in the locations of the products and the users. A drug is 
acceptable where the expectations of the users about actual features of the products are 
satisfied.30 
As earlier highlighted, just like pharmaceutical innovation, availability of medicines follows 
the market forces of demand and supply. For a demand to be effective, it is must be backed 
with the ability to pay. Accordingly, drug supply is limited or unavailable in the locations where 
the consumers are unable to pay because of limited financial means. In the occasion where the 
supply is available, they can be expensive and unaffordable.31 It follows that, despite higher 
disease burden in LICs, drugs might not be available for most patients, and where they are, 
they might be unaffordable. 
As earlier noted earlier, access to medicine is a human right. This right creates a positive 
obligation on states to ensure that medicines are available at affordable prices for the needing 
population. This obligation arises from the duty to ensure the right to health and life under the 
 
27 World Health Organisation (WHO), The top 10 causes of death fact sheet (2018).  https://www.who.int/news-
room/fact-sheets/detail/the-top-10-causes-of-death Accessed on 14/03/18. 
28 WHO, World Health Statistics, 2017,19 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/255336/1/9789241565486-
eng.pdf?ua=1 Accessed on 19/02/18 
29 Management Sciences for Health. 2012. MDS-3: Managing Access to Medicines and Health Technologies. 
P.1.8 https://www.msh.org/sites/default/files/mds3-jan2014.pdf accessed 28/05/2020. See chapter 4 of the 
Thesis, 75-77 
30 Ibid 
31 See chapter 4 of the thesis for the substantive discussion on access to medicine  
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human right conventions and national legislations. This obligation also requires states to adopt 
legitimate and proactive measures to realize the right of access to medicine.32   
Against this background, this thesis would examine the right of access to medicine and the 
obligations on states and IP holding pharmaceutical firms towards the full realization of access 
to medicine.    
 COMPULSORY LICENSE MECHANISM 
Consistent with the human right obligation of states to adopt measures to facilitate access to 
medicine, compulsory license mechanism presents one of the viable measures that fulfils this 
purpose. Through compulsory licenses, a state can authorize a third party to exploit a patented 
invention without the authorisation of the patent holder.33This license is inspired by the need 
to address the externalities arising from the exploitation of patent rights. Some of the situations 
warranting the issuance of compulsory licensing range from but not limited to high price of 
patented drugs, anti-competitive practices, failure to supply a market,34public interest and 
access to medicine.35This power to authorize the production of generic versions of a patented 
drug through a third party, is usually balanced with the payment of reasonable royalty to the 
patent holder.36  
The Paris Convention,37TRIPS Agreement,38 regional and national IP legislations recognise 
the use of compulsory license to safeguard the extreme exploitation of IPR. Compulsory 
licenses mitigate the patent holder’s market advantage and facilitates third party 
 
32 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para. 
10  https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html Accessed 9 May 2019 
33 Article 5A Paris Convention 1883, Article 31 TRIPS Agreement 1995. See also Management Sciences for 
Health. 2012. MDS-3: Managing Access to Medicines and Health Technologies. P.3.6 
https://www.msh.org/sites/default/files/mds3-jan2014.pdf accessed 28/05/2020. See also Rojina Thapa, ‘Waiver 
Solution in Public Health and Pharmaceutical Domain under TRIPS Agreement’ (2011) 16 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 470, 470 
34 Sisule Musungu et al, ‘Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection through South-South Regional 
Frameworks (South Centre, 2004) 13 http://archives.who.int/tbs/global/s4968e.pdf Accessed 06/06/20 
35  Jerome Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical 
Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA, (Issue 
Paper, 5, 2003), 10 
36 Commission Report on Macroeconomics and Health, (n 4), 90 
37 Article 5A Paris Convention 1883 
38 Articles 31&31bis TRIPS Agreement 1994 
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competition39and access to medicine.40This license seeks to induce marginal pricing for drugs 
against the usual supra-competitive prices that are partly enabled by patent advantage.41  
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement defines the scope and grounds of compulsory license. 
However, Article 31(f) clearly limits the license to the supply of domestic market of the issuing 
state. This limitation meant that, drugs that are produced under a compulsory license in a state, 
cannot be wholly exported to a needing state. Consequently, states with no or limited 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, are unable to issue compulsory license for local 
production. The implication of this limitation meant that, it will be difficult for most LICs to 
authorize compulsory license to facilitate access to medicine. This is in view of the limited 
capacity to engage in local production of pharmaceuticals in LICs. 
Against the background of  the difficulty arising from Article 31(f), the WTO 2001 ministerial 
conference adopted a Declaration on the TRIPS and Public health (referred to as the Doha 
Declaration).42The Declaration amongst other issues, acknowledged the rights of the WTO 
member states to use compulsory license to address the incidence of high price of drugs.43 
Paragraph 6 embodies one of the key objectives of the Doha Declaration. It recognised the 
difficulties of LICs with no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to effectively exploit 
compulsory license. In recognising this need, paragraph 6 mandated the Council of TRIPS to 
find an expeditious means to remove Article 31(f) impediment. The 2003 Council of TRIPS 
Implementation Decision (referred to as the ‘Decision’) addressed this challenge and permitted 
the full export of drugs manufactured under compulsory license to a needing nation.44The 
Decision consequently laid the foundation for the export of drugs that are manufactured under 
compulsory license to countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.  
Following the Decision, the protocol for the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement was 
approved on 6 December 2005 to amend the TRIPS Agreement with the inclusion of 
compulsory license for export in Article 31bis.45 Following the acceptance of the protocol by 
 
39  Carlos Correa, TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Protection and Impacts in Latin America in Danial Garvais (ed) 
Intellectual Property, Trade and Development (Oxford Press, 2014) 156 
40 Reichman and Hasenzahl, (n 35)  
41 Ibid 
42  The Doha Declaration 2001, https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/. Accessed 
20/03/2020 
43 Ibid, Paras 1-4  
44 Decision of the general Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health WT/L/540 and Corr.1 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm Accessed 29/09/20 




two-third of the WTO member states, the amendment of the TRIPS took effect on 23 January 
2017. Article 31bis ideally waived Article 31(f) limitation.  
Despite the Declaration, the Decision and the amendment, there are still concerns and 
arguments that Article 31bis solution is quite unworkable, impracticable and incapable of 
facilitating access to medicine in LICs.46Consequently, this criticism fuelled the concern that 
Article 31bis is unable live up to the paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration.47  
Against the backdrop of this concern, this thesis examines the challenges and practicality of 
Article 31bis and the possibility that Article 31bis(3) mechanism can be used by LICs to 
achieve the paragraph 6 objective. Article 31bis(3) recognises a joint or a regional compulsory 
license (RCL) that enables LICS that are bound in a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) to issue 
a joint license.  
1.4  THE OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
This thesis seeks to identify the challenges arising from pharmaceutical patent protection in the 
context of access to medicine and under the TRIPS Agreement. Against the background of 
paragraph 6 objective and the concern that Article 31bis is problematic, this study also seeks 
to determine how LICs can exploit Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access 
to medicine. 
1.5  RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND QUESTION 
Arising from the externalities of pharmaceutical patent protection, is a tension between patent 
proprietary right and the right of access to medicine. These two interests continue to compete 
hence in need of a balance. Achieving this balance would mean, facilitating access to medicine 
without unreasonably endangering the right of the patent holder. The disproportionate disease 
burden in LICs justify the need to resolve this tension. Even though it has been adjudged 
unworkable, this study considers that Article 31bis compulsory license flexibility can balance 
these competing interests.  
As already highlighted, Article 31bis has been described as cumbersome, impracticable, and 
incapable of generating sufficient Economies of Scale (EoS) that are needed for generic 
 
46 Fredrick Abbot and Jerome Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production 
and Diffusion of the Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provision’ (2007) 10(4) JIEL 921, 970. See 
also Satish Kumar Verma, ‘TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines’ (2006) https://www.kansai-




competition. These criticisms were used to justify the conclusion that Article 31bis is unable 
to meet the objectives of the Doha Declaration towards public health challenge in 
LICs.48Against the background of the criticisms, a closer attention at Article 31bis(3) that 
supports a strategic use of compulsory license has become imperative. Assuming but without 
conceding that Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement is completely impracticable as argued, 
this thesis considers the need to explore Article 31bis(3), to determine whether it can be 
exploited to achieve paragraph 6 objective.   
Based on the forgoing, this thesis addresses this central question: towards the effective use of 
compulsory license in LICs, can Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, maximize the Doha 
Declaration’s Paragraph 6 objective, in balance of the patent holder’s right?   
This question is borne out of the criticism of Article 31bis. To answer this research question, 
this thesis would explore patent mechanism, pharmaceutical patent protection under the TRIPS 
globalized patent regime and the challenges arising therefrom. The economics of patent and 
the patent strategies that maximize patent monopolies and market share would be examined to 
provide a contextual background to the discourse.    
In answering the research question, this research also considers access to medicine as a human 
right and the obligations of states and IP holding pharmaceutical firms in facilitating access to 
medicine. This study further explores the potentials of compulsory license in facilitating access 
to medicine and the challenges confronting the effective exploitation of Article 31bis TRIPS 
compulsory license mechanism. Based on the emerging challenges of Article 31bis and 
illustrating with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, this thesis would 
consider the potentials of a region-wide compulsory license under Article 31bis(3), as capable 
of satisfying paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. 
1.6  LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
Pharmaceutical patent mechanism and compulsory license have for so long received extensive 
discussions from legal, economics, trade, IP, political and health perspectives. These 
perspectives cover patent protection regimes prior to the TRIPS, TRIPS, and the post–TRIPS 
Agreement’s era. Mainly, these conversations focused on the relationship and the implications 
of patent protection of pharmaceuticals on access to medicine and the use of compulsory 
license as an access strategy.   
 
 
48 This is discussed in detail in chapter 6 of the Thesis 
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The interrelationship between public health challenge, pharmaceutical patent protection and 
international trade has generated intense debates. Academic literature, working papers and 
policy statements from the WTO, WIPO, WHO, other intergovernmental organisations and 
Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) on these issues have emerged.49 The discussions 
represent two opposing divides of the relationship between pharmaceutical patent protection 
and the price of drugs. On one hand, literature abound on the potentials of compulsory license 
in mitigating or facilitating access to medicine generally and especially in LICs.50 On the other 
hand, taking the pharmaceutical industry perspective, some literature considered that, poverty 
and nothing more is solely responsible for limited access to medicine in LICs. Consequently, 
the use of compulsory license should be discouraged, because it diminishes patentee’s rights 
and the incentive for continued R&D investment.51 
 
This study considers the arguments in favour and against patent protection and the use of 
compulsory license. This thesis also considers the WTO TRIPS Agreement and other legal 
instruments that are relevant to this discourse. With respect to compulsory license, Articles 31 
and 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement have since the Doha Declaration, the Decision and the 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement received considerable deliberations. These discussions 
are focused on the objectives, potentials, impracticability and the inability of Article 31bis to 
meet paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration.52 
 
 
49 Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Panel (n 1) 3. See also Commission Report on 
Macroeconomics and Health, (n 4) Hemel and Ouellette, (n 9) Schuster (n 11) 
50  Jerome Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical 
Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA, (Issue 
Paper, 5, 2003) 10. See also Carlos Correa: Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights, (2002) Global Social 
Policy, pp. 261, 271 Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on patents 
and Related Rights, (2011 oxford university press)127. See also Pier DeRoo, Public Non-Commercial Use 
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs (2011) Michigan Journal 
of International Law, 347,348, Elena Pantopoulou, The Status and Legal Effect of Compulsory License in 
Investment Law, (2016) 1 International Journal of Law, 33,34,  
51 Richard Epstein and Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for 
Pharmaceutical Patents, (2011) 78 University of Chicago Law Review, 71,81 See also: Joseph Yosick, 
Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient use of Inventions, (2001) University of Illinois Law 
Review,1275,1276. See also Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 
(2009) Journal of International Business and Law,137,140,  
52 Carlos Correa, ‘Implementation of the WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health’ in WHO Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines: Papers and Perspective 
(2010) p. 83. See also: United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicine, Report 2016 
p. 25, Carlos Correa, Intellectual Property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Increasing the Barriers for the Access 
to Affordable Medicines (South Centre Research Paper, 62R, 2017) 8, Beatrice Stirner, ‘Learning form Practice: 
Compulsory Licensing Cases and Access to Medicines’ (2012) 1(5) Phar. Pat. Analyst, 555, 559. See also Article 
13 of EC Regulation 1768/92, Bryan Mercurio, ‘TRIPS-PLUS Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends’ in Lorand 
Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 231 
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The argument that Article 31bis is impracticable, was borne from the point of view of the 
procedural requirements. These requirements have been adjudged herculean and cumbersome. 
Another argument against the practicality of Article 31bis is the failure to generate sufficient 
Economics of Scale (EoS). These arguments prompt inquiry into first, the challenges 
confronting the effective use of Article 31bis mechanism in LICs to determine whether, it is 
impracticable or the extent of the impracticability. In the absence of any empirical data on the 
use and impact of Article 31bis, this thesis would examine Article 31bis procedural 
requirements, advanced IPP measures, trade politics and the EoS of Article 31bis, to determine 
how they challenge Article 31bis mechanism. Secondly, arising from the first enquiry, this 
thesis would explore Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement and would seek to argue that a 
RCL under Article 31bis(3) can provide a strategic and a more productive means of using 
Article 31bis in LICs. Incidentally, till date, Article 31bis(3) has neither been used in practice 
nor developed beyond the general recognition as a viable compulsory licensing strategy.   
 
Based on the second enquiry, this study considers previous proposals for the use of Article 
31bis(3) by Reichman, Sisule et al, Ellen ‘t Hoen, Manu and Adekola. Beyond the recognition 
of Article 31bis(3) prospects, 53some of the proposals considered the establishment of  a 
regional entity to coordinate Article 31bis(3) license and a regional pharmaceutical 
manufacturing centre to engage in the local production of generic drugs. Particularly, 
Reichman and Sisule et al respectively proposed the establishment of Regional Pharmaceutical 
Supply Centres (RPSC) or the  Advisory Council on Trade Related Innovation Policies 
(ACTRIPS) to pursue a RCL in LICs.54  Ellen ‘t Hoen et al considered the prospect that 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) can facilitate the procurement of generic 
medicines through Article 31bis(3).55 Adekola proposed a regional coalition in Africa and 
South East Asia. Using a broad continental model of African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement (AfCTA), Adekola proposed the establishment of local pharmaceutical 
 
53 Manu Thaddeus, ‘Essential Medicines and the Complexity of Implementing Nationally Based Compulsory 
Licensing: On the Need for A Regional System of Compulsory Licensing in Sub-Sahara African’ (2014) 36(1) 
European Intellectual Property Review, 28. See also T.A Adekola, ‘Public health-oriented Intellectual Property 
and Trade Policies in Africa and the Regional mechanism under Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual Property 
Rights Amendment’ (2019) 173 Public Health, 1,3 
54 Jerome Reichman, ‘Procuring Essential Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions: The Prospects for 
Regional Pharmaceutical Supply Centres’ (Seminar on Intellectual Property Arrangements, UNCTAD Geneva, 
2016) see also, Sisule Musungu et al, ‘Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection through South-
South Regional Frameworks (South Centre, 2004) XVI, XV http://archives.who.int/tbs/global/s4968e.pdf 
Accessed 06/06/20 
55 Ellen ‘t Heon, Tapiwanashe and Pascale Boulet, ‘Patent Challenges in the procurement and Supply of Generic 
new Essential Medicines and Lessons from HIV in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Region’ (2018) J Pharm Policy Pract.1-13  
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manufacturing capacity in Africa.56Manu on the other hand, proposed a pooled manufacturing 
system by LICs and the establishment of pharmaceutical production plants to facilitate local 
production of generic drugs, across the sub-regions in Africa.57 The overall argument, supports 
the view that Article 31bis(3) can be used by LICs to issue a joint license to either manufacture 
or import generic drugs.  
 
Building on the above proposals, this study addresses this issue from a broader perspective to 
further strengthen the understanding of the issues. First, this thesis will contextualise the 
conversation. It examines the legal, economic, political and trade issues that challenge Article 
31bis. These challenges would be used to demonstrate the extent Article 31bis can work and 
to also justify the need to explore the prospects of Article 31bis(3). Secondly, this thesis would 
address this issue from a more practical perspective, suggesting the possible procedural 
requirements for a regional license. Within Article 31bis framework, this study identifies the 
central interests in the Art.31bis framework and how they are satisfied. Using the existing 
RECS in Africa, this thesis would seek to demonstrate how these interests can be reasonably 
satisfied under Article 31bis(3) mechanism and the possibility that it can be used to facilitate 
access to Covid 19 treatment. Beyond the prospects of Article 31bis(3), this study like 
Reichman’s, anticipates and offers more insight in the legal and operational issues that can 
challenge Article 31bis(3) outcome. It also recognizes some limitations of the mechanism. 
Against the background of balancing the competing interests, the implications of a regional 
license on pharmaceutical innovation and the economic expectations of the patent holders, 
would be considered.  Overall, Article 31bis would be analysed as capable of providing legal, 
economic and political solutions that can bridge the gap between the right of access to medicine 
and pharmaceutical patent protection.  
 
Significantly, this study seeks to provide a contextualised and comprehensive guide on the 
legal, trade and economic considerations that are relevant for a successful regional license. This 
discourse in this study continues to hold relevance. Even though access to affordable medicine 
has a disproportionate application in LICs, it is still a global challenge. Gloomier pictures of 
global disease burden continue to emerge, especially with the possibility of new disease 
 
56 Tolulope Anthony Adekola, ‘Regional Mechanism Under Doha Paragraph 6 System-The Largely Untested 
Alternative Route for Access to Patented Medicines’ (2020) 15 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health 
Law and Policy, 61,74-6 
57 Manu Thaddeus, ‘Essential Medicines and the Complexity of Implementing Nationally Based Compulsory 
Licensing: On the Need for A Regional System of Compulsory Licensing in Sub-Sahara African’ (2014) 36(1) 
European Intellectual Property Review. 28 
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outbreaks and the consistency of recurring diseases like HIV and hepatitis C. These issues 
highlight the need for constant and unrestricted access to treatments that are under patent 
protection. Accordingly, states continue to seek ways to harness or maximize the flexibilities 
within the TRIPS to facilitate access to medicines. This public health challenge and obligations 
reinforce the need to rethink the exploitation of the compulsory license flexibility within the 
TRIPS Agreement. The insight from this thesis will provide a good resource for regional 
organizations and LICs that are seeking to exploit a regional compulsory license as an access 
strategy. In September 2020, the African Union (AU) called for consultants to investigate how 
AU can use regional blocs to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities.58 This study will also be useful to 
IP and access to medicine policy makers, access to medicine-based NGOs and IP scholars that 
are interested in the TRIPS flexibilities and access to medicine research area.  
 
1.7  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Mainly, this study is evaluative, comparative, analytical and appraises the relevant international 
IP legal regime to this discourse. The concept of pharmaceutical patent protection, compulsory 
license and access to medicine were considered from legal, socio-legal, economics and 
comparative perspectives. In addressing these issues, this thesis did not undertake empirical 
data collection. However, this study relied on some empirical data that are already available 
and relevant to some aspects of the discourse.  
  
A) DOCTRINAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
 
The doctrinal legal research methodology involves the synthesis of rules, principles, norms, 
and interpretative guidelines, to explain and justify the law.59This research approach examines 
the essential features of legislations and case laws. The essence is to extract the relevant 
elements and establish an arguable statement of law on the matter.60Doctrinal research method 




58 African Union, ‘Consultancy Services to Support Member States to Benefit from WTO TRIPS Flexibilities to 
Promote Access to Medicines and Public health in African Union Countries in the Coronavirus Pandemic and 
Beyond. September 18, 2020 https://au.int/en/bids/20200918/consultancy-services-support-member-states-
benefit-wto-trips-flexibilities-promote   Accessed 16/12/20 
59 Trischa Mann, Australian Law Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 2010) 197 
60 Terry Hutchinson, Researching the Jury, in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law, 
(Routledge, 2017) 14 
61 Paul Chynoweth, Legal Research in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in 
the Built Environment, (Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 29  
15 
 
This study examines primary materials that are relevant to this study. This thesis examines and 
relies on various legal texts, case laws, international conventions, national legislations and 
official texts. Essentially, the major approach to this study is a legal analysis of the key legal 
provisions to identify, clarify and synthesise the issues arising therefrom. Accordingly, the 
doctrinal and the normative analysis of the law underpin this study. The legal analysis focuses 
on the law and legal policies on patents, pharmaceutical patent protection, access to medicine 
and compulsory license mechanism. To establish the argument in this thesis, this study 
examines relevant sections of the TRIPS Agreement, regional legislations, national IP laws, 
other related legislations, human right conventions and case laws. 
 
Accordingly, in using the doctrinal method to answer the research question, this thesis will 
provide an exposition of the rules governing the mechanism of patent, compulsory licence, and 
access to medicine. It identifies the gaps, establish a relationship between the rules and access 
to medicine and make recommendations for future developments.62This approach is justified 
where a reform-oriented doctrinal approach is adopted. The reform-oriented method evaluates 
the adequacy of the existing rules and recommends changes where applicable.63  
 
In terms of limitation, the criticism that doctrinal methodology isolates the study of law from 
the concept it emanates from,64applies to this study. The doctrinal method usually takes an 
internal view of the law and as explained by William Twining, “it typically takes as its starting 
point and its main focus of attention rules of law without systemic or regular reference to the 
context of problem they are supposed to resolve and the purposes they were intended to serve 
or the effects they in fact have.”65This limitation justifies the broad research approach of this 
study which incorporates insights from other disciplines like economics where necessary.66 
 
Consequently, the doctrinal research method may not present the most appropriate method in 
answering the question about the implications of the patent system on public health and the 
implementation of compulsory license. Doctrinal method cannot engage in the economics, 
 
62 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing, 1987) 
63 Ibid 
64 Pauline. Westerman, Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate 
on Law, in M. Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for what Kind of 
Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 91 
65 William Twining, Taylor Lectures 1975 Academic law and legal Development, Lagos: University of Lagos 
Faculty of Law, 1976, 20.  
66 Albert Sanchez-Graell, “Economic Analysis of Law or Economically Informed Research” in Dawn Watkins 
and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 173 
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trade, health, and the political issues arising from pharmaceutical patent protection, the value 
of compulsory license and access to medicine. This means that, in the absence of appropriate 
normative and interdisciplinary enquiries, this research will be descriptive. Doctrinal 
conclusions are usually supported with normative evaluations of theories. This approach 
complements the doctrinal method to enable an analysis outside the law.  
 
This method enables this thesis to theorise and question the normative elements, justifications 
and rationales of legal and economic concepts underpinning this research. This is done by 
bringing in interdisciplinary elements such as economics.67 This thesis normatively analysed 
patent rights using economics and law, in the context of pharmaceutical patent protection, to 
demonstrate how patent rights interact with the dissemination and access to innovation.  
 
 
B) SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The relationship between law and social situations is quite relevant for a better understanding 
law.68 Schiff noted that: 
According to a socio-legal approach, analysis of law is directly linked to the analysis 
of the social situation to which the law applies and should be put into the perspective 
of that situation by seeing the part the plays in the creation, maintenance and/or change 
of the situation.69 
 
The socio-legal approach integrates other disciplines and applies a scientific approach to the 
study of law.70This method considers the changing social and political context where legal 
concepts find meaning.71There are some elements outside law that are relevant to this study. 
Economics, trade, social and political issues feature prominently in this thesis. These 
dimensions necessitate the use of socio-legal approach. Ideally, economics underpin the 
mechanism of patent and trade. This study therefore considers the contributions of international 
trade as well as some of the principles of economics like monopoly, market externalities, 
market structure, demand, and supply. The economics concepts significantly explain the social 
 
67 Jan Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 33 
68 David Schiff ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’ (1976) 39 The Modern Law Review, 287, 287 
69 Ibid 
70 Brian Tamanaha, ‘Realistic Socio-legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of law’ (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997) 2 
71 Roger Cotterell, ‘Socio-legal Studies, Law Schools, and Legal and Social Theory’ Paper presents at the 40 th 
Anniversary Conference, centre for Socio-legal studies, University of Oxford, 22nd June 2012.  
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context for the adoption and the implementation of pharmaceutical patent and compulsory 
license mechanism.   
 
In view of the foregoing, socio-legal method is also adopted to highlight the interactions 
between the applicable laws in this research and the context they operate. This thesis considers 
the relevant sections of the TRIPS Agreement, regional and national patent and other related 
legislations, treaties, trade agreements and how they influence the social context of public 
health. The evaluation or the analysis in this thesis cannot be done in isolation of the dynamic 
social and political context where the law on patent mechanism and trade operate.72Relying on 
the available empirical data, this thesis examines the concerns about the influence of patent 
protection on price of drugs and pharmaceutical innovations, the possible implications of 
compulsory license on foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions of the patent holder and 
continued innovation.  
 
C) INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH METHOD  
 
This study also adopts an interdisciplinary approach to complement the socio-legal discussion. 
In answering a research question, most legal research consults other disciplines. Cotterell noted 
that where the theories in other disciplines are introduced into legal research, it become a 
“vehicle for developing an understanding of important general aspects of law that traditional 
legal study ignored.”73  
 
Interdisciplinary approach therefore combines insights from non-legal discipline(s). The 
research method uses non-legal data to give context to legal phenomenon and the essence is to 
determine how law works.74Schrama noted that, interdisciplinary method is either unilateral or 
multilateral. Where the interdisciplinary approach uses theories and available data outside law, 
the approach is unilateral. On the other hand, the multilateral method involves working with 
experts in another field to generate useful data and theories for the research.75 It is therefore 




73 Roger Cotterell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, making Law Central: A view of Sociological Studies’ (2002) 29 
Journal of law and Society 632, 634 
74 Wendy Schrama, ‘How to carry out interdisciplinary legal research: Some experiences with an Interdisciplinary 
research method’ (2011) 7 Utrecht Law Review, 147,150 
75 Ibid 
76 Cotterell (n 73)  
18 
 
This study draws insights from economics to highlight the research enquiry. This study 
examined the economics of patent monopoly, compulsory license, and the relevance of 
economics of scale in compulsory license. In addressing these enquiries, this study adopted or 
used some law and economics empirical data. 
 
As a possible draw back, the use of the interdisciplinary method has a limitation in this thesis. 
Notably, a unilateral interdisciplinary approach is adopted in this study. The difficulties of 
finding the needed information and data independently, might arise. This is added to the risk 
of incorrect understanding and application of concepts from other disciplines.77 Undoubtedly, 
each discipline has peculiar concepts and approaches that may be difficult for a legal researcher 
to fully understand.78 
 
D) COMPARATIVE RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The comparative legal research method has gained huge relevance because of globalisation. 
Consequently, it has become imperative to consider legal developments in other countries.79 
The comparative research method ‘deals with the various national legal orders in order to 
describe and explain their common features, their differences and their peculiarities… to 
analyse and to comprehend their approximations to each other and their distances from each 
other, and in order to ascertain and to understand their similarities, their strangeness and their 
mutual influences’.80  
 
The harmonisation of IP rules through the TRIPS Agreement might be interpreted and applied 
differently by the member states of the WTO. In this context, international and regional 
instruments like the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris Convention, various regional and national IP 
legislations as well as the relevant human right treaties may imply different national 
implementation strategies and judicial interpretations. 
 
This thesis referred to international, regional, and national legal framework on patent, 
compulsory license, and access to medicine. Case laws and different trade practices from 
different jurisdictions were considered. The comparative approach is used to highlight similar 
 
77 Schrama, (n 74) 
78 Ibid.  
79 Jurgen Basedow, ‘Comparative Law and its Clients’, (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative law, 821,822 
80  Michael Martinek, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence: What Good Does it Do? History, Tasks, Methods, 
Achievements and Perspectives of an Indispensable Discipline of Legal Research and Education, (2013) 39 
Journal of South African Law,39, 40 
19 
 
or diverging issues that emerge from legislations, judicial decisions and different experiences 
of countries.  
 
1.8  THESIS OUTLINE  
This thesis consists of 6 substantive chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the legal framework of patents 
and pharmaceutical patent protection. This chapter explores the mechanism of patent, the 
historical development, the economics, pharmaceutical patent protection and innovation. 
Chapter 3 explores the TRIPS Agreement’s globalised pharmaceutical patent protection and 
the peculiar influence on access to medicine. Chapter 4 discusses public health challenge, the 
legal framework of access to medicine and the obligation of states and non-state actors towards 
the realisation of the right of access to medicine. Chapter 5 examines compulsory license 
mechanism, the economics, the potentials, and the implications on FDI decisions, innovation, 
and the expectations of the patent holder. Chapter 6 examines the legal, policy, trade and EoS 
issues that challenge the optimal use of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement. Thereafter, 
chapter 7 examines the regional compulsory license mechanism under Article 31bis(3). Finally, 
chapter 8 embodies the research findings and recommendations. 
  
1.9  THESIS SCOPE 
Every research project is limited in some form. The enquiries in this thesis are limited to the 
pharmaceutical industry and drugs. This thesis does not claim that the issues arising from patent 
protection on pharmaceuticals apply in a similar way to other industries. This thesis also 
recognises that beyond patent protection, other factors threaten access to medicine. 
Consequently, this research does not claim that all treatment options are subject to patent 
protection. Where the drugs are not under patent protection, the influence of patent on the price 
might be doubtful.  
 
The potentials of Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement is illustrated with the existing REC 
structure or model in Africa to demonstrate how it can work in practice.  RECs in other regions 
that satisfy Article 31bis(3) criteria can exploit the mechanism. However, the outcome will 




PATENTS AND PHARMACUETICAL PATENT PROTECTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
To encourage and reward innovative activities, an inventor is granted the exclusive right to 
solely commercialize an invention. National and international legislations recognise patent 
protection in all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceutical patent is seen 
as an essential mechanism for the recovery of Research and Development (R&D) 
investment1and the incentive for further research. Despite these benefits, patent mechanism 
raises a concern. With respect to pharmaceuticals, it has the potentials to induce higher prices 
of patent protected innovator drugs and consequently limit public or consumer access to them.  
Against this background, this chapter examines patent mechanism generally and 
pharmaceutical patent protection. The analysis seeks to demonstrate how the exploitation of 
patent interferes with dissemination and access to patented pharmaceutical inventions.  
This chapter is structured into 8 sections. Section 2 discusses the overview of patent system, 
the theories of patent and the implications of patent exclusive rights. Thereafter, section 3 
considers the implications of patent exclusive rights. Section 4 considers patent in historical 
perspective. Section 5 explores the legal framework of patent mechanism against the backdrop 
of whether it interferes with patent territoriality principle. Section 6 examines the law and the 
economics of patent monopoly, pharmaceutical patent protection and the implications of 
further patent strategies. Thereafter, section 8 considers access to medicine and section 9 
concludes.      
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Inventors have two options. An inventor can keep an invention a secret and risk independent 
discovery or obtain a patent protection on the invention.2Developing new technologies involves 
expensive and rigorous processes. This provides one of the legal justifications for patent 
mechanism. It offers protection against unauthorised third-party access.3 The absence of this 
legal protection can disincentivise continued innovation, knowledge sharing, and technology 
 
1 Carlos Correa, ‘Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights’ (Sage Publications London, 2002) 263 
2 Nancy Gallini, ‘The Economics of Patent: Lesson from Recent U.S Patent Reform’ (2002) 16 Journal of 
Economics Perspectives,131,139 
3  Peter Lee, ‘Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships and Organisational Integration in 
Technology Transfer’ (2012) 100 California Law Review, 1510,1515 
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transfer.4 Absent this protection, inventors might become more inclined to keep the inventions 
a secret.  
2.2.1 PATENT MECHANISM  
Patent protection is granted to inventions5that solve technical problem(s). National patent 
legislations award patent to inventions that represent exceptional contribution(s) to the state of 
the art.6 The award of patent confers on the patent owner the exclusive and property right to 
the invention.7 These rights prevent unauthorised third parties from practicing the inventions 
unless they are authorised by the patent owner.8 Specifically, without the authorization of an 
inventor, third parties are clearly excluded from commercially making, offering for sell, 
reselling, using, or importing a patent protected knowledge. 9These rights are specifically 
reserved for the inventor or authorized third parties. 
Notably, not all inventive efforts are eligible for patent protection. For an invention to earn 
patent protection, it must be novel, involve inventive steps and capable of industrial 
application.10 However discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical method, literary work, 
dramatic, musical works, presentation of information, schemes, rules, and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games, or doing business and the programs for computers are 
excluded from patent protection.11 
The grant of patent confers on the owner an intangible property right12and the right to oppose 
third party infringement of the invention.13Consequently, third party access to a patented 
invention is usually gained through voluntary transactions like licenses and assignments.14 In 
conferring exclusive right to an inventor, the patent system presents a society and inventor 
 
4 Ibid 
5 35 US Code, s.100(a) refers to invention as ‘new and useful process, machine, manufacture, composition, or 
composition of matter or any useful improvement’ S. 100(b) defines process as ‘process, art or method and 
includes a new use of known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. See also KSR 
International Co. V Teleflex Inc 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
6 UK Patent 1977, Section 1 
7 W. Cornish & D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patent, Copyright, Trademark and Allied Rights, (London 
Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed, 2007) 179, Paul Torremans, Holyoak & Torremans Intellectual Property Law, (7th 
Edition Oxford University Press 2013) 45. 
8 Ibid 
9 Correa, ‘Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights’ (n 1) 263. See also TRIPS Agreement, Article 28(a) 
10 TRIPS Agreement Article 27, Patent Act, 1977 Section 1(1) a-d UK, 35 USC 101 US Patent Act 
11 UK Patent Act 1977, S. 1(2) (a-d), European Patent Convention, Article 52.2, Canadian Patent Act, 1985 S.8 
12 UK Patent Act 1977, S.30(1) (2), 31(2), 35 U.S.Code S. 261 US stating that ‘patent shall have the attribute of a 
personal property’ 
13 ECJ C-15/74 Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper V Sterling Drug Inc (1974) ECR- 1147, 9 
14 Joshua S. Gans, Philips L. Williams and David Briggs, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: A Grant of Monopoly or 
an Aid to Competition?’ (2004) 37 Australian Economic Review, 436, 436 
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bargain. The patent property right is usually granted for 20 years and in exchange for the 
exclusionary right, the inventor is required to disclose the details of the invention to the 
state.15The disclosed information are protected from unauthorised access until the expiration 
of the period of protection. Afterwards, the knowledge returns to public domain and open for 
third-party use.  
Notably, patent is granted in the expectation that the exclusive ownership and use of an 
invention would encourage technology transfer, the dissemination of knowledge and the 
commercialisation of new inventions16 No doubt, the benefits of patent protection enable an 
inventor to derive social and economic benefits from the exclusive commercialization of an 
invention during the period of patent protection.17 Beyond earning rents for producing and 
selling the products embodying the patent, the patent owners also obtain value through 
licensing and crossing-licensing of the invention to other competitors.18  
Notably, directly linked to the ability of a firm to appropriate their invention to maximize  
patent benefit, is the market structure where the patent owner operates.19 A patent holder 
envisages a market structure that promises higher returns on investment to incentivize further 
R&D investment.20 This use of patent as an appropriation and market advantage mechanism is  
built on several theories that justify the usefulness. 
2.1.2 PATENT THEORIES 
Several theories of patent exist. Mazzoleni and Nelson identified four theoretical rationale for 
patent protection.21 The disclosure theory, the prospect development or exploration control 
theory, the development and commercialisation theory as well as the invention-motivation 
theory.22 These theories, exclusively or inclusively, account for different reasons inventions 
are patented. The disclosure theory explains that patent encourages firms to disclose the 
 
15 UK Patent Act 1977, S.25, 35 US. Code S. 154, Article 33 TRIPS Agreement. See also Kristine Paterson, On 
the Monopoly: Speculation, pharmaceutical markets, and intellectual property law in Nigeria (2014) 41 Journal 
of American Ethnologist,128,130 
16 Bronwyn Hall, ‘Patent and Policy of Patent’ (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 568,569 
17 John Kay, ‘Foundation of Corporate Success: How Business Strategies add Value’ (2003) Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 1 
18 Kevin Rivette, Henry Nothhaft and David Kline, ‘Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property’ (2000) 78 
Harvard Business Review, 54,55-6 
19 Kay (n 17)  
20 Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin and Heidi Williams, ‘Patents and Research Investment: Assessing the Empirical 
Evidence’ (2016) American Economics Review, 183-187 
21 Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard Nelson, ‘Economic Theories about the Benefits and Cost of Patent’ (1998) 




invention to the state for eventual public use. In the absence of such disclosure, the inventor 
may choose the option of trade secret. Disclosure of patent helps downstream or follow-on 
inventors to improve the original invention.23  
The invention motivation theory represents the most popular economic justification for patent. 
The grant of exclusive right motivates increased investment on new inventions. It gives the 
patent holder the right to solely commercialise an invention. This right presents a market 
advantage that provides an optimal mechanism for the recovery of R&D expenditures.24 The 
absence of this market advantage, may discourage the patent owner from further R&D 
investment.25   
The prospect exploration theory explains that, patent creates the possibilities for follow-on 
inventions on the original patent. In the words of Mazzoleni et al, ‘wasteful mining of the 
prospect’ would occur26where patent does not allow for future exploration of earlier patents. 
They argued that, in the absence of a controlling patent, many inventors are likely to see the 
same thing. To avoid ‘wasteful mining’ this theory also supports broad patent scope for the 
initial invention.27  
The reasons for the protection of inventions and the market benefits of patent to the inventors 
and public have been seen. It remains to see the possible implications of the patent mechanism.  
2.3  THE IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT EXCLUSIVE RIGHT 
The highlighted patent theories demonstrate the benefit of using the patent system for 
competitive  advantages to minimize the imitation of technology, enhance the reputation of a 
brand and to obtain financing.28Beyond rewarding and incentivizing R&D investments, patents 
are used to block other competitors in the same or adjoining application field from using a 
firm’s technological invention.29  
 
23 Scherer Frederic and Ross David, ‘Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance’ (1990) University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in 
Entrepreneurship. 439-458.  
24 Mazzoleni and Nelson (n 21)  
25 Ibid, see also David Encaoua, Dominique Guellec, and Catalina Martinez, ‘Patent Systems for Encouraging 
Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis’, (2006) 35 Research Policy,1423, 1429 
26 Mazzoleni and Nelson (n 20) see pp. 44-46 of the thesis on patent scope 
27 Ibid, 1042 
28 Stuart J.H Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman, ‘High Technology Entrepreneurs 
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey’ (2008), 24 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
1255,1255 
29 Knut Blind, Jakob Edler, Rainer Frietsch and Ulrich Schmoch, ‘Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from 
Germany’ (2006) 33 Research Policy, 655, 657 
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These benefits are enabled by market exclusivity advantage which confers temporary 
monopoly on the inventor to exclusively exploit a patented invention, until the expiration of 
the patent. Case laws30 and literature in law and economics,31recognize that patent exclusive 
market right connotes an economic monopoly. The patent owner can use the advantage of 
exclusive right to monopolize the market, shield itself from competition and charge supra-
competitive or higher price for the patent protected products.32 Significantly, the benefits of 
market exclusivity and supra-competitive pricing are only becomes when the patent owner 
commercializes the invention during the period of protection.33  
Regardless of the legitimacy of patent motives and incentives, there are concerns that patent 
monopoly situation may restrict access to patented information and technology.34 Excluding 
third parties from practicing inventions that are subject to patent protection can distort the 
market35and adversely affect the efficient use of new knowledge.36 Unfortunately, market 
distortion can result to underproduction and high prices of commodities. 37 Overall, the 
challenges arising from patent protection can be summed into monopoly, rent seeking and the 
inhibition-of-future-innovation. 38 These challenges also imply that access to the product 
embodying the invention, may be inaccessible and limited. 
On the other hand, the highlighted implications of the patent have been seen as fair 
compensation to inventors who are meant to benefit from the exclusive right to commercialize 
their inventions.39 This argument is regardless of the implication of patent on access to the IP 
products. Despite the benefits of patent protection, the implication patent on access can present 
a cost to the society. In the attempt to relegate the cost of patent to the background, it was 
 
30 Apotex Inc V Wellcome Foundation Ltd (2002) SCC 77, (2002) 4 S.C.R 153, para. 37, International Salt Co. 
V.  United States, 332 US 392, 395 (1947) where in antitrust case the court said (“The… patents confer limited 
monopoly…”); Morton Salt Co. V. G.S Suppinger Co. 314 US 488, 491 (1942),  
31 Andre Eckert and Corinne Langinier, A survey of the Economics of Patent System and Procedure, (2014) 28 
Journal of Economics Survey,996,997,  
32 Michael Schuster, ‘Artificial Intelligence and patent Protection Ownership’ (2018) 75 Washington and Lee Law 
Review,1945,1982 
33 Andrew Chin, ‘Teaching Patents as Real Options’ (2017) 95 North Carolina Law Review, 1433, 1446 
34 Elisabeth Judge and Daniel Gervais, The Limits of Patent in Daniel Gervais (ed), International Intellectual 
Property: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2015) 246. 
35  Kenneth W. Dam, ‘The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law’ (Working Paper No. 19, 1993)1 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1508&context=law_and_economics Accessed 
03/09/2020 
36 Corinne Langiner and GianCarlo Moschini, The Economics of Patents: An Overview, (CARD Working Papers 
335, 2002) 3 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/38919865.pdf accessed 03/09/2020 
37 Ibid 
38 Dam (n 35) 3  
39 Meiners Roger & Staaf Robert, ‘Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?’ (1990) 13 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 91, 95 
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argued that the cost is justifiable especially where of the benefits of increased innovation 
outweigh the cost of patent. 40 In other words, in view of the benefits of technology 
advancement, the social cost of patent should be tolerated.  
Arising from this discourse is a concern that patent exclusive right generates an access problem 
to the public. This concern stems from the idea that patent creates a monopoly situation. This 
monopoly reward historically draws from the early days when licenses, monopolies and 
privileges were issued to inventors to reward their innovative and commercial activities.   
2.4  BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT  
Mainly from Italy and United Kingdom (UK), the current patent system and the economics of 
reward underpinning the patent developed through bureaucracies.  Drawing from the historical 
development of patent in the United Kingdom, the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 (SoM) 
represents the foundation of the British patent legal framework. 41 However, prior to the 
enactment of SoM, the English monarchs granted monopolies, privileges and letters of 
protection to person, through the monarch’s prerogative powers.42 These privileges included 
the sole right to make, sell and import a product into England.43 These licenses and monopolies 
were awarded by the monarch to reward monarch’s favourites and to generate revenue for the 
empire.44The privileges were extensively used to promote and regulate trade and to inspire the 
import new technologies into England.45 During the 15th and 16th centuries, numerous royal 
privileges and import franchises or licences were issued to manufacturers and traders, to attract 
superior technology to England.46 This saw the grant of the earliest patent by King Henry VI 
in 1449 to John of Utynam, to make stained glass for 20 years.47  
The UK monopolies were primarily the prerogative of the monarch who issued them for the 
benefit of the realm. Incidentally, the exercise of the right to issue monopolies was abused.48 
 
40 Judge and Gervais (n 34) 248 
41 Kyle Chris, ‘But a New Button to an Old Coat: The Enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 James 1 Cap.3’ 
(1998) 19 Journal of Legal History, 203 
42  Craig Allen Nard and Andrew Morris, ‘Constitutionalizing Patents: from Venice to Philadelphia’ (2006) 
Review of Law and Economics, 223, 259 
43 Ibid, 269 
44 Ibid, 262-63 
45 Ibid, 259 
46 Macloed Christine, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 1660-1800, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) 11 
47  United Kingdom (Uk) Intellectual Property Office, History of Patent, (2012) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120207081548/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-about/p-
whatis/p-history/p-history-tudor.htm accessed on 4/4/18 
48 Nard and Morris (n 59) 264 
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There were concerns that the Monarch used patents in exchange for direct payments and to 
reward the courtiers. 49  The monarch’s abuse of monopolies provoked sentiments against 
monopolies and this prompted complaints to the parliament. There was also a concern that 
patent restricted trade.50 
To curb this abuse, the parliament enacted the SoM in 1623, which voided most of the previous 
monopolies and licenses that were granted by the monarch. However, the SoM continued to 
recognise the right to grant letters of patent for new inventions for 14 years. The patentee is 
also required to sufficiently describe the invention and the manner it can be performed51  
Overall, the historical development of patent mechanism demonstrates the early intent of patent 
as a monopoly and that patent is territorial in nature. As seen, the idea of patent monopoly did 
inspire trade and economic development. The practice of acquiring profits through patents, 
patronages, licenses, and monopolies derived from the long history and practices of granting 
monopolies to inventors and importers. The grant must have enabled the owners to dominate 
the market and due to the benefits of increased innovation, the society allowed it.  
Patent mechanism monopolies still finds expression in international, regional and national legal 
frameworks. 
2.5  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PATENT  
Generally, patent rights are limited to the jurisdictions they are granted. The territorial nature 
of the patent system is one of the foundational principles of patent. This principle allows states 
to tailor national IP laws to suit their level of technological and economic development.52 As 
highlighted in the brief history of patent, the privileges were limited to specific territories and 
under the control of the sovereign and they were issued to achieve specific society goals within 
the issuing territory.53 Consequently, patents that are granted in one country has no effect 
beyond the territorial boundary of that country and cannot be infringed upon in other 
jurisdictions.54The territoriality of patent is mostly explicit in national patent laws55which 
 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid, 268 
51  Wilson Gunn, History of Patent since 1864, https://www.wilsongunn.com/history/history_patents.html 
Accessed on 04/04/18 
52  Emmanuel Kolawole Oke,‘Territoriality in Intellectual Property Law: Examining the Tension between 
Securing Societal Goals and Treating Intellectual Property as an Investment Asset’ (2018) 15:2 SCRIPTed, 315 
53 Ibid, 316. See also W. Cornish & D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patent, Copyright, Trademark and Allied 
Rights, (London Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2013) 28 
54 Teruo Doi, ‘The Territoriality Principle of Patent Protection and Conflict of laws: A Review of the Japanese 
Court Decisions’ (2002) 26 Fordham International Law Journal, 378-9 
55 See UK Patent Act 1977 S.60(1), Australia Patent Act 1990, S.13(3) 
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implies that patent protection is a domestic discretion.56 Accordingly, countries can differ on 
what to protect and the grounds of protection.57As the grant of patent requires a state act to 
operate, it is assumed to be limited by the territorial reach of the sovereign that granted them.58 
Overall, the rights, privileges and the obligation of the patent begin and end with the issuing 
country.59  
Incidentally, globalization would necessitate that beyond the national level, patent protection 
is recognised at the international and regional levels. Increased cross-border trade necessitated 
an increase in multilateral and bilateral trade associations and agreements that often incorporate 
IPRs to secure protection for the rights of nationals abroad.60 With respect to patent, cross-
border trade resulted to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883. 
The Convention represent one of the foundations for international IP law.61 Subsequently in 
1994, the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement emerged and also incorporated IPRs into the trading 
system.62 
The moot question remains how international IP system has responded to the principle of 
territoriality. Whether the protection of IPR beyond the national level interfered with the scope 
of patent territoriality to enhance patent privilege and rights.  
 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 1883 
The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (known as the Paris 
Convention) was signed in Paris in 1883. The Paris Convention is administered by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). With about 177 Contracting Parties, the Paris 
Convention covers patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility models, service marks, trade 
names and geographical indications. 
Article 1(4) of the Convention recognises patent, and this includes patents of importation and 
improvement as well as patents and certificates of addition. Mainly, Arts 2 and 3 of the 
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Convention requires the Contracting parties to provide the same patent protection they grant to 
their nationals to the nationals of other Contracting States. The same protection is also 
conferred to other non-contracting states if they are domiciled in a Contracting State. In Art. 
4bis of the PC, patents that are granted by Contracting States are independent of other patents 
obtained for the same invention in other countries. Despite this provision, Contracting States 
still recognise importation patents to create incentives for foreign companies to exploit their 
inventions in another countries.63 Even though the patents of importation are granted on the 
basis of the foreign patent without conducting novelty and inventive check, such patents are 
independent of the foreign equivalent.64 
 THE TRADE RELATED ASPECT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AGREEMENT (TRIPS) 1995  
The TRIPS Agreement constitutes Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement that established the 
WTO. TRIPS Agreement incorporates a uniform IPR protection in the WTO trading system by 
setting up a global IP standard for the member states of the WTO. Patent protection under the 
TRIPS Agreement is conferred on all technological inventions that satisfy the requirements of 
industrial applicability, usefulness, and non-obviousness.65  
As noted earlier, the TRIPS confers on the patent owner the property and exclusive right to an 
invention. Consequently, third parties are prevented from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing the product without the authorisation of the patent owner.66 The TRIPS 
Agreement’s core objective is to minimise IP impediments to international trade by 
encouraging a uniform IPR protection. The standardized provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
are minimum standards the member states of the WTO have the obligation to enforce. 
However, the TRIPS recognizes diversity in domestic law. 67Just like the Paris Convention, the 
TRIPS in Art. 3 imposes a national treatment obligation on the member states of the WTO.  
 PRESERVING THE SCOPE OF TERRITORIALITY AND THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The question is whether the highlighted international legal framework encroach or disrupt the 
territoriality of the patent system? Notably, the highlighted legal framework is based on 
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national treatment to ensure non-discrimination of the patents that are granted in different 
Contracting States. The national treatment requirement does not oblige another Contracting 
State to grant the same patent.68 As argued, supranational legislation that pursues uniform IPP 
usually creates an obligation for Contracting States to make changes in their national IP law to 
accommodate such requirement.69 This therefore raises the concern that the national treatment 
requirement can undermine the territorial nature of patent. Does the national treatment 
requirement take away the freedom of the countries to design their national IP legislation? 
Under the national treatment requirement, the Contracting states of the PC and the TRIPS are 
required to treat eligible foreign nationals at least as favourably as they treat their own nationals 
within the scope of the PC and the TRIPS.70States still enjoy the scope to fashion their IP laws 
to further their own economic, social and cultural policies.71PC as argued, still preserves the 
principle of territoriality as the Contracting States are largely permitted to design their national 
IP legislations in a manner that suits their needs and interests as long as the principles of 
National Treatment are respected.72 Notably, specific provisions of the Convention preserves 
the principles of territoriality.73 
Unlike the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement has been argued to significantly encroach 
the territoriality principle. 74 This argument stems from the minimum standard of IPP the 
member states of the WTO are meant to recognise and implement at the national level.75 The 
standard requires the member states to adjust their national IP legislations to comply with the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
There have been concerns amongst scholars that incorporating IP in international agreements 
threatens the territoriality of the IP system.76As argued, this can potentially challenge the ability 
of nations to exercise full control over the decision to either grant or refuse patent rights or to 
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recognise either process or product patent. 77  The minimum standard can eliminate the 
flexibility of designing a national IP regime to achieve specific societal goals.78  
Significantly, despite the concern that the TRIPS Agreement may have encroached the 
principle of territoriality, some provisions of the TRIPS Agreement made references to the 
territoriality of the patent system.79 Additionally, the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement 
still allow countries to calibrate their national IP legislations to their level of technological and 
economic development 80 
Overall, it is noted that an encroached territoriality (no matter the extent) has a direct 
relationship with the extent national patent legislations can be used to satisfy national needs 
despite the international obligations. Consequently, territoriality remains integral to the 
international IP system despite the attempts towards a globalized IP system. An encroached 
national autonomy largely contributes to the extent patent protection can challenge access to 
IP goods.   
So far, the feature of patent as conferring exclusive and property right over an invention has 
been seen. Same applies to national IP legislations as they are compliant with the highlighted 
international IP legal framework. As seen, the patent exclusive right confers monopoly to a 
patent holder and at the same time, international IP system may have encroached the 
territoriality principle of the IP system. It therefore remains to understand the law and 
economics of patent monopoly, to determine the breadth and how it is exploited or maximized 
to derive more market advantage.   
2.6 EXAMINING THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PATENT EXCLUSIVITY AND 
MONOPOLY 
In describing the patent mechanism, IP legislations, case laws and academic literatures have 
made references to exclusive use and monopoly. The monopoly expressions highlight the 
economics underpinning the patent system. The justification for the monopolies is premised on 
the assumption that R&D requires substantial investment. This is added to the ease of reverse 
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engineering or imitation of some inventions.81 This is especially the case with pharmaceutical 
innovations. Consequently, monopoly and exclusive right to practice an invention are needed 
to enable the patent holder to recoup the cost of R&D and to continue R&D investment.82  
Case laws employed the language of complete monopoly to give effect to patent suits. In the 
US case of Continental Paper Bag Co. V Eastern Paper Bag Co83 the court held: 
The patent law is the execution of a policy having its first expression in the 
constitution… to provide for an exclusive right to inventors to make, use and 
vend their inventions.  … language of complete monopoly has been employed 
In Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. V Automotive Maintenance Machinery84 the court 
recognised patent as conferring monopoly. It recognised that patent creates a valid exception 
to the general rule against monopolies and the right to access free and open market. Conversely, 
the court in the case of Carl Schenck, A.G V Nortron Corp85 held that patent neither creates nor 
confers market monopoly.  
The two opposing positions therefore raise the question of whether patent creates market 
monopolies or merely a property right like other form(s) of property rights? The brief history 
of Patent demonstrated a link between patent and monopoly. Describing patent as a monopoly 
may align with the grant of patent as monopolies and privileges in the early days. The Guilds 
in Europe formed a cartel and granted letters of patents. Over time, the cartel controlled the 
market by setting prices of products and controlled new market entrants.86The guild granted 
monopolies, privileges and import license to the members in the guise of promoting  
technological innovations. 87  Similarly, the privileges that were granted in the UK were 
rewarding and protecting innovators to enable them dominate trade and commerce.88 The 
advantages of  privileges, proprietary and exclusive rights, gave patent the appearance of 
monopoly (albeit for a limited time).  
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However, whether patent confers monopoly is queried on the ground that patent only confers 
exclusive and property right to an inventor, which may not have the semblance of monopoly 
in the strict sense of it. In the light of this, whether patent confers economic monopoly would 
justify analysis of patent monopoly situation from the lens of economics. This is to determine 
whether the microeconomics meaning of monopoly applies to the patent monopoly scenario.   
 THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLY 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) described monopoly 
as a market structure with a single seller of a product(s) with no close substitute(s). These 
features as noted by OECD, give a seller significant power over the price it charges.89 Hylton, 
describes monopoly as the “absence of competition from other firms” which makes a 
monopolist a single supplier of goods.90  
Drawing from OECD and Hylton, patent monopoly would mean a scenario where: the product 
embodying an invention has no close substitute(s), the inventor is the sole supplier, the inventor 
can sell at higher prices, and the inventor has the incentive to offer the invention to only the 
buyers who are willing to pay the set price. With these elements in place, patent owner being a 
monopolist, can dominate the market and could segment the market according to willingness 
to pay. The monopolist is incentivised to set the product price above marginal cost 91 to 
maximise profit.92This may result in consumers buying few quantities than would have been 
possible in a competitive market.93  
A monopoly market structure presents consumers with limited choice and higher prices. This 
situation encourages income transfer from the consumers to the monopoly firm and this results 
to a deadweight94and welfare loss to the society.95These losses arise from the barriers96 to 
market access and the absence of competition. The barriers also shield and safeguard a 
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monopolist against potential competition.97  According to the OECD, some of the market 
barriers can be patent protection and monopoly franchises.98 In explaining the situations that 
lead to market monopolies, Koutsoyiannis listed products and process patents, ownership of 
strategic raw materials, exclusive knowledge of production techniques, and the size of the 
market.99   
Some of the deadweight losses arising from monopoly range from higher prices of products, 
reduced output and quality, reduction of development and application of new technology.100A 
monopolist can create economic problems by restricting production101and this can lead to 
economic inefficiency and lower standard of living.102In most monopoly scenario, the quantity 
of products sold may be less because of higher prices. Consequently, the consumers buy fewer 
or no unit of goods because of limited income and savings.103 Ideally, this is a simple law of 
demand and supply which states that, “the higher the price, the lower the quantity of goods 
demanded”. 
Explaining further, Fynn et al104 noted that pricing above marginal cost105creates a scenario of 
wealth transfer from the consumers to the monopolist. This is because, the products are 
purchased at a higher price the consumers would not have paid in a competitive market. 
Conversely, they also noted that, pricing above marginal cost accounts for the monopolist’s 
reward for innovation. 106 However, such pricing strategy enables situations where the 
transactions that would have taken place are forgone because of higher prices. Consequently, 
a monopolist pricing strategy may create no surplus or benefits to the monopolist and the 
consumers. The surplus benefits for the consumers and the profit to the monopolist 
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disappear107because of inability to pay. The resulting deadweight losses create an ‘access’ 
problem to the public108due to limited or no competition.109  
Overall, it is seen that monopoly challenge is not limited to high price. It also finds expression 
in welfare cost or loss.110The forgoing economics of monopoly represent the microeconomics 
of monopoly. The relevant question is whether the downward sloping monopoly graph apply 
to patent exclusive market or monopoly scenario. Put differently, does the patent exclusive 
right that excludes third parties from exploiting an invention to delay follow-on innovation, 
connote a market power or a competitive advantage? Does it create market entry barriers to 
generic manufacturers or other substitute goods? Does it create deadweight and welfare losses? 
As in the economics of monopoly, does it result to an increase in price?  
 EXAMINING THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT MONOPOLY  
In describing monopoly powers, the US courts in the case of United States V E.I. du Pont de 
Nermours & Co. held that a party has monopoly power contrary to Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act 1890 if it has ‘any part of the trade or commerce among the several states ‘a power of 
controlling prices or unreasonably restricting competition.111In Steel Corp. V Fortner Enters, 
Inc,112 the court held that a patentee is a monopolist, where he possesses the power within a 
relevant market to increase the price of patented product(s). In Tool Works Inc. Independent. 
Ink. Inc113 the court recognised that patent and other relevant factors can confer the power to 
raise prices of a patented product. The court however noted that patent alone is insufficient to 
confer market monopoly or a presumption of market power.  
In analysing the economics of patent, Fyne et al argued that patent only creates monopolies 
where there is no effective substitute for the patented product. The absence of effective 
substitute gives the patent holder the incentive to set higher prices. In other words, where the 
demand for a product is inelastic,114the monopolist can demand higher prices.115This according 
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the Fyne et al, creates large deadweight losses. A substantial segment of the consumers unable 
to pay the high price.116  
In explaining IPR monopoly, economists explained that giving inventors the right to exclude 
others from their work may restrict the market entry of new firms into the relevant 
market.117Such restriction can create an artificial scarcity of IP goods which can produce an 
increase in price.118Consequently, this generates a trade-off between incentive to innovate and 
access to invention.119Similarly, innovation is cumulative, incremental, and in most cases, 
dependent on the input of previous IP goods.120 Accordingly, increased IP protection may limit 
access to such input and this can hinder follow-on innovation.121  
Contrary to the general understanding that patent exclusive right creates a monopoly, Simpson 
argued that even though patent can generate market entry barrier, it does not create monopolies. 
He argued that patent exclusive rights are merely mechanisms of protection against 
unauthorised use.122In juxtaposing the effects of patent and monopoly, Simpson further argued 
that patent provides the incentive to develop new inventions or make improvements on old 
ones. Whilst monopoly on the other hand, decreases economic efficiency, quality, and the 
supply of goods. He concluded that since the effects oppose themselves, patent cannot confer 
monopoly on a patent owner but rather, the absence of patent creates monopoly.123  
Edmund Kitch also argued that the exclusive right to use an invention largely differs from 
‘economic monopoly’ that merely implies an exclusive right to sell in a market.124He concluded 
that monopoly situation is a rare occurrence because patent does not preclude generic producers 
or substitutes. He premised his argument on the fact that social losses that are associated with 
the patent system do not emanate or have the semblance of the deadweight losses in economics. 
Kitch considered that any system of property right should ideally entail some costs. These costs 
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he argued, could arise from defining the scope of the rights, detecting and preventing trespass. 
He considered that these issues also apply to patent as property right. Every property right is 
subject to the analysis of whether the benefits outweighs the cost of maintenance. This analysis 
he argued, should also apply to patent.125It is seen from Kitch’s arguments that social costs 
arising from patent property right are different from the costs arising from monopolies. 
Consequently, the social cost should be regarded as the price the society should pay for having 
someone invest in R&D. Overall, the cost should be anticipated and accommodated.  
It is highlighted that Kitch and Machlup’s arguments hold some validity. It is possible that 
patent alone (depending on the product) may not significantly connote a market power. 
However, Kitch and Machlup may have overlooked the effect of broad patent scope (especially 
for break through innovation) and the use of further patent strategies. Broad patent claims can 
anticipate, cover or block follow-on innovations, even where the follow-on innovation hugely 
differs from the original invention. Where follow-on innovations are held to infringe original 
patent, it can block market entry.126The uniqueness of patent right can also be put into strategic 
uses to maximise the benefits. Further patent strategies can be adopted by patent holders to 
extend the duration of the original patent, sustain market presence, delay market entry of future 
or follow-on innovation during the life of a patent.127  
Robert Merges partly shared the views of Kitch and Machlup. Merges noted that the economics 
explanation of monopoly is too simple to explain the influence of IPR on the market. He 
however observed that patent may have some effect on market or can at best create a 
‘monopolistic competition’ 128 situation and this may not significantly influence price and 
market entry.129He concluded that monopoly pricing theory may be inaccurately applied in IPR 
situation because, most commercial products are often manufactured from several components 
that are subject to IPRs. As he further argued, a product encompasses components of multiple 
overlapping property rights that are held by different right holders. 130  
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It is highlighted that, Merges’s argument comes across as an assumption that there is always 
an understanding amongst multiple right holders before a product is manufactured. Access to 
initial invention is usually authorised through licences, cross-licenses, or assignments. The 
patent owner largely determines the terms and the cost of such licences and ultimately 
determines whether dependant follow-on innovators can access the original patent to work a 
follow-on invention.  
Bostyn et al considered that patent could imply monopoly where it offers a market advantage 
for the patentee to successfully commercialise the invention. This advantage they noted may 
not guarantee that a patented technology would gain immense market power to create 
monopoly. This argument is premised on the fact that patent hardly implies the “single 
supplier” scenario in microeconomics. They further argued that patent does not reward 
commercialisation but invention.131 In this sense, they believed that linking patent to monopoly 
is unjustifiable in IP law especially where the possession of patent does not provide any positive 
right of use to the patentee. 132 Consequently, the ability of a patent owner to set supra 
competitive prices has direct relationship with the attractiveness of the invention and not the 
patent.133It is highlighted that although patent does not mean a commercial success, the use of 
further patent strategies (which is usually the case) can enable the exploitation of patents in 
ways that suggest monopoly advantage.  
In analysing the interaction between market and patent; Feldman argued that it is rare to find a 
product market without a substitute(s). Consequently, whether patent creates a monopoly or 
market dominance will largely depend on the presence or otherwise of substitute products in 
the market.134 He further argued that patent only provides the opportunity to market a product. 
Consequently, patent does not create a monopoly where there are substitutes. 135  It is 
highlighted that even though the presence of substitute products in the market induces market 
competition, Feldman may have assumed this situation to the case for every product market. 
There are some products that may not have substitute(s) or readily available substitutes. This 
might the case for some breakthrough medicines and drugs for the treatment and the 
 
131  Sven Bostyn and Nicolas Petit, Patent Monopoly- A legal fiction (2013) 4IP Council, 1-18, 2 
https://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/files/7014/3325/2653/Patent_Monopoly_-_Legal_Fiction_-
_Bostyn_and_Petit_-_4iPcouncil.pdf Accessed on 03/04/18 
132 Ibid, 4 
133 Ibid, 6 
134 Robin Feldman, ‘Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning’ (2008) 13 Virginia Journal of Law and 
Technology. 1,11. See also William Mark Lemley, ‘The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law’ 
(1997) 75 Texas Law Review, 996 
135 Ibid, 10 
38 
 
management of some diseases like HIV/AIDS. Some diseases largely depend on innovator 
drugs that may have few or no substitute generic drug(s). In that scenario, the originator patent 
owner may have significant influence on the market price.    
This discourse aligns with Kitch on the fact that patent confer monopoly where there are no 
alternative means for other competitors to provide the same economic functionality, without 
infringing the earlier patent claims.136This is also a recognition of the difficulties of a follow-
on invention that mostly relies on existing patented inventions to work.  
So far, it is seen that patent confers a market advantage that can be exploited. Even though 
patent does not guarantee commercial success, it presents a framework that can be exploited to 
achieve commercial success. Depending on the nature of the product, patent alone may not 
confer strong patent advantage. However, beyond patent, patent owners especially 
pharmaceutical IP holding firms, always adopt further patent strategies to maximise patent 
advantage.  
 PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND OTHER PATENT STRATEGIES: 
MAXIMISING EXCLUSIVE RIGHT 
Patent claims relating to pharmaceutical inventions cover the processes of making the drugs 
and the drugs itself. To pre-empt other competitors, pharmaceutical firms apply for patents at 
the early stage of drug development.137As already highlighted, early application for patent 
means that the chemical compositions and the process of making a product are protected 
against unauthorised third-party access or use.138  
Prior to the TRIPS recognition of global pharmaceutical patenting in 1995, patent protection 
on drugs has existed in a handful of countries. The first US Patent Act of 1790 recognised 
pharmaceutical patent. However, to avoid disclosure, the ‘patent medicine’ industry at that time 
hardly relied on patent. Consequently, only about 75 drug patents were granted between 1790 
and 1836.139 The first US drug patent was granted in 1796 to Samuel Lee jr for ‘Bilious Pill’ 
which was a cure for yellow fever, dysentery, and biliousness.140Similarly, the 1923 Canadian 
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Patent Act also recognised and granted patent protection on drug inventions for processes and 
products.141  
In the past, most of the countries in continental Europe did not recognise product patent. The 
rationale for allowing only process patent was based on the reason that it provides a reward to 
the inventor without restricting further innovation. Notably, product patent was excluded. It 
was thought that by patenting a specific product, it can significantly exclude other competitors 
from producing the same product, even when different processes are used.142  
The 1791 French Patent law treated drugs like other industrial innovation hence, 
pharmaceutical patent was recognised. However, the 1844 Patent law did not recognise 
pharmaceutical inventions.143Physicians and pharmacists advocated for the exclusion of drugs 
from patent. Their argument was premised on the fact that physicians and pharmacists were 
not meant to seek profit. It was thought that patent as a legal monopoly could result in higher 
prices for drugs, thereby restricting access to therapies.144In accepting the argument, France 
excluded drugs from the 1844 patent law. 145However, by 1978 pharmaceutical patenting 
became recognised in France.146 
The 1877 German Patent law recognised patents for chemicals and pharmaceutical processes. 
The law however extended patent protection to products obtained via a patented process. 
Finally, the 1967 Patent law introduced product patent.147Switzerland expressly prohibited 
chemical and pharmaceutical products until the 1907 Swiss law that allowed only a process 
patent. The 1954 Swiss Patent law continued to apply patent to processes until in 1977 when 
product patent was introduced.148At the international level, Article 4 of the Paris Convention 
1883, Article 52 EPC and Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement recognise the grant of patent for 
products and processes.149  
As seen, countries retained the autonomy to choose the IP regime that was considered 
appropriate for them. Countries reserved the right to either recognise process or product patent. 
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The rationale for delaying product patent or a having a flexible IP regime in the highlighted 
countries can be linked to countries’ level of economic development and local technological 
capacity. As innovative capacity continues to develop, countries started recognising stricter IP 
protection. 
The processes of pharmaceutical production have been described as quite uncertain, lengthy, 
and expensive. Dimasi et al surveyed the cost of developing new drugs across 10 large 
pharmaceutical companies. The survey estimated that about $802 million is invested to produce 
new drugs.150Christopher et al’ survey estimated that the average expenditure on the production 
of new drugs is between $354m and $558m.151Notably, the disparities in the estimates do not 
discredit the fact that drug innovation involves rigorous, expensive and risky processes.  
Empirical surveys recognise patent protection as one of the key elements of drug innovation. 
Richard Levin, et al152and Wesley Cohen, et al153empirically surveyed the U.S R&D managers 
on the factors firms take into account when appropriating innovation. The surveys found that, 
companies engage in innovative activities for the following reasons: competitive advantage of 
being the first in the market, superior sales and services efforts, secrecy and complexity of 
production, product technology, and patent advantage. Both studies found that, pharmaceutical 
industry relied more on patents whilst other industries such as computers and semi-conductors 
relied more on lead-time to appropriate returns. 
Taylor and Silberston survey of UK R&D managers estimated that pharmaceutical R&D 
expenditures would be reduced by 64% without patent protection.154 The explanation for the 
findings is derived from the rigorous pharmaceutical R&D process which has been estimated 
to be in the range of $354155- $802m.156Consequently, in the absence of patent protection to 
block competitors, prevent copying or imitations and to increase licensing revenue; imitators 
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would have a free reign at no cost157which might discourage pharmaceutical innovation.158 
Usually, the high risk of chemical compositions failing in the innovation process means that, 
the costs of R&D in most cases will be majorly funded by the successful on-market products.159 
This has made drug patent even more compelling.  
Glover has argued that the uncertainties in drug development are quite substantial. 
Consequently, it has become imperative for patent holders to maximise the certainty that allows 
the opportunity to enforce, defend and make full legitimate use of IPR to sustain innovation 
cycle.160The argument is understandably premised on the fact that, throughout the innovation 
cycle, a predictable IP protection is important. Glover advanced the following justifications for 
predictable IPRs:161First, strong IPR would encourage drug firms to invest in the early stage of 
the innovation process.  Secondly, IPP offers financial gains from commercial advantage of 
the innovation and this incentivises further R&D investment for the development of new drugs. 
Thirdly, because many drugs have the potentials of further innovation, IPP would encourage 
further development of related innovations. 162 Finally, IPP is quite integral in creating a 
pharmaceutical market where generic drugs can thrive and compete when patent duration 
expires.163 With respect to Glover’s last justification, it is highlighted that the realities of the 
further patent strategies make it unlikely for a generic manufacturer to benefit from patent 
advantage in real time.   
2.6.3.1 MAXIMISING PATENT EXCLUSIVE RIGHT: FURTHER PATENT 
STRATEGIES 
 
As demonstrated in the preceding discussions, patent exclusive right confers some market 
advantages to the patent holder. Drawing from pharmaceutical innovation, usually, primary or 
original patents cover the active compound of a drug and in most cases, it provides the strongest 
protection against generic competition.164Once the primary patent expires, generic competition 
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can commence. However, this is hardly the case as pharmaceutical firms increasingly seek 
additional patent protection on various aspects of the original patent.165 Additional patent are 
the secondary patents.166  
The practice of seeking additional patents on existing patents are strategic practices. These 
strategies concern the use of patent mechanism to the benefits of a company and in relation to 
generic competition. These strategies also cover the timing, the scope of filing and the manners 
in which patents are applied.167 
The value of patent continues to improve168 through further patent strategies. To achieve 
competitive advantage through IP strategies, patent owners, can offensively and defensively 
use patents to sustain market relevance. The offensive patent strategy implies the use of patent 
to block or prevent firms in related field from using earlier patents.169 On the other hand, 
defensive patent strategy involves acquiring large portfolio of patents to prevent firms from 
manufacturing new goods.170These strategies are deliberate use of patent to disrupt innovation 
programs of competitors, to increase the chances of licensing and cross licensing amongst 
competitors.171     
Some of the patent practices that accentuate patent values can be patenting around a patent to 
increase the value and extend the duration of the original patent.172 This practice can potentially 
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blanketing,174flooding,175fencing,176surrounding,177clusters,178 amongst others. For instance, 
patent clusters broadly encompass the use broad patent scope and maximising patent terms 
through additional or incremental innovations (evergreening).179  
 
The justification for these strategies or filing secondary patent is based on the argument that 
patent duration in the actual sense lasts for less than 20 years. This is because, most patent 
applications occur in the early days or development of the invention. In some cases, before the 
invention is commercialised, the life of the patent would have reduced.180 This is especially the 
case for pharmaceutical patents where the drugs are further subjected to regulatory approvals 
before they are finally commercialised.181 
 
These patent strategies and more, are especially used in drug-life cycle management in 
pharmaceutical industry. Evergreening for instance, is used to extend a drug’s life cycle. 
Pharmaceutical firms develop variations of originator products and file further patents on 
them. 182 Some of these practices include filing new methods of drug administration, 
dosages183and new manufacturing processes.184  
 
 
174  Ove Granstrand, Strategic Management of Intellectual Property (CIM Working Paper, 1991:01) 4 
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178 Clusters involve filing multiple patent applications on process and reformulation of a drug. This is done with 
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Feldman’s empirical research on instances where pharmaceutical companies filed new patent 
revealed that, pharmaceutical firms largely recycle and repurpose old medicines. The survey 
found that about 78% of drugs that were associated with new patents, were existing drugs. As 
found, this practice is more prevalent in blockbuster drugs. 185 European Commission on 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry also found that pharmaceutical companies obtain the most 
efficient, broadest and largest possible patent protection for the products and variation.186 The 
enquiry found that the originator companies prolong exclusivity period beyond the expiration  
of the base patent.187 The inquiry noted a ratio of 1:7 of primary and secondary patents. The 
claims of the secondary patents were mostly formulations, processes and non-formulations like 
salts, hydrates, polymorphic particles and solvates.188 Consequently, attempts to develop a 
generic version of the medicines in form of a salt or crystalline form would result to a patent 
infringement on salt, or crystalline form of medicines.189 
 
In explaining how patent maximises monopoly, Birgitte noted that the size of patent, strategic 
interaction with other patent holders, the breadth, and the scope of patent190are strategic uses 
of patent in Intellectual Property Management (IPM). Some products or processes may 
comprise of separate patented components and usually, a single firm does not have proprietary 
right over the complementary components of the drugs that are been developed. Other firms 
may possess the proprietary right over some of the relevant elements of the innovation process. 
This creates a condition of mutual dependence that fosters extensive licensing and cross-
licensing.191  
As part of patent clustering, the scope and the breadth of a patent at the point of filing the 
primary patent can be exploited to delay generic competition. The scope of a patent application 
is seen from the patent claim(s). The legal right to exclude third parties from unauthorised use 
of a patent is derived from the claims.192 Patent scope presents the boundaries or limits of an  
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invention as represented in the claim.193 Ideally, a patent application will consist of adequate 
description of the invention, the manner and process of making the invention to persons skilled 
in the art.194 
A narrow patent scope is the precise invention and the method of making the invention as 
described in the specification. This is ex-ante because it represents the precise invention at the 
time the claim was filed.195 On the other hand, a broad patent scope covers and predicts 
incremental innovations on the original invention. In this case, the scope is less predictable.196 
Filing a broad patent at the early stage of the invention, presents an inventor with the 
opportunity to pre-empt and prevent another firm from copying the invention. Consequently, 
adopting a broad patent scope to block copying and follow-on innovation becomes logical.197   
[[ 
 THE IMPLICATIONS OF FURTHER PATENT STRATEGIES  
 
The highlighted strategies are deployed to sustain market presence and rents from brand 
pharmaceutical products. Generic manufacturers are delayed from market entry until the 
expiration of the secondary patents.198The concern is that the changes to the primary patent 
may not significant influence on the safety and the efficacy of the brand product.199 Gurgula 
noted that practices of filing secondary patents  are usually employed for blockbuster drugs to 
extend the exclusivity period. In some cases, the secondary patents might have little or no 
therapeutic value, compared to the primary patent. As the patent web gets dense, it becomes 
more difficult for generic companies to develop generic equivalents without the risk of 
infringing myriads of secondary patents.200   
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Notably, a broad patent claim as a cluster strategy, even though beneficial to the patent holder, 
it can be detrimental to the development of related and future research.201 A broad patent claim 
could mean excessive patent protection that can potentially increase patentee’s monopoly and 
market power. Consequently, secondary innovation can be prevented or delayed until the 
expiration of the patent duration.202This outcome can reduce the optimal public use of the 
innovations. A narrow scope on the other hand, neither delays nor prevents competition 
because it allows secondary inventions or follow-on innovations around the original 
invention.203 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting judgement in the case of Lab. Corp. of America Holdings V. 
Matabolite Labs., Inc.204 noted that:  
Sometimes, too much patent protection can impede rather than promote the 
progress of Science and Useful arts’… Patents do not only encourage research 
by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can 
discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example 
by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas… and by 
raising the costs of using patented information, sometimes prohibitively too. 
Usually, the patentee is unable to clearly envisage what future innovation(s) will follow at the 
time a patent is filed (especially for break through inventions).205This is usually regarded as a 
justification broad claim. Kitch has therefore argued that broad interpretation should be given 
to a patent claim, to allow upstream patent holders to have significant control over downstream 
innovation.206  
In Continental Paper Bag Co. V. E. Paper Bag Co207the court had ruled that a broad claim 
protects the patent holder against downstream innovators that produces products embodying 
the original patent. The court also recognised that through patent claims, patentees envisage 
downstream innovation at the time of filing the patent application. This means that a broad 
patent claim can encompass several future downstream products. 208  In analysing patent 
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breadth, Eric Bond and Ben Zissimos recognised that the ‘choice of patent breadth involves a 
trade-off… A broader patent will make innovative activity more profitable and thus make it 
more likely that there is a successful innovation. However, a broader patent protection will 
also result in greater static deadweight loss due to less intense competition…’209  
The UK Supreme court in the case of Actavis (UK) & Ors V Eli Lily & Co.210broadly interpreted 
a patent claim to cover variants that achieve substantially the same result in the same way as 
the original invention. The Respondent in this case discovered and claimed that the damaging 
side effects of pemetrexed in treating cancer can be avoided by administering pemetrexed 
disodium with Vitamin B12. The Appellant’s product does not contain pemetrexed disodium 
but has pametraxed diacid or a pemetrexed potassium. The question was whether ‘pemetrexed 
disodium’ claim extends to premetrexed dipotassium, pemetrexed diacid or pemetrexed 
ditromethamine. The supreme court held that the Appellant’s product is an immaterial variant 
and thus infringes the patent of the Respondent through the doctrine of equivalence. The court 
relied on the fact that it was unlikely that persons skilled in the art as contemplated in the patent 
claim, would exclude any pemetrexed salts other than pemetrexed disodium free acid from the 
scope of the patent.  
The supreme court of Canada in Free World Trust V Electro Sante211 held that claims may 
extend to cover some equivalents beyond a literal interpretation of the claim’s language. The 
courts further recognised that the language of the patent claim as construed, defines the patent 
monopoly. However, the claims should be read in an informed and purposive way to promote 
fairness and predictability instead of having recourse to vague notions that will excessively 
expand the scope of the claim(s).   
Article 1 of the Protocol on the interpretation of Article 69 EPC recognised that a patent scope 
should be interpreted fairly to protect the patentee but with a reasonable degree of certainty for 
third parties. The UK Actavis case clearly demonstrates that a broad claim can potentially 
imply that most follow-on inventions are at risk of infringing the original patents, even though 
they might differ. The extent of the differences between the two inventions now largely 
depends on the discretion and the interpretation of the court. Evidently, broad interpretation of 
claims by the courts beyond the literal words of the claim can jeopardise generic competition 
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and exacerbate the deadweight losses associated with patent monopoly. A broad interpretation 
can make it difficult for follow-on innovators to invent around the original patent without 
infringing the upstream patent. Consequently, a broad patent scope can be deployed to block 
downstream competitors.  
Drawing from the overall discourse on the law and economics of patent monopoly, the impact 
of patent on access to patented invention is seen. Evidently, patent strategies are deliberately 
used to maximise monopoly advantage. Regrettably, they can be quite problematic. These 
strategies, as argued by Gurgula, works against the shared goal of the use of patent to facilitate 
innovation for the benefit of the society.212 It is seen that patent strategies and patent protection 
(depending on the nature of the invention), can produce a significant impact on market 
competition. 
So far, the patent monopoly and how it is maximises market advantage have been seen. It is 
therefore relevant to understand pharmaceutical patent protection and the specific roles it plays 
in drug innovation.  
2.7 ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
Access to medicine recognises the role of medicine in protecting, maintaining, and restoring 
health.213 The WHO highlighted the importance of ensuring that medicines are appropriate for 
the public, with their quality and quantities accessible at a reasonable price.214 
 
Frost and Reich, described access to medicine as:  
 
People’s ability to obtain and use quality health technologies when they are needed. 
Access is not just a technical issue involving the logistics of transporting a technology 
from the manufacturer to the user. Access involves social values, economic interests, 
and political processes. Access requires a product as well as services and depends on 
how health systems perform in practice. We think of access not as a single event but as 
continuous process involving a series of activities and actors over time.215 
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Access to medicine encompasses distinct but interrelated dimensions. The WHO recognises a 
four ‘As’ (4As) dimensions that are particularly relevant to access. Availability, Affordability, 
Accessibility and Acceptability, represent the 4 dimensions to access. 216 Accordingly, 
medicines must be available, affordable, accessible, and acceptable to the needing population.  
 
The availability dimension recognises the relationship between the quantity of the products that 
are demanded and the quantities that are made available or supplied. Affordability represents 
the ability of consumers to pay the price of the available product. Accessibility describes the 
relationship between the location of the product and the eventual user. Acceptability on the 
hand, connotes users’ attitude and expectation from the products, services, and the actual 
characteristics of the product.217  
 
Despite being the WHO recommended first-line treatment for HIV, an affordable DTG has 
been unavailable to children under 20kg. Lack of dispersible tablets that are considered age-
appropriate formulation, has been attributed to this challenge. 218  There are concerns that 
children living with HIV, respond slowly to treatment because of the intake of ARV 
medications that are either incorrectly dosed or bitter to taste. 219 Besides the adaptability 
challenge, the cost for yearly paediatric HIV treatment was over $480 per child. However, in 
December 2020, a new price agreement for paediatric DTG was reached between ViiV 
healthcare (the owner) and Viatris and Macleods (generic producers). The agreement is to 
produce strawberry masked generic formulation for paediatric DTG. Following the agreement, 
the price would drop to under $120 yearly per person.220 Whether this price is now affordable 
is still unknown. 
 
The access dimension framework below, demonstrates how they closely interact with other 
strategic government policies to facilitate safe, efficacious, cost-effective, and quality medical 
products and services that underlie access.221  
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The above framework demonstrates a joint responsibility between national governments and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, towards access to medicine. The government has the obligation 
to adopt measures to facilitate affordable medicine and healthcare financing. The government’s 
responsibilities further extend to adopting strategic policies and legal mechanisms to facilitate 
access. Governments can adopt procurement mechanism(s) and make health insurance plans 
to ensure drug affordability and availability. With respect to accessibility, the government has 
the responsibility to build and maintain both healthcare, transport and other infrastructures that 
facilitate access. 
 
On the other hand, the pharmaceutical manufacturers play vital role in ensuring that therapies 
are affordable, available and acceptable. The discourse on pricing and patent strategies of IP 
holding firm, demonstrates how the highlighted access dimensions are undermined. Notably, 
most pharmaceutical innovations are market driven. This means that R&D investments focuses 
more on the regions that guarantee more profitable return on investment (ROI). Incidentally, 
this maybe a rational business strategy. However, it would mean that drugs are not available to 
treat diseases that predominantly affect people that are unable to pay. The WHO 2017 statistics 
estimated that about 1% R&D funding is allocated to diseases that predominantly affect 
developing countries. Unfortunately, the diseases in that category account for more than 12.5% 
of the global disease burden. The therapies for the diseases in that category are neglected 
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because the market does not stimulate sufficient ROI.222With respect to acceptability, the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are expected to ensure adaptable therapies. The characteristics 
of products are expected adapt to the expectations of the users. A taste-masked medication for 
babies and young children223present good example.  
 
The WHO continues to maintain a list of essential medicines to wellbeing.224 In 1975, Halfdan 
Mahler, the then Director–General of WHO warned the World Health Assembly (WHA) of the 
‘urgent need to ensure that most essential drugs are available at a reasonable price’.225 The 
essential medications are ‘…selected on the basis of current and estimated future public health 
relevance and potential for safe and cost-effective treatment’226 Incidentally, the patent market 
monopoly effect as demonstrated as already highlighted and noted in chapter 3 can present 
significant challenge to the affordability of patented innovative health-care products. 
 
2.8  CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing from the overall discourse, patent protection generally and on pharmaceuticals play a 
significant role in fostering scientific innovation. With respect to pharmaceuticals, the ease of 
imitation and the enormous cost of R&D further justify the need for patent protection. Even 
though patent may not guarantee the commercial success of a product, a strategic patent use 
alongside other business factors can create market relevance and commercial success.  
Depending on the nature of the invention, it was seen that further patent strategies can 
significantly maximize patent market advantage. It follows that, in the absence of further patent 
strategies, patent standing alone may not produce much impact on market competition. By 
adopting patent strategies, the patent holder can significantly enhance the value of patent for 
licenses and cross-licenses. With these strategies, dependant or follow-on innovation can either 
be blocked, or delayed until the expiration of the patent. Downstream innovators can also be 
made to pay exorbitant prices for licenses and this cost is passed onto the consumers. As 
demonstrated, courts and legislations were seen to favour a broad interpretation of patent claim 
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to cover future similar innovations. This increases the tendency that most follow-on innovation 
can potentially infringe the original patent, even when they involve significant differences.  
In maximizing the benefits of patent exclusivity and monopoly, the incidence of supra-
competitive prices occurs, thereby giving rise to deadweight losses. Applying patent 
externalities to pharmaceutical patent, where the production of generic drugs is either blocked 
or delayed, the patent holder is encouraged to maintain high price of patented drugs. This 
supports the view that patent gives the impetus to charge supra-competitive prices. Regrettably, 
high prices occasion welfare losses to the society. With increase in price, a significant part of 
the population is unable to pay for the products embodying the patent. The implication of this, 
is a limit on the number of patients that can access patented medicine because of high price. 
This challenge is further heightened or felt more, where the demand for the product is inelastic 
and the patients privately fund their medical expenses.  
Patent externalities challenge patent bargain that seeks to encourage innovation and the 
dissemination of innovation. Consequently, despite the benefits of patent mechanism on 
innovation and the patent holders, the externalities generate an access challenge which is a cost 
to the society. Feldman and European Commission’s findings demonstrate the vigour at which 
pharmaceutical IP holding firms use patent and the strategies to sustain market presence, high 
drug price and undermine patent bargain. The implications of the externalities arising from 
patent protection and the strategies, limit access to medicine and consequently exacerbate 
public health challenge.  
Besides the access challenge arising from patent mechanism, it is recognised that the WTO 
through the TRIPS Agreement, introduced another dimension to pharmaceutical patenting. The 
next chapter examines the TRIPS Agreement’s pharmaceutical patent protection against the 




TRIPS AGREEMENT PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINE  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Examination of the patent mechanism in Chapter 2 revealed the policy objectives and how they 
undermine consumer access to IP goods, and in the case of pharmaceutical patent protection, 
access to drugs. This is seen from the influence of patent and further patent strategies on the 
price of IP products and generic competition. Still on the access to medicine challenge from 
pharmaceutical patent protection, it is considered that the TRIPS Agreement introduced a 
similar but unique dimension to the access challenge. This chapter explores the TRIPS 
Agreement’s globalised patent system against the backdrop of how it undermines access to 
medicine.  
This chapter is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 explores the TRIPS Agreement’s 
pharmaceutical patent protection regime. Sections 3 considers the globalised IPR regime under 
the TRIPS Agreement and the emerging issues. Thereafter, sections 4 and 5 considered the 
global pharmaceutical markets arising from TRIPS Agreement, country experience and the 
emerging issues. Section 6 concludes.  
3.2 TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995 1  to pursue four primary 
objectives: “set and enforce rules for international trade, provide a forum to negotiate and 
monitor trade liberalisation, improve policy transparency and resolve trade disputes”.2 One of 
the foundational, multilateral treaties of the WTO was the TRIPS Agreement.3  Venturing 
beyond the confines of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, the 
TRIPS Agreement requires signatory States to enact and enforce substantive minimum 
 
1The World Trade Organization was established by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of The Uruguay Round vol. 1 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [Uruguay Final Act]. As of January 1 2020, the WTO has 164 member 
States. 
2  Kym Anderson, The Future Agenda of the WTO, in WTO Secretariat, From GATT To THE WTO: The 
Multilateral Trading System in The New Millennium (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 7, 8. In greater detail, see 
Uruguay Final Act (n 1), preamble 4.  
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), April 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay 
Round, Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)  
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standards for the protection of IP in their domestic legal orders. TRIPS Agreement also 
establishes an international mechanism to monitor and enforce compliance.4  
Historically, the GATT framework did not originally include substantive provisions addressing 
IP law5 beyond the Most Favored Nations (MFN) principle6. However, in the 1986, Uruguay 
Rounds on multilateral trade negotiation started at the behest of developed countries, and the 
US in particular. The 1986 Punta del Este Declaration directed trade negotiators to consider  
“trade-related intellectual property law” issues.7 At the outset, negotiations were meant to 
tackle only cross-border trade in counterfeit goods and the effects on IPR.8 Over time, however, 
developed countries managed to expand the scope of this agenda, despite protestations from 
developing countries and LICs.9 It was presumed that the inadequate protection of IP at the 
national level creates a barrier to trade. There was a concern that the existing IP multilateral 
framework, no longer represent a functioning multilateral rule of law.10 Hence, a global IP 
protection was pushed in the Uruguay rounds to justify the inclusion of IPP in the WTO trading 
system.   
During the negotiation, developed and developing countries held different positions. The 
developed countries led by the US, favored a strong IPP. The push for stronger IPP was 
premised on the concern about weak IPP and enforcement mechanism in developing countries 
that distort trade and encourage piracy.11 On the other hand, developing countries were averse 
to the mandatory inclusion of drugs within patentable subject matter, especially in the form of 
product patents. LICs were of the view that pharmaceutical patent would result in artificial 
supply constraints and unaffordable prices for large segments of their local population and thus, 
impede their access to medicine.12 Developing countries further argued that a higher standard 
 
4 This mechanism functions as a dispute settlement system between States. See Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments— Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
5 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement Drafting History and Analysis (4th Edn Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) 8-9  
6 GATT 1948 Article III(4) 
7 Antony Taubman, Thematic Review: Negotiating ‘Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in 
The Making of the TRIPS Agreement: Personal Insights from the Uruguay Round Negotiations (eds) Jayashere 
Watal and Antony Tauban (WTO, 2015) 16 
8 Gervais (n 5) 
9  The African group which consists of African countries, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri lanka, Thailand and 
Venezuela. Paper IP/C/W/296 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_develop_w296_e.htm 
Accessed on 25/03/19 
10Tauban (n 7) 
11 Jennifer Anna Selin, Access to Medicines: The Interface between Patents and Human Rights. Does one size 
fit all? (Intersentia Publishing, 2014) 148 
12 Holger Hestermeyer, Human Right and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicine’ (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 47-48 
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of IPP will affect technology transfer to their countries and access to the IP product because of 
price. They also argued that including substantive IP standard in WTO would mean giving up 
the freedom to decide on national developmental goals.13 They further argued that the WIPO 
and not the GATT is the appropriate forum to discuss IP issues.14 Ultimately, faced with a “take 
it or leave it” proposition,15 LICs agreed to concede on the IPP, in exchange for unimpeded 
access to markets of developed economies. By the time the Uruguay Rounds ended, IP had 
become one of the elements of the WTO framework. This is shown by the fact that the TRIPS 
Agreement became one of the foundational treaties of the WTO.16 
The TRIPS Agreement requires the signatory states to enact and enforce substantive minimum 
standards for the protection of IP in their domestic legal orders. It also establishes an 
international mechanism to monitor and enforce compliance.17Beyond patent, the following 
IPRs are covered in the TRIPS Agreement: copyright and related rights, trademarks 
geographical indications, industrial designs, the layout-designs of integrated circuits and 
undisclosed information including trade secrets and test data. 
Crucially, the TRIPS minimum standards for patent mandate that signatory states must grant 
patents both process and product inventions, for a term of 20 years, provided they satisfy the 
requirement of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability.18 There are no exceptions, 
enabling signatory states to tailor this protection regime or limiting it to processes or requiring 
rights holders to work their patented drug locally. TRIPS almost completely effaced the 
heterogeneity in pharmaceutical patents regimes that had existed up to 1994 across 
jurisdictions. However, the TRIPS Agreement recognised the position of developing and the 
least Developed Countries (LDC) and provided for different transition periods.19 Developing 
countries are required to amend their national IP legislations in compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement within 10 years after the TRIPS came into effect and this ended in 2005. On the 
 
13 Selin (n 11) 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid  
16 For the history the TRIPS Agreement, see Gervais (n 5), Adrian Otten, The TRIPS Negotiations: An 
Overview in Jayashere Watal and Antony Tauban (eds) in The Making of the TRIPS Agreement: Personal Insights 
from the Uruguay Round Negotiations (WTO, 2015) 16 
17 This mechanism functions as a dispute settlement system between States. See Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments— Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
18 TRIPS Agreement 1995 Articles 27 and 33,  
19 Ibid, Articles 65 and 66  
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other hand, the LDCs are entitled to suspend the recognition of the pharmaceutical patent 
protection till 2033.20 
3.3 TRIPS GLOBALIZED IPR REGIME: EMERGING ISSUES 
There have been some concerns that TRIPS minimum IP standard introduced a contextual 
change in the patent regime. As earlier demonstrated in chapter 2, the TRIPS may have 
encroached the patent territoriality principles. Unlike the TRIPS, the Paris Convention allows 
more freedom to countries to design their domestic IP laws in ways that are suitable to the 
country’s socioeconomic circumstances.  
From the LICs point of view, the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, would necessitate 
an extensive reform of the substantial part of the domestic IP legislations. The TRIPS minimum 
standard would mean that, LICs are unable to benefit from weaker IP standards like the 
industrialized countries counterparts did before introducing strict IP standards.21 It follows that, 
TRIPS Agreement can limit the member states autonomy in areas of economic policy of 
importance especially when it comes to the issue of access to medicine.22It also follows that 
the territoriality principles may have been compromised. 
With respect to access to medicine, there are two major concerns arising from the TRIPS 
Agreement. First, is the introduction of pharmaceutical patent protection and the 20 years 
patent duration. Secondly, is the inclusion of IPRs within the WTO enforcement framework 
3.3.1 THE TRIPS PHARMACUETICAL PATENT PROTECTION 
The TRIPS pharmaceutical patent protection and the 20 years duration have been seen as 
constraining the autonomy of the WTO member states to determine the IP regime that is most 
suitable to their level of socio-economic development. The 20 years minimum patent duration 
is thought to be high.23As already demonstrated, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, some countries 
did not recognise product patent and in some cases, they offered less patent duration. This is 
based on the rationale that such a policy would enable local pharmaceutical industries to engage 
 
20 Ibid, Article 66, Council for the TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period under Art. 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement for LDC member states for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/73, 6 
November 2015. Para.1 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/73.pdf&Open=True Accessed 17/10/20 
21 See chapter 2 on the recognition of pharmaceutical patent protection by some developed countries. pp. 47-48 
22 Selin (n 11) 165 




in generic production.24  The 1970 Indian Patent Act presented a good example. The Act 
permitted only a process patent. Besides granting only a process patent, it allowed only a 7-
year duration for a process patent in contrast to 14 years for other inventions. Following the 
TRIPS Agreement, the Indian Patent Act was amended in 2005 to recognise product patent and 
20 years patent duration.  
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, most countries relied on the generic products from India or 
China. 25 The market for generic drugs as argued, flourished and enabled the cost of 
pharmaceuticals to remain relatively low.26 This also explained the practice of many countries 
that until mid-1990s did not allow product patent on pharmaceuticals. The generic firms were 
selling medicines at considerably lower prices than the originator pharmaceutical companies, 
thereby driving down the competition of the brand drugs in the market.27  
The discussions in chapters 2 and 5 on the economics of patent and compulsory license, 
demonstrate the challenges arising in a case where a patented brand drug has no substitute and 
yet, the product demand remains inelastic. As earlier demonstrated, the demand for drugs are 
generally inelastic because of their uniqueness as consumer goods. 28 However, generic 
competition can make the demand elastic by introducing alternative therapeutic options. The 
globalised patent protection of pharmaceuticals is therefore believed to give drug firms greater 
scope for price discrimination.29The pricing is considered exploitative to developing countries 
who are net importers of IP drugs.30 The global firms largely depend on the availability of 
market exclusivity to maximise returns from the markets.31 
 
24 Sigrid Sterckx, Patents and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical Analysis (2004) 4 Developing 
World Bioethics, 61.  
25 Eric W. Bond and Kamal Saggi, ‘Bargaining over Entry with a Compulsory License Deadline: Price Spill overs 
and Surplus Expansion’ (2017) 9(1) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 31 
26 Naomi Bass, ‘The Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century’ (2002) 34 George Washington International Law Review, 
191, 192 
27 Elena Ghanotakis, ‘How the US Interpretation of Flexibilities Inherent in TRIPS Affects Access to Medicines 
for Developing Countries’ (2004) 7 Journal of World Intellectual property 563, 565 
28 See chapter 4, p. 81-82 on the nature of drugs as consumer goods 
29 Joseph Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing Countries in from the Cold,  
(Blackwell Publishers 2000) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9701.00283/epdf Accessed on 
27/02/18 
30 Ibid 
31John Barton, Differentiated Pricing of Patented Products, Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, (CMH Working Paper Series WG4:2, 2001),3 
http://library.cphs.chula.ac.th/Ebooks/HealthCareFinancing/WorkingPaper_WG4/WG4_2
.pdf Accessed on 27/2/18 
58 
 
With the TRIPS Agreement, pharmaceutical manufacturers of innovator drugs are free to seek 
for patent protection in any WTO member state and expect the TRIPS level of IPP and 
enforcement. 
3.3.2 TRIPS IPR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM 
Adding IPR to the WTO dispute settlement and enforcement mechanism was borne out of the 
concern about inadequate multilateral dispute settlement and excessive national enforcement 
mechanism.32Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement incorporates Articles XXII and XXIII of the 
1994 GATT as applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO. 
Consequently, issues or disputes arising from countries’ implementation or enforcement of the 
TRIPS obligations can be settled through the DSU. Notably, the DSU provides robust 
provisions for dispute settlement through a three staged approach, to wit: the Consultation, 
Board and Appellate Body.33  
A WTO member state can have recourse to the DSU where it considers that any benefit that 
directly or indirectly accrues to the state is being nullified or impaired or where the attainment 
of any objective of the Agreement is impeded.34 Under Article XXIII(1)a-c of the GATT, three 
types of actions can give rise to the nullification and the impairment of benefits under the DSU: 
1. Where a complainant state alleges that another member state has violated a provision 
of a WTO Agreement which results in the nullification or impairment of benefits of the 
complaining state.35 This violation arises from failing to carry out an obligation.  This 
is referred to as a violation cause of action.  
2. A complainant state can allege that another member’s action even though not violating 
any WTO Agreement, nullified and impaired the benefits of a WTO agreement.36 This 
is called a non-violation claim.  
3. A complainant state can allege a nullification and impairment arising from other 
situations outside the WTO agreement.37 This is called the other situation claims 
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Article 3(2) DSU, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism makes 
the WTO trading system secure and predictable. The DSU preserves the rights and obligations 
 
32 Otten (n 16) 61 
33 DSU, Articles 4-17 
34 GATT1994, Article XXIII (1) 
35 Ibid, Article XXIII (1)a  
36 Ibid, Article XXIII (1)b  
37 Ibid, Article XXIII (1)c. See also DSU, Article 26(2) 
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of the member states in the WTO multilateral agreements. Consistent with the customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law, the DSU also seeks to clarify the provisions of the 
agreements. 
With respect to the violation claim, Article 64(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that 
obligations arising therefrom are justiciable and enforceable before the DSU. In this scenario, 
complainant state is not required to demonstrate that a trade benefit has been nullified or 
impaired by another member state. The proof of violation of WTO obligations suffices to 
sustain a non-violation action against another member state. Once there is a violation, 
nullification and impairment are presumed.38Consistent with the GATT, the rationale for this 
genre of complaint is to protect the expectations of the member states with respect to their 
competitive relationship between their domestic and foreign products.39Where the competitive 
relationship is upset, it can result to a nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing to 
that member state whose competition depreciates as a result of the violation.40 This upset 
occurs, where specific obligations in any of the WTO agreements (in this case, the TRIPS 
Agreement) is undermined and such violation cannot be justified.41 Pursuant to Article 19 
DSU, where the Panel or the Appellate Body finds a violation, the concerned state is 
recommended to bring the measure in conformity with the concerned agreement.  
With respect to non-violation and other situations, the claims arising therefrom are not eligible 
for adjudication before the DSU, until 5 years after the coming into effect of the TRIPS 
Agreement.42 However, under Article 64(2)(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, they can still be 
brought before the Council of TRIPS and the Ministerial Conference for examinations and 
recommendations. The recommendations are further subjected to the approval of the 
Ministerial conference. Approved recommendations become effective for all the 
members.43Notably, where the non-violation measures of a member state are found to impair 
the benefits of the complainant member state, the Appellate Body creates no obligation on the 
defending member state to withdraw such measures. However, it can recommend the parties to 
 




42 TRIPS Agreement, Article 64(2). 
43 TRIPS Agreement Article 64(3) 
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‘make a mutually satisfactory adjustment’ and may also suggest the ways and means of 
reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment.44 
Notably, in 2017, the 5years moratorium period was extended to 2019.45 Following the 2019 
TRIPS General Councils’ meeting, the moratorium was further extended until the 12th 
Ministerial Conference (MC 12) which is scheduled to hold on 29 November 2021.46 During 
the ministerial meeting, the WTO Members are to discuss the scope and modalities for non-
violation complaints under Art.64(2)(3) of the TRIPS.47 
There are concerns that non-violation and other situation complaints under Article 
XXIII(1)b&c may present a challenge to developing countries when they seek to exploit the 
flexibilities within the TRIPS and under the national IP legislations. In the 9 June 2021 formal 
meeting of the Council of TRIPS, some members of the WTO considered that the non-violation 
complaints create legal uncertainty and further curtails the use of the flexibilities within the 
TRIPS.48 Prior to the June Council of TRIPS meeting, the communication sent by Brazil in 
2005 on behalf of 15 developing countries described the provisions as unnecessary and capable 
of undermining market access. 49  Some of the systematic concerns arising from the 
communications were summarised as follows: 
a. The complaints potentially challenge the legitimate and non-violating actions or IP 
measures of states. Consequently, they threaten, challenge and infringe states’ 
sovereign rights.   
 
b. States are restricted from using the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement to contain 
IP barriers to trade and to secure the other public health interests. Accordingly, Article 
XXIII(1)b&c of the GATT undermines Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement which 
allow the member states to adopt measures towards the protection of public health. 
 
 
44 DSU, Article 26(1)b 
45  Note also the moratorium has been extended to 2019 during the WTO 2017 Ministerial Conference. 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN17/66.pdf&Open=True Accessed 
19/01/21  
46  WTO General Council’s Decision on TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints Moratorium, 
WT/L/1080, 11 December 2019 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/1080.pdf&Open=True Accessed 
24/07/21 
47 Formal meeting of the Council of TRIPS on Members Approach Text-based Discussions for an Urgent IP 
Response to COVID-19, 9 June 2021 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_09jun21_e.htm 
Accessed 21/07/21 
48 Ibid 




c. The contemplated measures in Article XXIII(1)b&c GATT are legally vague and 
imprecise. The measures that can give rise to non-violation and other situation 
complaints are quite unclear and unknown.   
 
d. By elevating patent private right over the interests of the IP users, Article XXIII(1)b&c 
of the GATT can upset the balance of right and obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. 
This effect contradicts Article 3(2) of the DSU which provides that WTO’s dispute 
settlement system should be predictable and secure and the recommendation arising 
therefrom should neither add nor diminish the right and obligations under the WTO 
agreements.  
 
e. Article XXIII(1)B&C GATT seems to introduce some incoherence among WTO 
agreements. It allows what a WTO member state has agreed to accept as part of a single 
undertaking to be challenged on the basis that it could nullify or impair benefits in 
another area.  
The overall concern highlights that non-violation complaints can strengthen the trade position 
of developed countries who are net exporters of IP goods. It gives the advantage of enforcing 
stricter IP standard and the incentive to challenge and oppose non-violating IP measures that 
are TRIPS compliant, in the guise that they impair their benefits. These benefits justifies the 
recent argument by developed countries in the June 2021 formal meeting of the Council of 
TRIPS that the moratorium period should be terminated. This argument was premised on the 
fact that non-violation complaints are integral to maintaining a proper balance of rights and 
obligations within the TRIPS whilst helping to ensure legitimate obligations are not 
circumvented or avoided.50  However, the concern remains that weaker countries may be 
vulnerable to trade sanctions and oppositions51even when they adopt non-violating actions.  
WTO member states have the freedom to adopt TRIPS compliant measures or flexibilities that 
are necessary to protect public health. Some of the available flexibilities within the TRIPS are 
compulsory license, parallel import and other measures. Provided the measures do not violate 
the TRIPS or any other WTO MTAs, they are legitimate. Consequently, they are not violative 
of another member state’s right, even though the IPR forms the subject matter of the measure.  
 
50 Formal meeting of the Council of TRIPS on Members Approach Text-based Discussions for an Urgent IP 
Response to COVID-19, 9 June 2021, 4 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_09jun21_e.htm 
Accessed 21/07/21 
51 Theresa Beeby Lewis, Comment, ‘Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Survey of Patent Laws 
of various Countries’ (1996) 30 The International Lawyer 835, 849-50 
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As argued, Arts 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement safeguard the use of these flexibilities by 
providing the objectives and the principles that play relevant roles in the interpretation and 
implementation of the TRIPS provisions.52The freedom to adopt the flexibilities within the 
TRIPS Agreement is mainly enabled by Arts. 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. As earlier 
demonstrated, non-violative complaints strike at the territoriality of the patent system because, 
countries may no longer have the unqualified autonomy to adopt national IP measures to avoid 
violating international IP and TRIPS commitments. Nonetheless, Arts. 7 and 8 still represent 
part of the preservation of patent territoriality under the TRIPS. However, the extent Arts. 7 
and 8 preserve patent territoriality and can be relied on by the member states of the WTO to 
adopt suitable IP policies would be examined. This is to determine whether or how 
Art.XXIII(1)b&c GATT undermines states’ freedom53to adopt measures to contain excessive  
exploitation of IPR.  This analysis is in view of the fact that Art. XXIII(1) b&c incentivizes a 
member state whose IPR has been the subject of a state’s measure to challenge the adoption of 
legitimate and non-violative measures despite Arts. 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.   
As demonstrated in chapter 2, international IP system under the TRIPS Agreement may have 
encroached the territoriality of the patent system. However, the flexibilities within the TRIPS 
recognised and preserved the opportunity for the member states to calibrate their national IP 
legislation to suit their socio-economic policies.54 Notably, Arts. 7 and 8 provide the basis and 
safety nets within the TRIPS Agreement that enable Member states to exploit the flexibilities 
towards socio-economic advancement and reduction of IP trade distortions.  
Arts. 7 and 8 re-echoes the preamble of the TRIPS, the broad and the unfettered discretion of 
the WTO member states to pursue non-violative public policy objectives.55 However, with 
Art.64(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, the exploitation of Arts 7 and 8 may no longer be clear cut 
or at best compromised. On one hand, the TRIPS Agreement legitimised IP mitigating 
measures or flexibilities to facilitate access. On the other hand, a country can face a dispute 
resolution action or unilateral action that challenges a legitimate and non-violative measure 
that is adopted to facilitate access to medicine.  
Several uses of Art.XXIII(1)b GATT advantage have been seen in practice. Developed 
countries in particular adopt unilateral actions like withdrawal of trade concessions, threats and 
 
52 Peter Yu, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement’ (2009) 46 Houston Law Review, 979,981 
53 Lydia Lundstedt, Territoriality in Intellectual Property Law (Stockholm University, 2016) 85 
54 Ibid 
55 Yu (55), 1005  
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actual trade sanctions and other forms of retaliations, to challenge another state’s use of 
legitimate flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement.56 These or any of these practices can 
undermine Arts.7 and 8.  
It is however important to understand the legal status of Arts.7 and 8 and whether Arts.7 and 8 
can be relied on to challenge oppositions under Art.XXIII(1)b. 
3.3.2.1 EXAMINING ARTICLES 7 AND 8 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  
Arts. 7 and 8 embody the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement. Art. 7 which is 
entitled ‘Objectives’ provides that: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations. 
Art. 8 which embodies the principles of the TRIPS provides that: 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
 2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology 
Arts. 7 and 8 represent IP bargain which requires that the rights and obligations arising under 
the TRIPS are to be properly reconciled and balanced.57 These provisions are recognised as 
introducing a balanced approach to the TRIPS IPP. Consequently, they have formed the lens 
through which the enforcement and the implementations of TRIPS provisions should be 
 
56 See Chapter 6 various use oppositions against legitimate trade practices. pp. 151-155 
57 Alison Slade, ‘Good Faith and the TRIPS Agreement: Putting Flesh on the Bones of the TRIPS ‘Objectives’ 
(2016) International and Comparative Law Quarterly,354 
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interpreted.58 As argued, the socio-economic welfare of states should be the guiding objectives 
for all TRIPS compliant regimes.59This prompted the insistence by developing countries to  
link IPR protection to the promotion of social and economic and technological 
development60and the need to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade due to 
IPP. 
The WTO DSU has over time clarified the role of Arts 7 and 8 in calibrating the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement. In Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, it was 
argued by Canada that Arts. 7 and 8 call for a liberal interpretation of Art.30 of the TRIPS to 
enable the government to have the relevant freedom or flexibility to adjust patent rights towards 
achieving the desired balance with other important national policies.61 Canada also argued that 
Art. 7 declares one of the key goals of the TRIPS which is a balance between the IPRs under 
the TRIPS and other relevant socio-economic policies of each WTO member state.62 
On the other hand, the European Commission (EC) did not dispute the goal of achieving a 
balance between IPRs and important national policies. However, EC argued that Arts. 7 and 8 
are used to explain the attempt to balance that goals that were already negotiated in the TRIPS 
Agreement. Consequently, viewing Art. 30 as authorising a renegotiation of the balance of the 
TRIPS Agreement would mean double counting socio-economic policies. This according to 
the EC would undermine the TRIPS preamble and Art.1.1 which laid minimum requirements 
for the protection and enforcement of IPRs.63 
In response to the arguments, the DSU Panel noted the need to examine Art.30 conditions with 
care. The Panel further noted that the goals and the limitations in Arts. 7 and 8 must be borne 
in mind when interpreting Art.30 and other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.64 This view 
has been argued to merely express the inherent characteristics of the international IP system. 
Consequently, the Panel’s interpretation is believed to accord little or no legal value to the 
provisions of the TRIPS.65The Appellate decision in Canada-Term of Patent Protection noted 
 
58 Ibid. see also Yu (n 55) 1022 
59 Slade (n 60) 
60 Abdukqawi Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in Carlos Correa and Abdulqawi 
Yusuf (eds) Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd ed Kliwer Law 
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that the applicability of Arts. 7 and 8 still await determinative and appropriate interpretation.66 
In interpreting Arts.7 and 8, the Panel’s decision in United States-Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriation Act of 1998 identified Art.7 as a form of good faith principle which enjoins a 
good faith obligation for all member states of the WTO when interpreting and implementing 
the TRIPS.67 Member states must therefore implement the TRIPS in a manner that is consistent 
with the good faith principle in Art.7.68 The Appellate Body in United States –Shrimps also 
noted that Art.7:69  
…controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this principle, the 
application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive 
exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right 'impinges 
on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to 
say reasonably.' An abusive exercise by a Member of its own treaty right thus results in 
a breach of the treaty rights of the other members and, as well, a violation of the treaty 
obligation of the Member so acting." 
The good faith interpretation means that Art.7 safeguards against potential arbitrary regulation 
of IP by any of the member states of the WTO.70As argued, the good faith interpretation in the 
US- Shrimps reinforces the importance of Art.7 as an interpretative tool and an authoritative 
source of legal obligations in the international IP system.71 As a vessel of good faith, Art.7 can 
form part of a claim before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body where TRIPS rights and 
obligations are applied inconsistently with the good faith principle.72 
The Report of the Panel in the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging on Arts. 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS also confirmed that the goals and the principles of the TRIPS should be borne in mind 
when interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.73 The Panel confirmed that Art. 8 preserves the 
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ability of the WTO member states to pursue legitimate societal interests. It also confirmed that 
such measures may have an impact on IPRs. Notably, such measures are only required to be 
consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement .74 For instance, in issuing compulsory 
licenses, the issuing states must comply with Arts 31 and 31bis requirements as well as the 
procedures in the TRIPS Annex. The Panel noted that: 
Article 7 reflects the intention of establishing and maintaining a balance between the 
societal objectives mentioned therein. Article 8.1, for its part, makes clear that the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are not intended to prevent the adoption, by 
Members, of laws and regulations pursuing certain legitimate objectives, specifically, 
measures "necessary to protect public health and nutrition" and "promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development", provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of the 
Agreement.75 
In applying the interpretative guidance of the Doha Declaration in para.5a, 76 the Panel 
confirmed that Arts. 7 and 8 provide important context for the interpretation of the TRIPS.77 
Significantly, the Appellate body in the Australian Tobacco Packing also supports the position 
of the Panel about the contextual relevance of Arts. 7 and 8.78 Consequently, Arts. 7 and 8 
possess the central relevance in establishing the object and principles that according to the 
Doha Declaration, expresses the object and the purpose of the TRIPS. 79  This relevance 
according to the Panel, draws from Art.31(3(a) of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).80 The Panel noted that the Doha Declaration was adopted by the member states of the 
WTO at the highest level. Additionally, Annex 1C of the TRIPS adopted the Doha Declaration 
in para.1(a). Consequently, the Panel held the view that the Doha Declaration expresses an 
agreement between the members on how to interpret the TRIPS. The Doha Declaration 
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confirms the manner each provision of the TRIPS must be interpreted.81According to the Panel, 
the guidance in the Doha Declaration requires a Treaty interpreter to take into account of the 
context and purpose of the Treaty. Consequently, Arts. 7 and 8 provide important context for 
the interpretation of the TRIPS.82  
As earlier noted, Arts. 7 and 8 echo the preamble of the TRIPS and the broad and the unfettered 
discretion to the WTO member states to pursue public policy objectives.83 Peter Yu identified 
some ways Arts. 7 and 8 facilitate this flexible interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. First, Arts. 7 and 8 guide the interpretation and the implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Secondly, it can be used to shield against aggressive expansion of IPRs and thirdly, 
it can be used to challenge lack of balance in the international IP system.84 
Drawing from the forgoing relevance of Arts.7 and 8, in relying on these provisions, countries 
can adopt TRIPS compliant measures to facilitate societal goals. However, would the 
possibility of challenging such measures under Art.64(2)(3) of the TRIPS undermine the 
freedom in Arts. 7 and 8? Clearly, the Panel and the Appellate decisions in the Tobacco Plain 
Packaging clarified the status of Arts. 7 and 8 and the relevance towards the interpretation of 
the TRIPS. Following the decisions, Art.64(2)(3) should be interpreted consistently with Art.7 
and 8 of the TRIPS. 
Notably, Arts. 7 and 8 do not imply indiscriminate adoption of measures by the member states 
to facilitate societal goal like access to medicine. On the other hand too, Art. 23(2)a DSU 
guards against unilateral sanctions by a member state who complains about the violation of 
WTO obligations and the nullification or impairment of benefits. Article 23(2)a DSU implies 
that WTO member states are not allowed to make a unilateral assessment of the implementation 
of TRIPS standards in another member state.85  
The overall discourse on the TRIPS regime and emerging issues, demonstrate a policy 
incoherence between the right of access to medicine, trade rules and the right of an inventor.86 
The UN High Level Panel report on access to medicines further recognised that the globalised 
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IPR under the TRIPS Agreement created a new standard of IPR governance and enforcement.87 
Consequently, in view of this incoherence, the TRIPS may not fully secure public health 
objectives whilst protecting the pharmaceutical industry. The TRIPS IP regime enabled the 
emergence of a global pharmaceutical market that exploits the TRIPS advantage to maximize 
patent monopoly. 
3.4 GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
The global pharmaceutical market has two major market competitions: original brand and the 
generic medicines. Original brands88are the innovator or breakthrough drugs and are usually 
under patent protection.89On the other hand, the generic medicines are the chemical equivalent 
of the original brand and they can be manufactured without a license from the originator 
company.90 
 
The global patent-holding pharmaceutical market is intensely concentrated and dominated by 
mostly high-income and industrialised countries. The countries account for over 90% of the 
global pharmaceutical export. Europe was reported to have sold the highest dollar value worth 
of exported drugs in 2019, covering about $317.1b or 80.7% of the global sales. 91  The 
companies also have affiliates in other developed and developing countries. By using the patent 
market advantage, they can consolidate the global market to earn substantial rents.92 They can 
seek for patent protection and demand for the TRIPS or advanced IPP standard and 
enforcement. This is in addition to the opportunity to exploit other patent strategies. 
 
On the other hand, developing countries are net importers of IP drugs and they relatively engage 
in the production of generic products and traditional medicines in some cases.93Within the 
context of globalised IPR system, importing countries tend to pay high prices for imported 
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drugs.94The globalised patent protection of pharmaceuticals is therefore believed to have given 
drug firms greater scope for price discrimination.95 The global firms largely depend on the 
availability of exclusive market right to maximise returns from the markets.96 As demonstrated 
in chapter 2, the pricing strategy can be exploitative to the net importers.97  
 
On the contrary, pharmaceutical firms hold the view that the increasing cost of R&D is largely 
caused by high mark-ups on branded medicines in most countries. 98  The International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA) highlighted that import 
tariffs, port charges, importer’s margin, VAT on medicines and high profit margins in the 
wholesale and retail supply chain, significantly add to the cost of drugs.99  
 
 
Source: IFPMA, 2017 
 
No doubt, the pricing components highlighted by the IFPMA influence the price of drugs, 
especially in importing countries. It is however noted that this may not be the case for some of 
the brand drugs that are used as management or definite therapy for some infectious, acute and 
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chronic diseases like HIV/AIDS. Some of the treatment options for the highlighted diseases 
are subject to government procurement in some LICs, which are distributed to the patients 
freely or sold at a discount. Ideally, government procurement is tax, VAT, and mark-up free. 
Yet, they are still considered expensive for government purchase. As demonstrated in chapter 
2, private procurement or access to these categories of drugs are difficult to access because of 
supra-competitive pricing. Some of these patented drugs are management therapies and as they 
do not provide a definite cure, they are taken regularly and in most cases, indefinitely. Where 
this is the case, the demand becomes inelastic despite the price. 
As demonstrated, the TRIPS IPR standard prompted a global pharmaceutical market that 
exploit the TRIPS framework. Drawing from the experiences of India and South Africa, this 
thesis further considers the exploitation of TRIPS IP regime and the practical implication on 
access to medicine.  
3.5 THE INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA EXPERIENCES 
Musungu noted that the WTO treats medicines like any other consumer product. As exclusive 
right and patent strategies continue to apply, prices are likely to be higher for new medicines 
that are patented in the countries with no previous patent protection. 100  In view of this, 
developing countries continue to be confronted with the challenge of domestic IP infrastructure 
that recognises the medical needs of the citizens.101The experiences of India and South Africa 
demonstrate this challenge. 
 
3.5.1   INDIA 
The attempt to strengthen patent eligibility criteria in Section 3(d) of the 2005 Indian Patent 
Act was challenged by Novartis, a brand drug manufacturing company. Section 3(d) provides: 
‘the mere discovery of a new form of a known efficacy of substance is not patentable. Similarly, 
the mere discovery of a new property or new use for a known process results in a new product 
machine or apparatus, unless such known process results in a new product or employ at least 
one new reactant, shall not be a subject matter of patent’. This section clearly restricts 
‘evergreening.’102 Section 3(d) restricts the scope of the subject matters that are eligible for 
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patent protection. The section also indicated the conditions an invention must satisfy. Based on 
Section 3(d), out of 25 patent applications that were filed in India between 2005 and 2008, 20 
were rejected.103  
 
India used the TRIPS 10 years transition period from 1995-2005 before amending the Patent 
Act. However, in line with the TRIPS Agreement, India was required to set up a mailbox of 
patent application during the period of transition.104The patent applications in the mailbox were 
meant to be examined by the end of the transition period. Whilst patent applications remain in 
the mailbox, the applications are required to be granted Exclusive Marketing Rights 
(EMR).105The EMR is meant to be granted where the product(s) are already patented and 
granted market approval in another WTO member state.106   
 
Following the obligation to grant EMR, Gleevac (Imatinib Mesylate) a brand drug owned by 
Novartis which was used to treat chronic myeloid leukaemia, came up for EMR. The generic 
versions of Gleevac also emerged in India.107 Whilst the generic drugs cost about US$166.6 
per year, the Novartis brand cost about US$2500 per year.108Following the grant of EMR to 
Gleevac in 2003, six companies in India namely, Sun, Cipla, Ranbaxy, Intas, Hetero and 
Emcure were asked to stop production, sale, marketing, and export of the generic drugs.109 
 
In 2005, Novartis filed a patent for Gleevac for beta crystalline polymorphic which derived 
from imatinib mesylate, an improved form of imatinib. In response to the application, generic 
companies also filed a pre-patent opposition against Novartis Gleevac for failing the eligibility 
criteria.110 In 2006, Chennai patent office rejected Novartis’s patent application for failing to 
demonstrate increased efficacy under Section 3(d). The patent office noted that Novartis did 
not demonstrate how the beta crystalline form was significantly more effective than imatinib 
mesylate.111 Dissatisfied with the decision, Novartis challenged the constitutionality of Section 
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3(d) before the Madras High court in Novartis AG V India & Ors112 Novartis argued that 
Section 3(d) is arbitrary and incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement. The court however held 
that Section 3(d) was constitutional and compatible with the TRIPS Agreement. The court also 
noted that ‘efficacy’ in the sense of pharmaceutical innovation, is understood to mean 
‘therapeutic efficacy’.  
 
Upon further appeal to the supreme court in Novartis Ag V Union of India and Ors,113 the 
supreme court refused the appeal and held that the ‘small changes and improvements to the 
Gleevec did not amount to innovation deserving a patent.’114 This was despite the argument of 
Novartis that Gleevec has better physicochemical qualities such as the shape of the molecule, 
stability, hygroscopicity and solubility. Novartis argued that the highlighted features qualify as 
enhanced efficacy requirement. The court further held that the changes were attempts at 
‘evergreening’.115  
 
The decision of the Indian courts has been lauded as a recognition of public health over the 
TRIPS global patent system. Reacting to the judgement of the court, Wiesmman observed that, 
Section 3(d) only sets a high standard for patent eligibility for secondary inventions.  He 
believed that a relaxed Section 3(d) would give effect to ‘evergreening’, delay generic entry of 
low-priced drugs and invariably hamper state obligations towards health.116Section 3(d) merely 
prevents pharmaceutical firms from retaining exclusive right through minor changes of the 
original product to block or delay the launching of cheaper generics of the drug.117  
 
Based on the forgoing, it is highlighted that pursuant to Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, 
countries can exclude from patentability inventions the prevention of which is important to 
health. Notably, incremental innovation (which can be patent eligible) is an essential part of 
innovation and drug-life cycle management. As demonstrated in chapter 2, patenting 
incremental innovation is one of the patent strategies available to drug manufacturers to 
maximize or strengthen market exclusivity right. Allowing every incremental innovation on 
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the original patent (minor or major) could mean prolonging the effective period of patent 
protection of the original patent beyond the 20 years duration. 118  Consequently, generic 
competition is further delayed to the detriment of IP users. 
 
3.5.2   SOUTH AFRICA 
The South Africa’s (SA) effort to utilise the parallel import trade measure was met with 
resistance. SA amended the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 
(MRSCA) 1997. The amendment empowered the minister of health to prescribe conditions for 
the supply of more affordable medicines to protect public health. Section 10 of the Act 
permitted generic substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent pricing for all medicines 
and parallel importation. Prior to this amendment, a vast majority of South Africans were 
infected with AIDS and unable to afford ARVs, which at that time cost about $12,000-$15,000 
for one individual per year.119The AIDS crisis in South Africa at that time inspired the need to 
make relevant drugs available and affordable.  
 
This amendment resulted to about 42 pharmaceutical companies filing a suit against the South 
African government and 10 others. The suit challenged Section 10 of the Act in the case of the 
Big Pharma & 42 ORS v The President of the Republic of South Africa, the Hon. Mr. N.R. 
Mandela & 10 ors at the Pretoria High Court.120 The Applicants sought for a declaration that 
Section 10 was unconstitutional on several grounds.  
 
One of the grounds for challenging Sections 10 and 15C of the Act was that the provisions 
potentially expropriate the property right of the patent holder without any provision for 
compensation. They also argued that the amendment contradicts Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and consequently discriminates against the right of the pharmaceutical industry.121  
 
In defence, South African government argued that Section 15c does not empower the minister 
to abrogate patent rights. It also argued that the relevant section was TRIPS compliant, since 
the TRIPS Agreement permitted parallel import in Article 6. The minister of health recognised 
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that in pursuit of access to medicine, South Africa reserves the right to procure drugs from 
affordable markets.122  
 
The head of the pharmaceutical Association of South Africa Mirryena Deeb argued that parallel 
importation of drugs under the amendment, undermined the ability of the pharmaceutical 
companies to charge different prices in different parts of the world.123 Besides the formal suit 
against the South African government, the applicants had the support of their home 
government, who reacted with threats of trade sanctions and withdrawal of benefits from South 
Africa. The US government Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 1999 in 122 Stat. 2681-155124provides: 
 
… provided further that none of the funds appropriated under this heading may 
be made available for assistance for the central government of the Republic of 
South Africa, until the secretary of State reports in writing to the appropriate 
committee of the congress on the steps being taken by the United states 
governments to work with the government of the republic of South Africa to 
negotiate the repeal, suspension, or termination of section 15(C) of the South 
Africa’s Medicines and related Substances Control Amendment Act No, 90 of 
1997… 
 
Additionally, the US trade representative added South Africa to the Special 301 ‘watch 
list,’125based on the justification that South Africa did not recognise adequate IPP. Being in the 
US watch list also meant that South Africa can be sanctioned by US. Under the US Special 301 
list, the USTR publishes countries with IP related barriers to market access for the US 
firms.126Placing a country on either the watch list or priority list, is a unilateral and subjective 
assessment to indicate that a country is non-compliant with the USTR’s IP policy.127. 
Reacting to the US government approach, Dr. Ian Robert the then special adviser to the South 
African Health Ministry, noted that the reaction of the US government disregarded South 
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Africa’s public health crisis and objectives. He added that ‘medicines to treat HIV/ADS are far 
too highly priced for the mass of our people with up to 16% of our people already HIV positive 
which can be seen as a disaster’.128In support of the US approach, David Warr an associate 
director of tax and policy at Bristol-Myers Squibb, noted that patents are vital to the 
pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, measures like compulsory license and parallel import 
expropriate innovation model hence, South African action was unsupported.129  
This controversy was widely criticised which made the US to adjust the trade decision against 
South Africa. In September 1999, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and South 
African government announced amicable resolution of the dispute out of court. There was also 
an understanding that the US government will no longer pressurise South Africa.130South 
Africa on the other hand agreed to observe its TRIPS obligations.131Following the resolution, 
South Africa was struck off the US 301 watch list and the suit was withdrawn 2001.132  
3.5.3  EMERGING ISSUES FROM THE EXPERIENCES 
The SA and the Indian experiences demonstrate one of the challenges that may confront 
developing countries under the TRIPS globalised patent regime. This is usually the case where 
countries are devising non-violative policies, measures, and other legal means to mitigate 
patent barriers and to facilitate societal goals like access to medicine under Arts. 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. These experiences highlighted the implications of the GATT’s Article 
XXIII(1)b on non-violative measures that only impair and nullify the market benefit of a 
member state. They also highlighted Article 23(1) of the DSU that prohibits the use of 
unilateral measures (based on subjective assessment) in response to trade measures adopted by 
another member state.   
The use of trade sanctions and the withdrawal of concessions within the WTO legal order, 
usually apply to specific circumstances. Pursuant to Article 22 DSU, trade sanctions are used 
to compel a member state to refrain from or comply with trade obligation(s) in the WTO’s 
MTAs. Incidentally, trade sanctions may be ready tools or measures that can be used to compel 
or cajole weaker economies to refrain from adopting legitimate measures or practices that suit 
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their socio-economic circumstance(s). It may seem that the TRIPS Agreement’s globalised 
patent system gives grounds to patent holding firms to enforce or demand certain IPP standard. 
Drawing from the Indian and SA’s examples, challenging Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act 
and Section 15(c) of the SA MRSCA may unreasonably restrain and challenge countries’ 
legitimate use of legal rights in the TRIPS Agreement.  
As noted in the Arts. 7 and 8 discussions, the TRIPS Agreement is sensitive to the highlighted 
challenge in Arts. 1 7 and 8. Against the backgrounds of Arts. 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
it is highlighted that the measures adopted against South Africa and India, challenge the policy 
spaces of countries to adopt legitimate measures in response to public health and other public 
interests. Clearly, Art. 8 allows the member states the freedom to formulate and amend national 
laws and regulations to adopt measures that are necessary to protect public health and other 
public interests. The legal right to adopt these measures were guaranteed in the highlighted 
TRIPS provisions. Provided the measures are legitimate and non-violative, this freedom should 
ideally be exercised without the fear of threats, sanctions, or retaliations from other countries. 
Notably, the extant interpretation of Arts. 7 and 8 in the Australian Tobacco Packaging by the 
Panel and the Appellate Body, guarantees flexible implementation and interpretation of the 
TRIPS to sustain patent territoriality and to sustain the freedom of the member states to adopt 
legitimate measures towards societal goals. The Appellate Body upheld the findings of the 
Panel on Arts. 7 and 8 and also concluded that WTO members ‘enjoy a certain degree in 
imposing encumbrances on the use of trademarks under Art.20 of the TRIPS Agreement’133 
The public health challenges are legitimate concerns under Art.8. More so, the responsibility 




The growing public health challenge in LICs and the challenges of private patients or the 
government in accessing patent protected brand drugs continue to raise concerns. This 
challenge questioned the TRIPS Agreement’s globalized IPR regime and its impact on access 
to medicine.  
The TRIPS Agreement’s pharmaceutical patent protection, the duration and the enforcement 
mechanism highlight the relationship between patent and consumer access to pharmaceutical 
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products. Developed countries seem to have a greater scope to exploit the TRIPS and beyond 
the capacity for pharmaceutical innovation, they have more capacity to exploit the DSU, sustain 
trade sanctions and retaliations to sustain certain IPP standard.  
On the hand, the autonomy of states in Arts. 7 and 8 to adopt suitable IP standard to their socio-
economic status, may have been circumscribed by the possibility of non-violative claims. The 
efforts to exploit non-violating measures like amendments of national IP legislation, 
compulsory license and other measures to facilitate societal goals may be restricted and 
discouraged due to fear of trade sanctions and other retaliatory measures. Incidentally, 
developing countries lack cross-retaliatory capacity in most cases due to lack of comparative 
market advantage, innovation and political will. Significantly, the WTO DSU decision in 
Australian Tobacco Plain packaging clarified the legal status of Arts. 7 and 8. 
Notably, the DSU mechanism is open for all the WTO member states to access. Incidentally, 
most developing countries or LICs may not be exploiting the mechanism to challenge 
unjustified retaliatory measures at DSU. However, it would be useful for LICs to exploit the 
DSU mechanism to challenge indiscriminate, unilateral and unjustified use of retaliatory 
measures that undermine Arts. 7 and 8 of the TRIPS.   
Overall, chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated the access to medicine challenge that emerge from the 
exploitation of pharmaceutical patent protection generally and under the TRIPS Agreement. 
The TRIPS Agreement’s pharmaceutical patent protection highlighted the inter-relationship 
between the underlying policies of IP, trade, and public health. The trade and IP policies serve 
useful objectives. However, as demonstrated in the discourse, applying the principles or polices 
of trade to drug innovation may unreasonably interfere with public health objectives. 
Consequently, such interference is seen to challenge equitable access to medicine especially in 
LICs.  
Patent mechanism as a proprietary right and the emerging access issues have thus far been seen. 





PUBLIC HEALTH AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE CHALLENGE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
So far, chapters 2 ad 3 have demonstrated the market externalities arising from patent 
protection and how the TRIPS Agreement IPP standard further exacerbates the access 
challenge. The market advantage from exclusive right has been seen as capable of encouraging 
supra-competitive pricing, thereby making drugs unaffordable and unavailable to the needing 
population. The public health challenge arising from limited or no access to medicine continues 
to present a global concern. Even though several factors account for this challenge, the patent 
influence is significant. This chapter therefore explores the access to medicine legal framework 
and the legal obligations arising therefrom, to justify the need to balance same with the patent 
proprietary right.     
This chapter is made of 8 sections. Section 2 of this chapter discusses the public health 
challenges. Section 3 explores the nature of medicines as consumer goods. Thereafter, sections 
4 and 5 will examine legal framework of access to medicine and the human right obligations 
of the pharmaceutical IP holding firms and the states. This is followed by section 6, which 
discusses the right of the patent holder to the benefits of intellectual efforts. Section 7 discusses 
the non-TRIPS measures and access to medicine. Thereafter, section 8 concludes.    
4.2 PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGES 
Public health challenges majorly arise from limited availability of pharmaceutical products to 
meet the health needs of a population.1 Several factors account for this challenge. Usually, 
limited supply of quality and affordable medicines and the ineffective response to public health 
are some of the key issues.2 Poverty, non-existent or underdeveloped health insurance scheme, 
patent protection, Poor health infrastructure and high prices of drugs, cumulatively or 
individually exacerbate this challenge.  
The global disease burden, which disproportionately affects LICs, is quite challenging. The 
WHO estimated that one-third (1/3) of the World’s population including nearly half of the 
poorest in Africa and Asia lack essential drugs.3 In isolating patent protection challenge, this 
 
1 World Health Organisation (WHO), Access to Medicines: Intellectual Property Protection: Impact on Public 





discourse draws from HIV/AIDS disease burden to demonstrate the severity of public health 
challenge and the influence of patent protection on the price of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs.  
4.2.1 HIV/AIDS 
The 2020 WHO report highlighted that HIV/AIDS remains a major global public health 
challenge. The report noted that about 38.0million people are living with HIV/AIDS. The 
regional burden is as follows: Africa 25.7million, America 3.7million, South East Asia 
3.7million, Europe 2.6million, Eastern Mediterranean 420,000 and Western Pacific, 
1.9million.4 An estimate of 0.7million HIV/AIDS related death and 1.7million new infections 
occurred in 2019.5 The death distribution across regions is as follows: Africa 440,000, America 
52,000, South East Asia 110,000, Europe 39,000, Eastern Mediterranean 15,000 and Western 
Pacific 41,000.6 
Notably, in the absence of a definite cure for HIV/AIDS, the treatment is under a management 
therapy. Due to the resisting nature of HIV/AIDS infection, the management usually involves 
four lines of regimen, namely: first line, second line and third line regimens as well as salvage 
treatment. The generic Antiretroviral (ARV) for most of the first and the second-line HIV/AID 
treatments are available and quite accessible.7 However, the health challenge arises from access 
to the third line and salvage regimens which are widely patented.8 The lowest prices for the 
widely patented third line regimen are: $664, $439 and $553 per person yearly (ppy) for 
daruvir, etravine and raltagravir respectively. For the salvage treatment, some countries have 
been reported to be paying: $6072, $5190 and $7,700 for Tirpravavir, maraviroc and 
enfuvirtide respectively.9 Incidentally, a research found that about 3.5m people living with HIV 
(PLHIV) will be on second- and third-line regimes between 2020-2025.10    
The use of patent and further patent strategies on ARV drugs, have been seen in practice, and 
this demonstrates the influence of patent protection on the price and the accessibility of 
patented ARV drugs. ViiV healthcare the owner of dolutegravir (DTG) regimen, has been 
 
4  World Health Organisation (WHO), Latest HIV Estimates and Updates on HIV Policies Uptake, 2020 
Guidelines (who.int)Accessed on 08/04/21.  
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
7 Frontline AIDS, The Problem with Patents: Access to Affordable HIV Treatment in Middle Income Countries, 
(2020) 6, The-problem-with-patents_pages_web2.pdf (frontlineaids.org) Accessed 22/12/20 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Aastha Gupta et al, ‘Projected Uptake of New Antiretroviral (ARV) Medicines in Adults in Low-and Middle-
Income Countries: A Forecast Analysis 2015-2025’ (2016) 11 PLoS ONE, Journal, 1 
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reported to have filed multiple evergreening patents on DTG to extend the exclusive market 
right on DTG and DTG based regimens in several countries. These patents would last till 2026 
and 2031 respectively.11 Notably, the WHO in 2018 adopted the DTG as the preferred first line 
regime for HIV.12 The 2020-2025 ARV uptake forecast further demonstrated that DTG would 
be a major player in the ART regimen by 2025, with about 15 million patients using it.13 This 
has clearly positioned DTG in a good place.  
Amin et al’s empirical research on evergreening strategy and secondary patents, presents a 
ready example. The research focused on Kelatra’s ritonavir and lopinavir ARV drugs for the 
management of HIV. The research identified additional 108 patents filed on the ARV regimens. 
These additional patents on new indication could prolong the period of exclusivity of the 
original patent. This could result to additional 12 years after the expiration of the original patent 
on the drugs’ base compound and 31 years after the first patent on ritonavir was filed.14The 
clear implication is the delay of generic competition on ritonavir and lopinavir until after 2028. 
These examples align with the findings of Feldman and the European Commission in chapter 
2, on the use of patent thicketing and clustering strategies to delay generic competition by 
extending the period of patent protection.15 
The treatment and steady supply of affordable medicines are essential to curbing HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and some of the co-infections like the hepatitis virus (HCV) and tuberculosis (TB). 
Incidentally, the price of ARV can strain countries’ financial budget. In 2019, the All Ukrainian 
network of PLHIV challenged the patent on ARV Aluvia and Kaletra that were granted to 
AbbVie pharmaceutical company. This challenge was premised on the monopoly pricing of 
the drugs. The Network noted that the Ukrainian government spends about $19m to provide 
kaletra for 27,000 HIV patients, out of about 240,000 Ukrainians living with HIV. On the other 
hand, the Network’s forecast estimated that the government’s spending on generic ARV would 
be about $5-6m. They therefore argued that generic ARV can potentially fund treatment for 
about 138,000 HIV patients in Ukraine.16    
 
11 Frontline AIDS (n 7) 7 
12 WTO: Drug Resistant Report 2019, WHO | HIV drug resistance report 2019 Accessed 22/12/20 
13 Gupta et al, (n 10)  
14 Tahir Amin and Aaron Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceutical: A Case Study of how 
Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could be Extended for Decades (2012) 31 Health Affairs, 2286 
15 See chapter 2 pp. 38-42 on patent strategies 
16 Make Medicines Affordable, Action Against Abbvie. Money that Could Treat HIV Patients ‘Goes up in Smoke’ 
in Kiev, 25 January 2019 Action against AbbVie. Money that could treat HIV patients ‘goes up in smoke’ in Kiev 
- Make Medicines Affordable.....Accessed on 22/12/20 
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The increase in the number of on-patent medicines in the WHO EML and other patented brand 
drugs that are not included in the EML, suggests that access to medicine challenge will persist 
because of affordability.17The inability to access treatments because of high price is a global 
concern. The pricing strategy can present a huge challenge to private individuals who fund 
their medical expenses as well as strain government’s already lean healthcare budget. This 
challenge undoubtedly, is more intense in resource constrained economies like the LICs.  
The WHO 2017 report on health statistics restated that health technologies such as medicines 
are quite expensive.18 Additionally, the highlighted WHO 2020 report on global HIV/AIDS 
burden, demonstrates a disproportionate application of the disease and death ratio in LICs, 
especially in Africa. The pricing and the patenting strategies of the brand owners of ARVs can 
undermine access to the lines and salvage treatment.  Given the relevance of medicine to good 
health and life, medicine as a consumer good, should be affordable and available. 
4.3 MEDICINE AS CONSUMER GOODS 
Medicines are integral to good health, and wellbeing. The consumers of medicines have been 
described as captives, as against willing buyers.19The uniqueness of some medicines has made 
the demand highly inelastic. For example, regardless of the price of ARV as seen in the 
preceding discussions, the consumers are stuck with it, especially where there is no generic 
substitute(s) available. This is usually the case for innovator, break through or blockbuster 
drugs.  
 
Against the background of the importance of medicine, it is considered quite unsafe to allow 
monopolistic pricing of drugs to determine the market availability.20 In view of the anxiety 
associated with illness and death, patients can even demand for more expensive options from 
health workers or proceed to buy for themselves.21 This also happens even when cheaper 
medicines can achieve the same result.22In most cases, the treatment options are not determined 
by the consumers, as the drugs are prescribed and recommended by physicians. Even where 
 
17 Esteban Burrone et al, ‘Patent Pooling to Increase Access to Essential Medicines’ (2019) 97 Bulletin of World 
Health Organisation, 575,576 
18 WHO, World Health Statistics, (2017) 19 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/255336/1/9789241565486-
eng.pdf?ua=1 Accessed on 19/02/18 
19 Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The “Fourth Wave” of Corporate Human 
Rights Scrutiny’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 425, 436. 
20 Management Sciences for Health, Policy an Economic Issue (2012) 5 





the consumer makes the choice, the consumer is incapable of determining the suitability, safety, 
quality, or the value for the amount paid.23  
 
As seen from the HIV/AIDS public health challenge, the relevance of medicine as consumer 
goods and as highlighted in chapter 2 on access to medicine, scaling up access to patented 
medicines would imply efforts towards ensuring that medicines are available to the needing 
population despite the patent status. It remains to highlight on the legal status of access to 
medicine and the legal obligations of states and the pharmaceutical IP holding firm that arise 
therefrom.    
 
4.4  ACCESS TO MEDICNE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
[Access to medicine is a derivative of right to health, right to life and customary international 
law. Consequently, access to medicine as a human right, would presume positive obligations 
on government to adopt measures towards facilitating the realisation of the access dimensions.  
The United Nations (UN) categorised human rights as civil and political rights on one hand, 
and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand. 24  These genres of rights are 
regulated by two human right conventions, namely: International Convention for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) respectively. Other human right Treaties, regional instruments, and national 
legislations also recognise civil and economic rights.25  
4.4.1 ACCESS TO MEDICINE AS RIGHT TO HEALTH 
The preamble of the WHO constitution recognises that: ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being…’26 Article 25.1 of 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948 affirmed health as a  
human right. It provides that ‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, medical 
care and necessary social services…’. Comprehensively, Article 12 of the ICESCR recognised 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
 
23 Ibid 
24 Seth Harris, ‘Recent Development: Asian Human Rights: Forming A Regional Covenant’ (2000) I University 
of Hawaii Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal, 17 
25 Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History’ (2006) 12 Annual Survey of International and 
Comparative Law, 219, 227 




health. The ICESCR further imposes an obligation on state parties in Article 12.2(c&d) to 
ensure the prevention, treatment, control of epidemic and medical attention for sickness. At the 
national level, the fact sheet of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) revealed that at least, 155 domestic constitutions recognise right to health and the   
responsibility to grow national health care services and allocate specific budget to them.27 
UN human right conventions impose on state parties the responsibility to provide access to 
health facilities and to adopt legitimate measures or policies to promote access to medical 
facilities. This obligation affirms that access to medicine constitutes one of the essential 
conditions of right to life and health.28 These conventions and other regional conventions on 
human right are further ratified and domesticated into national legislations by state parties. By 
so doing, the conventions have become directly applicable and enforceable in the state parties 
to the conventions.29 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and special rapporteurs 
on rights to health, interpret the normative contents of the right to health in the ICESCR. They 
provide authoritative explanation of specific treaty provisions for a better understanding of the 
treaty obligations. The CESCR interpreted the obligation in Article 12(d), to include the 
provisions of essential drugs, treatment, care and appropriate treatment of prevalent diseases.30 
UN general assembly noted that the prevention, treatment and control of sicknesses are central 
to attaining the highest standard of health. The UN general assembly also recognised that the 
realisation of such right largely depends on access to medicine.31 
 
27 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Fact Sheet No. 31, The Right to Health, 
June 2008, No. 31, 10,  https://www.refworld.org/docid/48625a742.html   Accessed 9/05/19 
28 Joo-Young Lee, A Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, Innovation and Access to Medicine (1st 
edn, Ashgate 2015) 121 
29  Ibid. See also Article 5(e)(iv) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)1969; Article 11.1(f) and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination against Women 1981, Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (ACHPR) 1986, Article 11 European Social Charter (1961, revised in 1996), Article 10 of the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) 1988 
30 CESCR, Substantive issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted in 22nd session (2002) UNO Doc. 14 E/C.12/2000/4, para. 17. https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/439/34/PDF/G0043934.pdf?OpenElement Accessed on 09/05/19  
31 UN General Assembly, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, adopted in 61st session (2006) UN Doc. A/61/338, Para. 40.  https://undocs.org/en/A/61/338 . 
Accessed on 09/05/2019.  See also UN Human Right Council Resolution on Access to Medicines in the Context 
of the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Standard of Physical and Mental Health (2013) 
A/HRC/RES/23/14, Para 6. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/752297/files/A_HRC_RES_23_14-EN.pdf 
accessed on the 09/05/19 
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It may seem that the CESCR’s interpretation of access to medicine as a human right is against 
the strict interpretation of right to health. However, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treatise (VCLT)32 recognises that treaty provisions must be interpreted in good faith, 
literally, in their context and the light of their objectives and purposes. The general rule of 
interpretation in Article 31 of the VCLT presupposes a holistic rule of interpretation of the 
treaty language. The meanings attributed to the treaty must be based on the overall context, 
object and purpose of the treaty.33 Human right treaties favour the effective protection of right, 
as against restrictive interpretations by states.34 Restrictive interpretations permit states to 
justify the neglect of the obligation to take positive actions towards ensuring the realisation of 
right to health. Notably too, Article 32 VCLT permits recourse to supplementary aids of 
interpretation and even the preparatory works of treaties. The intention is to determine the 
meaning and the intention of the law, and to avoid absurd or unreasonable result. 35 
Consequently, states are permitted to rely on the relevant UN committee’s interpretation of the 
normative content of the conventions to provide effective and meaningful interpretation to the 
human right provisions.  
With respect to access to medicine, Article 2(1) ICESCR enjoins states to ‘…undertake steps 
individually …with a view to achieving progressively in full the realisation of the rights … the 
adoption of legislative measures’. The CESCR explained the minimum but the core obligation 
of state parties as:‘…a state party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived 
of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care… is prima facie, failing to discharge 
its obligation under the covenant… if the covenant were to be read in such a way as not to 
establish such minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison 
d’etre’.36CESCR also recognised the constraints of states with limited resources in satisfying 
the obligation towards health. Article 21(1) ICESCR was therefore interpreted to require states 
to take steps to the maximum of its available resources.37  
 
32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1153 UNTS 331 
33 Alison Slade, ‘The Objectives and Principles of the WTO TRIPS Agreement: A Detailed Anatomy’ (2016) 
53(3) Osgoode Hall L.J 948, 951 
34 Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights, and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicine (Oxford 
University Publication, 2007) 86 
35 Article 32 VCLT 
36 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para. 




The CESCR also acknowledged that right to health creates the obligation of ‘immediate effect’ 
to make the essential medicines available and accessible to the citizens.38 Consequently, guided 
by the WHO list of Essential Medicines, states are required to develop and adopt national list 
of essential medicines. States have the obligation to ‘Respect, Protect and Fulfil’ the right to 
health.39 These obligations require states to refrain from ‘denying or limiting equal access for 
all persons…to preventive, curative and palliative health services…’40With respect to the 
obligation to protect, states are further obliged to adopt measures that prevent third parties from 
interfering with the realisation of the right. The obligation to fulfil requires states to take and 
implement suitable legislative, administrative and budgetary measures, to facilitate the full 
realisation of right to health.41It is therefore  considered a violation of public health obligation, 
where state policies are inconsistent with the legal obligations of states towards the right to 
health.42   
The UN human right council resolution on access to medicine recognised access to medicine 
as one of the vital elements to fully realise the highest attainment of standard of physical and 
mental health.43The South African Supreme Court in Minister of Health & Ors V Treatment 
Action Campaign & Ors44 adopted this position. The court highlighted on the government’s 
responsibility to ensure access to medicine with respect to making ARV drugs available and 
accessible in South Africa. This appeal sought to reverse the judgement of the lower court 
against the South African government, for failing to appropriately respond to the HIV/AIDS 
challenge. The high court found that the appellant did not reasonably reduce the risk of HIV 
transmission from mothers to their babies at birth. At the trial court, the Respondents contended 
that the state’s programme on mother-to-child transmission of HIV at birth, identified 
nevirapine ARV drug for the purpose. Incidentally, the programme restricted the availability 
of nevirapine to the public sector and to few sites. Consequently, although nevirapine was free, 
 
38 UN General Assembly, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, adopted in 61st session (2006) UN Doc. A/61/338, Para. 56 https://undocs.org/en/A/61/338.  
Accessed 09/05/2019 
39 Ibid. para 33.  
40 Ibid para. 34.  
41 Ibid para 33 
42 CESCR, Substantive issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted in 22nd session (2002) UNO Doc. 14 E/C.12/2000/4, para. 48. https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/439/34/PDF/G0043934.pdf?OpenElement Accessed on 09/05/19  
43 UN Human Right Council Resolutions on Access to Medicine in the Context of the Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health (13 June 2013) AHRC/RES/23/14, 
Para. 2. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/752297/files/A_HRC_RES_23_14-EN.pdf. Accessed on 09/05/19 
44 Minister of Health & 8 Ors V Treatment Action Campaign & 5 Ors NO 2 (2002) CCT8/02 ZACC 15; 2002 (5) 
SA 721; 2002 (10) 
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it was impossible for the doctors that were not working at the designated sites to prescribe 
nevirapine to their patients.  
The Respondents argued that such restriction was unreasonable and against Sections 7(2) and 
8(1) of the 1996 South African Constitution which created the obligations to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bills of right. The Respondents further contended that the 
restriction infringes Section 27(1)(2) that guarantees the right of access to health care services 
and the obligation to adopt legislative and other measures to realise the right. 
The Supreme court considered the obligations of the government in the constitution, the sate 
obligations in Articles 2(1) and 12 of the ICESCR and CESCR normative interpretations. The 
court found that, Section 27(1) (2) of the Constitution requires the government to devise a 
comprehensive programme to progressively realise the rights of pregnant women and their 
newborn. This extends to ensuring access to health services for the prevention of mother-to-
child HIV transmission. Accordingly, the court ordered the applicants to remove the restriction 
that prevented the nevirapine from being made available at public hospitals and clinics that are 
not in research and training sites.45  
Overall, it is seen that states have the legal obligation to ensure that health care facilities and 
medicines are accessible and available to their citizens. This obligation extends to ensuring that 
third parties do not hinder access to medicine.46This third-party challenge could emanate from 
the activities of drugs manufacturers and the use of IPP strategies to sustain high price of drugs 
and delay generic competition. The CESCR comment on human right obligation and IP 
recognised that IP policies at all levels, must comply with the international human right laws.47 
Accordingly, IPR protection or measures that interfere with state party’s obligation in ICESCR 
is inconsistent with the binding obligation of the states towards access to medicine.48States are 
therefore enjoined to adopt legislative measures and policies to facilitate and safeguard 




45 See also Venezuela’s case of Cruz del Valle Bermudez, et al V. Ministerio de Sanidad Y Asistenica Social 
(MSA), Case No. 15.789, Decisión No. 916 (1999) 
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Accessed 09/05/19 
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4.4.2 ACCESS TO MEDICINE AS RIGHT TO LIFE 
Notably, the major prerequisite for the actualisation of all human rights is the right to 
life.49Article 3 of the UDHR provides that: ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of person’. Article 6(1) of the ICCPR provides that: ‘every human being has the inherent right 
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his …’50   
Right to life has been interpreted broadly to cover the conditions that promote and sustain life. 
Consequently, right to life now involves the protection against the deprivation of quality and 
healthy life due to lack or limited access to medicines.51 The UN Human right committee’s 
general comment on right to life explained the scope of Article 6 thus: ’…the expression 
“inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood  in a restrictive manner, and the 
protection of this right requires the state to adopt positive measures…’52As demonstrated in 
section 4.3, medications are essential to life. Accordingly, policies, mechanisms, strategies and 
measures that reduce access and the ability to pay for a drug, may amount to deprivation of 
right to life.53  
The Inter-American Commission on Human Right (IACHR) recognised a broad interpretation 
of right to life to mean:’…the tendency towards a broader and more comprehensive concept of 
the right to life … not only as a legal foundation for all other rights, but also as an integral 
part of all the rights that are essential to guarantee… required for the development 
…existence.’54In the El Salvador’s case of Odir Miranda V El Salvador,55 the IACHR held that 
the Respondent’s refusal to purchase the triple therapy and other medications to improve the 
quality of life of the people living with HIV/AIDS, amounts to a failure to guarantee the right 
to life. The commission considered that such refusal was against the intents and purposes of 
right to life.56  
 
49 Alicia Yamin, ‘Not Just A Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right Under International Law,’ (2003) 21 
Boston University International Law Journal, 325, 330 
50 See also ACHPR Article 4, ECHR in Article 2 
51 Lee (n 28) 132 
52 UN Human Rights Commission general comments on Right to Life, UN Doc. A/37/40 (1982) 
53 Yamin, (n 49) 331 
54 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Nicaragua, Annual report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85, Doc.9 Rev. (1994), 465 
55  Odir Miranda V. El Salvador, Case 12.249, Report No. 29/01 IACHR Annual Report 2002, 
OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 Rev. (2001) 
56 See also Social and Economic Rights Action Centre V Nigeria Communication (2002) No. 155/1996, ACHRP, 
COMM/A044/1 para 3f, Tavares V France (1991) Application No. 16593/90, European Commission of Human 
Right, Association X V United Kingdom (1978) Application No. 7154/7514, Decision Report 31, European 
Commission of Human Rights, 32 
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Domestic courts increasingly find an obligation to provide medications as part of right to health 
and life. The supreme court of Venezuala in Glenda Lopez V Instituto Venezolano de Los 
Seguros Sociales (IVSS),57held that the social institute that regularly fail to provide ARV 
treatments can provoke the destruction of the immune system and viral resistance. The court 
held that the Respondent has the legal duty to ensure steady supply of HIV medicines and 
testing services to the HIV patients who are covered under IVSS. Failing to ensure regular 
supply meant the breach of right to health and life in Article 58 of the Venezuelan Constitution 
and international conventions on human rights.58  
Overall, a broad interpretation of the right to life includes right to health and access to medicine. 
This interpretation is in consonance with Articles 31 and 32 of VCLT. Accordingly, states have 
the obligation to facilitate access to medicine to fully realise the obligations towards right to 
life. This obligation also extends to adopting legislative measures and policies that promote a 
wider access to medicine to the citizens.   
4.4.3 ACCESS TO MEDICINE AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Has access to medicine acquired the status of a norm under customary international law? 
Consistent with Article 38(b) of the Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ), to attain the 
status of a norm, access to medicine must be considered ‘a general practice accepted by law.’ 
In line with Article 38(b) requirements, two objective elements must be present before a 
customary international law can arise. State practice(s) and opinion juria sive necessitates 
represent these objective elements. The ICJ in the North Sea Shelf cases between the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) V Denmark and FRG V Netherlands59 Explained the elements of 
norm under the customary international law thus:  
 
…not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
 
57 (2001) Expediente No. 00-1343, Sentencia No. 487, https://www.globalhealthrights.org/health-topics/health-
care-and-health-services/lopez-glenda-ors-v-instituto-venezolano-de-los-seguros-sociales-ivss/ Accessed on 
16/05/19 
58  See also the Columbian case of Fabio Moron Diaz, Magistrado Ponente, T-328/98. 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1998/T-328-98.htm Accessed on 16/05/19 the court found that 
the refusal to supply the plaintiff with ARV drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS undermined right to life. The 
applicant who was a HIV/AIDS patient was not allowed access to the relevant ARV drugs for failing to pay up 
his minimum weekly contribution to the Columbian ministry of health. See also State of Punjab V. Mohinder 
Singh Chawala (1997) 2 SCC 83, Consumer and Resources Centre V Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42 
59 ICJ Report 1969, 3 para 77 (20 February 1969) 
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it’. With respect to the opinion juris, the state concerned must feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation and not just following a 
tradition or usage.60 
 
State practices that emanate from acts or official statement of states like legislations, press 
releases, judicial decisions, resolutions of international organisations attain the status of a 
norm.61 In several judicial decisions,62the ICJ considered official statements as evidence of 
custom. Notably, it is required that the concerned acts and statements must have been in use 
for quite an extended period. However, as held in the Continental Shelf case (supra), the 
requirement for long duration is no longer a prerequisite for a state practice. A state practice 
can be extensive even though it has only been around for a short period.63 
 
Opinion juris on the other hand covers the practices state undertake as legal obligations. As 
explained in Continental shelf case (supra), ‘the acts must be such, or be carried out in a way, 
as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
of law requiring it…The states concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation’.64 
 
In the context of access to medicine, the relevant question is, have state declarations, 
international resolutions, official statements, acts, judicial decisions, and the opinion juris with 
respect to public health challenges and access to medicine, acquired the status of norms under 
customary international law? Various resolutions of UN General Assembly65on access to 
medicine and commitment to diseases, affirmed, and reaffirmed the obligations and conducts 
of states with respect to access to medicine. The UN Resolution 58/179 urged states to develop 
strategies to realize access to comprehensive treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria as well 
as ensure that medicines are available, accessible, and affordable.66 The UN Resolution 60/262 
also contain the commitments of states towards pricing, tariffs and trade agreement barriers to 
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65 UN General Assembly, Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, 26TH Session, 2 August 2001, UN Doc. 
A/RES/S-26/2, para.15, 55, General Assembly Resolution 58/179 UN Doc. A/RES/58/179, (22 December 2003) 
paras. 4, 6, 7, General Assembly Resolution 60/262 UN Doc. A/RES/60/262 (2 June 2006) paras. 42, 49, General 
Assembly Resolution 65/277, UN Doc. A/RES/65/277, Para. 32 
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access.67 The UN Assembly 2015 resolution 70/1 adopted the WHO SDGs which embodies 
the commitments of states’ towards Goal 3 on health and well-being.68  These resolutions 
reiterate that access to medicine is pivotal to right to health and also the state obligations 
towards making drugs accessible.   
 
At national level, state acts, constitution, legislations and official statements on access to 
medicine also qualify as norms. As demonstrated by ICJ in the North Sea shelf cases, norms 
create positive and legal obligations for states. The highlighted state practices on access to 
medicine embody binding obligations for the states to ensure access to medicine. At the 
international level, state minsters also represent states at international organisations and the 
Resolutions emerging therefrom are usually adopted by the state representative’s on behalf of 
the states.69 
 
So far, access to medicine as derivative of right to health and right to life as well as customary 
international law highlight the legal status of access to medicine and the expected level of 
protection. The UN committee reports also highlighted the influence of IPR on the right of 
access to medicine and the positive obligations on states to ensure adequate protection of the 
right. Beyond the legal framework on access to medicine and the state obligations, the 
pharmaceutical industry plays quite a vital role towards the actualisation of this right. The 4As 
dimensions of access to medicine recognise the obligations and the need to refrain from 
adopting IP measures and pricing strategies that constrain state efforts towards access to 
medicine. 
4.5   HUMAN RIGHT OBLIGATIONS OF PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS
 TOWARDS THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
 
The UN recognises the obligations and the roles of non-state actors towards the fulfilment of 
human right.70 The preambles in UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR71recognise that non-state actors 
also have the responsibility to promote and observe the rights in the Conventions.  However, 
preambles are not binding. They only offer interpretative guide to the substantive provisions 
 
67 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/262 UN Doc. A/RES/60/262 (2 June 2006) Para. 42 
68 UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015) P. 16 
69 Lee (n 28) 132 
70 CESCR, General Comments. 14, Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 42 
71 The preambles to the ICCPR and ICESCR  state that ‘realising that the individual, having duties to other 
individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognised in the present Covenant’ 
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of the Conventions.72 Nonetheless, with Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, preambles can be 
relied on to accentuate the meaning of a substantive provision. Article 2 of the ICESCR and 
ICCPR respectively indicate that only states are bound by the Covenants. However, the usual 
comprehensive interpretation of the conventions as enabled by the VCLT, can accommodate 
human right obligations of non-state actors.73  
The UN Human Right Sub-Commission on the promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
the 2003 adopted ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transactional Corporations (TNC) and 
other Business Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights’.74The commission recognised that 
‘…transactional corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, 
secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect and protect human rights recognised in 
international as well as national law, including the rights and interest of indigenous people 
and other vulnerable groups’.75Corporations are further enjoined to refrain from activities that 
encourage the abuse of human rights.76 Corporations are required to respect the socio-economic 
and the civil and political rights that contribute to the realisation of physical and mental 
health.77  
Notably, the UN Commission had recognised that human right norms for TNC have no legal 
status.78 However, Resolution 2005/69 created a mandate for the special Representative of the 
UN-Secretary General led by John Ruggie. The mandate focused on human right and TNC and 
other Business Enterprises. The report recognised that, the governance gap created by 
globalisation, incentivise firms to adopt practices that can potentially violate human rights.79 
Consequently, companies were enjoined to integrate in their management function, a better 
understanding of their human right responsibilities.80 It follows that, IP holding pharmaceutical 
firms are expected to integrate the right of access to medicine in pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
 
72 Lee, (n 28) 144 
73 Hestermeyer, (n 34) 96 
74UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2  
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/501576/files/E_CN.4_Sub.2_2003_12_Rev.2-EN.pdf Accessed on 21/09/19 
75 Ibid Para. 1 
76 Ibid Para. 11 
77 Ibid Para. 13 
78 UN Commission in 2004 Resolution 2004/116, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7 
79 UN Human Right Council Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for 
Business and Human Rights. Para. 3 
80 Ibid, Para. 54 
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In 2011, John Ruggie issued a guiding framework on Business and Human Rights on the 
implementation of the UN’s ‘protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’.81 The UN Human 
right council via Resolution 17/4 adopted the Ruggie’s framework July 2011.82The guidelines 
are soft laws. However, they provide authoritative UN standard for human right responsibilities 
of business enterprises. With respect to access to medicine, the guidelines acknowledged the 
health responsibilities of patent-holding companies. The recognition is against the background 
of the impact of their activities on price of drugs and neglected diseases.83 With respect to 
patent and licensing, pharmaceutical companies were required to avoid practices and policies 
that undermine state efforts towards access to medicine. This is especially in cases where the 
flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement are used or contemplated. 84  
 
With respect to pricing, the guidelines require pharmaceutical firms to consider pricing 
strategies that promote access to medicine. The guidelines also recommended firms to consider 
differential pricing between countries, commercial and not-for-profit voluntary licenses, 
donations, and public-private partnership (PPP). These pricing strategies can ensure that 
medicines are equitably accessible.85 
 
Overall, it is seen that access to medicine as a human right envisages a joint responsibility 
between states and pharmaceutical firms. Clearly, the realisation of this genre of right, largely 
depends on pharmaceutical firms’ core commercial activities.86For instance, the core activities 
of pharmaceutical firms is drug R&D and this is integral to the realisation of the right of access 
to medicine. Incidentally, a market-based approach to pharmaceutical commercialisation may 
undermine the actualisation of this right and states’ efforts towards the realisation. 
 
Access to medicine as human right to health and life has been established in the preceding 
discussions. Despite the highlighted obligations of the pharmaceutical IP holding firms, the 
right to the protection of IP that accords an inventor protection against the benefits of their 
 
81  UN Human Right Council Doc. No. A/HRC/17/31. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. 
82 UN Human Right Council Doc. No. A/HRC/RES/17/4, Human Rights, transnational corporations, and other 
business enterprises. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/RES/17/4. Accessed on 21/05/19 
83 Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to Medicine. Annexed to the 
Report of the Special Rapportuer on the Right to Health to the UN General Assembly (11 August 2008) UN Doc. 
A/63/263 
84 Ibid, para. 26-27 
85 Ibid, para. 33 
86 Lee (n 28) 153 
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intellectual efforts is recognised. This right seems to be pitched against the right of access to 
medicine and this might create a conflict of interest between the patent holders and the public.  
 
4.6 RIGHT TO THE BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL EFFORTS 
 
Arts. 27(2) and 15(1)c of the UDHR and the ICESCR respectively recognise that everyone has 
a right to the protection of the moral and material interests that result from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of the author. As demonstrated in chapter 2, IP has the attributes 
of property rights, albeit intangible.87 This is also consistent with Art.17 of the UDHR which 
guarantees the right to own property and the fact that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property. The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights in Art. 17(2) also recognised 
that IP shall be protected. IP as property right and the right to derive the benefits from scientific 
inventions seem to advance the utilitarian goal of patent that protects intellectual efforts against 
free riders and to encourage the advancement of knowledge.88  
 
The above provisions recognise property rights as international human right. The fact that 
individuals have a property right to ideas is derived from Locke’s theory of property right 
which is based on labour.89 It follows that an inventor is entitled to benefit from innovative 
efforts. Notably, a line of argument has been advanced. It has been argued that since the 
highlighted provisions made no specific mention to ‘inventor’, it will be indefensible in law to 
claim that an entitlement to patent protection is a human right.90  
 
With access to medicine and the IP as human right, the question is how to deal with the conflict 
that could emerge from the exploitation of the right of access to medicine and property rights. 
As earlier demonstrated, the exploitation of patent proprietary right can undermine the right of 
access to medicine. The question and the challenge arise where one human right is pitted 
against another.91  
 
 
87 UK Patent Act 1977, S.30(1) (2), 31(2), 35 US. Code S.261 stating that ‘patent shall have the attribute of a 
personal property’.  
88 Rochelle Cooper Drefuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox in William Grosheide (ed) in 
Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar, 2010)74 
89 See generally, Lee, (n 28) 35-37 
90 For the argument on IP as property right, see Jan Brinkhof, On Patents and Hu8man Rights in Willem 
Grosheide (ed) Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox 
91 Drefuss (n 88) 72 
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In terms of superiority of rights, it has been argued that since right to health is a basic right and 
vital to an adequate standard of living, it should assume eminence over property rights and 
other rights that are based on wants and desires.92In thinking about the paradox of property 
right, Peter Draho noted that:93 
At a level it is inconceivable that the development of human personality and the 
protection of individual interests within a group can take place in the absence of 
property rules that guarantee the stability of individual possession. Yet within the 
context of the social group no other rules require the continuous adjustments that the 
rules of property do… It is for this reason that, when a general right6 of property is 
recognised in a human right instrument, it is made subject to some sweeping public 
interest qualification.  
In balance of the recognition of right to scientific progress, Article 15(1) of the ICESCR 
enjoined state parties to recognise the right to the enjoyment of scientific progress. Notably, 
the legislative intentions would not be to pitch one right against another but rather to take a 
balanced approach. This explains the reason most rights are not absolute but exercisable subject 
to reasonable limitations and the extent public interests and considerations permit. 
Consequently, there is therefore a need to recognise a balance between the property right of an 
inventor over a patented invention and the interest of the public in the scientific invention.  
 
It has become important to ensure that patent protection of an invention does not impede efforts 
towards attaining right to health and life. In providing the normative content of Art.15 ICESCR, 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that: ‘… state parties should 
prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights and 
dignity, including the right to life, health and privacy by excluding inventions from patentability 
whenever their commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of these rights’94  
 
The relevance of medicine as consumer goods, access to medicine as very relevant to attaining 
right to life and health have been demonstrated. In view of this relevance, Puyembroeck has 
 
92  R Chandra, The Role of Law in Reconciling Constitutional Right to Heal with TRIPS Obligations: an 
Examination of the Glivec Patent Case in India’ in T Pogge, M Rimmer and K. Rubenstein (eds) Incentives for 
Global Public Health: patents Law and Access to Medicines (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 381 
93 Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights’ (1999) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly, 360 
94 UN Economic and Social Council comments on the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the 
author (article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/17 12 January 2006, 9 
https://undocs.org/en/E/C.12/GC/17 Accessed 20/07/21 
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argued that given the contribution of health to human capabilities, health deserves utmost 
priority.95Consequently, where the protection of patent as property right would endanger the 
actualisation of the right of access to medicine, the protection of the right of access to medicine 
would take precedent.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 clearly demonstrated how IP holding firms pursue patent proprietary right in 
a way that may undermine the right of access to medicine. Further IP strategies and the use of 
trade sanctions and retaliations against states that adopted legislative measures to facilitate 
access to medicine were seen. Those practices clearly interfere with the realisation of right of 
access to medicine as guaranteed under customary international law, the right to life and health. 
 
Notably, the WTO seem to recognise the need to subordinate the exploitation of the proprietary 
right to public health and other interests. The general comments of the CESCR on human right 
and intellectual property reiterates that the realm of trade, finance and investment are not 
exempt from the principles of human right.96 Hence, Legislations, polices and international 
rules on IP must abide by the provisions of International Human Right law.97 The CESCR in 
restating the core obligations of the state parties with respect to the ICESCRs states that, IPR 
regime that makes it difficult for a state party to meet up with its core obligation with respect 
to health, education, food and other related rights is ‘inconsistent’ with the legally binding 
obligations of the state party.98 
From the perspective of the TRIPS and public health, the challenges arising from patent 
protection and access to medicine has been seen. It has become imperative to ensure that 
international trade and IP are exploited in manners that do not undermine the right of access to 
medicine whilst at the same time, protecting the right of the patent holder. Art.xx of the GATT 
recognise that states can adopt measures to restrict the exploitation of IP to protect public 
health. In Art. 27(2 & 3) of the TRIPS provides that the scope of patent protection can be 
restricted or denied and that the exploitation of IP can be restricted for the protection of public 
interests. Under Art. 31 and 31bis of the TRIPS as well as the Doha Declaration, the 
exploitation of patent proprietary right that endangers public health can be restricted through 
 
95  Rudolf Puymbroeck, ‘Basic Survival needs and Access to medicine – coming to Grips with TRIPS: 
Conversation + Calculation (2010) 38 Journal of Medical Law and Ethics, 520, 527 
96 UN CESCR, Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Doc. No E/C.12/2001/15 (2001) para. 3 
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid,  para. 12 
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compulsory license under determinate circumstances. Under Art. 6 of the TRIPS, the member 
states of the WTO are permitted to adopt any convenient regime of patent exhaustion to limit 
the exploitation of patent proprietary right.  Accordingly, the need to facilitate the right of 
access to medicine can justify limiting the exploitation of patent proprietary right without 
unreasonably undermining the legitimate interest of the patent holder. All of these demonstrate 
that patent proprietary right is not absolute but balanced towards ensuring public access to 
patented inventions.  
Beyond the highlighted measures within the TRIPS Agreement that limits the scope of patent 
exploitations, some non-TRIPS measures also exist to address the patent and access to 
medicine challenge. Some of such measures are Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) and the activities 
of non-governmental organisations like Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF).  
 
4.7 NON-TRIPS MEASURES AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
Several non-governmental organisations and measures exist to bridge the patent barrier to 
access and to facilitate the development of life saving medicines for LICs. The strategies of 
these organisations can be used to facilitate and reasonably resolve the access challenge. One 
of these strategies is a patent pool option. This option is facilitated by the MPP which is a UN 
backed public health organisation that works towards facilitating access to medicine in LICs. 
A patent pool refers to a business arrangement where MPP partners with civil societies, 
international organisations and other stake holders to pool IPRs on drugs and then license them 
to generic manufacturers to develop.99 This is done through a public-private partnerships. The 
overall aim is to improve access to medicines and health technologies through non-exclusive 
voluntary licensing of patent.100 A patent pool is constituted where two or more patent holders 
put their patents together in a way that authorisation for use can be granted for all patents in 
the pool as a single package.101  
As at 2021, MPP has signed agreements with 10 patent holders for 13 ARVs, 3 hepatitis C 
Direct Acting Antiviral (DAA) and a tuberculosis treatment.102 So far, since the establishment 
 
99 Medicines Patent Pool, https://medicinespatentpool.org/ Accessed 26/07/21   
100 MPP, Licensing for Public Health, https://medicinespatentpool.org/what-we-do/licensing-for-public-health/ 
Accessed 27/07/21 
101 Olasupo Owoeye, ‘Compulsory licensing and Local Drug Manufacturing Capacity in Africa’ (2013) Bulletin 
of World Health Organization, 214, 216 
102 Medicines Patent Pool, https://medicinespatentpool.org/ Accessed 26/07/21   
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of MPP in 2010, it has facilitated the production of generic drugs to treat millions of people 
through a model that helps pharmaceutical firms to license their rights voluntarily to generic 
manufacturers.103 MPP has been argued as capable of responding to patent thicket challenge 
where several patent holders hold intersecting rights that a manufacturer must obtain licenses 
for in order to bring a product to the market. MPP does this without infringing the patent 
holder’s rights.104  
So far, about 148 countries have benefitted from access to MPP-licensed products in exchange 
for royalties sometimes.105No doubt, the MPP is quite promising for developing countries to 
obtain licenses from the pool to facilitate health needs. Notably, the MPP is yet to cover myriad 
of other diseases outside HIV, Hepatitis and TB. Nonetheless, the existing model provides a 
great avenue for other tropical diseases to follow.   
The MSF and similar non-governmental organisations are international, independent medical 
humanitarian organisations that provide medical assistance to people affected by conflict, 
epidemics, disaster and exclusion from healthcare. The MSF facilitates access to medications 
for myriads of diseases like Hepatitis C and E, HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Corona Virus and host of 
others. The MSF works towards ensuring that effective drugs, test and vaccines are available, 
affordable, accessible and adaptable to the needing population. 106 Following the 
Implementation Decision waiver of 2003 which also established the conditions that enable 
compulsory license to be granted for export purposes, the MSF facilitated the use of the 
mechanism for the export of the three-in-one ARV combination of 
Zidovudine/lamivudine/nevirapine (AZT/3TC/NVP) drugs between Rwanda and Canada 
through Apotex Inc.107  
The MSF further drive new approaches to medical R&D through the Drugs for Neglected 
Initiatives (DNDi).108 The DNDi as a non-profit R&D organisation that was founded in 2003. 
It works to deliver treatments for neglected patients that are living with filarial infections, 
paediatric HIV, Hepatitis C, leishmaniosis etc. Since 2003, DNDi has delivered 8 new 
treatments and also successfully developed new chemical entity fexinidazole that was approved 
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in 2018 for the treatment of sleeping sickness.109 The DNDi’s 2021-2028 Strategic plan aims 
to deliver 15-18 new treatments for a total of 25 new treatments.110 The vision of DNDi for 
global health R&D is to contribute to more equitable system for innovation and access. 
According to the Chief executive Director of DNDi Dr. Bernard Pecoul, DNDi not only 
addresses treatment gaps, but also drives wider systemic changes to ensure access to fruits of 
scientific progress for all peoples.111The MSF was concerned that the high price of ARVs as 
charged by the pharmaceutical firm’s patent holders made the drugs out of the reach poor 
patients in LICs. Notably, through their strategies, a drop in price of ARV has been seen.112 
Besides MPP, MSF and DNDi, other measures to bridge access gaps to medicine are also 
pursued by other government and non-governmental organisations like the US President’s 
Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), the United Nation’s International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Global Fund and the United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) amongst others.  
No doubt, through patent pool and the funding R&D for generic and brand drugs, low price of 
drugs and generic competition emerge. One might then question the relevance of the 
flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement that can contain the patent barriers to access. Notably, 
these non-TRIPS measures might explain the sparing use of the flexibilities like compulsory 
license by the states where the need is even more compelling.  
Notably, the relevance of the highlighted measures is somewhat limited and only complement 
the existing legal flexibilities.  These measures may not offer a ready solution to new and 
incremental inventions for existing and new diseases like the recent Covid 19 infection and the 
vaccines. Regardless of the relevance of the highlighted measures, the TRIPS flexibilities are 
legal provisions that could serve a ready use for patented inventions. They remain  legal means 
that can be exploited instead of relying on the benevolence of an organisation.  
4.7   CONCLUSIONS 
Public health challenges arising from inequitable access to medicine and the role of patent 
protection have been seen. Using the HIV/AIDS scenario, this chapter demonstrated the 
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influence of patent exclusive right on the price of ARVs. The nature of medicine as a consumer 
good further highlighted the importance of consumer access to life saving drugs. The WHO 
2020 HIV/AIDS statistics further demonstrated a global disease burden with a disproportionate 
application in LICs. The statistics justify the need for states to adopt proactive measures that 
can reduce disease burden.  
The 4As access framework and the human right legislations presented the obligations of states 
and the pharmaceutical IP firms towards ensuring that medicines are affordable, accessible, 
available, and adaptable to the users. The legislations and cases laws highlighted the tripartite 
and positive obligations of states to fulfil, protect and promote the right of access to medicine. 
These positive obligations require states to adopt proactive measures towards the realization of 
the right of access to medicine. On the other hand, IP holding pharmaceutical firms have the 
right to the benefits from innovative efforts. However, this right is balanced with public interest 
considerations. Consequently, patent holders are required to refrain from adopting IP measures 
and strategies that potentially frustrate the realization of the right of access to medicine.  
Following the analysis in chapters 2, 3 and 4, a tension between two competing interests or 
rights has emerged. These competing interests to wit: the right of access to medicine and patent 
proprietary right are subject to different but interrelated policy and legal considerations. Access 
to medicine is primarily under the legal and policy sphere of public health and human right. 
On the other hand, pharmaceutical patent proprietary right is within the policy sphere of IP and 
trade. As these competing interests serve legitimate and interrelated purposes, there is need for 
a balance.  
A balance is expected to broaden consumer access to medicine, without jeopardizing the 
interest of the patent holder and continued innovation. Against the background of the 
obligations of states to adopt measures to facilitate the right of access to medicine, the TRIPS 
Agreement and national IP legislations recognize several viable measures or flexibilities that 
are available for state use. One of such measures is the compulsory license mechanism. Chapter 
5 proceeds to explore the potentials of compulsory license in facilitating the right of access to 




COMPUSORY LICENSING MECHANISM 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The discourse in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that maximising pharmaceutical patent 
monopoly can present an access to medicine challenge. As seen in Chapter 4, access to 
medicine is a human right and it imposes positive obligations on states to adopt measures to 
promote, protect and fulfil this right. Facilitating the right of access to medicine is expected to 
be pursued in a way that does not undermine patent proprietary right. Against the background 
of the positive obligations of states to facilitate the right of access to medicine, the compulsory 
license flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement and domestic IP legislations can be used to 
facilitate the availability of drugs, in balance of patent right. Despite this perceived potential of 
compulsory license, there are also concerns that, it encourages free riding, and might 
discourage innovation and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decisions. From the perspective of 
the TRIPS Agreement, this chapter explores the potentials of compulsory license measure in 
facilitating access to medicine.  
This Chapter comprises of 8 sections. Section 2 provides the general overview of compulsory 
license. Thereafter, section 3 explores the legal framework. This is followed with the nature 
and scope of compulsory license in section 4. Section 5 considers the grounds and potentials 
of compulsory license. Thereafter, sections 6 and 7 explored the economics of compulsory 
license and the concerns against the mechanism. Section 8 concludes.  
5.2 WHAT IS COMPULSORY LICENSE? 
Compulsory license is issued to allow for either the use, importation, production, and the 
distribution of patented products, without the authorisation of the patent holder. 1 This 
authorisation is issued by a competent authority in a state, to either the government itself or 
third parties to exploit a patent.2  
 
1 Kenneth C. Shalen, Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzman and N. Lalitha, Globalization, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Pharmaceuticals: Meeting the Challenges to Addressing Health Gaps in the new International Environment 
in Kenneth C. Shalen, Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzman and N. Lalitha (eds) Intellectual Property, 
Pharmaceuticals and Public Health (Edward Elgar, 2011) 17 
2  Jerome Reichman and Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical 
Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA, (2003) 
Issue Paper, 5, 1. See also TRIPS Agreement 1995, Article 31 
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As demonstrated in chapter 2, a third party’s right to use, make or sell patented inventions are 
accessed through a voluntary license between the patent holder and the third-party. However, 
with a compulsory license, a state can override the patent right on specific grounds and terms. 
The patent holder is mandated to provide a firm or the government with the right to import, 
reproduce and/or sell the patented product3in the exchange for reasonable compensation.4The 
patent holder is therefore expected to tolerate against his will, a third party use of the invention.5 
5.3 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPULSORY LICENSE  
Historically, compulsory license has been part of the patent system and it has primarily been 
used to address the issues arising from local working of a patent, as a form of patent abuse.6 
Compulsory license as a general term covers different types of non-voluntary authorisations by 
a state. As adopted by different patent legislations, crown use, government use, use without 
authorisation, statutory licenses, and licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices7are different 
references to compulsory license. It is relevant to consider some of the legal framework of 
compulsory license. To wit: Paris Convention, TRIPS Agreement and some national 
legislations, to demonstrate the underpinning objectives and grounds.  
5.3.1    PARIS CONVENTION (PC) 1883 
Article 5A(2-4) of  PC recognises the use of compulsory license as a measure to correct patent 
abuse. The contracting states of the PC have the right to issue a compulsory license to prevent 
patent abuses that arise from the exercise of exclusive right. One of the instances of patent 
abuse in the PC, is where a patent holder refuses to work a patent. For failing to work a patent, 
the PC permits the issuance of compulsory license, except the patent holder can justify the 
failure. However, under this circumstance, compulsory license can only be issued after four 
years of filing the patent or three years after the patent has been granted. Article 5A(4) PC 
generally requires that compulsory license should be non-exclusive and non-transferable, even 
in the form of sub-licenses. 
 
3 Jarrod Tudor, ‘Compulsory Licensing in the European Union’, (2012) 4 George Mason Journal of International 
Commercial Law. 222,231 
4 Robert Bird, ‘Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximising Access to Essential Medicines 
While Minimizing Investment Side Effects’ (2009) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 209, 209 
5 Reichman and Hasenzahl, (n 2) 10 
6 Susan Sell, ‘Intellectual Property at a Crossroads: The Use in Intellectual Property Jurisprudence: Intellectual 
Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestations and Settlement’ (2004) 38 Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review, 267, 273.  
7 Padmanabha Raamujam and Yogank Goyal, ‘One View of Compulsory Licensing: Comparative Perspectives 
from India and Canada’ (2014) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review,369, 377 
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Historically, the 1925 revision of the PC dealt with the abuse that can result from the exercise 
of patent exclusive right. Article 5 of the 1925 revised PC, allowed contracting states to take 
legislative measures to prevent abuses. Where compulsory license fails to correct the abuse, 
the patent would then be forfeited.8   
Notably, there is no definition of ‘working’ in the 1883 PC. The PC recognised that forfeiture 
of patent as a sanction for non-working could generate a cost to the patent holder. In some 
cases, investment or know-how may be insufficient to work an invention.9 The system of 
compulsory license as a primary sanction for non-working was therefore adopted in the 1925 
revised PC in place of outright forfeiture of patent.10  
Compulsory license measure in the 1925 revised PC was amended at the 1934 and 1958 
conferences of revision. Each contracting state then reserved the right to issue compulsory 
license to prevent patent abuses. Where issuing compulsory license is insufficient to prevent 
an abuse, the patent will be forfeited 2 years after the grant of the first compulsory license.11   
Neither ‘abuse’ nor ‘compulsory license’ was defined in the PC. The PC however mentioned 
‘failure to work’ as one of the practices that may constitute an ‘abuse’ of patent. Under the PC, 
cases of deliberate non-use of patent can be patent abuse.12 In the absence of specific mention 
of patent practices that can give rise to patent abuses, countries are free to issue compulsory 
license for varieties of reasons.13  
5.3.2    THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 1995 
Under specified grounds, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits the use of patent by 
government or third parties, without the authorisation of the patent holder. The authorisation 
of the license is considered on individual merits.14The issuing authority is required to first make 
efforts towards obtaining prior authorisation from the patent holder on reasonable commercial 
terms. The requirement of prior authorisation is however waived, where the license is issued 
 
8 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (The Hague Act) 1925, Article 5 
9 Reichman and Hasenzahl, (n 2) 10 
10  Ibid 
11  Paris Convention for the protection of Industrial 1934 (London), Article 5A(2-4) 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287734 Article 5A(2-4) Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 1958(Lisbon) http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=287778. 
Accessed on 16/10/2018 
12  The Paris Convention Centenary: From 1883-1983 (International Bureau of Intellectual Property WIPO, 
Geneva 1983) 36 http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/875/wipo_pub_875.pdf       Accessed 
16/10/18 
13 Reichman and Hasenzahl (n 2) 12 
14 TRIPS Agreement Art.31(a) 
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for national emergency, circumstances of extreme urgency and public non-commercial use. 
Where the license is issued for national emergency and extreme urgent situations, the patent 
holder is expected to be notified as soon as reasonably practicable about the license. Similarly, 
where the license is issued for public non-commercial use, the patent holder is expected to be 
informed thereafter.15   
The scope of compulsory license is limited to the purpose it is initially issued and must be non-
exclusive and non-assignable.16Article 31(f) requires that compulsory license must be issued 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market. The issuing state is also obliged to protect 
the legitimate interest of the patent holder and terminate the license, once the circumstance(s) 
leading to the license ceases to exist and unlikely to reoccur.17Upon the issuance of the license, 
the patent holder is entitled to the payment of adequate remuneration and this is measured by 
the economic value of the authorisation.18 
The legal validity of compulsory license and the decision that relates to remuneration, can be 
subject to judicial review or the independent review by a higher authority in the member 
state.19Where compulsory license is issued to correct anti-competitive practices, the member 
states are not obliged to negotiate with the patent holder prior to the authorisation or issue the 
license predominantly for the domestic market.20   
From the above, it is deduced that the TRIPS Agreement recognises two broad uses of 
compulsory license. On one hand, compulsory license can be issued for public interest reason. 
This ground covers public health issue, emergency situations and public non-commercial use 
amongst others.  On the other hand, compulsory license can be issued to correct anticompetitive 
practices where the exploitation of patent right violates competition law.  
Ultimately, compulsory license intervention under the TRIPS Agreement, is meant to override 
the patentee’s exclusive rights for the period of the license. It offers a flexibility that can be 
used to mitigate abuse of patent monopoly.21 This is with the expectation that compulsory 
 
15 Ibid, Art.31(b) 
16 Ibid, Art.31(c-d) 
17 Ibid, Art.31(g) 
18 Ibid, Art.31(h) 
19 Ibid, Art.31(j) 
20 Ibid, Art.31(k) 




license will generate generic competition to induce price reduction and then increase access to 
patented inventions.22  
Article 31(f) requirement raises concern about the practicality of the mechanism in LICs. 
Article 31(f) legally presupposes that, countries issuing compulsory license should locally 
manufacture the subject matter of the license. Also, the countries are unable export more than 
half of the products to a needing member state. This requirement significantly challenges the 
ability of LICs to use compulsory license.  
In view of public health challenge and the need to facilitate access to medicine in LICs, Article 
31(f) limitation poses a difficult challenge for LICs with insufficient pharmaceutical capacity. 
This challenge makes it difficult for such LIC to exploit the mechanism. The severity of this 
challenge inspired the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. The Council of TRIPS Doha 
Declaration of 2001, the Implementation Decision of 2003 and the amendment of the TRIPS 
in 2017, addressed this challenge.   
5.3.2.1 COMPULSORY LICENSE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE DOHA 
DECLARATION 2001  
 
The implication of patent exclusive right on public health, price of drugs and the use of 
compulsory license to facilitate access to medicine, were acknowledged and addressed in the 
WTO Ministerial Declaration at Doha Qatar, in 2001 (herein referred to as the Doha 
Declaration). The Doha Declaration recognised the importance of patent in stimulating 
innovation and the effect of patent on price of drugs.23 The Declaration further recognised the 
gravity of public health challenges arising from HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidermis that challenge most developing and least developed countries (LDCs). The 
Declaration also confirmed the positive rights of member states of the WTO to adopt measures 
that are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement for the protection of public health and access to 
medicine.24 Paragraph 5 of the Declaration permits countries to determine the grounds of 
compulsory license and the circumstances giving rise to emergency and extreme urgency.  
The declaration further affirmed that many developing countries experience public health 
epidemics and the need to reconcile the TRIPS Agreement with efforts towards containing the 
 
22 Ibid 
23 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health No. WT/MIN(0)/DEC/2, 14 November 2001, para. 1  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf  Assessed on 22/10/18 
24 Ibid, para.5 
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public health crisis. Accordingly, the Declaration carries a clear statement about the rights of 
the WTO members to grant compulsory licenses25 in response to the public health challenge 
arising from patent protection.  
Notably, bearing in mind the limits of Article 31(f), paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
recognised the difficulties of LIC member states of the WTO with insufficient pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity may face in making effective use of the license. The Council for the 
TRIPS was therefore charged with the responsibility to find expeditious solution to the 
challenge. In response to this, the Implementation Decision of 2003 emerged.   
 
5.3.2.2 THE 2003 IMPLEMENTATION DECISION  
 
The mandate of paragraph 6 necessitated the WTO general council’s Implementation Decision 
in August 2003 (referred to the Decision) to give effect to paragraph 6. The Decision provided 
a tailored approach to the use of compulsory license to benefit countries with insufficient 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.26Majorly, the Decision created an exception to Article 
31(f). The Decision waived Article 31(f) requirement and allowed pharmaceutical products 
manufactured under compulsory license (under laid down procedures.), to be wholly exported 
into another territory  
Following the Declaration and the Decision, a protocol to amend the TRIPS Agreement was 
submitted to the General Council of the WTO for adoption. 27  The General council on 8 
December 2005,28 adopted the protocol amending the TRIPS and submitted to the members for 
acceptance. Upon the ratification of the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement by two third 
(2/3) majority of the WTO members, the TRIPS Agreement was formerly amended in 2017. 
This amendment has therefore replaced the Decision for the member states that have accepted 
the amendment. The amendment of the TRIPS Agreement resulted to the inclusion of Article 




25 Fredrick Abbot, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health: Lightening a Dark Corner at the WTO’ 
(2002) Journal of International Economic Law, 469,494 
26 Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. WT/L/540. 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm  Accessed on 23/10/18  
27 Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Ip/c/41.  6 December 2005 
28 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. WT/L/641 8 December 2005 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm Accessed on 23/10/18 
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5.3.2.3 ARTICLE 31BIS TRIPS AGREEMENT29 
 
Article 31bis and the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement incorporate the amendments on 
compulsory license. Article 31bis permits the export of the products manufactured under 
compulsory licenses to eligible importing states, subject to the payment of adequate 
remuneration to the patent holder. Under Article 31bis(2), the amount of remuneration is 
measured by the economic value of the license to the importing state.  
For a broader and a more productive use of compulsory license, Article 31bis(3) recognises the 
need to harness Economies of Scale (EoS) in LICs. Article 31bis(3) therefore promotes a joint 
or regional license to enhance purchasing power and also facilitate local production of 
medicines in LICs. Consequently, it recognises that a joint compulsory license can be issued 
by LICs that are bound in a Regional Trade Arrangement (RTA). Significantly, pharmaceutical 
products manufactured and imported under Article 31bis(3) into a member state of a RTA, can 
be re-exported into other countries within the RTA.   
The use of Article 31bis is generally subject to the procedures in the Annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement. 30 The Annex provides the terms and obligations of both the importing and 
exporting states.  
5.3.3    THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION REGULATION NO 816/2006 
Each member state of the European Union (EU) regulates the grounds and conditions for the 
issuance of compulsory license. Nonetheless, in response to WTO’s 2001 Declaration and the 
2003 Decision on compulsory license and public health, the EU Parliament adopted Regulation 
(EC) No 816/2006 on compulsory license. The Regulation covers the production of 
pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health challenges. The essence is 
to create a uniform implementation system to ensure uniform conditions for the issuance of 
compulsory license for the export of pharmaceutical products.31 
Article 1 of the Regulation establishes a procedure for the issuance of compulsory license in 
relation to patents and supplementary protection certificates (SPC). Under the Regulation, any 
person can submit application for compulsory license to the competent authority in the member 
state of the EU where patent or SPC have effect.32The application shall contain particulars of 
 
29 Article 31bis is discussed extensively in Chapter 6 of the thesis.  
30 See Chapters 6 & 7 for extensive discussions on TRIPS Agreement compulsory license for export.  
31 Regulation (EC) No. 816/2006, Recital 4 
32 Ibid Article 6 
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the applicant, the pharmaceutical products as contained in Article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement.33 
Under Article 9, before an application for compulsory license can be made, the applicant is 
required to negotiate with the patent holder for a period of 30 days. Compulsory license under 
the Regulation is not assignable and the quantity of products manufactured under the license is 
limited to the quantity that meets the needs of the applicant’s country.34Additionally, the 
duration of the license shall be clear and the products manufactured under the license are to be 
specially packaged and specifically distinguished from those made by the right holder.35 
The issuance of compulsory license under the Regulation is subject to the payment of adequate 
remuneration to the patent holder. The Commission predetermines the amount of remuneration 
to the right holder. The amount is usually fixed at 4% of the total price paid by the importing 
country. The 4% is applied where the license is issued for national emergency, cases of extreme 
urgency and for public non-commercial use. In other cases, the remuneration is based on the 
economic value of the use the license was authorised by the importing state.36  
5.3.4    UNITED STATED OF AMERICA 
The United States of America (USA) has no general statute regulating non-voluntary licenses 
of patented inventions.37However, 28 USC 1498 allows government use of patented invention 
without a license or the lawful right to use or manufacture it. The only remedy available to the 
patentee is the recovery of reasonable and entire compensation for the unauthorised use. The 
compensation is recovered through an action against the US in the court of federal claims.  
Other US legislations also recognise the use of compulsory licenses or the unauthorised use of 
patent for public interest. The Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 USC 2402-2404 permits a 
protected variety to be declared open for use in the interest of the public. Such declaration is 
necessary to ensure satisfactory supply of fibre and food. The license is issued where the owner 
refuses to supply the public at a reasonable and fair price.  
In relation to environmental Protection, the Clean Air Act 1970 (42 USC 7608) permits the 
issuance of a compulsory license where the patented technology for the reduction of emission 
is not “reasonably available” to a licensee. To safeguard Public interest, the US Atomic Energy 
 
33 Ibid Article 6(3 a-f) 
34 Ibid, Article 10(1)(2) 
35 Ibid Article 10(3)(4)(5) 
36 Ibid Article 10(9) 
37 Reichmann and Hasenzahl (n 2) 10.  
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Act 1948 (42 USC 2183) permits the government or a third party to apply to use a patented 
invention for public interest. Where a patent is needed to produce special nuclear material or 
atomic energy or for common defence and security, compulsory license may be authorised. 
5.3.5    CANADA   
Section 19 of the Canada Patent Act, 1985, permits government use of patented 
inventions.38The government use is authorised on terms the government considers expedient.  
Such authorisation is non-exclusive and predominantly limited to the supply of Canadian 
market.39  The patent owner is entitled to the payment of ‘adequate remuneration’ by the 
commissioner. However, the amount is measured by the economic value of the authorisation.40 
Where the circumstance(s) leading to the authorisation of the license ceases to exist or unlikely 
to reoccur, the commissioner can terminate the license.41 
The use of compulsory license is recognised as one of the remedies of patent abuse. The 
Canadian Competition Act 1985 empowers the federal court to authorise a license for the use 
of patented invention when the patent holder exploits the patent right in ways that unduly 
prevent or reduce competition.42An applicant is required to negotiate a voluntary licence with 
the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms. Where the negotiation fails, the application 
for the license can be made.43 However, in cases of national emergencies, extreme urgencies, 
and for public non-commercial use, the requirement of prior negotiation does not apply.44 
Section 65 of the Patent Act permits the Attorney general of Canada or any person to apply to 
the commissioner to allege ‘abuse of exclusive right’. The commissioner may grant the 
applicant the license on expedient grounds. The Act recognises the following grounds for 
compulsory license: when the demand for the patented article in Canada is not met, where trade 
or industry in Canada is prejudiced by the refusal of the Patentee to licence the invention on 
 
38 Canada Patent Act, R.S.C 1985 c. P-4. Prior to this amendment, Patent Act 1935, S. 40(3) recognised the 
authorisation of compulsory license for the preparation and production of food and medicine. The license is based 
on the need to make food and medicine available to the public at the lowest possible price. In Ss.65 &66, 
compulsory license was granted against patent abuse arising from non or insufficient working of the patent or the 
refusal to license an invention. Following the 1969 report of the Harley Committee on the quality, price, and 
availability of prescription drugs, in 1969 the Canadian compulsory license provision was amended to permit the 
issuance of compulsory license for the importation and manufacture of drugs. See Canadian Patent Act 1969 P-4 
R.S.C, S.41(4) 
39 Ibid. Section 19(2) a-c 
40 Ibid, S. 19(4) 
41 Ibid, S.19(5) 
42 Competition Act R.S.C, 1985 C-34 
43 Canada Patent Act 1985, S.19.1 (1)a-b 
44 Ibid, S. 19.1(2) 
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reasonable terms, for public interest and where trade or industry in Canada is unfairly 
prejudiced because of the conditions attached by the patentee for the use, working or licensing 
of the patented article.45Section 32 empowers the federal court to license a patent where the 
exclusive right has been used to unduly injure trade, unnecessarily enhance the price, and lessen 
competition in the production and sale of the patented article.46 
In response to the Doha Declaration and the Implementation Decisions on compulsory license, 
Canada amended the Patent Act and the Food and Drug Act in 2004. The amendment created 
the Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR). The amendment recognized the issuance 
of compulsory license for export to the designated countries. Following this, Canadian drug 
manufacturers are allowed to wholly export medicines that are manufactured under compulsory 
license to LDCs with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.47Consistent with 
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement, the amended Act allows a Canadian generic producer 
to manufacture generic drugs for export to LDCs.48 The amended Patent Act gives effect to the 
Canada and Jean Chretien’s pledge to Africa to facilitate access to medicine. The Act contains 
specific procedures for the Commissioner of patent to issue compulsory license to a 
pharmaceutical company, to produce eligible drugs for export to the LDCs that are recognized 
under the Act. 
5.3.6    SOUTH AFRICA 
The 1978 South African Patent Act recognises the issuance of compulsory license. Compulsory 
license under the Act is issued for the working of a dependant patent and to prevent the abuse 
of patent right.49 For cases of patent abuse, any interested person who demonstrates the abuse 
of patent right over a patented invention, may apply to the commissioner for compulsory 
license.50  Under the 1978 Patent Act, abuse of patent right is deemed to arise under the 
following circumstances: where the inventions are not sufficiently worked without any 
satisfactory reasons(s),51when the demand for the patented article is not met on reasonable 
terms, the refusal to grant a licence on reasonable terms, where trade or industry is 
prejudiced,52where the demand for the invention is met by importation and the price charged 
 
45 Ibid, S.65(2)a-f 
46 See S. 32(1) a-d and 32(2) c Competition Act R.S.C c. C-34 
47 Canada Patent Act, R.S.C c. P-4, S. 21.03(1) 
48 Ibid 
49 Patent Act 1978, S. 55 a-c 
50 Ibid, S. 56(1) 
51 Ibid, S.56(2)a 
52 Ibid, Section 56(2) c-d 
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for the product is considered excessive.53 Like the TRIPS Agreement and the Canadian Patent 
Act, compulsory license under the South African patent Act is non-exclusive and non-
transferable.54 
 
Overall, the legal framework of compulsory license recognises similar grounds and conditions. 
This is a recognition that compulsory license can be used to pursue public interests and to 
broaden access to patented invention where the exploitation of exclusive right challenges 
accessibility. It remains to see the nature and the scope of compulsory license to determine its 
limitations.  
5.4   THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF COMPULSORY LICENSE 
Essentially, compulsory license neither suspends a patent nor hinders a patentee from 
competing with the compulsory licensee in the same market. Despite the license, the patent 
remains in force. Except the compulsory licensee, the patentee still reserves the right to exclude 
unauthorised third parties from exploiting the invention.55 Consequently, a patent holder is not 
denied ownership of the patent. However, regarding the market for the invention, the patentee 
will no longer enjoy the exclusive right to make and sell the patented invention.56  
The right of a patent holder to remain in the market derives from Article 31(d) of the TRIPS 
Agreement and similar provisions in national legislations. Article 31(d) requires that 
compulsory licenses should be non-exclusive. The patentee remains free to exploit the patent.  
It has been argued that, allowing the patentee and the compulsory licensee in the same market 
diffuses the exclusive use of the market (hitherto belonging to the patentee). In turn, the society 
benefits from generic competition.57However, so long as the patent holder complies with local 
competition law, he can still exert influence in the market.58  
As argued by Calabresi et al, Compulsory license mechanism operates to convert the patent 
holder’s proprietary right to liability. The supposed entitlement of the patent owner under the 
 
53 Ibid, Section 55(2)e 
54 Ibid, Section 55(5) 
55  Elena Pantopoulou, ‘The Status and Legal Effect of Compulsory License in Investment Law’ (2016) 1 
International Journal of Law,33, 34  
56 Cynthia Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on patents and Related 
Rights, (Oxford university press, 2011)127. See also Pier DeRoo, ‘Public Non-Commercial Use Compulsory 
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs’ (2011) Michigan Journal of 
International Law. 347,348 
57 Sigrid Sterckx, Patents and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical Analysis (2004) 4 Developing 
World Bioethics, 59, 61 
58 Reichman and Hasenzahl (n 2), 23 
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patent property rule, becomes a liability. 59  Consistent with Article 28(2) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the right to assign and conclude a licensing contract over a patent, rests primarily 
on the right holder. However, a non-voluntary license strikes at the core of the patentee’s 
private right and can undermine the economic expectations of the patent holder.60This can 
partly explain the resistance against the use compulsory license with trade sanctions and 
withdrawal of concessions.61Incidentally, countries with insufficient economic, political and 
the technical capacity may lack cross retaliatory capacity to withstand such oppositions. 
Countries possess the discretion to determine the grounds of compulsory license. However, the 
open-ended discretion is usually exercised with caution to avoid abuse. Pires de Carvalho noted 
that ‘Compulsory licenses are exceptions to patent rights and as such, should be kept 
exceptional. In the light of Article 7, and in considering paragraph 4 of the preamble, the 
balance between rights and obligations cannot be obtained by diminishing the rights of the 
patent holders without accruing to the collective interests of individuals only. Only social and 
collective interests justify the grant of compulsory license’62 
Overall, compulsory licenses serve legitimate public interest. However, it is expected to be 
exploited in a way that takes into adequate account, the legitimate interest or expectations of 
the patent holder.  
5.5   THE GROUNDS AND POTENTIALS OF COMPULSORY LICENSE 
As seen from the legal framework of compulsory license, countries are free to determine the 
grounds and reason upon which the license is issued. 63 Across the legal frameworks of 
compulsory license, some of the following circumstances justify the use of compulsory license: 
public interest, government use, public non-commercial use, emergencies and extreme urgent 
situations, inadequate supply of the domestic market, refusal to licence, anti-competitive 
practices, price reduction, improvement of prior inventions and supply of food and drugs.64 
Notably, the existence of any or all of these grounds can significantly limit access to patented 
inventions.   
 
59 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review,1089,1092 
60 Reichman and Hasenzahl (n 2) 23  
61 Chapter 6, pp. 151-153 on the experiences of Thailand and Columbia 
62 Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (2nd Edition, Kluwer Law International, 2005) 318  
63 Para.5(b-c) WTO 2001 Doha Declaration (n 23) 
64 Fredrick Abbot, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at the WTO after the Doha 
Declaration on Public Health (Occasional Paper No. 9, 2002) 24  
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In practice, the most common grounds of compulsory license are public interests and anti-
competition practices. Public interests also cover the use of compulsory license for price 
reduction of IP goods and this can be achieved through generic competition. Drawing from the 
instances of the use of compulsory license, cases laws and the US Federal Trade commission’s 
(FTC) rulings, the next section highlights the possible use of compulsory license to induce 
price reduction of drugs, to facilitate public interest and to stem anticompetitive practices.  
5.5.1   PRICE REDUCTION 
 
As demonstrated in figure 5.3.1, the Council of TRIPS 2001 Doha Declaration recognised the 
influence of patent on price of drugs, the impact of high price on public health and the use of 
compulsory license to facilitate price reduction. 65 Chapter 2 also demonstrated how IP holding 
firms exploit patent strategies to sustain high price of drugs. Where monopoly pricing is found 
to limit access to medicines, compulsory license may present a viable tool to authorise the 
importation or the production of cheaper generic drugs. This induces generic competition and 
consequently broadens access to pharmaceuticals. Compulsory license in this sense, corrects 
the patentee’s monopolistic market practices that result to high price.66 As seen in chapters 2, 
3, and 4, compulsory license will be helpful, where the invention has no or limited substitute(s). 
Benoliel and Salama agreed that compulsory license presents a viable tool for price reduction 
of pharmaceuticals. They however noted that the effective use of the mechanism is largely 
influenced by three important elements. The key elements are the anticipated net savings from 
the license, the expected cost of any sanction (that is the retaliatory cost the patentee may 
impose) and the expected administrative costs of lax IP institutional framework.67  
In explaining the net savings, Benoliel et al, noted that the cost of compulsory license must be 
weighed against the expected benefits. A country may choose to issue compulsory licenses 
instead of negotiating a voluntary license and then pay the agreed royalty. The decision to issue 
compulsory license only becomes cost–effective where the issuing country has the capacity to 
either buy or produce the drugs at a cheaper rate.68 Benoliel et al further explained that net 
saving is only guaranteed in industrialised countries because indigenous generic production is 
 
65 The Council of TRIPS 2001 Doha Declaration (n 23) 
66 Atif Azher, ‘Antitrust Regulators and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Compulsory licensing Schemes Ignoring   
Gene Therapy Patients’ Needs’ (2004) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law,283,384 
67 Daniel Benoliel and Bruno Salama, ‘Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post WTO-ERA’ 
(2010) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 265, 291-2 
68 Ibid, 292-3 
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possible. 69 Overall, they concluded that a viable and competitive generic pharmaceutical 
industry, local technical capacity, proper manufacturing conditions and a large consumer 
market could guarantee a productive use of compulsory license.70  
This thesis agrees with Benoliel et al’s argument about indigenous pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity. However, the lack thereof does not mean a productive use of 
compulsory license is impossible in LICs. Article 31bis of the TRIPS has made it possible for 
LICs (where the capacity element is absent), to exploit compulsory license through import. On 
the other hand, even though compulsory license can send a wrong signal, it does not indicate a 
lax IP system. Even with strong IPP and enforcement standard, developing countries recognise 
and have been seen to issue compulsory license to facilitate access to medicine.71 This means 
that the use of compulsory license does not indicate a weak IP system. Only a routine and 
indiscriminate use can indicate so. 
Notably, local manufacturing capacities can guarantee net savings. It also lends more 
credibility to the threat of compulsory license.72 Patent holders are more willing to negotiate a 
price reduction or a voluntary license where the threat of compulsory licence is credible.73 
Notably, this credibility is usually absent in LICs with limited or no innovative capacity. 
Remarkably, before the threat of compulsory license can induce price reduction as in the case 
of Brazil,74 the issuing country must possess the indigenous capacity to develop and produce 
at least, the generic drugs of the brand product.75 
The Canadian House of Commons’ Harley Committee that was set up in 1962,76investigated 
the quality, price, and availability of prescription drugs in Canada.77The committee noted that 
 
69 Ibid  
70 Ibid, 297   
71 The United Kingdom’s compulsory licenses for cancer and Cystic Fibrosis drugs in 2015 and 2019      
respectively are still pending. Notably, this information is not available on the UK IPO official website. See 
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72 Benoliel and Salama (n 67) 293 
73 Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations (2002) 20 Wincosin 
International Law Journal 563, 571 
74 Brazil used the threat of compulsory license to reduce the price of HIV/AIDS drugs by up to 75%. See Peter 
Yu, ‘Access to Medicine, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action’ (2008) 34 Journal of Law and Medicine, 345, 
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the price of drugs in Canada was artificially high. One of the recommended solutions was to 
weaken patent monopolies to improve generic competition. 78  Consequently, in 1969, the 
compulsory license provision was amended to allow the commissioner to issue compulsory 
license for the importation of drug.79 
Instances of the use of compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals in the past, demonstrate the 
benefits of price reduction.80 In 2003, Zimbabwe81granted a compulsory license to Varichem 
Pharmaceuticals ltd (a Zimbabwean registered company) to produce ARV and other HIV/AIDS 
related drugs.82Varichem published proof of price differentials between the patentee’s drugs 
and the generic drugs manufactured under the license. 83  Varichem’s ARV generic drug 
‘Varivar tablet 60s’ was launched in 2003 at US$13.95 per month for AZT/3TC. This was 
against US$30 per month for the brand drugs.84 Varivar was the generic version of Combivir 
(a double fixed dose combination of Zidovudine and Lamivudine) which belonged to 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer-Ingelhiem’s Nevirapine the right holders in Zimbabwe. It 
was reported by Health GAP that, AZT+3TC (brand name: Combivir) for HIV, was also 
available for as little as 75cents per day from an Indian generic manufacturer. However, the 
cheapest price of the Combivir in Zimbabwe was $2.00 per day.85 
Similarly, Urias and Ramani conducted a systemic review of the issuance of compulsory 
license and the impact on price. The review revealed that compulsory license is an effective 
 
78 Ibid 
79 See Section 41(4) of the Canadian Patent Act 1969 P-4 R.S.C 
80 Samuel Anum, World Intellectual Property Organisation’s  Regional Seminar on the Implementation and the 
use of Several Patent-Related Flexibilities’ held in Durban, South Africa, January 29-31 2013.Ghana in 2005 
issued compulsory license and achieved Antiretroviral (ARV) price reduction of more than 50% from US$495-
235 for one-year treatment.  
81 Zimbabwe granted a compulsory license on ARV in 2002. Health GAP, Zimbabwe’s Declaration of ‘AIDS 
Emergency’ Opens Doors for Increased Access to Affordable Drugs’ (2002). Available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/zimbabwe/hgap05302002.html. Accessed on 14/03/19 
82 Information from Mashayi W and Mawire I. of Zimbabwe Intellectual Property Office and Ministry of Justice 
and Legal Affairs Zimbabwe, respectively. Presented during the WIPO Regional Seminar for Certain African 
Countries on the Implementation and Us of Several Patent Related Flexibilities held in South Africa (January 29-
31, 2013  https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent_policy/en/wipo_ip_dur_13/wipo_ip_dur_13_ref_t10c.pdf. 
Accessed on 14/03/19 
83 Cecilia Oh, Compulsory Licenses: Recent Experiences in Developing Countries (2006) 1 International Journal 
of Intellectual Property Management, 22, 26 
84 Mashayi W and Mawire I., The Use of Compulsory Licenses: The Experience of Zimbabwe (2013) presented 
during the WIPO Regional Seminar for Certain African Countries on the Implementation and Us of Several Patent 
Related Flexibilities held in South Africa. 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent_policy/en/wipo_ip_dur_13/wipo_ip_dur_13_ref_t10c.pdf. Accessed 
on 14/03/19 
85 Health GAP, Zimbabwe’s Declaration of ‘AIDS Emergency’ Opens Doors for Increased Access to Affordable 
Drugs’ (2002). http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/zimbabwe/hgap05302002.html. Accessed on 14/03/19 
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means of reducing drug price. They considered about 24 compulsory license events with price 
data. The review found a mean price reduction that ranges between 66.2 to 73.9%.86  
Overall, the actual use or threat of compulsory licenses can induce price reduction and generate 
net savings. However, for a threat to be credible, the issuing state should possess the capacity 
advantage as in the Brazilian example. Notably, it is recognised that Benoliel et al’s three 
elements are relevant considerations when compulsory license is contemplated.  
5.5.2   PUBLIC INTEREST 
Public health concerns, the need for equitable access to medicine and food, emergency and 
cases of extreme urgency, public-non-commercial justify public interest use of compulsory 
license. With respect to public health, the German court in Bioferon V Genentech & BGH 
referred to as ‘Polyferon’ determined what amounts to public interest.87 The court held that the 
interest of the public and the patent holder should be weighed. To issue compulsory license on 
a medication on the ground of public interest, the medication must be for the treatment of a 
serious disease. The disease must be such that cannot be treated with a comparable product or 
can only be treated without considerable side effects. In view of the criteria for determining 
public interest, the court confirmed that Polyferon’s drug, which treats rheumatoid arthritis, 
has a valid alternative in IFN-gamma. Hence, the removal of Polyferon from the market will 
leave patients with a potent alternative.  
In a similar case, the German federal Court in 2017 held that, the Shionogi (a Japanese 
pharmaceutical company) must grant Merck a license to Raltegravir. Raltegravir was 
Shionogi’s European patent on HIV active substance. 88  Expert evidence established that 
Raltegravir (Isentress) was more effective than other alternative treatment options because of 
the reduced side effects. The court understood that the removal of Isentress from the market 
would affect babies, children under the age of twelve and pregnant women. The alternatives to 
Raltegravir proved to be hepatotoxic.89 Another risk was the possibility that patients who 
cannot take isentress may completely stop HIV treatment. Based on the public interest criteria 
 
86 Eduardo Urias and Shyama Ramani, ‘Access to Medicine after TRIPS: Is Compulsory Licencing an Effective 
Means to Lower Drug Prices? A Review of the Existing Evidence’ (2020) 3 Journal of International Business 
Policy, 367, 381 
87 BGH GRUR 1996, 190, 193- Polyferon 
88 BGH GRUR 2017, 1017-Raltegravir 
89 Toxic to liver cells 
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in Polyferon, the court found a strong case for public interest, which justifies the need for 
compulsory license for vulnerable patients and the prevention of new infections. 
The Canadian Court of Exchequer in the case of Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd V. Bell-Craig 
Pharmaceuticals Division of L.D Craig Ltd90 explained the purpose of compulsory license 
under the Canadian Patent Act as:  
In my view, the objective of the provision is to bring about competition. On balance, in 
most fields, competition is regarded by Parliament as being in the public interest ... and 
also because competition tends to bring about greater efficiency, better service, and 
further research. The monopoly granted to an inventor is an exception to this general 
principle in our law. [The compulsory licensing provision] was passed because, in the 
field to which it applies, “the specific public interest in free competition” was deemed 
to be more important than the maintenance of the patentee’s monopoly rights91 
Upon further appeal against the amount of royalty wherein the Supreme Court dismissed case, 
Justice Abbot92said:  
In my view, the purpose of s. 41(3) is clear. Shortly stated it is this. No absolute 
monopoly can be obtained in a process for the production of food or medicine. On the 
contrary, Parliament intended that, in the public interest there should be competition 
in the production and marketing of such products produced by a patented process, in 
order that as the section states, they may be "available to the public at the lowest 
possible price consistent with giving to the inventor due reward for the research leading 
to the invention. 
Based on the forgoing, it is seen that the potentials of compulsory license are recognitions that 
public interest, the need for price reduction and generic production of drugs were interpreted 
as overriding the economic interests of the patent holder. Access to innovative drugs, (subject 




90 (1966) S.C.R. 313  
91 Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd v LD Craig Ltd, Bell-Craig Pharmaceuticals Division (1965), 46 CPR 32, [1965] 2 Ex 
CR 266  
92 Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd v LD Craig Ltd, Bell-Craig Pharmaceuticals Division, [1966] SCR 313, (1966), 48 CPR 
137, at CPR 144  
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5.5.3   ANTI-COMPETTIVE PRACTICES 
The legal framework of compulsory license demonstrates that beyond the use of compulsory 
licence for public interest, it can also be used as anti-competition remedy. A patent holder can 
adopt anti-competitive strategies to strengthen market presence. Consequently, the practices 
can restrict the market entrance of new firms into the market. Refusal to license or licenses that 
are based on unreasonable terms, excessive prices amongst other practices can restrict 
competition.  
Under the TRIPS Agreement, where anti-competitive practices are established, the requirement 
of prior consent from the patent holder is not required.93Notably, anti-competitive practices are 
regulated by independently by Antitrust or Competition laws. As form of market regulation 
and where a patent abuse is established, compulsory license may be imposed.94 
Where anti-competition practices have been established against a right holder, the courts also 
ruled that a right holder’s exclusive right cannot prevail.95 To protect consumers and ensure 
market competition, the US used compulsory licenses to stem anti-competitive practices. The 
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) granted non-voluntary licenses in consent decrees on 
corporate mergers and acquisitions, to address antitrust violations.96  
In 2005, the US FTC ordered the compulsory license of Guidant’s IP, for the RX delivery 
system for Drug-Eluting Stents (DES). The licensing of Guidant’s IP was a precondition for 
the acquisition of Guidant by either Johnson & Johnson or Boston Scientific. For winning the 
bid to acquire Guidant, Boston Scientific was required to license DES patent to Abbott who 
was a potential entrant. The FTC thought the merger might undermine competition.97 
 
93 TRIPS Agreement, Art.31 b, f, k  
94 See Cases 6 & 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italino SPA, Commercial Solvents Corp. V. Commission (1974) 
E.C.R, 256 the court found the Appellant abused its dominant position for refusing to supply a raw material for 
the production of anti-tuberculosis drug. The ECJ confirmed the EC decision to order compulsory license of the 
solvent against the appellant for infringing Art 102. FTC, “FTC Accord in Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz Merger to Prevent 
Slow Down in Gene Therapy Development and Preserve Competition in Corn Herbicides, Flea Control Market, 
supra no. 58, FTC, “Resolving Anticompetitive Concerns, FTC Clears $16b Acquisition of Immunex Corporation 
By Amgen Inc (2002) supra no. 59  
95  Hartford-Empire Co. United States 323 US 386, 453, 64 USPQ 1 (1945), United States V United Shoe 
Machinery Corp 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953) 
96 FTC, “ FTC Requires Asset Divestiture Before Allowing Boston Scientific $27B Acquisition of Guidant 
Corporation (2006) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/04/ftc-requires-asset-divestitures-
allowing-boston-scientifics-27 Accessed 10/01/2018. See also Carlos Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing Countries” 1999 (South Centre T.R.A.D.E. working Papers 
5, 1999) 16 
97 FTC, “ FTC Requires Asset Divestiture Before Allowing Boston Scientific $27B Acquisition of Guidant 
Corporation (2006) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/04/ftc-requires-asset-divestitures-
allowing-boston-scientifics-27 Accessed on 10/01/18 
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In 1997, the US FTC decided on the merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz into Novartis. 
The FTC considered that a merger between the two companies will mean that they would 
control Chiron a biotechnology Company. The FTC reached a conclusion that the merging of 
the two companies would violate antitrust laws, because they are current competitors for 
several products. To contain the risk of such market advantage, FTC issued compulsory license 
of the IPR for several other healthcare inventions. The companies were required to license a 
large portfolio of patents, data and the know-how relating to HSV-tk haemophilia gene to 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer.98 With this license, Rhone-Poulenc is placed in a position to compete 
against the merging firms. 
From the above instances; compulsory licenses minimise the effect of strategic mergers and 
acquisition on competition. Strategic mergers can be used by few firms to collude or co-operate 
within a market. This alliance can block or restrict market competition or entry of potential 
competitors.  
Overall, from the forgoing discussions, it is seen that compulsory license possesses the 
potentials to resolve monopoly pricing and other externalities arising from patent exclusive 
right. It is therefore important to address the economics of compulsory license to highlight the 
mechanics of this license.    
5.6  THE ECONOMICS OF COMPULSORY LICENCE 
Like patent mechanism, compulsory license and the welfare benefits, derive from economics. 
An economics analysis explains the theoretical application that justifies the function of 
compulsory license. The economics of patent in chapter 299reveals the welfare and deadweight 
losses arising from patent monopoly. From the monopoly scenario in chapter 2, one of the 
effective ways welfare losses that are associated with monopoly pricing can be reduced or 
eliminated, is through generic competition. Similarly, as earlier demonstrated in the preceding 
discussions on price reduction and public interest, compulsory license can generate welfare 
gains.  
 
98 See FTC, “ FTC Accord in Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz Merger To Prevent Slow Down in Gene Therapy Development 
and Preserve Competition in Corn Herbicides, Flea Control Market https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/1996/12/ftc-accord-ciba-geigysandoz-merger-prevent-slowdown-gene-therapy Accessed on 10/01/18 
99 See chapter 2, pp. 32-38  
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It has been argued that a compulsory license can achieve market equilibrium100and the trade-
off between incentives to innovate and consumer savings.101 Clearly, these economic benefits 
contrast the restriction on competition and production that are connected with the marketing of 
patented inventions.102 The economics of compulsory license focuses on the nature of market 
demand, especially in situations or countries with unequal income distribution or purchasing 
power.  
A simple microeconomics demand curve usually demonstrates the implications of deadweight 
losses which is chiefly a function of the degree of elasticity103of the product in demand.104This 
is especially the case for products with high inelastic105demand like innovator drugs. In Fyne 
et al’s convex graph scenario below, compulsory license is assumed to eliminate or reduce 
deadweight losses. The curve indicates that consumers are willing to give up their purchases 
because of high price.106The graph also indicates the elastic107and the inelastic part of the 
market to demonstrate how access to a product is limited to only few consumers that can pay 
the price. 
 
Convex demand curve showing monopoly pricing and the effects on demand when the demand 
is either elastic or inelastic. (Fyne et al, p. 187). 
 
100 This is where the forces of demand and supply are balanced. In this scenario, the tendency for a change in price 
is limited.  
101 Victoria Kuek, K. Philips and Jillian Kohler, Access to Medicines and Domestic Compulsory Licensing: 
Learning from Canada and Thailand, (2011) 6:2 Global Public Health, 111, 112 
102 Kristina Lybecker and Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in Canada, and Thailand: Comparing Regimes 
to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules (2009) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 222, 224 
103 Elasticity of demand shows how demand for a product responds to a change in the price of a product.  
104 Lybecker and Fowler (n 102) 
105 Demand is inelastic where, a change in price causes a small or no percentage change in the quantity of goods 
that are demanded. Regardless of increase in price, consumers may be stuck with the product, because of its 
essential nature. 
106 Sean Fyne, Aiden Hollis and Mike Palmedo, An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine 
Patents in Developing Countries (2009) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics,184,187 
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Fyne et al explained that the quantity demanded in the flat/elastic part of the demand curve 
from 41-97, is unprofitable to the patent holder. Here, an increase in price affected many 
consumers who were priced out of the market. Monopolists target consumers at the steep of 
the demand curve because of their willingness to pay. Those consumers can hardly react to an 
increase in the price of products. This signifies a reduction in demand where there is an increase 
in price.108 The result is that majority of the consumers are unable to pay for the product and 
this generates substantial deadweight losses. In the final analysis, Fyne et al explained that in 
this case, a monopolist is inclined to serve only a smaller segment of the market.109 
On the other hand, Fyne et al argued that a compulsory license can be used to induce generic 
competition, achieve market equilibrium and then convert the deadweight losses into consumer 
surplus and lower prices.110By licensing a competitor to produce and supply the same or similar 
products in the same market as the patent holder, market competition is induced. Consumers 
are then presented with alternative suppliers or credible substitutes. Consequently, compulsory 
license can improve consumer welfare111and consequently reduce the deadweight losses arising 
from monopoly pricing.   
The economics of compulsory license demonstrates that welfare benefits of its use. It balances 
the indiscriminate enforcement of the patent proprietary rules. Ideally, compulsory license 
targets marginal pricing or cost112of production to increase consumer access. It also provides a 
determined contribution to R&D expenses through reasonable royalty. 113 The standard of 
remuneration is expected to trade off the negative effects of licensing with positive consumer 
effects.114 
As seen, compulsory license generates welfare benefits that can minimise access gap through 
generic competition. This is against the patent scenario where innovator medicines with no or 
limited substitutes incentivises market control. On the other hand, payment of adequate or 
 
108 Goldberg P.K, ‘Intellectual Property Right Protection in Developing Countries: The Case of Pharmaceuticals’ 
(2010), 8 Journal of the European Economic Association 326,  
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110 Ibid,191 
111 Pankaj Tandon, ‘Optimal Patents with Compulsory License’ (1982) Journal of Political Economy,470,470 
112 This is the change in total production cost which arise from the production of additional unit of product. 




reasonable remuneration covers the impact of such market intervention on the profit 
expectation of the patent holder. 
So far, the potentials of compulsory license are clear. However, despite the demonstrated 
potentials, there are concerns that compulsory licenses might generate welfare losses to both 
the consumers and the patent holder as well as discourage innovation.  It remains to see if or 
the extent compulsory license generates welfare loss. 
5.7 CONCERNS AGAINST THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSE ACCESS 
STRATEGY 
So far, the economics and the potentials of compulsory license demonstrated the capacity to 
correct monopoly pricing and to broaden access to innovative drugs. Despite these potentials, 
there are concerns about welfare losses to the consumers and the patent holder. There are 
arguments that compulsory licenses can generate loss of earnings to the patentee, affect Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) decisions of pharmaceutical IP firms and future R&D investment.   
5.7.1  WELFARE LOSSES 
As already demonstrated in the discourse so far, patent is based on the mechanism of reward 
and incentive. As highlighted earlier, without the patent mechanism in place, it may become 
more economically attractive to copy an invention than make R&D commitments. 
Consequently, in the absence of the promise of a legal protection against unauthorised copying, 
inventors that rely on patent protection may be less inclined to invest in innovation,  
Chapter 2 highlighted on the estimated cost of pharmaceutical R&D investments.115 It follows 
that, a legitimate expectation of patent owners is the recovery R&D investment for possible re-
investment. This has made monopoly pricing part of the innovation cycle. Innovator 
pharmaceutical firms leverage on patent protection and the strategies, to guard not just against 
competition, but also sale drops that might occur after the expiration of patent term.116 
As patent rights are not absolute, it can be fettered within the bounds of the law117through 
recognised exceptions, one of which is compulsory license. This unauthorised use of a patent 
 
115 See Chapter 2, 49 
116 Christain Sternitzke, ‘An Exploratory Analysis of Patent Fencing in Pharmaceuticals: The Case of PDE5 
Inhibitors’ (2013) 42 Research Policy, 542, 544. See also Carlos Correa, ‘Public Health and Intellectual Property 
Rights’ (2002) 2(3) Global Social Policy 261, 265 
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has therefore been described as quite destructive118and disruptive of the profit expectations of 
patent holders.119 Alan Fisch described the potential impact of compulsory license on the 
pharmaceutical industry’s expected ROI. He noted the high likelihood that developing a 
breakthrough drug would result in a ‘net loss’ as a result of the license. He argued that 
pharmaceutical companies would also be inclined to reduce R&D expenditures. Overall, this 
can reduce the incentives to invest in breakthrough pharmaceuticals.120The presumption in 
Fisch’s submission is that a compulsory license means selling at a marginal price and this make 
it difficult for firms to recover the production cost.121 Fisch therefore argues that compulsory 
license leads to a less-than-maximal level of R&D. This according to Fisch, contradicts the 
patent policy goal of achieving optimal level of production. Epstein et al equally argued that a 
deviation from the standard property right undermines the incentive for private investment. 
Inventors are unlikely to invest where property rights are insecure. Consequently, the gap in 
drug may continue to widen.122 
Given these concerns, compulsory licenses have been argued to be counter-productive and 
capable of retarding optimal innovation, 123 on the ground that it encourages free ridding. 
Consequently, it has been argued that patent holders may result to concealing inventions which 
unfortunately strikes at the benefits of disclosure policy.124  
Against these concerns, the issuance or contemplation of a compulsory license, can provoke 
counter reactions from patent holders, and some cases, even beyond the specific product that 
was directly affected by the license.125The patent holder can also initiate a complaint under the 
WTO DSU mechanism against the issuing state. Trade sanctions and other retaliatory measures 
like reduced trade, indifference towards technical assistance or technology transfer and a 
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general reluctance to promote FDI in such country, are possible 126 punitive responses to 
compulsory licenses.127  
Against the forgoing arguments, it is highlighted that the concerns are valid to an extent. It 
noted that compulsory license may not generate as much welfare losses as argued. As 
demonstrated in section 5.5 on the grounds and scope of the license, compulsory license neither 
breaks nor suspends a patent. Compulsory license is non-exclusive and issued for a specific 
duration. The only implication is the fact that the patent holder no longer enjoys the exclusive 
market right over the invention. Notably too, the requirement to pay reasonable remuneration 
to the patent holder can reasonably compensate against any welfare loss that might occur. 
Beyond the market where the license is used, the patent holder remains free to exploit the patent 
exclusively in other markets.    
5.7.2  FDI DECISIONS 
FDIs are cross-border transactions or investments in the form of controlling ownership in a 
business, by an entity in another country.128Remarkably, FDI drives the development of local 
enterprises to improve the competition in the host (recipient) country, through capital 
accumulation.129Large Multinational National Enterprises (MNEs) are usually, the major FDI 
investors.130Usually, states design policies to encourage foreign firms to either export or 
establish a presence in their domestic market. The essence is to encourage the production and 
distribution of goods and services.131 National policies also target skill spillovers, know-how 
and technologies that enable domestic producers to scale up the value chain and to reasonably 
compete with MNEs in the same market.132 
A recipient country can benefit from spillovers through reverse engineering or imitation by 
local competitors. It is also possible to access patent information and master technological 
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information in MNEs through employment.133FDI promotes economic development and plays 
a key role in international economic integration, development of local enterprises and 
technology transfer.134 
Despite the benefits of FDI, there are concerns that compulsory licences might threaten FDI 
decisions and the economic benefits that could have accrued to a recipient country. Importantly, 
whether compulsory license can threaten FDI would largely depend on whether the MNE rely 
on IPP to make FDI decisions. Beyond the benefits of FDI, does the MNE rely on the strength 
of IPP (if any) when considering FDI as a business stratagem? Where this is established, the 
next question is whether compulsory license does in fact affect FDI decisions? 
It has been argued that strong IPR regimes135enhances access to knowledge and technology 
transfer through FDI, joint ventures or licensing agreement.136On the other hand, a weak137IPR 
regime may encourage the imitation of foreign technologies by domestic firms.138 In analysing 
the role of IPP in FDI decisions, Maskus explained that, since IPR guarantees exclusive rents 
to inventors to compensate for the cost of investment; creative activities may be threatened in 
the absence of a strong IPP regime 139  Maskus was concerned that insufficient IPP over 
technical information, discourages IP firms from providing technology to the market.140 
Kashcheeva’s empirical survey examined the impact of tighter IPR on GDP growth in countries 
at different levels of development. The survey relied on set of FDI data from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Developments UNCTADstat. The statistics reported the inflow and 
out flows of FDI of 103 countries. The survey investigated the global effect of higher levels of 
IPR on economic growth from 1980-2009.  The report found that IPR does have positive effects 
on economic growth. Significantly, the survey found that a stronger IPR can ‘mitigate’ the 
growth effect of FDI due to capital accumulation by the recipient nation. On the other hand, 
Kashcheeva found that a ‘lax’ IPR can increase the growth rate. 141  Overall, the survey 
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concluded that a strong IPP only triggers a slight increase in FDI hence, the strength of IPR do 
not have a major influence on MNE FDI decision.  
In explaining the cost a recipient country pays to acquire knowledge from patent owners, 
Kashcheeva found that, ‘a 10%-point increase in a country’s ratio of FDI to GDP leads to an 
approximately 3%-point increase in growth…a one standard deviation increase in IPR is 
associated with a 1% increase in growth’. 142  Overall, she concluded that both the 
characteristics and the phase of development of countries are relevant factors. They play 
decisive roles in determining the link between FDI and IPR, which may lead to different 
welfare result.  
Branstetter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi143 analysed the effect of strengthening IPRs in developing 
countries. In considering FDI growth, Branstetter et al used a North South perspective, wherein 
the North and South represent innovation and imitation, respectively. The study focused on 
domestic industrial production and the U.S MNEs’ perception of the 1980-1990 IPR reforms. 
Drawing from the activities of US MNEs, they found that, stronger IPR in the South accelerated 
the rate at which MNE production was transferred to the South.144Discrete IPR changes in 
sixteen countries led to an expansion of multinational activities in those countries. Hence, 
stronger IPR can accelerate production shift to the Southern affiliates, thereby enhancing 
industrial development.145They explained that, as production shifts to the South, the Return on 
Investment (ROI) transferred to the North is re-allocated to R&D to drive an increase in the 
global innovation rate. Overall, MNCs that make extensive use IP disproportionately increased 
their inputs because of IPR reforms.146 
Overall, the empirical findings demonstrated that the IPP influence on FDI decisions is relative 
and largely depends on the level of the economic growth and development of a country. The 
extent an industry relies on IPP for the commercialisation of invention plays an important role 
in determining if IPP is directly linked to FDI decision. However, it is seen that the strength of 
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IPP quite influences FDI decisions especially for the industries that rely on patent protection 
(like the pharmaceutical industry) for competitive advantages. To what extent then (if any) 
would a compulsory license affect the FDI decisions of pharmaceutical firms?  
Bird and Cahoy examined the impact of compulsory license on FDI decisions in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The analysis covered the effect of compulsory licence across LDCs 
and two Middle-Income Countries (MICs)- Brazil and Egypt. They found that the practice of 
compulsory license disrupts the investment-backed expectation of property right. The survey 
found that compulsory license triggers a distrust for the issuing nation, especially to the 
pharmaceutical and other patent reliant industries. Consequently, industries may avoid FDI 
investment in the countries where property rights are insecure. With respect to pharmaceutical 
industry, loss of investment opportunities in developing countries may affect access to essential 
medicines.147Markedly, Bird et al identified the efficiency advantage(s) that foreign countries 
leverage to sustain FDI decisions. 148 The efficiency advantages relate to the: certainty of 
ownership, localisation, and internalisation (OLI).149  
The ownership element is the security of both tangible and intangible assets. With respect to 
LDCs, Bird et al noted that, the use of compulsory licence has no significant effect on the 
ownership advantage of foreign firm(s). This is because, the market sizes of LDCs is quite 
negligible, non-lucrative and insignificant to impact MNE FDI decision.150 Bird et al drew from 
the experiences of Brazil and Egypt’s compulsory licenses on drugs. They explained that since 
MICs are moving from a distribution to a research focused economy; they possess attractive 
economic environment for the exploitation of FDI OLI advantages.  
In response to MIC’s OLI advantage, patent applications and FDI decisions increase to 
maximise the efficiency.151In taking OLI advantages, foreign investors will need security 
against compulsory license, especially in MICs.152Incidentally, the MICs possess a degree of 
technological infrastructure to resist pressure from MNE against the use of compulsory license. 
In view of the peculiarities of MICs, the eventual use of compulsory license can therefore 
trigger a substantial loss of FDI.153 
 
147 Robert Bird and Daniel Cahoy, ‘The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on FDI: A Collective Bargaining 
Approach, (2008) 45 American Business Law Journal, 1,2-3 
148 Ibid, 18 
149 Ibid, 14 
150 Ibid 
151 Ibid, 20 
152 Ibid, 27 
153 Ibid, 47 
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Overall, the empirical studies have demonstrated that the exact influence of compulsory 
licenses on FDI depends on the level of economic growth or classification of the issuing 
country. Country classification as either LDC, MIC, developing country, developed country 
and the extent the industry relies on IP to commercialise an invention are significant factors.  
Markedly, the OLI elements are essential to FDI decisions. However, it is also unlikely that the 
OLI advantages are mutually inclusive hence, this question. Must the OLI elements be present 
in a recipient country before an FDI decision will happen? It is uncertain that a firm(s) will not 
pursue an FDI decision because the IP security and enforcement mechanism are weak and the 
localisation and internalisation154advantages are favourable. It follows that, the location of the 
market and internalisation advantage may be guaranteed in a market whilst the ownership 
advantage is threatened. An MNE might as well pursue an FDI decision regardless of the status 
of the ownership advantage. Notably, this is not to argue that a weak IPP regime might not 
have at least, a marginal impact on FDI decisions.  
It is also noted that the possibility of issuing compulsory license does not imply a weak or lax 
IP regime. It serves a legitimate purpose and only exploited, where the patent holder’s market 
behaviour demands or triggers it. 
5.7.3 COMPULSORY LICENSE AND INNOVATION 
The relationship between patent and innovation in the drug industry has been seen in chapter 
2. Since patent has a positive influence on pharmaceutical innovation, does it mean that 
compulsory license can negatively impact innovation?  
The assumption that compulsory licences can reduce innovation has been questioned. Chien’s 
survey relied on the results from the empirical analysis performed on six compulsory licences 
on drug patents that were issued in the U.S between 1980s and 1990s.155The analysis compared 
the rates of innovation within a therapeutic area. The analysis was measured by patent counts 
and other indicia before and after the licenses were issued. Chien observed no measurable 
decline on future innovation. The companies that were affected by the license continued to 
perform R&D in the same therapeutic areas.   
 
154   Ibid, 14-5, explained ‘localisation’ to mean the geographic advantage efficiency which benefits MNE 
production in the target country. For instance, proximity to other markets within a region, raw material and natural 
resources etc. Internalisation refers to the ease in acquiring local enterprises as subsidiaries with expert and local 
knowledge in the target country. 
155 Colleen Chien, ‘Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals 
Hurt Innovation?’ (2004) Berkeley Technology Law Journal,1,5 
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Overall, she concluded that the concerns about compulsory license on innovation were 
probably wrong.156  Chien further considered the ‘predictability’ and the ‘importance of a 
market’ as vital elements that determine the extent compulsory licence may affect future 
innovation. She argued that unpredictable license which does not affect an important market 
would have unnoticeable impact on R&D.157In other words, compulsory license and innovation 
may not necessarily conflict, where the market is unimportant to the inventor. However, a 
compulsory license can cover the product in the patent holder’s target market. It means that the 
innovation is ordinarily premised on market significance. The patent holder and the compulsory 
licensee would share or operate in the same market throughout the life of the license. In this 
scenario, the generic competitor directly threatens the patent holder’s market. On the other 
hand, where the license covers an unimportant market to the patent holder or a product where 
the market is still immature, the likelihood of head-to-head competition is low.158  Chien 
however observed that an unanticipated loss of exclusivity with unpredictable compulsory 
licenses might influence a company’s follow-on innovation and commercialisation decision.159  
The 1995 Canadian Eastman commission investigated the impact of Canada’s broad 
compulsory license system on pharmaceutical innovation. The report covered the period 
between 1969 to 1983, wherein almost 80% of the application for compulsory licenses was 
granted. This resulted to an average of approximately 20 compulsory licenses per year in 
Canada. 160 The data from the pharmaceutical industry showed no adverse effect on the 
pharmaceutical industry in Canada. It also found that the overall profitability of the firms in 
the pharmaceutical industry, measured by their after-tax profit on capital for 1968 to 1982 was 
more stable than most industries in Canada. The profit was also found to be higher than most 
industries were. The report therefore concluded that compulsory license had no apparent effect 
on the profitability of the Canadian pharmaceutical industry. However, the report found an 
 
156 Ibid 
157 Ibid.  
158 Ibid, 21 
159 Ibid. See also Fredrick Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing (New York University 
Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, 1977) pp. 67-75 found no negative impact of compulsory license 
on innovation. However, Scherer found slight positive relationship between licensing and high R&D-to-sales 
ratio. Joerge Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser, Does Compulsory Licensing Discourage Invention? 
Evidence from German Patents After WW1, (NBER Working Paper No. 21442, 2015) 2, Petra Moser and 
Alessandra Voena, Compulsory Licensing: Evidence form the Trading with the Enemy Act’ (2012) The American 
Economic Review, 396, 396 
160 Eastman Commission Report, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry (1985) 
Canadian Government Publishing Centre. Available on http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bcp-
pco/CP32-46-1985-1-eng.pdf. Accessed on 10/08/18 
129 
 
adverse effect on the profits of specific firms.161After comparing the R&D intensities in Canada 
with some countries in the same level of development at that time, the report concluded that 
compulsory licenses did not significantly affect innovation in Canada.162 
Similarly, Mcfetridge’s 163 study focused on Canada’s use of compulsory license on 
pharmaceuticals. The study found that Canada’s compulsory license had no negative impact 
on pharmaceutical innovation. Mcfetridge explained that in comparison to the world 
pharmaceutical market, the Canadian market size was insignificant at that time. This explains 
the reason compulsory license could not significantly affect innovation. Adding to this, 
Mcfetridge noted that patent protection in Canada at the time also had little influence on R&D 
decision-making.164  
The Eastman and Mcfetridge findings support Chien’s emphasis on the ‘importance of the 
market’. The conclusions that compulsory licenses did not significantly affect innovation in 
Canada because of the market size, can also hold for most LICs, (particularly the LDCs) in 
view of their seemingly small market sizes. Correa also noted the unlikelihood that compulsory 
license would reduce R&D spending in developing countries. Correa considered that developed 
markets already provide a viable market for R&D recoveries and that R&D contribution from 
most developing countries is negligible. 165 It follows that losses that occur because of 
compulsory licence in developing countries may not have significant effect on the overall 
profitability of the R&D industry. This is because, drug manufacturers largely rely on 
developed markets to recoup the cost of investment.166  
Correa’s recognises market reality. However, this argument supports transferring the cost of 
innovation to the patients in developed countries. To mitigate the loss of profit from the market 
where a compulsory licence is issued, the patent holder might impose supra-competitive price 
on the developed markets. Price of similar or unrelated product(s) may also increase in the 
attempt to mitigate the net loss arising from compulsory license. Consequently, Epstein et al 
 
161 Ibid, xviii 
162 Ibid 
163 Donald Mcfetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion, and the Growth in Robert D. Anderson & 
Nancy Gallini (eds) Canadian Economy, in Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge 
Based Economy (Routledge,1998) 65 
164 Ibid, 84. In explaining the size of the Canadian pharmaceutical market, the study reported that; with the 
exception of Merck, in 1994 Canadian R&D worldwide percentage expenditures were less than 2%. 1.3% for 
Glaxo, 1.0% for Hoffman LaRoche, 0.7% for Pfizer, 1.2% for Sandoz, 4.4% for Ciba, 1.7% for Eli Lilly, and 
6.1% for Merck 




argued that Correa’s argument could mean a ‘back door subsidy, coerced and concealed wealth 
transfer’ from developing to developed nations.167The back door subsidy in the sense of 
Correa’s argument may support free riding or even the routine use of compulsory license. It is 
also an assumption that the consumers in developed countries should bear the cost of 
innovation. 
On the other hand, Mansfield’s survey of the about 100 US firms across several industries 
evaluated the rate at which innovation can decline after the issuance of compulsory 
license.168With respect to the effect of compulsory licence on R&D, Mansfield found that with 
unauthorised license, innovators rarely realise the market value of the technology. Accordingly, 
by encouraging compulsory license, a country unintentionally reduces the incentive for 
pharmaceutical firms to invest in drug innovation.169  
Overall, the empirical findings did not find a significant decline in innovation following the 
use of compulsory licenses in the past. However, negative marginal impact on drug innovation 
cannot be overlooked. This might explain the reason for less R&D investment in neglected 
diseases. The possibility that compulsory license may be issued on the drugs might be 
predictable. However, still bearing in mind the marginal trade-off with innovation, the 
potentials or the net benefits of compulsory license are worth pursuing. A well thought royalty 
payment that objectively considers the need to sustain and reward innovation holds significant 
relevance. It can balance the need to improve access, sustain future innovation and the inflow 
of FDI. 
In view of the internationalisation of IP and against the backdrop of the potentials of 
compulsory license, public health crisis and access to medicine challenges in LICs can justify 
the exploitation of the compulsory license flexibility. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the right 
of access to medicine creates a positive obligation on states to, amongst other flexibilities,  
adopt compulsory license to facilitate access. This has therefore beamed the light on exploiting 
the Doha Declaration and Art.31bis of the TRIPS.  
Although compulsory license generates great potentials for LICs, the productive use largely 
depends on the extent of local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in countries that are 
seeking to exploit the mechanism. Based on the limitation in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
 
167 Robert Epstein and Scott Kieff, ‘The Licensing of Intellectual Property: Questioning the Frequency and 
Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents’ (2011) University of Chicago Law Review, 71, 81 
168 Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, (1986) 32 Management Series, 173,174 
169 Ibid, 180 
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Agreement, the absence of local manufacturing capacity in most LICs makes a meaningful use 
of the license impossible. However, as demonstrated in section 5.3.2, the TRIPS compulsory 
license framework, the Doha Declaration and Article 31bis have significantly addressed the 
local capacity challenge. The core of paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration is to 
promote efficient use of compulsory license in LICs despite insufficient manufacturing 
capacity. The 2003 Implementation Decision and Article 31bis resolved this issue. By allowing 
compulsory license for export, Article 31bis makes it possible for a country to wholly export 
drugs that are manufactured under compulsory license to a needing country. Consequently, 
sufficient local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity prerequisite is no longer needed to 
authorise and exploit compulsory license in LICs.   
Despite this effort, the moot question remains whether Article 31bis intervention can achieve 
paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration towards Access to medicine? Put differently, 
can LICs effectively use Article 31bis to facilitate access to medicine? Against the backdrop 
of paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration, chapters 6 and 7 would examine Article 
31bis of the TRIPS Agreement. The analysis would seek to determine whether Article 31bis 
can achieve the paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration.  
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The legal framework of compulsory license demonstrates a robust provision at all levels. The 
grounds of the license recognise the implications of patent protection on access to patented 
innovations. Drawing from the instances of compulsory license and the economics, it was seen 
that the mechanism possesses the potentials to induce price reduction through generic 
competition, address public interest and anti-competitive practices.  
As demonstrated, the benefits of compulsory license are not pursued indiscriminately and with 
undue regard to the economic expectation of the patent holder. The role of patent protection in 
stimulating innovation and the welfare losses to patent holders and the society are considered 
and balanced against the need to facilitate access. The empirical evidence and theoretical 
explanations on the relationship between compulsory license, innovation and FDI, reveal 
minimal impacts on the patent holder and innovation, especially where the license is issued by 
LICs. This is in view of their small market sizes and the level of economic development. This 
is quite relevant, considering that the use of compulsory license is more compelling in countries 
with income inequality. Notably, the minimal impact does not support abuse or the 
indiscriminate use of compulsory license by countries.  
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The potentials of compulsory license demonstrate that Art.31bis should considerably produce 
the same effect. The possibility that compulsory license can be wholly issued for export to 
bridge the gap in local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity should be explored by LICs. 
However, whether Art.31bis can be effectively exploited to achieve the para.6 objective of the 




ARTICLE 31BIS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE 
DOHA DECLARATION:  THE EMERGING ISSUES  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have examined the role of the patent system generally and the globalized 
TRIPS Agreement’s pharmaceutical patent protection as intensifying access to medicine 
challenge. Against the background of the right of access to medicine and the obligation of states 
to adopt public health measures, the potentials of compulsory licence were considered.  
This chapter builds on the conclusions of the previous discussions and also focuses on 
paragraph 6 objective of the 2001 Doha Declaration, the 2003 Implementation Decision and 
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 31bis demonstrates the sensitivity of the TRIPS 
Agreement to the public health challenges arising from pharmaceutical patent protection. 
Article 31bis is tailored to satisfy the paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration on the 
effective use of compulsory license in LICs to facilitate access to medicine. Despite this effort, 
there are arguments that Article 31bis is ‘unworkable’ hence, unable to deliver this goal. 
Against this background, this chapter asks and answers the question of whether, Article 31bis 
can be effectively exploited by a LIC to maximize paragraph 6 objective of the Doha 
Declaration in balance of the right holder. To answer this question, this chapter examines the 
challenges confronting Article 31bis to determine whether it is completely ‘unworkable’.  
This chapter is made of 9 sections. Section 2 provides an overview of Article 31bis. Section 3 
examines Article 31bis conditions and procedural requirements and the emerging issues. 
Sections 4, 5 and 6 explore the incidences of trade politics, TRIPS-Plus measures, the 
Economies of Scale (EoS) of Article 31bis and how they challenge the exploitation of Art.31bis 
mechanism. Thereafter, section 7 considers whether Article 31bis can live up to the expectation 
of Paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. Section 8 explores the possibility that 
Art.31bis(3) can significantly overcome  the EoS challenge.  
6.2 ARTICLE 31BIS: AN OVERVIEW  
As demonstrated in chapter 5, the limitation in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement inspired 
the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. However, the Doha Declaration, the Implementation 
decision and Article 31bis intervention suspended this limitation. Article 31bis highlights one 
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of the means to balance access to medicine and pharmaceutical patent protection under Articles 
7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement that embody the objectives and the principles of the TRIPS.  
As revealed in chapter 5, compulsory license as an access strategy targets the lowest possible 
price of medicine.1 Abbot et al, highlighted that compulsory license is usually exploited to shift 
the patent holder’s strategy of ‘low-volume, high margin returns’ to a ‘high volume-low 
margin’ without excessively impacting the inventor’s incentives to engage in R&D activities.2 
This emphasizes marginal pricing for drugs. Incidentally, patent owners hardly adopt marginal 
pricing strategy in a voluntary license scenario or open market. Some of the possible reasons 
could be the risk of reference pricing, parallel import3 and loss of profit.   
Following the prescribed procedures and conditions in Article 31bis and the annex to the 
TRIPS Agreement, generic drugs that are manufactured under compulsory license can be 
wholly exported into another territory. Consistent with the potentials of compulsory license as 
demonstrated in chapter 5, Article 31bis mechanism was designed to optimise paragraph 6 
objective of the Doha Declaration. 
Generally, Article 31bis compulsory licence scenario envisages at least, two countries and two 
licenses. Country A4in furtherance of public health concerns, issues a compulsory license for 
local production or importation of a generic drug(s) from country B.5The drug maybe under 
patent protection in both countries and in one of them. Where the drug is subject to patent 
protection in country A, compulsory license is first issued against the patent holder. Country A 
thereafter engages a generic manufacturer in country B for the production and export of the 
drug(s) into country A. Subject to the country B’s domestic legislation on compulsory license, 
the generic manufacturer initiates the process to issue compulsory license in country B. This is 
a simple illustration of compulsory license mechanism under Article 31bis. However, 
considering the procedural conditions, the procedure demands more in practice.   
Despite the tailored approach of Article 31bis, it has been criticised for failing to provide a 
practical solution to the access to medicine challenge in LICs. The procedural requirements of 
Article 31bis have been described as ‘unnecessary administrative hurdles’, impracticable,6 
 
1 Fredrick Abbot and Jerome Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production 
and Diffusion of the Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provision’ (2007) 10(4) JIEL 921, 970 
2 Ibid 
3 Patricia Danzon and Adrian Towse, ‘Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and 
Patents’ (2003) 3 International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics,183, 184-5  
4 Usually developing or LDCs who are referred to as issuing, recipient or importing states 
5 The exporting country where the drugs will be manufactured and exported to country A 
6 Abbot and Reichman (n 1)  
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‘administratively too complex, burdensome’ and with pre-conditions that obstruct the Doha 
Declaration goal.7 It is believed that Article 31bis offers ineffective means of facilitating access 
to medicine.8 As argued by Abbot et al, the procedural requirements of Article 31bis are 
incapable of generating EoS and capable of overshadowing the practicality of the export 
mechanism. Consequently, the intended purpose or benefits of the flexibility for LICs is lost 
or difficult to achieve.9 
Against the backdrop of the purpose of Article 31bis and the concerns about its practicality, 
one of the relevant questions is whether the WTO 2001 Doha Declaration and Article 31bis 
have/can optimized/optimize the goals? Consistent with paragraph 6 objective of the Doha 
Declaration, the goal of Article 31bis is to promote the effective use of compulsory license in 
LICs. In pursuit of this goal, the TRIPS Agreement is confronted with two competing interests. 
On one hand, is the need to increase access and wider availability of medicines in countries 
with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. On the other hand, is the need to 
balance the expectations of the patent holder(s) in recovering the cost of pharmaceutical R&D.  
In answering the above question, it is noted that, there is no systematic or empirical study on 
whether Article 31bis promotes paragraph 6 objective or the effectiveness of Article 31bis 
mechanism. To determine the extent of Article 31bis efficiency, this chapter examines the some 
of the issues that have direct relationship with Article 31bis and the extent it can work. The 
following issues or challenges are addressed: the procedural conditions of Article 31bis and 
the TRIPS Annex, advanced IP trade measures, trade policies and the EoS of Article 31bis. 
Against this backdrop, this study views these issues or challenges that confront the potentials 
of Article 31bis mechanism from four perspectives. Namely: procedural, substantive, political 
and economic. These issues are both internal and external to Article 31bis. The analysis of 
some of the procedural requirements or conditions of Article 31bis and the annex, offers insight 
into the legal impediments that inherently challenge Article 31bis. On the other hand, the 
external issues that potentially undermine the exploitation of Article 31bis emerge from 
advanced IP measures in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the practice of trade politics and 
insufficiency of EoS in in Article 31bis. These issues respectively present substantive, political 
and economic challenges to the effective use of compulsory license in LICs.  
 
7  Satish Kumar Verma, ‘TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines’ (2006) 90 https://www.kansai-
u.ac.jp/ILS/publication/asset/nomos/29/nomos29-06.pdf Accessed on 02/04/2020 
8 Ibid 
9 Abbot and Reichman (n 1)   
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The following discussions examine these issues to demonstrate the extent they challenge the 
productive use and the potentials of Article 31bis.   
6.3 EXAMINING ARTICLE 31BIS CONDITIONS 
The analysis of some of the procedural conditions of Article 31bis TRIPS Agreement draws 
out the legal and procedural impediments confronting its use in LICs.    
a) PRODUCTS, DISEASE COVERAGE AND ELIGIBLE MEMBER STATES 
In pursuit of access to medicine objective, Article 31bis10recognises that compulsory license 
can be issued to manufacture all patented pharmaceutical products and processes. Active 
ingredients and necessary diagnostic kits that are used to manufacture pharmaceutical products 
are also covered within the scope of pharmaceutical products. In explaining the disease scope 
of Article 31bis, paragraphs 1 and 5c of the Doha Declaration expressly mentioned HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as representing national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.11 Paragraph 1(b) also requires that any LDC and any other 
WTO member state can issue Article 31bis license. 
Article 31bis disease scope might have raised some questions. Does it imply a narrow 
application of compulsory license to specific drugs and specific diseases?  
Are the diseases in Para.5c of the Doha Declaration used to determine or measure the diseases 
that give rise to extreme urgency and emergency?12Does the disease category also cover non-
communicable diseases that do not generally give rise to pandemic situations?  
Stirner has argued that extending the disease scope of Article 31bis to non-communicable 
diseases, such as cancer and heart diseases, might undermine the exceptional character of 
compulsory license, as part of the solutions to public health challenges.13This argument is 
notwithstanding Stirner’s recognition that the disease category in the Doha Declaration is 
illustrative and has no semblance of a definitive scope.14 It seems that Stirner seeks to limit the 
scope of Paragraph 1a to only the diseases that can give rise to pandemic situation. It is 
 
10 See also Para. 1(a) Annex to the TRIPS Agreement and the 2003 Implementation Decision 
11 Para. 1 of the Doha Declaration, 2001 referred to’…public health problem afflicting many developed and least 
developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics’. This 
cannot be interpreted to mean a limited disease scope.  
12 Kevin Outterson, ‘Should Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities be Limited to Specific Diseases?’ 
(2008) 34 Am J. Med. 317-338, 319 
13 Beatrice Stirner, ‘Learning from Practice: Compulsory Licensing Cases and Access to Medicines’ (2012) 1(5) 




highlighted that, applying the ‘ejusdem generis’15rule of judicial interpretation to the scope of 
paragraph 1a, might justify Stirner’s argument to an extent.  The implication of paragraph 1a 
may operate to limit the disease scope of the Doha Declaration to only the diseases that are 
pandemic in nature like Zika, Ebola, HIV/AIDS and COVID 19 virus outbreak. It may not be 
extended to cover regular but recurring diseases, except where they are designated or declared 
pandemic by the state or the WHO. Notably, Paragraph 5c of the Doha Declaration permits the 
member states of the WTO to declare any disease a national emergency and public health crisis. 
It can therefore be argued that, any disease whether communicable, non-communicable or 
recurring, can represent emergency if so declared. 
Notably, Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement permits the member states of the WTO to 
implement a more extensive IPP beyond the TRIPS Agreement. Article 1 has therefore given 
impetus to countries to limit the application of Article 31bis. The 1985 Canadian Patent Act 
presents a good example. Section 21.02 limits the definition of pharmaceutical products for the 
purposes of compulsory license, to the drugs listed in Schedule 1 of the Act. The listed drugs 
appear to be largely for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, and related diseases. 
Maintaining a list of drugs that are eligible for compulsory license can potentially present a 
challenge. The ability of Canada to act as an exporting country is only limited to the diseases 
and drugs that are covered in Schedule 1. Incidentally, the content of schedule 1 has a 
semblance of diseases that appear pandemic in nature.  
Similarly, Schedule 2 of the Act also maintains a list of countries that are eligible to use Canada 
to produce and import generic drugs under compulsory license. Only LDCs that are so 
designated by the United Nations are eligible to use Canadian Patent Act for public health 
purposes. Consequently, Schedule 2 can be interpreted to exclude the application of the Act to 
developing countries. Notably, S.21.03 (1)c provides an exception. On the recommendation of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International Trade and Minister of 
International Development can amend Schedule 3 to add the name of any WTO members that 
is not listed in Schedule 2. Furthermore, pursuant to s.21.03(1)d, on the recommendation of the 
Foreign Affairs Minister, the Minister for International Trade and the Minister for International 
Development can amend schedule 4 to add to countries that are not listed in schedules 3 and 3. 
 
15 As a rule of statutory interpretation, where a class of thing is followed by general wording, the meaning of the 
general wording is construed to apply to the specific items that were mentioned. See Jo Ann Boylan-Kemp, 
English Legal System (4th edn Sweet and Maxwell, 2018) 74, see also The Law Dictionary Online. 
https://thelawdictionary.org/ejusdem-generis/ Accessed on 03/04/2020.  
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Consequently, whether a country that is not so listed in the highlighted schedules can use the 
Art.31bis mechanism in Canada depends on the discretion of the Foreign affairs Minister.  
 Incidentally, by virtue of Paragraph 1(b) of the TRIPS Annex, all the member states of the 
WTO (not only LDCs and developing countries) are free to use Art.31bis. Notably, several 
developed states have expressly stated that they will not use the system as importing member 
states.16 Some members opted to only use the system in situations of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency.17 
Based on the forgoing, it can be argued that the combined effect of Schedules 1 and 2 restrict 
the potentials and the operation of Article 31bis. Despite having sufficient pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity, Canada is legally unable to export to LDCs that are not so listed in 
Schedule 2 and also to developing countries. Incidentally, the only qualification in paragraph 
1(2)aii TRIPS Annex on the eligibility of developing countries to use the system, is the 
obligation to demonstrate insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing ability for the specific 
drug(s).  
Where Article 31bis disease coverage receives a restrictive interpretation, the rights of the 
WTO member states in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and paragraph 4 of the Doha 
Declaration are undermined.18 It is also highlighted that, the higher the number of developed 
countries with restrictive interpretation of Article 31bis, the more difficult it would be for LICs 
to use Article 31bis mechanism. Such restrictive provisions run contrary to Paragraph 4 of the 
Doha Declaration. Paragraph 4 enjoins states to implement and interpret IPP in the manner that 
supports public health and promotes access to medicine.  
b) NOTIFICATION FROM IMPORTING MEMBER STATES 
A WTO member state that intends to use Article 31bis, is required to notify the council of 
TRIPS of the intention to issue compulsory license for the production and importation of 
generic drugs. The notification should detail the specifications, names and the expected 
quantity of the products that are requested for production.19Where a developing country issues 
 
16 Para.1(b) Annex to the TRIPS. The countries include: Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Iceland, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States 
17 Ibid 
18 Stirner (n 13)  
19 Para. 2(a)i annex to the TRIPS Agreement and Decision 2003. 
139 
 
the license, there is an obligation to demonstrate insufficient local manufacturing capacity for 
the pharmaceutical product in question.20  
The importing member state must also confirm the intention to issue or the actual grant of 
compulsory license, where the pharmaceutical product(s) in question is patented in its 
territory.21 Only the amount that is necessary to meet the needs of the importing member state 
would be manufactured and exported.22The products are further required to be clearly marked 
and distinctively labelled with special packaging, colouring and shape. The generic 
manufacturer and licensee are expected to post the information on the quantity of the products 
to be supplied and the distinguishing features on a dedicated website.23  
The requirements for special colouring, shapes, and labelling have raised a concern. This 
concern is premised on the potentials of making the use of Article 31bis more expensive. Correa 
is concerned that the special feature requirement can potentially add to the cost of generic 
production.24 This also makes a significant impact where an importing country requests for the 
production of additional quantity under the license. It would follow that, special features must 
be fulfilled all over again and this would imply meeting additional obligations.25 Significantly, 
Correa further argued that, the special features requirement may require the need to study or 
investigate the package, colour and other features of the brand drugs for proper differentiation 
from the generic drugs.26This may necessitate a generic manufacturer to demonstrate or carry 
out bioequivalent,27bioavailability28 and pharmacokinetic29 studies of the generic drugs. These 
studies may become necessary as some distinctive features may require some chemical 
 
20 Para. 2a ii Annex to the TRIPS Agreement 
21 See paragraph 2a Annex to the TRIPS Agreement and Decision 2003. 
22 Para. 2(b)i annex to the TRIPS and the Decision 2003. 
23 See paragraph 2(b)ii Annex to the TRIPS Agreement 
24 Carlos Correa, ‘Will the Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement Enhance Access to medicines? (2019) 57 Policy 
Brief, 1, 3 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 21 U.S.C s.355(J)(8)(b) Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. A drug is considered a bioequivalent if the ‘rate 
and the extent of absorption of the drugs do not show significant  difference  from the rate and extent of absorption 
of the listed drug when administered  at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar 
experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses…’ . See also European Patient’s Academy, 
Bioavailability and Bioequivalence. https://www.eupati.eu/pharmaceutical-development/bioavailability-and-
bioequivalence/ Accessed 03/04/2020. It is the relationship between the expected biological equivalence of 
proprietary preparations of two drugs in the same dosage form which have similar bioavailability. 
28 This is the fraction of the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) of an administered dose of unchanged 
medicine that reaches the blood stream. See European Patient’s Academy, Bioavailability and Bioequivalence.  
https://www.eupati.eu/pharmaceutical-development/bioavailability-and-bioequivalence/ Accessed 03/04/2020 
29 This study is performed to determine the metabolism of drugs into the blood, their half-lives, and the excretion 
rate. See Hari Narayan Kushwaha et al, ‘Pharmacokinetic Study and Bioavailability of a Novel Synthetic Trioxane 
Antimalarial Compound 97/63 Rats’ (2014) Malarial Research and Treatment,1-9. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4180634/pdf/MRT2014-759392.pdf Accessed on 04/04/2020 
140 
 
formulations to devise. 30 The cost of demonstrating bioequivalence and availability can 
significantly add to the cost of generic production and ultimately, the price of generic drugs. A 
study on the cost of bioequivalence for anti-hypertensive and anti-inflammatory drugs in 
Columbia, revealed a 46-61% price increase of the generic drugs.31 However, it also depends 
on the size of the generic manufacturer. A large generic manufacturing company may be able 
to absorb such cost better than small or mid-size generic firms.32  
It is highlighted that generic manufacturers ordinarily rely on test or clinical data that are 
originally submitted by brand manufacturers to prove bioequivalences. Arising from the need 
to ensure distinctive features, the process of demonstrating bioequivalence may be quite time 
consuming. This is especially in a scenario where it is possible to avoid clinical trials. This 
requirement can significantly delay a compulsory license that may have been initiated in 
response to a disease outbreak.  
Notably, paragraph 2(b)ii of the TRIPS annex recognises the difficulties that can emerge from 
the obligation to ensure special features. Where such features impact on the overall cost of the 
license or where they become quite unreasonable to achieve, the generic supplier can disregard 
those efforts. This qualification may have made the need to distinguish generic drugs that are 
manufactured under the license an optional legal requirement, especially where it imposes extra 
cost. It is however highlighted that, where the terms of the license or the national IP legislation 
in the exporting country, (in line with Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement) require a generic 
manufacturer to specifically use distinctive features, it may be difficult to avoid.    
A. NOTIFICATION FROM THE EXPORTING MEMBER STATE WITH 
‘ATTACHED CONDITIONS’ 
The exporting country is required to notify the council of TRIPS of the intention to issue a 
compulsory license with ‘attached conditions’.33 It is highlighted that the TRIPS recognition 
of ‘attached conditions’ accentuates a country’s freedom to adopt further compulsory license 
conditions in domestic IP legislations and related regulations. It is also likely that some of these 
 
30 Correa, Will the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement (n 24)  
31 Joan Rovira, ‘Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capacities: A Solution for Developing 
Countries, in Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey and David Vivas-Eugui (eds) Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property 
and Access to Medicine (Earthscan, 2006) 227, 236 
32 Peter K. Yu, ‘Access to Medicine, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action’ (2008) 34 American Journal of 
Law & Medicine, 354-394, 359-360 
33 Paragraph 2c Annex to the TRIPS. 
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conditions may be more stringent than the TRIPS minimum compulsory license standard 
procedure. 
As earlier demonstrated, schedules 1 and 2 of the 1985 Canadian Patent Act represent good 
examples of advanced conditions. 34  It is recognised that the TRIPS compulsory license 
provision only provides minimum requirements, conditions, and procedures that countries are 
required to satisfy. However, consistent with Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement, countries are 
free to adopt procedural and substantive provisions that are beyond Article 31bis minimum 
requirement. 
It is highlighted that, the TRIPS recognition of additional conditions in national compulsory 
license legislations carries a legal implication. Ideally, national compulsory license legislations 
and regulations complement the TRIPS Agreement. However, additional conditions although 
legal, can considerably add to the overall time, technicalities, and expense of Article 31bis. The 
Rwanda use of compulsory license to import ARV drugs from Canada35reveals the influence 
of advanced national compulsory license provisions on the outcome. Following the Rwandan 
outcome, Article 31bis procedural requirements were adjudged stringent. It then follows that 
additional national conditions can complicate the use of Article 31bis.  
Kampf reviewed features in domestic compulsory license implementing legislations on Article 
31bis. The outcome revealed that, even though national legislations substantially mirrored 
TRIPS Agreement, some implementing measures established certain regulatory approvals or 
other compulsory license requirements. Some of the measures relate to, ensuring compliance 
with safety, quality, and efficacy standards beyond the TRIPS Agreement.36 Some patent laws 
allow patent owners to exercise the right of appeal against a decision for compulsory license. 
Notably, an appeal may not suspend the immediate execution of the license. However, the 
patent owner may obtain an injunction against the applicant and this may delay the export or 
imports of the drugs, until the final judicial or administrative decision.37 It is highlighted that 
the possible implication of dealing with such situation is a protracted compulsory license that 
 
34 See pp 139-140 
35 See pp.176-178 on the Rwanda/Canada use of Article 31bis.   
36  Roger Kampf, Special Compulsory Licenses for Export of Medicines: Key Features of WTO Members’ 
Implementing Legislation. (Staff Working Paper, WTO ERSD-2015-07) 8 
37 Carlos Correa, ‘Implementation of the WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 




may defeat or frustrate the overall objective, especially during a disease outbreak. Kampf’s 
findings affirm that, some national legislations on compulsory license can be quite restrictive.   
It is further highlighted that; it is within the autonomy of the member states of the WTO to 
adopt advanced IP provisions. However, it is imperative to avoid overly burdensome 
preconditions that are far beyond the requirement of the TRIPS Agreement in national 
legislations. A less restrictive national implementing system is advocated for effective 
exploitation of Article 31bis. National measures that are overly complex, discourage potential 
generic supplier from participating in the system.38 The extent of the twist in national patent 
legislations, can largely determine the number of generic manufacturers that are willing to 
participate in generic production for export.  
B. NOTIFICATION OF QUANTITY OF DRUGS 
Paragraph 2c of the TRIPS Annex, requires an exporting country to notify the Council of 
TRIPS of the products, the quantity, the country the products are to be shipped to, the duration 
of the license, the names and addresses of the licensee. Paragraph 2(b)i of the TRIPS Annex 
further requires that ‘only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing 
state may be manufactured’ under the license.  
The paragraph 2(b)i requirement has been considered quite inhibitive, especially in a pandemic 
situation(s). Abbas and Riaz argued that, it would be both economically and practically difficult 
to be clear on the quantity of drugs in epidemic and pandemic situations.39The envisaged legal 
implication is that, where the license requires prior negotiation with the patent holder(s), the 
whole process will be repeated for more drugs to be produced.40 Abbas et al are considering 
the implication of the requirement of prior negotiation with the right holder(s), before the 
license is issued. It means the generic manufacturer will have to repeat the process of prior 
negotiation.  
It is highlighted that Abbas et al’s argument is a valid concern. However, it may have a limited 
application in this sense. This argument will largely depend on the ground the License is issued. 
Article 31(b) does not require prior negotiation with the patent holder, where the license is 
issued for emergency, extreme urgent situations and for government non-commercial use. 
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However, it is noted that the conditions for compulsory license are further regulated by national 
legislations, which may require prior negotiation for voluntary license, regardless of the ground 
the license is issued. The difficulty with paragraph 2(b)i will be more profound in emergency 
health situations. The outbreak of viruses that have been seen recently like SARS, Zika, Ebola, 
and COVID-19 in China, Brazil, Africa and globally respectively, present good example. Being 
clear on the quantity to be manufactured under the system may be unrealistic in this situation. 
More so, where multiple patentees are also involved.  
It is however important to underscore the need for some degree of certainty, regarding the 
quantity or the estimated quantity to be produced. Absolute certainty may not be feasible 
(depending on the nature of the public health response). However, it might play a significant 
role in determining or calculating the amount of royalty that is due to the patentee(s). On the 
other hand, para.2c of the TRIPS Annex does not prevent member states from modifying the 
initial quantity, if the need arises. The major challenge would stem from the provisions of 
national legislations on compulsory license that might restrict that possibility.   
It is further highlighted that, one of the legal means of circumventing the requirement of prior 
negotiation for voluntary license is for national legislations to mirror Article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Article 31(b) exempts compulsory licenses that are issued for national emergency, 
extreme urgency, and non-commercial use, from the requirement of prior negotiation. The 
patentee is however required to be promptly notified of the license after it must have been 
issued. Ultimately, the license is already issued and delays that may arise from negotiating a 
voluntary license with multiple patentees are averted.  
E) RE-EXPORTATION AND TRADE DIVERSION MEASURES 
Paragraph 3 of the TRIPS Annex requires importing member state to adopt ‘reasonable 
measures… proportionate to their administrative capacities’ to contain the likelihood of the 
diversion of drugs that are exported under the license. The importing country is required to 
ensure that generic drugs that are manufactured for export are solely used for the purpose the 
license is issued. This is needed to prevent or minimise the possibility of re-export of the 
generic drugs into other territories.41 
Notably, paragraph 3 further accentuates the need for distinctive marks and features, to detect 
diversionary attempts into another territory. To further reduce the risk of re-export, all the 
 
41 Paragraph 3 Annex to the TRIPS Agreement 
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member states of the WTO are required to ensure effective legal means to prevent the 
importation of and sale of products manufactured under compulsory license into their 
territory.42  
Containing the risk of trade diversion involves taking positive measures to completely prevent 
or intercept diversionary attempts of drugs. Such measures are taken by the importing country 
and may also be imposed on the generic supplier in the license.43  
Paragraph 3 raises a cost concern. As argued, para. 3 pro-diversionary measures can 
significantly add to the overall transaction cost of the mechanism.44 It has been argued that para 
3 requirement can occasion some expenses on the importing country, especially where a LDC 
is involved.45 Correa further noted that, diversionary measures seek to contain the risk of 
unjustified parallel market that can encroach into the patent holder’s market.46 They ensure the 
products eventually reach the intended users.47 Some pro-diversionary measures may involve 
further expenses. However, in order to appreciate the trade-offs, paragraph 3 and the potential 
cost should be weighed against the purpose its serves.  
Against the background of the purpose of this requirement, it is underscored that some degree 
of precautionary measures may be necessary to ensure the containment of diversionary 
attempts. Otherwise, the already wavering confidence in the use of compulsory license may be 
completely eroded.  
Beyond the cost implications of para.3, it has further been argued that para.3 has a significant 
limitation. Even when where it is possible to adopt pro-diversionary measures, the 
requirements of para. 3 are tailored towards chemical-based treatments. Consequently, para.3 
may be insensitive to novel biologics type treatment.48 Even though Art.31bis applies to all 
treatment and pharmaceutical products, applying para. 3 requirements to novel drugs like 
biologics, cellular and gene-based therapies may be challenging.49  
 
42 Para. 4 Annex to the TRIPS Agreement 
43 Paul Vandoren and Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, ‘The WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
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Notably, even though biologics make up a small proportion of the drug market, as at 2017, it 
accounted for about 26% of worldwide pharmaceutical sales.50 Biologics significantly differ 
from chemical-based formulations  which largely consist of a single dose active ingredient in 
tablets, capsules or combined with other components.51  On other hand too, biologics are 
composed of sugars, proteins or nucleic acids or complex combinations of these substances 
and also contain living entities like cells and tissues.52 Products like vaccines, gene therapy, 
blood and blood components, allergenics and recombinant therapy are biologics.53Biologics 
are expensive, complex, tend to be heat sensitive and susceptible to microbial contamination.54 
The first challenge is the fact that biologics are unable to satisfy the requirements of para. 3. It 
is difficult or impossible to impose any meaningful identifier to the naked eye as per para. 3 
requirements. This is regardless of the fact that the colour and the shape of biologics can be 
changed.55 Secondly, the labels on biologics can easily be erased, covered or altered. The 
difficulty in labelling and the possibility that the label can be easily altered make it difficult to 
dictate whether the drugs are part of Art.31bis program.56 The risk of spillover or re-export of 
biologics into non-participating markets that are not part of Art.3bis arrangement is possible. 
Since biologics are expensive, the risk of lower prices affecting markets in non-participating 
countries remains possible and a huge challenge.57  
Notably, Paragraph 3 only allows the adoption of reasonable and proportional measures to 
prevent the risk of diversion. This requirement may seem to have balanced the concern about 
the cost implication of taking diversionary measures. In other words, importing countries may 
be excused from adopting pro-diversionary measures where they exceed their financial and 
technical capabilities. Despite this qualification, exporting countries are not prevented from 
adding proactive measures to the terms of the license and the generic manufacturer may be 
required to comply with them. 
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F PAYMENT OF REMUNERATION 
Articles 31(h) and 31bis(2) TRIPS require that a patent holder should be paid adequate 
remuneration, based on reasonable commercial terms and the economic value of the license to 
the importing state. The TRIPS presupposes an open access that is exchanged with adequate 
remuneration.58The TRIPS however left open the question of how to determine ‘adequate 
remuneration’ when compulsory license is used.59 
There is no uniform guideline or yardstick to determine the amount of remuneration that will 
be commensurate with the economic value of the authorisation in specific circumstances. In 
the absence of any legislative guideline(s), the interpretation is left at the discretion of national 
authorities. Recourse is only had to the perceived economic value of the authorisation and this 
might be relative.  
Remuneration requirement is directly linked to the TRIPS objectives that recognises the need 
to balance the rights of producers and right to access in Article 7. It can therefore be argued 
that remuneration of the patent holder is one of the central elements that can reasonably balance 
the right of the patent holders and access. The amount of remuneration is as important as 
facilitating wider access to medicine. One of the concerns of the pharmaceutical industry 
against the Thailand’s use of compulsory license, was whether in line with Article 31(h), the 
amount of remuneration that was offered by the Thai government was adequate.60 For the 
Thai’s efaverinz license, 0.5% of the sales revenues of the generic drugs, were offered as 
compensation to Merck the patent holder.61 It follows that, a key aspect of compulsory license 
is to determine the appropriate remuneration to the right holder62that can compensate for the 
temporal market loss.   
In Indian Supreme Court case of Natco V Bayer,63 the Appellant advanced an argument that 
the  6% royalty that was ordered by the Indian Controller that granted the compulsory license 
was insufficient. The Appellant argued that the Controller did not factor in R&D expenditures.  
 
58 Antony Taubman, ‘Rethinking TRIPS: ‘‘Adequate Remuneration’’ for Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing’ (2008) 
11 Journal of International law,927, 927 
59 Ibid, 927 
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Secondly, the Controller should have added and fixed the amount of royalty that would be 
based on the sale of each pack by the 3rd Respondent. It was further argued that based on the 
bifurcation of the cost of the product given by the 3rd Respondent, the retailers and the stocklist 
would get more than what the inventors receive. On the other hand, the 3rd Respondent argued 
that the 6% royalty was high.  
In considering the arguments, the Supreme Court considered the reasons that were advanced 
by the Controller for fixing the royalty rate at 6%. The Court noted the reliance on the United 
Nations Development programme’s (UNDP) recommended royalty rate of 4% that should be 
paid to the patent holder when a compulsory license is issued. The court also noted that 4% can 
either be adjusted upwards or downwards depending on the therapeutic nature of the drugs and 
whether the product was partly funded with public funds. Overall, the Supreme Court found 
that the Appellant had genuine reason for requesting a revision of the amount of royalty. 
Consequently, the court found and ordered an increase of 1% for the royalty fixed by the 
Controller to meet the end of justice.64 
So far, some legal issues emerge from the procedural requirements of Article 31bis.   
6.3.1 EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 
As seen from the forgoing, despite the lauded solution of Article 31bis, the system may be 
confronted with some legal challenges that affect the optimal benefit. These challenges can 
frustrate Article 31bis towards paragraph 6 objective of Doha Declaration. The procedural 
conditions of the Articles demonstrate some challenges. The amount of remuneration, 
advanced national conditions and the request for specific number of drugs are some of the 
emerging legal issues. 
1. Article 31bis(2) TRIPS standard of ‘adequate remuneration’ on ‘reasonable 
commercial terms’ is measured by the economic value of the license to the 
importing state. The issue of adequate remuneration continues to present a 
challenge. In the absence of a TRIPS uniform remuneration guideline, countries are 
free to adopt different modalities or guidelines for remuneration to arrive at a 
reasonable or adequate remuneration. The amount of remuneration which is 
determined by the economic value of the license to country A, would largely depend 
on the size of EoS65 generated by country A. Where the market size is small, as with 
 
64 Ibid, para 54, p.44 
65 See pp 173- 177 on the EoS of Article 31bis 
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the case with most LICs (especially, LDCs), the eventual amount becomes a 
reflection of limited purchasing power. Notably, it is important to ensure that the 
amount of remuneration to the patent holder meets the patentee’s reasonable 
expectation. This should also be the case, where the decision on the amount of 
remuneration is unilaterally determined by the issuing state. As seen in the Natco 
scenario, oppositions against compulsory license may not be unrelated to the 
amount of remuneration. 
2. Paragraph 2(c) of the TRIPS Annex is a legal permission for countries to attach 
advanced compulsory license conditions. As demonstrated, these conditions 
significantly differ from the TRIPS compulsory license conditions. The conditions 
can range from limiting the scope of the license, the drugs, countries, and other 
requirements. As earlier seen, schedules 1 and 2 of the 1985 Canadian Patent Act66 
expressly restrict the application of Article 31bis to specific drugs and countries. 
The schedules clearly disregarded Paragraphs 1(a) and 2aii of the TRIPS Annex. 
Paragraph 1(a) broadly defined the scope of pharmaceutical products to cover any 
patented product(s) that is manufactured through a patented process, as well as 
active ingredients and diagnostic kits. Para.2aii recognises that developing 
countries are eligible to use Article 31bis mechanism. Incidentally, Schedule 2 
excludes developing countries. As would be seen in the discussions on IP trade 
measures, additional conditions can be imposed through FTAs, to limit the scope 
of compulsory licences.67 Limitations and conditions in national patent legislations 
and other related regulations make it increasingly difficult for countries to use the 
Article 31bis mechanism.   
3. As argued by Abbas and Raiz, the requirement of paragraph 2b(i) TRIPS Annex 
about clarity of quantity of drugs requested under the license, may not respond 
efficiently to emergency or pandemic public health situations. It is highlighted that 
the dynamics and uncertainty of disease outbreaks may not support a definite or 
correct estimation of the initial quantity of drugs to be requested for. Paragraph 2b(i) 
did not recognise the difficulty in having an accurate prediction of the exact quantity 
of the drugs, where a license is issued in response to a disease outbreak.   
 
66 See pp 136-138 
67 See pp 158-173 on trade measures that are negotiated in FTAs  
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Beyond these inherent legal challenge of Article 31bis, subsequent discussions examine trade 
politics and TRIPS-Plus factors which are the political and substantive issues that can 
undermine the efficiency of Article 3bis. 
  
6.4 TRADE POLITICS AND COMPULSORY LICENSE  
 
With respect to compulsory licenses and access to medicine generally, some countries in 
exercising the rights within the WTO legal order, adopt trade policies/politics as punitive 
measures against countries that issue compulsory license. Trade policies/politics which include 
the use of threats and actual trade sanctions against weaker countries68 can significantly restrict 
broad usage of Article 31bis. 
The UN secretary General’s High-Level panel on Access to Medicine report highlighted that, 
within the compulsory license mechanism, legal incertitude, intimidation and controversies are 
prevalent. Incidentally, these issues weaken the bargaining position of many countries within 
the compulsory license framework.69In the past, trade politics and policies in the form of threat 
and actual trade sanctions, withdrawal of concessions and other hostilities to oppose the 
issuance of compulsory license, have been seen.    
Between 2006 and 2008, Thailand issued about seven government-use licenses for 
communicable and non-communicable diseases. In November 2006, the Thai government 
issued a license under Article 51 of Thai Patent Act B.E. 2522 1979 to import the generic 
version of ARV Efavirenz from India. 0.5% of the generic sale value was paid as royalty.70 In 
January 25 and 29 2007, further licenses were issued for Plavix (Clopidogrel as generic name), 
Kaletra and ARV (Lopinavir/ritonavir as generic name) at a royalty of 0.5% of the generic total 
 
68 Alexandra Nightingale, WTO ‘Paragraph 6’ System for Affordable Medicine: Time for Change (2016) IP 
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Indian needs due to threat of retaliation by the US government and threats of action under Special 301 report. 
Additionally he stated that ‘there is very little incentive for the government of India to go out of their way to face 
these threats on behalf of another country and the likelihood that India would grant a license at the request of a 
non-producing is very small’. 
69 Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Panel on Access to Medicines: Promoting Innovation 
and Access to Health Technologies, (2016) 24 
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sale value.71 In 2008, another license was issued for imatinib, letrozole, docetaxel and erlotinib 
being drugs for the treatment of lung, leukaemia, and breast cancers. 
In some of the licenses, Thai government did not negotiate with the patent owner before the 
licenses were issued. Notably, this is consistent with Article 31b of the TRIPS Agreement that 
dispenses with prior negotiation, where the license is issued for public non-commercial use. 
However, the government use process continued concurrently with the voluntary license 
negotiation.72 
The motivation behind the efforts of Thai government was to maintain the country’s universal 
health coverage initiative and to facilitate wider access to medicine for the patients that are 
under Thai’s public health insurance schemes.73 It was thought that a cheaper generic version 
of the drugs would considerably save treatment cost.74These licenses were however met with 
hostility from the manufacturers of the brand drugs and their national governments. US 
government was reported to have pressed Thailand to withdraw the decision.75This pressure is 
notwithstanding the payment of royalty and the grounds of the licenses.   
The license for Kaletra, a second-line ARV prompted Abbott the patentee to withdraw the 
registration of other medications that were awaiting registration in Thailand. The new drugs 
were: medicines for blood clots, kidney diseases, Arthritis, high blood pressure, a new version 
of Kaletra, a painkiller and an antibiotic.76 Abbott’s spokeswoman Jennifer Smoter reportedly 
said: ‘Thailand has chosen to break patents on numerous medicines, ignoring the patent 
system. As such, we’ve elected not to introduce new medicines there’.77  Although, Abbot later 
rescinded the decision to withdraw the registrations, within that period, Thai patients could not 
access the heat resistant form of lopinavir/ritonavir as no generic equivalent existed at the 
time.78  
 
71 The Decree of Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, Regarding Exploitation of Patent on 
Drugs and Medical Supplies by the Government on Combination Drug Between Lopinavir and Ritonavir, 2007. 
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The European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson by a letter of 10 July 2007, criticised the 
license as detrimental to medical innovation. The concern was borne from the fact that such 
action can potentially isolate Thailand from the global biotechnology investment community.79 
The criticisms were also premised on the fact that the TRIPS and the Doha Declaration do not 
justify a systematic use of compulsory licenses where the price of drugs is higher than a 
determined price.80In taking exception to Mandelson’s position, the EU parliament called on 
the EU Commission and governments to support states that are seeking to override patents 
through compulsory license mechanism. 81  
Following the initial position of the Mandelson, the US government placed Thailand on Priority 
Watch List in 2007.82The US argued that the licenses lacked transparency and due process. US 
withdrew duty-free access to the US market for three Thai products that are under the US 
Generalized Preferences. 83  Sanofi-Aventis, the Plavix patentee in Thailand on the 1st of 
September 2007, threatened to sue Emcure Pharmaceuticals the Indian Company that was 
importing the generic version of Plavix, into Thailand.84 
Just like Thailand, Colombia contemplated issuing compulsory license on Imatinib, a 
leukaemia drug. Imatinib was owned by Novartis under the brand name of Gleevac and was 
offered at a price that was considered double the Columbian average citizen’s income per 
year.85 Through a resolution in 2016, the Colombian Ministry of Health considered affordable 
access to Imatinib a matter of public interest and then sought to issue a compulsory license.86 
The resolution attracted pressure from countries and multinational pharmaceutical companies. 
The Colombian Health Minister had initiated negotiations with Novartis for price reduction 
and the offer was rejected.87The US believed that the licence will distort international trade and 
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IP rules hence, they threatened a dispute settlement procedure and the possible suspension of 
‘Paz Colombia,’ a US promised fund for Colombian peace initiative.88  
As seen with Paz Colombia, depending on donor assistance, preferential treatments for market 
access and grants from developed countries, make beneficiary countries vulnerable to trade 
politics and economic pressure. In May 2000, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
Glaxo, Merck, and Roche agreed to 80% ARV price reduction for LDCs. It was reported that 
most of the needy countries did not participate in the negotiation even where some offers were 
as low as the available generic drug prices. 89  Some states rather preferred other access 
strategies that are under their local control. The essence is to avoid undue reliance on corporate 
and political favours.90 The then South African Health ministry director Ayanda Ntsaluba was 
reported to have said: ‘…no government in the world wants to put itself perpetually in the 
position where their every move is always going to be dependent on gestures from other 
people’.91 
Between 2000-2005, Ghana aborted the attempts to import ARV Lamiduvine/Zidovudine 
combination from CIPLA, an Indian generic company. Glaxo group ltd who had the exclusive 
rights over the four formulations of the ARV in Ghana, challenged the import. Even though 
the import was characterised as donation, Glaxo argued that the importation from CIPLA 
infringes the exclusive rights of Glaxo. Glaxo emphasised on the intention to enforce the IPR 
against further infringement, if CIPLA fails to discontinue the import.92Glaxo’s efforts were 
further backed with threat of legal action against Ghana, if the importation is not ceased.93 Prior 
to Glaxo’s letter, it was reported that a consignment of Duovir for the sum of US$ 16,000 was 
shipped into Ghana at the cost of 90 cents per pill in comparison to the US price of  $10.94 In 
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89 Manu Thaddeus, ‘Essential Medicines and the Complexity of Implementing Nationally Based Compulsory 
Licensing: On the Need for A Regional System of Compulsory Licensing in Sub-Sahara African’ (2014) 36(1) 
European Intellectual Property Review. 27 
90 Ibid 
91  Liz Highleyman, ‘The Global Epidemic: Affordable Drug Access for Developing Countries’ 
https://www.thebody.com/article/global-epidemic-affordable-drug-access-developing-countries Accessed on 
20/08/19  
92 G.G Brereton (Head of Global IP Department of Glaxo) to CIPLA Ltd letter of 10th August 2000.  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/africa/glaxocipla08102000.html. Accessed on 20/08/19. See also a similar letter 
of from Glaxo Wellcome to CIPLA: Importation of Duovir into Uganda 20th November 2000 where Glaxo 
requested Cipla to desist from the importation of ARV into Uganda for patent infringement. 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/africa/glaxocipla11202000.html Accessed on 20/08/19 
93 Mark Schoofs, ‘Glaxo Attempts to Block Access to Generic AIDS Drugs in Ghana’ The Wall Street Journal (1 
December 2000). https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB975628467266044917 Accessed on 20/08/19  
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consideration of the high cost of buying from a US firm, Ghana issued a compulsory license in 
2004 for ARV.95  
Chapter 396of the thesis detailed the South African (SA) experience after amending the SA 
Medicine and Related Substances Control Amendment Act to allow for generic substitution. 
The SA action attracted counter reactions from the international pharmaceutical firms and the 
home countries. Additionally, it also earned SA the US Priority watch List with some trade 
benefits withdrawn from SA.97  
The instances of counter-reactions from pharmaceutical firms and state sanctions against the 
use of compulsory licences, significantly challenge both the decision to issue compulsory 
license and access to medicine broadly speaking. 
 
6.4.1 IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE POLITICS ON COMPULSORY LICENSE 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE. 
What can be drawn from the highlighted experiences? Notably, the forgoing suggests a 
common thread of asymmetric power relationship between the global south and the north. The 
incidences also encroach the policy space of nations to adopt public health measure(s) under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. As earlier demonstrated, Articles 7 and 8 allow 
member states of WTO to adopt measures to protect public health and to enforce IPR in a 
manner that is conducive to their social and economic development. It is seen that Ghana, 
Thailand, Columbia and SA were not doing more than exploiting their rights in Articles 7 and 
8. 
Notably, Article 31bis(4) of the TRIPS discourages WTO member states from challenging 
measure(s) that are taken in conformity with Article 31bis, the annex to the TRIPS and Article 
XXIII(1)b&c of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII(1)b&c of the GATT recognise that countries 
can adopt measures within or outside WTO framework that do not violate any WTO agreement.  
The use of compulsory license and other flexibilities that are allowed within the TRIPS 
Agreement come under Article XXIII(1)b&c. As demonstrated in chapter 3, TRIPS flexibilities 
 
95 Ghana Ministry of Health, ‘Notification of Emergency and Issuance of Government use of License’ October 
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(compulsory license in this case) are non-violative and temporal measures, even though they 
can impair the market benefits of the patent holder.98  
Despite the express provisions of Article 31bis(4), the use of asymmetric power relationship 
have been seen from the scenario. Notably, Thailand, Ghana, Colombia and South Africa 
adopted non-violating measures yet, their actions were met with threats of sanctions, actual 
sanctions and withdrawal of concessions. Notably, Article 64(3) of the TRIPS Agreement 
recognises that any complaint arising from XXIII (1)b&c of the GATT, shall be referred to the 
council of TRIPS to examine the scope and the modalities of the licenses and then make 
recommendations thereafter. It follows that, unilateral actions or responses as seen in the 
examples, are against the Article 23 DSU which prohibits unilateral actions of states within the 
WTO legal order.  
It is highlighted that withdrawal of concessions, use of threat, or actual trade sanctions within 
the WTO legal order are used to secure a member state’s conformity with the obligations in the 
WTO’s multilateral agreements. Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) 1994, regulates the suspension of concession where a state adopts measures that are 
found by DSU to be inconsistent with WTO rules. Article 22 DSU suggests that, withdrawal 
of concessions or retaliations are used to compel the performance of WTO’s obligation and not 
against the legitimate use of trade measures.  
A relevant question is whether the exploitation of compulsory licence under TRIPS Agreement 
is inconsistent with WTO rules hence, capable of attracting sanctions? This may be answered 
in the negative in view of the combined effects of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the Doha Declaration on public health and Article 22 DSU. This suggests that, trade 
protectionism measures are only lawful when used within the confines or allowances of WTO 
legal order. These measures interfere with the legal right of states to issue compulsory license 
within the TRIPS and national IP legislations. Consequently, in the absence of cross-retaliatory 
abilities especially in LICS, governments’ efforts towards ensuring a wider access to medicine 
are undermined.  
Yet another relevant concern. The countries in the global south do not possess proportionate 
cross-retaliatory powers to match trade resistance or threat. The trend of trade hostilities as 
seen in the preceding discussions, negatively weigh on a nation’s obligation towards public 
 
98 See chapter 3 pp. 58-63 on substantive discussion on Article XXIII(1)b&c GATT 
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health and other sensitive national needs.99LICs may be discouraged to issue compulsory 
licenses for fear of retaliation or opposition.100 This demonstrates the relevance of political will 
when TRIPS flexibilities are used or contemplated. Political will is needed to withstand trade 
pressure against compulsory license.101 Trade pressure as reported, weaken a nation’s integrity, 
the legitimacy of the system of legal rights and human right obligations of nations to protect 
the right of access to medicine.102 In the highlighted incidences, it can argued that the major 
purpose of the threat of trade sanctions, actual trade sanctions, threat or actual withdrawal of 
benefits and market access is a show of power. They are unsupported and non-compliant with 
the WTO legal order. Possessing requisite political will was only made relevant because of 
non-compliant trade practices of the patent holder.  
As seen in the case of Thailand, it can also be argued that the percentage of remuneration paid 
or proposed to the patent holder(s) may have contributed to the hostility displayed against 
Thailand. Ideally, one of the fundamental terms in a voluntary license negotiation is 
remuneration/royalty. In situations where compulsory license is pursued without prior or failed 
negotiation, the amount of remuneration is unilaterally determined by a designated authority, 
without the input of the patent holder. With the co-operation of the home country, a dissatisfied 
patent holder may resort to the use of threat or actual trade sanctions and other measures to 
challenge the license. This is especially the case where the amount of remuneration is 
considered inadequate or unreasonable. It is possible that such challenge can suspend the 
process of the license. 
The total generic sales value of the Thailand license is unknown. The factors that were taken 
into account by Thailand are unknown. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether 0.5% 
royalty payment is reasonable and adequate. At 0.5%, Thailand’s royalty payment may not 
have been mutually agreed between the right holder(s) and Thai Government. Thus, depending 
on the overall total sales value of the generics, 0.5% may or may not represent a reasonable or 
adequate remuneration. No doubt, Article 31(b) TRIPS Agreement supports the action of 
government to waive the obligation of prior negotiation where the license is issued for public 
non-commercial use. However, the amount of remuneration should be based on objective and 
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transparent standards. This is bearing in mind that where the amount of remuneration is 
unreasonable, it generates more loss to the patent holder. 
Besides trade and political pressure, further measures that potentially limit the exploitation of 
compulsory license are further pursued through restrictive TRIPS-Plus provisions. These 
measures are usually found in bilateral and Regional free trade agreements that pursue stricter 
IP standards that are beyond the TRIPS minimum requirements. The rise of this trend especially 
where they are restrictive, continues to shape and restrict the use of TRIPS flexibilities.  Some 
of these measures directly or indirectly imply a limited scope of compulsory license as well as 
exacerbate access to medicine challenge.    
6.5 TRIPS-PLUS MEASURES: COMPULSORY LICENSE AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINE 
As noted in Chapter 3, the WTO legal order under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 1994 liberalises trade across countries, through several Multilateral Trade Agreements 
(MTAs).  On the hand, consistent with Article XXIV(4) GATT 1994, the WTO allows some 
degree of trade protection and preferences. Countries are permitted to negotiate preferential or 
separate trade agreements on terms that are beyond the WTO multilateral agreements.   
Similarly, states negotiate preferential trade measures, on terms that are beyond the TRIPS 
minimum requirements. These trade measures are generally referred to as TRIPS-Plus. TRIPS-
Plus measures may significantly restrict broad usage of Article 31bis and access to medicine.   
The trend of FTAs that are beyond the WTO multilateral trading system stem from the 
expectations that FTAs stimulate bilateral and regional growth.103Generally, FTAs cover all 
aspect of trade including IPP. The IP provisions recognise IP standards that can either expand 
or limit the scope of IPP and IP flexibilities. As would be demonstrated, the IP provisions in 
the FTAs reveal a TRIPS-Plus and TRIPS-Extra104standard provisions. TRIPS-plus and extra 
 
103 Krugman Paul, ‘Is Bilateralism Bad? In E. Helpman & A. Razin (eds), ‘International Trade and Trade Policy. 
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measures are IP strategies that are used to achieve or pursue a higher IPP standards that are 
beyond the TRIPS Agreement.105  
Zoellick in highlighting the US policy on FTA noted that: 
…as our FTA negotiation with Singapore showed, our agreement can also serve as 
models by breaking new grounds and setting higher standards. (emphasis mine) The 
US-Singapore FTA will help advance areas such as… intellectual property, labour…106  
Compulsory license as an access strategy pursues wider access to medicine. However, within 
some FTAs, higher standards of IPP are adopted to limit the use and the scope of compulsory 
licence and other flexibilities. The Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law (MPI) examined the trend of bilateral and regional agreements with the 
protection and enforcement of IPRs. The MPI found that: 
…these agreements…contain provisions on the protection and enforcement of IP that 
are more extensive than the multilateral standards contained in the Paris and Berne 
Conventions as well as the WTO Agreement. … Continuous extension of IP protection 
and enforcement increases the potential for law and policy conflicts with other rules of 
international law that aim to protect public health, the environment, biological diversity, 
food security, access to knowledge and human rights. At the same time, such extension 
often counters, rather than facilitates, the core IP goal of promoting innovation and 
creativity.107 
In pursuit of increased IP rent and other economic advantages, countries resort to bilateral and 
regional trade agreements to adopt higher standards of IPP and enforcement 
mechanism.108Certain IP measures within a FTA broaden the scope of patentability, lengthen 
the duration of exclusive right, promote patent linkages, limit the use of compulsory licence 
and recognise data exclusivity. The following discussions examine how these measures limit 
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the exploitation of compulsory licenses, the impact on access to medicine and the challenges 
that emerge from increased IPP.  
6.5.1 EVERGREENING/SCOPE OF PATENTABILITY 
Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement recognises the autonomy of the WTO member states of 
WTO to determine the inventions that are eligible for patent protection. As demonstrated in 
chapter 2,109 beyond a primary patent, it is possible for an inventor to find a new indications or 
secondary use(s) for the original invention. The inventor is free to seek further patent protection 
for the new indication or discovery. 
Illustratively, Viagra was initially a lifestyle drug. However, Viagra has demonstrated a 
secondary usefulness for the treatment of pulmonary hypertension and bone marrow 
transplant.110 In the wake of Covid 19 virus, remdesivir, a Gilead product that was originally 
developed for the treatment of Ebola and Marburg viruses, started ‘showing the potential’ of a 
secondary use for the treatment of Covid 19 virus. 111 WHO recently announced a 
SOLIDARITY large scale trial to determine if remdesivir and two Malaria medications: 
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine promise new indications for the treatment of the Covid-
19 virus.112  
New indications of already existing drugs are patentable where they meet the patent eligibility 
criteria. Incidentally, new indications for an invention refreshes the original patent leading to 
the patent protection of the new indication. This is referred to as ‘evergreening’ of the original 
patent. As part of ‘lifecycle management’ of drug by the pharmaceutical industry, evergreening 
is the strategy of making improvement around existing patent. 113  This strategy, is very 
important to pharmaceutical firms. It is used to extend market monopoly, enhance the scope 
and duration of the original patent.114  
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Chapter 4 demonstrated how ViiV healthcare used evergreening to recognise patent protection 
on DTG to 2026 and 2031.115 As further seen in chapter 4, 108 additional patents were filed 
for Kaletra’s ritonavir and lopinavir ARV regimens. These patents extended the patent duration 
to 2028. This is 12 years after the expiration of the original patent on the drug base compound 
and 31 years after the first patent was filed on ritonavir.116The clear implication is the delay of 
generic drugs, until 2028. 
Medicine law and practice reported a recent Dutch decision on evergreening, where 
AstreZeneca was ordered to pay damages. Menzis a health insurance company sued 
AstraZeneca over the pricing of Seroquel a Psychosis treatment. Menzis alleged that 
AstraZeneca abused the patent right over Seroquel, when it maintained an unjustifiable high 
price of Seroquel through evergreening. AstraZeneca sought for patent protection over an 
extended-release formula of Seroquel. The patent on the immediate release formula however 
expired in 2012. In 2012, a British court held that the patent on the new formulation was invalid. 
Despite the ruling, AstraZeneca continued to take legal action against generic competitors in 
the Netherlands. Sometime in 2014, the Dutch court declared AstraZeneca’s patent on the 
secondary indication invalid for failing to disclose inventive steps and ordered it to pay 
damages. The court decision caused the price of Seroquel to drop from €3,16 to €0,37. 
AstraZeneca has so far, enforced a weak patent between 2012-2014.117  
Notably, evergreening or the patents that are filed for a new indication may present a concern. 
Where the strategy is to merely secure or prolong market presence, the quest would be pursued 
with even minor new indications. Towards limiting the chances of elongating patent protection 
for minor indications, some national legislations restrict the practice of evergreening. Section 
3(d) of the Indian Patent, 2005 restricts the scope of subject matters that are eligible for patent 
protection.  Section 3(d) provides that: ‘the mere discovery of a new form of a known efficacy 
of substance is not patentable. Similarly, the mere discovery of a new property or new use for 
a known process results in a new product machine or apparatus, unless such known process 
results in a new product or employ at least one new reactant, shall not be a subject matter of 
patent’. Section 3(d) clearly restricts ‘evergreening’ 118 (new uses), except where a major 
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indication is involved. Consequently, Section 3(d) has raised the standard of patent eligibility 
for both original and new indication in India.  
Despite this concern, evergreening standard continues to be reinforced through FTAs. 
Obligations are created for parties in FTAs to recognise the practice of evergreening and 
consequently limit the standard of patentability (one of flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement). The evergreening standard is enforced, despite the possibility of refusing the 
patent application where it fails to make technical or significant contribution.119 
Illustratively, Articles 18.8(1) of the US–Korea FTA, 18.37(2) Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP) and 17.9(1) US–Australia FTA require 
governments to provide and recognise patent protection for new uses of a patented product, 
methods of use of known products and processes. 
A study of the patent linkage and evergreening in Canada revealed that pharmaceutical 
companies use patent linkage and evergreening strategies to restrain generic competition and 
the market entry of generic products. 120 Bouchard et al found that pharmaceutical firms 
extended patent duration with weak inventions to delay generic competition. Consequently, the 
society is deprived of fair pricing. The ‘quid pro quo’ of the patent system121is also breached 
or lost, because patent advantage heavily tilts in favour of the patent holder. 
Notably, as part of innovation cycle, incremental innovation should be encouraged. However, 
it must be balanced against the right of access to medicine. Allowing patent on minor or ‘mere 
efficacy’ merely indicates an innovation and business strategy that pursues a prolong market 
and nothing more. It was thought that if US did not patent the new indication of AZT after the 
expiration of AZT patent, generic competition would have brought about a significant price 
reduction.122  
In pursuit of economic interest, public health considerations are challenged. This also 
entrenches a weak or lax patent eligibility standard. In line with the ICESCR and ICCPR, 
incremental innovation may limit state actions towards the progressive realisation of human 
right to life and health.123  
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6.5.2 PROHIBITION OF PRE-GRANT PATENT OPPOSITION 
In reiterating the freedom to determine the standard of patentability, countries allow both pre-
patent and post-patent oppositions. The opposition of patent application empowers third parties 
to challenge inventions on recognised grounds. Articles 41(2) and 62(4) TRIPS Agreement 
recognise administrative patent opposition and the opportunity for a judicial review of the 
administrative decision. One of the grounds for the opposition of a patent application can be 
failure to meet the patent eligibility criteria. Under the TRIPS Agreement, the only requirement 
for patent opposition for member states is to ensure the procedures are fair and equitable.124  
To increase the possibility that patent applications are granted, some FTAs do limit the use of 
pre-patent opposition. This is especially the case for countries with less substantive patent 
examination system and this can be attributed to limited technical and scientific skills. Article 
15.9(5) of the US-Morocco FTA presents a good example. It states: ‘where a party provides 
proceedings that permit a third party to oppose the grant of a patent, a party shall not make 
such proceedings available before the grant of the patent’.125It is seen that, the US-Morocco 
and the US-Korea FTAs promote only a post-patent opposition. The legal implication is the 
possibility that patent applications are not challenged, even in compelling circumstances.  
What implication does this requirement have on access to medicine? It is argued that the 
implication would also depend on whether a country adopts an extensive patent examination 
system or not. Limiting or completely excluding pre-patent opposition may not affect the usual 
patentability standard. This would be the case where the country in question adopts a 
substantive patent examination system. This is usually the case for industrialised nations with 
the scientific capacity. On the other hand, countries with less substantive patent examination 
system, run the risk of granting patents that do not meet eligibility criteria. Such features could 
be exposed where the application is challenged before granting the patent. With a pre-patent 
opposition system, generic manufacturers and competitors that are skilled in the art of the 
invention can challenge126the application on valid ground(s).  
According to Correa, where such patents are granted, there is a possibility that the patentee can 
begin to exploit unearned exclusive right. Where an invention fails to make a significant 
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contribution, the possibility of refusing the patent application exists during pre-grant patent 
opposition. However, with an FTA obligation that precludes pre-patent opposition, the 
opportunity is lost.127 
6.5.3 INCREASED PATENT DURATION 
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that patent duration shall not end before the 
expiration of 20 years. However, the case of pharmaceutical patenting is unique. Patent term 
for pharmaceuticals can be shorter than 20 years by the time innovation processes are 
concluded, and the drugs are approved for commercialisation. Clinical trials, regulatory 
approval and the period for the patent application review, may take about 8 years into the patent 
term.128As a result, the patentee is in most cases left with about 10-12 years to exclusively 
exploit the invention.129  
Against this backdrop, some countries issue Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) to 
compensate for long authorisation process and to ensure the amortization of R&D 
investment.130 On the other hand too, some FTAs seek to compensate for the number of years 
that are taken up by regulatory approval and patent application review. Article 16.7(7) of the 
US-Singapore FTA requires the parties to extend patent term. The extension is meant to 
compensate for the delays that occur during the approval process. Articles 15.9(7) and 15.10(3) 
of the US-Morocco FTA require parties to adjust their patent term to compensate for delays in 
granting the patent.  
Undoubtedly, the reason behind extended patent duration is understandable. However, 
increased patent duration beyond the initial 20year period, invariably delays generic market 
entry and competition. The particles or molecules that were patented at the early stage of the 
process already conferred benefits and protection against unauthorised use on the patent holder. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the patent holder benefited from protection against 
independent discovery by a competitor. The combined effect of increased patent duration and 
evergreening, means extending the period of patent protection far beyond the 20-year duration. 
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6.5.4 LIMITS ON GROUNDS OF COMPULSORY LICENSE. 
The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration clarified that the issuance of compulsory 
license cannot be confined to specific grounds or range of diseases. Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha 
Declaration highlighted the member states’ right to grant compulsory license and the freedom 
to determine the grounds upon which the licenses are granted.  
Contrary to the above, some FTAs seek to confine or permit the use of compulsory license to 
specific grounds. Article 16.7(6) US-Singapore FTA and Article 4.20 of the US-Jordan FTA131 
respectively limit the grant of compulsory license to anti-competitive activities, public non-
commercial use, national emergencies and extreme urgency (provided the license is granted to 
government entities or legal entities acting for the government).  
It is highlighted that the above grounds are also recognised in the TRIPS Agreement. Most 
national legislations adopt broad grounds for compulsory license. Other recognised grounds 
are: incidences of abuse of patent, dependant patent, where the demand for the invention is 
satisfied by importation, excessive pricing, where reasonable requirement of the public is 
unmet and where the invention is important for the making of food and medicines and other 
grounds.132 
Notably, the FTA requirement that compulsory license must be granted to government entities 
or legal entities acting for the government, attempts to limit eligible licensees to only state 
actors to re-engineer the drugs. This means that, compulsory licenses cannot be granted to a 
private generic manufacturer. This condition makes it increasingly difficult for LICs that do 
not have government pharmaceutical manufacturing entity to issue a compulsory license. Even 
in compelling circumstances, the opportunity to issue the license is lost.   
The grounds of compulsory license in the US-Singapore FTA were also subject to the 
obligation to pay remuneration that must be ‘reasonable and entire’.133Notably, it is unclear 
whether an ‘entire’ remuneration would be interpreted to cover or mirror the entire cost of 
R&D allocated to the Singaporean market for instance. A relevant question is whether this 
requirement of ‘entire’ is feasible? If this is the expectation, it can be argued that an ‘entire’ 
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remuneration contradicts one of the major essences of compulsory license. In most cases, 
compulsory licenses are issued to address high price of drugs and to achieve the lowest possible 
price. Ideally, ‘entire’ remuneration should imply a compensation that covers the fixed cost of 
R&D and the expected profit that has been allocated to a specific market. Afterall, high price 
of drug was the reason the license was issued in the first place. Where ‘entire’ remuneration 
standard is used to compensate the patent holder, the licensee ends paying the same amount 
that would have paid in an open market situation. This remuneration standard clearly disregards 
TRIPS Agreement’s remuneration standard and indifferent to the economic standing of a LIC 
that might be issuing the license for import from either the US or Singapore. 
Yet another challenge, the US-Singapore FTA does not require patent holders to transfer 
‘technical know-how’ and ‘undisclosed information’ relating to the invention. This disclosure 
is only possible with the consent of the patent owner.134Article 17.9(7)(b)iii of the US-Australia 
FTA prohibits parties from requiring the patentee to ‘provide undisclosed information or 
technical know-how relating to a patented invention that has been authorised…’.135  
A know-how information facilitates the efficient use of a license. What then is the value of a 
compulsory license without a know-how information? The restriction on a ‘know-how’ would 
reduce the value of a patent. Without the technical input of the patent holder, the licensee is 
unable to exploit the patent.136 Restrictions on know-how is quite constraining. Even though 
Article16.7(6) US-Singapore FTA recognises that technical know-how can be disclosed with 
the consent of the patent holder, it still leaves room for the patent holder to withhold the 
consent. Incidentally, there is no qualification to the patent holder’s right of ‘consent’. At least, 
an indication that consent ‘cannot be unreasonably withheld’. Usually, a know-how licensing 
contract that contains technical information on drugs, should accompany a license. A qualified 
consent would enable a licensee to challenge an unreasonable refusal to license a know-how. 
Beyond qualifying the consent, FTAs can also recognise an exception that allows full access 
to a know-how, where public interest demands.    
It is further highlighted that, the limits on the use of compulsory license is quite restrictive. 
They constrain and undermine the ability of signatory countries to act as potential generic 
manufacturers and importer under Article 31bis mechanism This suggests that, the greater 
 
134 Art.16.7(6)b(iii) of the US-Singapore FTA 
135 See also Article 16.7(6)(a)iii US-Singapore FTA. 
136 Bryan Mercurio, ‘TRIPS-PLUS Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino 
(eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2006) 231 
165 
 
number of countries with pharmaceutical manufacturing ability that commit to these FTA 
obligations, the smaller the number of potential generic manufacturers and countries to 
manufacture and export under Article 31bis mechanism. The combined effect of limited 
grounds of compulsory license, the obligation to pay ‘entire’ remuneration, the need for a 
government pharmaceutical entity and limited access to a know-how information, results to the 
inability of LICs to harness Article 31bis mechanism. 
6.5.5 PATENT LINKAGE 
The practice of patent linkage permits a state’s Drug Regulatory Authority (DRA), to deny 
approval of generic drugs that are linked to an effective patent.137Patentees usually submit a 
list to the DRA to indicate the patents that are infringed when certain drugs are produced. Thus, 
where an application for the registration of a generic drug is received, the DRA considers the 
status of patents that cover the generic drug.138 Accordingly, a linkage is made between patent 
protected drugs and generic drugs.139 Consequently, where a generic drug is linked to a patent, 
regulatory approval of the generic drugs may be denied on the ground of potential patent 
infringement. According to Ho, DRA’s refusal of a generic registration is partly seen to be 
premised on the assumption of potential patent problem. The refusal is no longer based on 
failure to satisfy drug safety and efficacy standards.140 
Pharmaceutical industry considers that linking generic drugs to an existing patent prevents or 
reduces the possibility of patent infringement and enforcement litigations against generic 
manufacturers.141Patent holders have the option to obtain an injunction against an infringing 
generic manufacturer. However, they are concerned that in some cases, an injunction is 
inadequate, as the outcome of an enforcement proceeding can be quite uncertain and largely 
depends on the exercise of judicial discretion.142Patent linkage has now presented a strategy to 
minimise the cost of IP enforcement. 
The practice of patent linkage is usually pursued through regulatory agencies and FTAs. The 
essence is to delay generic market entry and to guard against patent infringement during the 
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life of a patent. In Article 17.10(2)c of the US-Chile FTA143a party to the FTA shall ‘not grant 
marketing approval to any third party prior to the expiration of the patent term, unless by 
consent or acquiescence of the patent owner.’ It is highlighted that in most cases and for 
obvious business or commercial logic, the patentee’s consent can be reasonably or 
unreasonably withheld. 
Typically, patent and drug regulations serve different purposes. Whilst the former seeks to 
reward inventors with exclusive right, the latter is responsible for efficacy and safety standards 
of drugs.144 Carlos has therefore argued that the requirement of patent linkage has altered the 
role of DRA. The DRA is now empowered to either grant or refuse generic registrations, 
because of linkage to existing patents.145Ideally, a patentee is meant to initiate an infringement 
proceeding to enforce a patent right and avoid using DRA to block generic competition146or 
guard against potential infringement. Where infringement proceedings replace patent linkage 
option, it distorts the usual evidentiary presumption of validity that is granted to a patent in 
traditional litigation.147  The presumption is replaced with an absolute guarantee of patent 
validity and a defacto injunction.148This is added to the possibility of a real likelihood that the 
patent in question may not be valid after all.   
Linking a generic drug to a patent can encourage ‘evergreening’ where the patentee can make 
incremental changes with minor or no utility to extend market presence and profit.149This might 
also imply a backdoor enforcement of patent rights.150Patent linkage further possesses the 
tendency to undermine compulsory licence. For a generic manufacturer to produce and 
distribute under compulsory license, it must obtain regulatory approval151not only to market 
the generic product but also to access test data, safety, and efficacy information. As noted by 
Sell, a patent linkage requirement therefore produces a ‘chilling effect’ on generic competition 
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and compulsory license. 152  During the life of a patent, the linkage provision prevents 
registration and marketing approval of generic drugs.153 Consequently, it blocks the marketing 
of generic medicines during the life of a patent, and this negates the effective use of compulsory 
license.154 
Delaying marketing approval of generic drugs due to patent linkage further presents an 
implication on the progressive realization of states’ obligation towards actualising the right of 
access to medicine.155Notably, possible safeguards to this measure should be recognised. 
Otherwise, the available flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement like compulsory license 
might be undermined. Exception to patent linkage should be recognised in FTA provisions. 
For instance, it is possible that patent linkage should not apply or have a limited application 
where compulsory license is considered for public health reasons. It is also possible that full 
access to scientific and test data information should be allowed when the use of compulsory 
license is contemplated.    
6.5.6 DATA EXCLUSIVITY 
Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement requires member states of WTO to protect undisclosed 
clinical test data and other data that have been submitted for marketing approval by a patent 
holder. The information contained in the data requires protection against ‘unfair commercial 
use’ and disclosure. The only exception is where the disclosure is necessary to protect public 
interest. The data also relates to pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products that are 
utilising new chemical entities.  
As part of innovation process, before introducing brand drugs into the market, the originator 
pharmaceutical firm first conducts clinical trials of the drugs on animals and human beings. 
Thereafter, the data generated from the trial to determine the efficacy and safety of the drugs, 
are submitted to the DRA for regulatory approval.156Once marketing approval of the new drug 
is granted, a period for the exclusive use of the data is conferred on the originator firm. Until 
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the duration expires, subsequent generic manufacturers are unable to rely on the data to 
evaluate or sustain the applications for marketing approval.157  
Notably, the TRIPS does not recognise a duration for the protection of test data. In explaining 
the justification for providing exclusive right to test data, Gaessler et al explained that, a time 
protection for test data is due to increased duration of clinical trials that have reduced the 
effective patent term. The data exclusivity period consequently serves to remedy the reduced 
patent.158A data exclusivity period may run in parallel with patent term. Where the remaining 
patent term is shorter than the period of data exclusivity, the latter continues to provide 
additional protection.159 However, data exclusivity period is independent of the patent process 
and can operate regardless of whether the drug is patented in the country or not.160 
Article 39(3) TRIPS Agreement does recognise that test data should be protected by the DRA 
against unauthorised disclosure. Has Article 39(3) inspired countries to adopt data exclusivity 
period as in the US,161European Union and some FTAs, for specific number of years. It is 
unclear whether Article 39(3) implies a test data protection that excludes generic manufacturers 
from accessing the data generated from clinical trials.162This is in view of the argument that, 
the TRIPS data protection does not create an obligation for countries to confer exclusive right 
over the clinical data of the originator company.163 
In the EU, generic manufacturers that are seeking for market approval, cannot rely on the bio-
equivalence data submitted by a brand pharmaceutical firm until after 11 years.164 Pursuant to 
Article 14(11) of the EC Regulation 726/2004, the EU practices the 8+2+1-year test data 
protection rule. The EC regulation prohibits the use of originator’s clinical test data by a generic 
 
157 Fabian Gaessler and Stefan Wagner, ‘Patents, Data Exclusivity, and the development of New Drugs’ (2018) 
Preliminary Draft for the 11th Annual Searle Centre/USPTO Conference on Innovation Economics,1 
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents/gaessler_wagner_2018_searle_wip.pdf Accessed 23/06/20 
158 Ibid, 2 
159 Ibid 
160 Bryan Mercurio, ‘TRIPS-PLUS Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino 
(eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2006), 228 
161  Section 505(b)(2) US Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act granting five years data exclusivity for 
pharmaceutical products with active moiety. Seven years for orphan drugs, three years for other exclusivity.  
162 Shadlen, (n 156) 
163 Ellen ‘t Hoen, Pascal Boulet and Brook Baker,’ Date Exclusivity Exceptions and Compulsory Licensing to 
Promote Generic Medicines in the European Union: A Proposal for Greater Coherence in European 
Pharmaceutical Legislation. (2017) 10(19) Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice,1. See also Carlos 
Correa, ‘Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards of the 
TRIPS Agreement (Geneva: South Centre, 2006) p. , Karin Timmermans, ‘Monopolizing Clinical Trails Data: 
Implications and Trends in WHO Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines: Papers and Perspective  (2010), 
117 
164 EC Regulation 726/2004, Article 14(11) 
169 
 
company to obtain market approval, until after the expiration of eight years. Thereafter, the 
regulator can process the generic companies request for market approval. However, the generic 
product cannot be put in the market until after the expiration of another two years, making a 
total of ten years. Furthermore, in some circumstances, where a new indication is filed by an 
originator company, an additional one year will expire before generic approval will be granted.  
Except with the consent of the originator firm, Article 16.8(1) of the US-Singapore FTA 
recognises the protection of safety and efficacy data against third party use. Such third party is 
precluded from relying on the data to obtain a marketing approval, until after a period of 5 
years for a pharmaceutical product and 10 years for agricultural chemical. Till after the 
prescribed period, the US-Morocco,165US-Bahrain,166US-Chile,167US-CAFTA168FTAs and 
CPATPP169bar national regulatory authorities from relying on clinical data to register generic 
equivalents. The duration of the protection largely depends on the nature of the pharmaceutical 
product.  
In addressing the significance of Article 15.10(a-b) of the US-CAFTA, Abbott observed that, 
the ‘…prohibitions are distinct from patents. They prevent marketing approval of drugs that 
are off patent. A restriction on marketing approval becomes another form of monopoly, here 
granted in ways the TRIPS Agreement does not require’.170 It is noted that FTAs only allows 
generic manufacturers to rely on test data where the originator firm consents to it. The 
consequence is that, access to test data would invariably depend on the discretion of the 
originator company and this discretion may not be exercised in favour of generic 
manufacturers. 
Against the background of test data protection in national legislations and FTAs, there is a 
concern that data exclusivity creates artificial barrier to market entry of generic drugs171 and 
this undermines generic competition.172This suggests that, test data exclusivity may impede the 
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effort of a generic manufacturer who seeks to rely on the data that were originally submitted 
by an originator company, for the regulatory approval of generic drugs.  
From TRIPS perspective, should the request to rely on such clinical test data be regarded as 
unfair commercial use? It can be argued that blocking generic manufacturers from accessing a 
test data could not have been the intention of the TRIPS Agreement. It is unlikely that the 
TRIPS would regard access to clinical data by a compulsory licensee as an unfair commercial 
use, especially when TRIPS permits the use of test data for public interest.   
It can be argued that national legislations and FTA obligations on test data protection may 
create difficulty in exploiting a cost-effective compulsory license. Where a compulsory license 
is granted during the pendency of test data period, a generic supplier is expected to generate its 
own clinical test data for drug approval. Ideally, compulsory license is only authorised for the 
use of patented invention. Since test data is an independent exclusive protection, compulsory 
license has not yet been extended to it. A generic supplier must then develop its own test data 
to proof bioequivalence.173 The process of producing new clinical data can be quite expensive, 
lengthy and involves ethical issues arising from animal and human test.174 On the other other 
too, it adds to the cost of generic production and where the cost is transferred onto generic 
products, it translates to an increased price of generic drugs.  
Bryan Mercurio states: 
… a period of data exclusivity could be detrimental to countries taking advantage of a 
compulsory license. Again, a manufacturer granted authority to produce a generic drug 
under compulsory license still must be registered by the national drug regulatory 
authority and if the generic manufacturer cannot rely on existing data to gain 
regulatory approval it cannot respond to the compulsory license and supply the needed 
drug. Thus, where a medicine is protected by patent, data exclusivity effectively could 
render the compulsory license meaningless if it cannot make effective use of the license 
without repeating the time consuming and costly tests to obtain marketing approval of 
its drug. Therefore, exclusivity provisions can effectively prevent the use of compulsory 
licensing during the patent term as well as extend the life of the patent. 
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It seems that the right to use TRIPS access options to facilitate the protection and the fulfilment 
of right to health, requires states to apply caution and also weigh the implication of TRIPS-
Plus measures on access to medicine, before acceding to them. Acceding to TRIPS-plus 
measures in exchange of market access may impede the freedom to adopt proactive measures 
and TRIPS flexibilities towards the realisation of the right of access to medicine.175  
6.5.7 IMPLICATIONS OF TRIPS-PLUS MEASURES ON COMPULSORY 
LICENCE AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
Achieving a liberal trade, market access across countries and economic growth are legitimate 
trade goals. However, they may imply elaborating or expanding the minimum requirements of 
the TRIPS Agreement. These extra IP commitments create multi-layered IP governance 
obligation at the national, bilateral, regional and international levels.176 It is also seen that 
expanding the breadth of IPP beyond the TRIPS is more advantageous to the patent holder. 
Consequently, this threatens the balance between IP exploitation and public interest as 
envisaged by the TRIPS Agreements in Articles 7 and 8. 
As demonstrated in the preceding discussions, TRIPS-Plus have legal and policy implications 
towards the effective exploitation of compulsory license and broadly speaking, on access to 
medicine. The TRIPS-plus measures as seen, legally suggest the expansion of patent scope for 
brand drugs and stricter regulatory and procedural safeguards. It is highlighted that the 
discussions on data exclusivity, patent linkage and limitations on compulsory license body of 
rules, reveal how they directly undermine the ability of states to exploit compulsory license 
and access to medicine. The pre-patent opposition, evergreening and increased patent duration 
present broad implications on access to medicine.  
Arguably, these TRIPS-Plus and regulatory measures as demonstrated, do serve the purpose of 
continued innovation for pharmaceutical firms. On the other hand, the provisions tend to 
eliminate or constrain the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement.177Consequently, a relevant 
question is whether TRIPS-Plus commitments are legitimate, illegitimate or a case of legitimate 
but undesirable?  
As earlier demonstrated, the WTO legal order in Article XXIV(4) GATT, allows trade 
protectionism through preferential trade agreements (PTA). In the PTAs, parties can agree on 
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terms that are outside or beyond the WTO multilateral trade commitments. It can therefore be 
argued that, FTA obligations can be legitimate exercise of liberalised trade practices. The first 
limb of Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO members to adopt in domestic IP laws, 
advanced IPP beyond the TRIPS minimum standard. Consequently, member states have the 
freedom to determine the appropriate method of implementing the TRIPS Agreement within 
individual legal system. To this extent, advanced IPP measures that are allowed by the TRIPS 
Agreement can also be pursued through FTAs. Against the backdrop of the first limb of Article 
1, FTA commitments can to this extent, be legitimate. 
Notably, the second limb of Article 1 contains a safeguard. Member states’ advanced IPP 
provisions should not contravene the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. As earlier 
demonstrated, the highlighted TRIPS-Plus measures interfere with the legitimate rights of 
countries to use the flexibilities within the TRIPS. Again, paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration 
requires that the TRIPS Agreement should be ‘interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, to promote access to medicines 
for all.’ Paragraph 4 is in sync with Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and they allow 
countries to adopt the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement. The question is whether these 
TRIPS-Plus practices contravene the provisions of TRIPS Article 7, 8, the qualification of 
Article 1 in the second limb and paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration? 
It is can therefore be argued that, adopting advanced IP measures in national regulations and 
FTAs are only legal to the extent Article 1 TRIPS Agreement allows. The measures can raise 
concerns where they impair the policy space of other member states to harness the flexibilities 
within the TRIPS Agreement in Articles 7 and 8 and paragraph 4. The issues emerging from 
the limits on compulsory license, data exclusivity, patent linkage, prohibition of pre-patent 
opposition and the effects of evergreening demonstrate undesirable outcome. To the extent that 
these measures undermine Articles 7 and 8, they are illegitimate, produce undesirable outcome 
and consequently non-compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.  
Notably, most LICs may not have committed to TRIPS-plus standards in FTAs. However, 
countries that have committed to FTA obligations are constrained to act as potential generic 
manufacturers for LICs178that issued the license. Even in a situation where the FTA measures 
are justified or legal, the outcome may still be undesirable. This is so, even though it is within 
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the legitimate rights of individual member states to adopt further IPP measures at the national 
and regional levels.  
It is further highlighted that the evident implications of TRIPS-Plus measures on the 
exploitation of compulsory license and access to medicine can be avoided or mitigated. The 
importance of states’ obligations towards ensuring that drugs are affordable, accessible, 
available, and adaptable, support the application of caution. TRIPS-Plus measures that impede 
state efforts towards access to medicine, should either be avoided or recognise a waiver of the 
application where public health demands. Section 5 of the Malaysian 2011 Directive on Data 
exclusivity, exempts the protection of Data exclusivity where compulsory license or other 
public health measure(s)are issued or implemented.179 Similarly,  Article 18(1)(3) of the EC 
Regulation 816/2006 exempts the application of Article 14(11) of the  EC Regulation 726/2004 
when compulsory license is issued.  It is therefore imperative to ensure that the flexibilities in 
the TRIPS, regional and domestic legislations on patent, are not rendered ineffective through 
trade commitments.180 
So far, the legal, trade politics and trade measures that confront the effective exploitation of 
compulsory license have been examined. The emerging issues reveal the undesirable outcomes 
that exacerbate public health challenge and the optimal use of compulsory license. It remains 
to examine the economics of Article 31bis.  
6.6 ECONOMIES OF SCALE (EOS) OF ARTICLE 31BIS 
One of the criticisms against Article 31bis is the concern that it does not generate or support a 
large-scale production or sufficient EoS.181 This concern draws relevance from the effect of the 
negligible market sizes of LICs. Usually, sufficient EoS is inspired by the size of a market 
demand.  
Article 31bis compulsory license is premised on the notion that LICS, especially LDCs, will 
be able to find a manufacturer in another country that might be interested in assisting with their 
production deficit. However, this presupposition is problematic. Production of pharmaceuticals 
is expensive as brand and generic drug manufacturers, need to make large investments in both 
R&D and production, to be able to produce a specific pharmaceutical. It is necessary to train 
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personnel, have a ready production facility, develop know-how, institute quality controls, 
arrange for shipment and many others. For such investments to be recuperated, production of 
any pharmaceutical must be sufficiently profitable for the generic manufacturer. When 
engaging with LDCs that are planning on taking advantage of Article 31bis, generic 
manufacturers will be aware from the outset that, Abbot et al’s high volume-low margin182 
strategy will not be viable. Production of pharmaceuticals would only be profitable if they are 
able to achieve EoS through a high volume-low margin strategy. Incidentally, this requires a 
considerable investment to achieve.  
A small market size invariably implies less demand. This demand size does not support large 
scale generic production and regrettably, a generic supplier needs a ‘solvable demand’183to 
produce on a large scale. Insufficient EoS can largely disincentivise the involvement of generic 
manufacturers to produce and export under Article 31bis mechanism. This is a valid concern, 
in view of the seemingly small market sizes of most LICs that do not generate large-scale 
production advantage that is associated with the supply of generic drugs.184 
How then is EoS generated? EoS arises where the average cost of producing a commodity falls, 
as more items are produced.185It is measured by the relationship between the scale of using a 
combination of productive services and the rate of output or the outcome.186 In the health 
sector, EoS would involve getting value for the money spent on production, by reducing the 
average cost of health, as output scales up.187 A company maximises production cost even 
though some variable costs like the cost of increased labour tend to increase.188 However, there 
are costs that may remain constant regardless of increase in production and this is where the 
efficiency gains are derived from.189  
The major challenge with Article 31bis is that eligible LDCs and other LICs generally cannot 
support a “solvable demand”, as their size and purchasing power are insufficient to support 
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production at levels that are required for a generic manufacturer to achieve EoS. Abbot et al’s 
‘high volume-low margin’190compulsory license pricing strategy is only possible, where large 
scale production is guaranteed. A Generic production that supplies only a small market size, 
cannot achieve a large-scale production. The Rwanda use of compulsory license to import 
generic ARV medicines from Canada in 2007, highlights how the absence of large-scale 
production challenges Article 31bis mechanism. 
Shortly after the WTO Implementation Decision in 2003, the Canadian Patent Act was 
amended to reflect the Decision. Consistent with the Decision, the amendment allowed the 
production and export of generic drugs that are manufactured under compulsory license to 
LDCs. Canada notified the Council of TRIPS of Rwanda’s intention to import 260,000 packs 
of TriVir. TriVir was an ARV fixed dose Zidovudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine which was 
to be manufactured in Canada by Apotex Inc.191 Nine Canadian Patents were related to the 
drugs, four of which were owned by Glaxo group, two by the Wellcome foundation, two by 
Shire Biochem and one by Boehringer and Dr. Karl Thomae GMBH. Important to note that a 
similar combination drug did not exist in Canada192at that time.  
In December 2005 Apotex requested the Canadian Health authority to approve the three-dose 
combination. By June 2006, the review was completed and Apotex sought for a customer. By 
July 2007, Apotex identified Rwanda as its customer and commenced the negotiation for 
voluntary licenses with the patent holders. After the negotiation failed, Apotex applied for 
compulsory license in September 2007 and it was approved. By October 2007, Rwanda opened 
a public tender for the supply of the medicines and by May 2008, Apotex announced that it 
won the Rwandan tender. By September 2008 and September 2009, the first and the second 
deliveries were made to Rwanda.193 The highlighted timelines from the WTO suggest that, it 
took about four years to finalise this process.  
The Rwanda/Canada licence elicited several reactions against the overall outcome. From the 
standpoint of generic manufacturers, the head of government affairs at CIPLA (an Indian 
generic manufacturing company), Denis Broun, was sceptical about the practicality of Article 
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31bis. He was reported to have found Article 31bis quite cumbersome and ineffective, stating 
that CIPLA will not use the mechanism in its current state.194 His scepticism is premised on 
the fact that, it took Apotex about 4 years to deliver the drugs to Rwanda and yet lost about 
US$3-4million by offering a lower price to win the Rwanda tender. In his words, ‘in such a 
small market, this is definitely a big problem’. This is given the fact that the number of drugs 
eventually supplied to Rwanda was lower than the amount produced by CIPLA in India, within 
a month.195  
Broun recognised that, beyond the complexity of the TRIPS and the Canadian compulsory 
license legal framework, the size and the ability of a LIC to generate sufficient and effective 
demand to support large scale generic production is doubtful. A generic producer makes 
considerable investment towards developing drugs on a large scale. However, in cases of small 
market demand, few quantities will be produced under the license.196 Consequently, the cost 
of R&D will only be spread across the few quantities and this may result to an increase in the 
price of the generic drugs or a loss to the generic manufacturer.  
Rwanda paid more for the supply by Apotex. This is compared to what could have been the 
case if ApoTriVir was imported from India at the time. It was reported that similar generic in 
India that was not affected by the Indian Patent legislation at the time, cost about $0.14 per 
tablet.197Clearly, India was producing at a large-scale to satisfy a global HIV market demand 
size hence, a high-volume low margin sale was possible and profitable for India. This explains 
the reason a unit price of ApoTriVir equivalent was lower in India. However, this was not the 
case for the ApoTriVir that was produced for only the Rwandan HIV market size. The Rwandan 
HIV market demand was not solvable hence, incapable of supporting a large-scale production. 
It follows that, even though Rwanda achieved a lower price compared to the US market price, 
Rwanda did not achieve the lowest possible price.  
Having regards to the time, the cost implications of generic production and the possibility of 
limited market demand or EoS, it is doubtful that many generic producers would participate in 
generic production under Article 31bis.198 The forgoing highlights on the importance of large-
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scale demand and willing generic manufacturer for a productive use of Article 31bis 
compulsory license mechanism. Most LICs particularly the LDCs, are unable to stimulate the 
level of effective demand that attracts generic manufacturers to produce under the license. 
Vandoren et al has considered the relevance of ensuring that the economics of Article 31bis is 
right. In the absence of a solvable demand, Vandoren et al argued that ‘even at lower prices, 
medicines may remain unaffordable for the poorest populations if no adequate funding and 
purchasing mechanisms are put in place’.199  
Overall, the procedural, substantive, political and the economic challenges of Article 31bis 
mechanism have been seen to undermine the practicality of the system, towards a productive 
or effective use of the system as envisaged in Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. The 
examined issues might have supported the arguments that Article is impracticable and 
incapable of satisfying paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. Against the backdrop of 
the highlighted issues, it remains to see whether Article 31bis can still harness paragraph 6 
objective of the Doha Declaration, despite these impediments. 
6.7 CAN ARTICLE 31BIS LIVE UP TO PARAGRAPH 6 OBJECTIVE OF THE 
DOHA DECLARATION? 
The preceding discussions have explored the issues that undermine the exploitation of Article 
31bis legal framework against the objective of the Doha Declaration. Drawing from the single 
practical use of Article 31bis mechanism by Rwanda, this section would identify some of the 
issues emerging therefrom, to highlight the practical application of some of the examined 
challenges of Article 31bis.  
The discourse in Section 6.6 on EoS noted the Rwandan use of compulsory license to import 
ApoTriVir from Canada. Notably, at the time Apotex proposed ApoTriVir, the triple 
combination was not included in Schedule 1 of the Canadian Patent Act 1985. Schedule 1 
contained the list of pharmaceutical products that are eligible for generic production under 
compulsory license. To accommodate ApoTriVir triple combination, Schedule 1 was 
subsequently amended pursuant to Section 21.03(1)(a).200The amendment enabled ApoTriVir 
 
199 Vandoren and Eeckhaute (n 183) 
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manufacturing approval from the Health Canada in 2006. 201  Clearly, this highlights the 
implications of adopting advanced compulsory license procedural requirements in domestic IP 
legislations. 
Section 21.04(3)Ci Canadian Patent Act requires prior negotiation of voluntary license with 
the patent holders. The requirement for prior negotiation of voluntary license was regardless of 
the grounds of the license. A generic manufacturer applying for compulsory license must first 
submit a statutory declaration to confirms that a voluntary license has first been sought from 
the patent holder(s) and failed. A failed voluntary license negotiation prompted the application 
for compulsory license in September 2007, whilst Rwanda’s public tender for generic 
manufacturers took place in May 2008.202  
The Rwanda/Canada compulsory license for export elicited further criticisms from generic 
manufacturers. With respect to prior negotiation of voluntary License and schedule 1 list of 
eligible drugs, Apotex Director Elie Betito, observed that: ‘…makes no sense if you are trying 
to save lives’ since the originator companies ‘can attach whatever conditions they like’ to a 
license. 203 He noted further: ‘we have spent millions of dollars on the (research and 
development) we’ve spent lawyer’s time and cost, just because it’s the right thing to do. It 
would be difficult to do again unless the legislation is made simpler…. Imagine if… another 
country, like Malawi, comes forward asking for the drugs, we’d have to start this whole process 
again’.204Jack Kay, Apotex President shared similar concern when he referred to the system as 
quite costly and complicated. He further noted that Canada should ‘fix or change the legislation 
if we want to meet the original intent of getting life-saving drugs to developing countries’.205  
It is noted that Betito’s criticisms highlight the implications of advanced IPP as permitted by 
Article 1 and paragraph 2c of the TRIPS Annex.206Even though the production and export of 
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ApoTriVir were achieved, the process highlights the complexity of Article 31bis procedural 
requirements and the economics challenging the system.  
Besides Article 31bis were additional conditions in the Canadian Patent Act that complement 
the TRIPS conditions. A request from country A would ideally necessitate the need to satisfy 
Article 31bis conditions and the conditions in both the exporting and importing countries. This 
creates a multi layered process and conditions that must be satisfied to achieve the desired 
outcome. 
Notably, Article 31b of the TRIPS Agreement, waives the need for prior negotiation with a 
patent holder(s), where a license is issued on grounds of national emergency, other 
circumstances of extreme urgency and in cases of public non-commercial use. Article 31b 
recognises the need for compulsory license to respond swiftly to pandemic situations. Hence, 
it obviated the need to negotiate with the patent holder in certain circumstances before issuing 
a license. Incidentally, the Canadian patent Act does not recognise such distinction.  Regardless 
of the grounds of the license, Section 21.4(c) mandates the negotiation of a voluntary license 
as a precondition for the grant of compulsory license. This is in addition to other conditions. In 
the Rwanda/Canada scenario, it was seen that Apotex negotiated with about four patent holders 
before applying for the compulsory license. The Council of TRIPS also noted that the Canadian 
Patent Act added significantly to the duration of the license.207 
Contrasting with the 1990 Australian Patent Act, Section 136E(1)(C)i&ii, recognise that a 
compulsory license for export can be issued for public health in circumstances of national 
emergency, extreme urgency and for public non-commercial use. Section 136E(1)(E)i&ii 
further recognises that where a compulsory license is issued for public non-commercial use  
and other circumstances, other than for emergencies, the applicant must first request for an 
authorisation from the patent holder(s) to exploit the license. The Australian requirement for 
prior authorisation only differs from TRIPS Article 31(b) to the extent that it did not exempt 
the licenses for public non-commercial use from prior negotiation. However, it does recognise 
the need to respond differently in pandemic situations unlike Canada. Consequently, it can be 
argued that Section 21.4(C) of the Canada Patent Act and similar national provisions are 
indifferent to emergency and recurring but pandemic health conditions like HIV/AIDS. Even 
though Article 31 and Section 136E(1)(E)i&ii of the Australian Patent Act do not expressly 
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recognise different compulsory license processes for recurring and emergency health needs, 
they are not completely indifferent to the need for a swift compulsory license process where 
the situation demands for it. 
Dr. Felipe Garcia de la Vega, AIDS Doctor with MSF in explaining the difficulties encountered 
in the use of Canadian Patent Act for export to Rwanda noted that:208 
... With this system, we have to persuade a government to notify the WTO, find 
a company willing to produce, push to get a drug on the list of eligible 
medicines, wait for voluntary license negotiations to be completed, wait for the 
compulsory license application to be made, and be granted…. For a disease 
that kills 8,000 people per day, not only is this not a solution. It is unacceptable. 
With respect to the economics of the system, the Director General of the European Generic 
Medicine Association (EGMA) Gerry Perry, found Article 31bis complicated, unworkable and 
unable to deliver any significant improvement to access to medicines.209 The Rwanda use of 
compulsory license for export, highlights the extent an advanced domestic compulsory license 
provisions and limited EoS in a LIC, can interfere with the outcome of Article 31bis 
mechanism.  
So far, the procedural, substantive, political and economic issues undermining the exploitation 
of Article 31bis mechanism have been seen. The emerging issues can significantly undermine 
the potentials of Article 31bis mechanism to facilitate access to medicine in countries with 
insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Nonetheless, the Rwandan experience 
suggests that Article 31bis can be exploited despite the shortcomings. Despite the emerging 
and the undermining issues, it remains to see whether Article 31bis can still live up to paragraph 
6 objective.  
6.7.1 BEYOND THE CHALLENGES OF ARTICLE 31BIS 
In the light of the highlighted challenges of Article 31bis mechanism and as widely argued, is 
Article 31bis legal framework impracticable, unworkable and incapable of generating EoS? 
The WTO recognises that Article 31bis is quite cumbersome and complex, which can partly 
explain the underutilisation of the system.210 On the other hand, the single use by Rwanda 
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demonstrates that, the mechanism can play a supportive role in the effort towards improving 
access to medicine. 211  In view of the challenges, the WTO, WIPO and WHO trilateral 
cooperation, considered  that Article 31bis system may not promise a complete solution to the 
access challenge. However, it forms part of the available measures that can facilitate access to 
medicine.212  
Against this backdrop, the council of TRIPS on IP considered the need to evaluate Article 31bis 
mechanism. Some of the concerns to be investigated were whether the mechanism works 
effectively, the reason potential importing countries do not use the mechanism and the 
procedural challenges to its operation (if any). 213 The WTO, WHO and WIPO trilateral 
cooperation did recognise that the system is administratively too complex and burdensome 
hence, the need to clarify the operation. The major concern would be to determine if the 
constraints are inbuilt in the system hence, the need for a reform or whether it depends on how 
individual member states exploits it.214  
Against the backdrop of the questions raised about the efficiency of Article 31bis towards 
access to medicine, the UN High level panel report on access to medicine considered the need 
to review Article 31bis. The Panel report recommended that:  
WTO members should revise the paragraph 6 decision in order to find a solution that 
enables a swift and expedient export of pharmaceutical products produced under 
compulsory license...215 
The entire conversation in this chapter which examined the challenges of Article 31bis 
mechanism, provide significant insights into the concerns raised by the Council of TRIPS, 
WTO, WHO, WIPO trilateral cooperation and the UN High level panel recommendations. True 
to these recommendations, the complexities of Article 31bis conditions, the use of trade 
politics, the TRIP-Plus measures, the economics of Article 31bis demonstrate the challenges 
arising from the TRIPS regime. Incidentally, the brunt of these challenges is borne by LICs.  
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The problems emerging from the procedural, substantive, political and the EoS challenges of 
the Article 31bis highlight the fact that Article 31bis is problematic and can be unsupportive of 
developing countries’ access to innovation. Consequently, the right of the member states to 
facilitate access to medicine may be significantly undermined and in need of a solution. 
Limited EoS, fear of trade sanctions, complexity of Article 31bis procedures, TRIPS-Plus 
measures can individually or cumulatively account for non-usage and underutilisation of 
Article 31bis mechanism. Until the challenges are decisively addressed or manoeuvred, the 
beneficiaries of the Doha Declaration and generic manufacturers might not be incentivised to 
use the mechanism. Fear of attracting trade sanctions, restrictions placed by FTAs, seemingly 
small market sizes of LICs and the complexity of Article 31bis procedures, raise significant 
concerns on the practicality of the mechanism.  
Remarkably, amongst the examined challenges of Article 31bis, the economics of Article 31bis 
present quite a unique concern from the rest. The economic challenges seem to present the 
most significant obstacle to the success of Article 31bis framework. It can be argued that, even 
where a country overcomes the challenges posed by Article 31bis procedural conditions, trade 
politics and TRIPS-Plus, a desirable outcome from Article 31bis mechanism remains doubtful 
in the absence of a solvable demand or EoS. Notably, this does not operate to undermine the 
severity or the credibility of the other challenges. This does not suggest that the procedural, 
substantive and political challenges are insignificant and should be disregarded. Rather, this 
highlights the unique challenge EoS presents in the scheme of Article 31bis. It is unlikely that 
TRIPS-plus measures, threats and oppositions against compulsory licenses would cease 
completely despite their undesirable restriction on compulsory license and the implications on 
access to medicine. It is also unlikely that Article 31bis procedural requirements will be 
reviewed any time soon. Even though the procedural, political and the substantive issues are 
problematic, they may not be in themselves completely decisive of the viability of the 
mechanism. 
The preceding discussions have demonstrated that the procedural, substantive, political and 
economic challenges hinder the efficacy of the Art. 31bis framework for LICs. Nevertheless, 
despite its considerable shortcomings, Rwanda’s experience offers proof that the TRIPS 
compulsory licensing framework is not completely unworkable. Consequently, attempts should 
be made to maximise the potential of Art.31bis mechanism. The Importing State overcame 
procedural challenges without excessive difficulties, and it faced neither substantive nor 
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political obstacles. Coextensively, in the Exporting State, a private generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer (Apotex) complied with all requirements associated with the risk of trade 
diversion and pharmaceutical piracy. Nevertheless, this whole endeavour was ultimately 
unsuccessful due to Rwanda’s lack of a solvable demand to support production of the patented 
drug in question at a workable price point for the manufacturer involved 
The economic challenges hindering Article 31bis are conceptually limpid. An Importing State 
is unlikely to find manufacturers in Exporting States that are willing to supply the patented 
drugs in question, unless it offers economic terms that allow production at profitable levels. 
This is not to say that it is inconceivable that either public or private entities might consider 
providing economic assistance to an Importing State. Nevertheless, without any such 
subsidiary intervention, the Art. 31bis mechanism is unlikely to bear fruit unless the Importing 
State can muster a sufficiently solvable demand. 
Against this backdrop, this thesis argues that Article 31bis remains problematic. However, it 
can still be exploited in the current state if the economics of the system is right. Against the 
background of the relevance of the uniqueness of EoS to a productive use of Article 31bis 
mechanism, it can be argued that the biggest obstacle to the success of Article 31bis is the 
absence of solvable demand in LICs. The demand that would be sufficient to support the 
production of generic pharmaceuticals in quantities that can incentivise generic manufacturers. 
Significantly, Art.31bis is sensitive to this challenge and may have provided a lee way to it. 
6.8 OVERCOMING THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES: ARTICLE 31BIS(3) AND 
POOLED PROCUREMENT  
The preceding discourse has highlighted that the EoS challenge is quite a significant obstacle 
that undermines the Article 31bis framework. It is submitted that LICs can make crucial 
advancements to overcome such difficulties through pooled procurement strategies that exploit 
the flexibility offered by the extant TRIPS framework.216 
6.8.1 ARTICLE 31BIS(3) FRAMEWORK 
In Article 31bis(3), pharmaceutical products that are manufactured under compulsory license 
and imported into another country, can be re-exported into the markets of other developing or 
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Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, Journal of International 
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Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that are within the same Regional Trade Arrangement 
(RTA). Art.31bis(3) provides that: 
With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing 
power for, and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products: where a 
developing or least-developed country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade 
agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision of 28 
November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), at least half of the current membership of 
which is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least-developed 
countries, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) shall not apply to the extent 
necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a compulsory 
licence in that Member to be exported to the markets of those other developing or least-
developed country parties to the regional trade agreement that share the health problem in 
question. It is understood that this will not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent 
rights in question. 
To further the recognition of a regional license, paragraph 5 of the TRIPS Annex, promotes the 
grant of a regional patent system to facilitate the issuance of a regional licence under Article 
31bis(3). Note 4 of the WTO Implementation Decision clarifies that countries can jointly apply 
for a regional compulsory license through a regional organisation.  
Against the background of paragraph 5 of the TRIPS Annex, it is highlighted that a regional 
patent would presuppose the presence of supranational IP organisation or entity that grants and 
enforces IPP within a region. A joint notification would therefore imply the issuance of a 
compulsory license on a regional patent (where it exists).  
Notably, a regional patent system is not a prerequisite for a regional license. Accordingly, a 
regional licence is still feasible even where a regional patent does not exist. As seen in Article 
31bis(3), exploiting a RCL is subject to the satisfaction of the following criteria: the developing 
or LDCs must be parties to a RTA within the meaning of the GATT; half of the membership 
of the RTA should consist of LDCs that are so designated by the United Nations Organisation 
(UNO); and the members of the RTA must share common health problems.  
Article 31bis(3) framework permits developing or LDCs WTO member states who share 
similar health challenge(s) and are parties to a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA), to jointly 
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issue a compulsory license. By virtue of this provision, a joint notification of compulsory 
license by a regional organisation has become possible.217 
Art.31bis(3) represents a manoeuvring spaces of Art.31bis. It demonstrates the sensitivity of 
the TRIPS Agreement to the need to balance the exploitation of the TRIPS general IP rules 
against the need to facilitate access. It is also a recognition that developing countries’ member 
states of the WTO cannot continue to put up with uneconomical solution within the TRIPS 
Agreement. Accordingly, RCL strategy goes to the root of the underlying principles and 
objectives of the TRIPS Agreement in Articles 7 and 8. Art.31bis(3) strategy can generate the 
right EoS that is needed to achieve paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration 
Article 31bis(3) provides a strategic path that can be meaningfully explored by LICs as Article 
31bis(3) seeks to harness EoS in LICs with limited market demand, enhance purchasing power 
and facilitate the local production of pharmaceutical products. The therefore takes the view of 
taking advantage of the basic flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement and especially leveraging 
on the flexibility of compulsory license in Article 31bis(3). This is a recognition of the need to 
make the economics of Article 31bis right. To achieve the objectives of Article 31bis(3), a joint 
or Regional Compulsory License (RCL) is therefore promoted.218 
6.9 CONCLUSIONS 
Paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration pursues the effective exploitation of compulsory 
license in LICs, in balance of the interest of the affected patent holder(s). The analysis of the 
procedural, substantive, political, and economic challenges of Article 31bis and the emerging 
issues, raised the concern that Article 31bis is quite problematic. This has also raised the 
concern that paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration, might be defeated.   
Notably, advanced IPP is permitted to the extent Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement allows. 
Similarly, trade protectionism practices as permitted within the WTO legal order, are quite 
unlikely to discontinue. However, in view of their implications on the exploitation of 
compulsory license and access to medicine generally, they have demonstrated undesirable 
outcomes and can be illegitimate practices. 
Against the background of intense public health challenges, a single state compulsory license 
action under Article 31bis may be quite appealing. However, learning from the highlighted 
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implications of TRIPS-Plus measures, asymmetric power relationship, lack of political will and 
the cross retaliatory ability, the exploitation of compulsory license and other flexibilities is 
largely discouraged. The seemingly small market sizes of most LICs, low purchasing power 
and the inability to create the required EoS, further presented significant concerns. 
Within Article 31bis, there are three ‘central interests and elements’ that must be reasonably 
satisfied, before a satisfactory outcome can be achieved. Notably, it is difficult to devise an 
alternative compulsory license system that would be devoid of concerns. However, a desirable 
compulsory license system should ideally strive to promote the following ‘key elements’, 
namely: EoS, reasonable remuneration for the patent holder(s) and a wider access to medicine. 
These elements represent the three ‘central interests’ in Article 31bis. To wit: the generic 
manufacturer, the patent holder(s) and importing/recipient/issuing country.  
Ideally, compulsory licenses under the TRIPS Agreement present little or no challenges to 
countries with the requisite technical and manufacturing capacities. This therefore beams the 
light on countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the major 
beneficiaries of the Doha Declaration and Article 31bis. Incidentally, these countries are also 
characterised by small market sizes. A compulsory license mechanism that promotes the key 
elements will need large-scale production. This highlights the need to strive towards 
aggregating or pooling otherwise negligible market sizes to generate large-scale production.  
This is done in the expectation that, aggregated markets can promote large EoS, generate a 
reasonable remuneration for the patent holder and a wider access to drugs.     
In view of the unique challenge of EoS, an approach to Article 31bis that promotes the central 
interests and elements, through market aggregation has become compelling. A coalition 
amongst states with similar health needs and economic situation is possible under Article 31bis. 
Against this backdrop, a region-wide, pooled or joint compulsory license which is consistent 
with Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement was considered as capable of overcoming the 
EoS gap. Even though Article 31bis(3) approach has been unexplored in practice, the idea of a 
pooled procurement strategy promises the potential to create a viable market that can drive 
large-scale production. 
It is envisaged that this approach would in satisfying the ‘key elements’ in Article 31bis(3), 
significantly achieve paragraph 6 objective. Against this background, chapter 7 would explore 
the prospects and how RCL mechanism can promote access to medicine and maximise 




EXPLORING ARTICLE 31BIS(3) OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As seen in chapter 6, the challenges that threaten the optimal use of Article 31bis and ultimately 
undermine paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration, have emerged. However, despite the 
emerging issues and contrary to the argument that Article 31bis is impracticable and unable to 
satisfy paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration, chapter 6 revealed that Article 31bis 
even though problematic, can still satisfy paragraph 6 objective once the economics is right. 
The conclusion prompted Article 31bis(3) proposal to support the argument that Article 31bis 
can be effectively harnessed once the economics is right. Even as a single state action 
compulsory license is appealing, this chapter considers that a joint compulsory license under 
Article 31bis(3) provides the most efficient strategy to use Article 31bis mechanism most LICs.   
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, pharmaceutical sales respond to the forces of 
effective demand and this is largely determined by market sizes. This demonstrates the 
relevance of large-scale demand in stimulating large scale generic production. This relevance 
also draws from the fact that generic manufacturers are central to the Article 31bis mechanism. 
The need for a pooled procurement approach that can potentially, generate adequate market 
demand and encourage large-scale production has become persuasive. To create a market with 
significant commercial value in LICs, will necessitate pooling or aggregating small markets 
sizes. 
Against the backdrop of the ‘key elements and central interests’ in Article 31bis compulsory 
license mechanism, this chapter examines the regional licensing pathway in Article 31bis(3). 
This analysis seeks to explore the prospects of a joint license and how the mechanism can 
satisfy paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. This is illustrated with the existing 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, to demonstrate the potentials of a pooled 
compulsory license towards paragraph 6 objective.  
This chapter is structured into 14 sections. Section 2 the justifications for RCL. Section 3 
explores a regional collaboration and the roles of RECs in facilitating Article 31bis(3) 
mechanism. Sections 4, 5 and 6 consider the proposals for a joint license, the checklist and 
examines the proposals for a regional license. Thereafter, sections 7, 8 and 9 explore the legal 
structure of the coordinating entity, possible procedural requirement for a regional license and 
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the possible use of Art.31bis(3) to facilitate access to Covid 19 treatment. Sections 10 and 11 
consider the possible limitations and challenges of Art.31bis(3) mechanism. Sections 12 and 
13 examines the implications of Article 31bis(3) on the expectations of the patent holder and 
continued pharmaceutical innovation and the remuneration standard for a joint license. Finally, 
section 14 concludes.   
7.2 EXPLORING ARTICLE 31BIS(3) PATHWAY: THE JUSTIFICATIONS 
The issues emerging from the analysis of Article 31bis in chapter 6, justify exploring a strategic 
approach to Article 31bis. Against the backdrop of the constraints of Article 31bis, it is thought 
that, Article 31bis(3) pathway presents a strategic or more productive approach to compulsory 
license, so long as the conditions are met. In justifying the use of Article 31bis(3) access 
paradigm, it is argued that a regional collaboration can significantly leverage the challenges 
arising from effective demand, limited technical and R&D capacity and trade politics, in 
balance of the right holders’ expectations.  
a) EFFECTIVE DEMAND AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE (EoS) 
As seen in chapter 2, the usual reliance of pharmaceutical innovation on the forces of demand 
and supply, presents an implication on access to medicine. As seen, the innovation industry is 
profit oriented. Consequently, the supply of brand pharmaceutical products focuses more on 
the population that can afford the fixed price for the drugs. This is not just applicable to drugs 
that are meant for the treatment of global diseases. It also applies to neglected drugs, albeit in 
the opposite way. This therefore fuels the concern that R&D investment in neglected diseases 
is mostly relegated to philanthropic goods, as opposed to a commercial activity1 due to lean 
profit prospects. Incidentally, innovation cycle is largely influenced by ‘effective demand’ and 
this is in turn determined by the health needs of a population and post-marketing research.2 
Ideally, the target is to make the economics of Article 31bis right. Chapter 6 3  already 
highlighted the importance of effective demand in generating large-scale generic production 
 
1 Thaddeus Manu, 'Exploring a regional Pharmaceutical network as a possible solution to the Market failure in 
the innovation of essential medicines for tropical diseases in SSA’ (2014) 6 African Journal of Science, 
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2 WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Health (CIPIH) Report, 2006 P. 33-37. ‘For 
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modified interventions appropriate to the disease burden and conditions of the country. This economic reality 
introduces an important gap in the innovation cycle: either no products exist in the first place, or if they do, then 
there is often disproportionately small effort, globally, to make them more effective and affordable in poorer 
communities. Broadly speaking, the innovation cycle does not work well, or even at all, for most developing 
countries’ (p.23) 
3 See chapter 6, section 6.7    
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and sufficient EoS. Incidentally, a solvable demand is largely limited in LICs, due to the 
seemingly small market sizes. Accordingly, the need for a solvable demand and the uniqueness 
of this challenges as highlighted in chapter 6, justify the use of a system or strategy that 
aggregates, or pools market demands to generate large scale production. 
 In support of the foregoing, Peter Yu noted that: 
To facilitate the supply of essential medicines to countries with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity, Article 31bis(3) creates a special arrangement not only for the 
affected countries, but also for those belonging to a regional trade agreement. Such 
arrangement allows less developed countries to aggregate their markets to generate the 
purchasing power needed to make the development of an indigenous pharmaceutical 
industry attractive. It also paves way for the development of regional supply centres, 
procurement systems, and patent pools and institutions, while facilitating technical 
cooperation within the region.4 (Emphasis mine) 
In the recognition of the need for EoS, the WTO, WIPO and WTO trilateral cooperation report 
on the promotion of access to medicine noted that: 
The special export license is one legal pathway that can be followed when it represents 
the optimal route to effective procurement, but, as for any compulsory license, it does 
not in itself make the production of a medicine economically viable. Sufficient scale 
and predictability of demand are prerequisites for making it practically and 
commercially viable for companies to undertake the regulatory, industrial and 
commercial steps required to produce and export a medicine under a license. Regional 
approaches to procurement and joint notifications by countries with similar needs for 
accessible medicines may offer pathways to aggregating demand under the system, thus 
enabling an effective response to the needs identified.5 
As demonstrated with the Rwanda/Canada use of Article 31bis mechanism, Chapter 6 
highlighted the significance of sufficient EoS in attracting generic producers to participate in 
Article 31bis mechanism. As one of the central interests in Article 31bis, a generic 
manufacturer needs a predictable demand to undergo the processes of production and export 
 
4 Peter K. Yu, ‘Access to Medicine, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action’ (2008) 34 American Journal of Law 
& Medicine, 354,356 
5 WTO, WIPO and WHO, ‘Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections between 
Public health, intellectual property and trade (2012), 179. 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf Accessed on 02/08/2019 
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of medicine in Article 31bis mechanism. In this way, a high-volume low-margin sale is possible 
without jeopardising the economic expectation of a generic manufacturer. Otherwise, a generic 
producer either sells at a loss or at a high price and this defeats the pricing strategy of the 
compulsory license mechanism. It is against this background that a regional collaboration or 
approach to compulsory license which can potentially stimulate large-scale market demand and 
EoS is promoted. This approach as highlighted by Peter Yu and the WHO, WTO and WIPO 
trilateral cooperation, makes a compulsory license commercially viable.  
 
b) TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL LEVERAGE 
 
Notably, the effective use of compulsory license depends on sufficient technical skill, capacity 
and the political will to manage the legal, scientific, and fiscal aspect of pharmaceutical 
innovation.6 These skills are incidentally limited or non-existent in most LICs and this is a 
major concern on the effective use of compulsory license.7 
Chapter 6 already highlighted the influence of trade politics, the use of threats and actual trade 
sanctions by economically stronger countries and the pharmaceutical industry against the use 
of compulsory license. The challenge demonstrated a clear case of asymmetric power 
relationship. Unfortunately, the vulnerable and threatened countries may lack strong cross-
retaliatory capacity given their level of development.8  
Based on the forgoing, Yu explored the possibility of using the BRICS coalition to exploit a 
compulsory license. Yu considered a partnership and market combination that combine 
available technical, legal, and managerial expertise in the countries within a region, to create 
strong capacity. 9  A RTA provides a united front for the members and such front gives 
credibility to even a threat of compulsory license which ordinarily depends on a countries’ level 
of innovation and capacity.10 Similarly, Reichman recognises that a regional collaboration 
would enable a degree of formidable force and strong defensive action against legal and 
economic pressures from the patent holder(s). He noted that:   
 
6 Yu (n 4) 361 
7 Sisule Musungu et al, ‘Utilising TRIPS flexibilities for Public Health Protection Through South-South Regional 
Frameworks (South Centre, 2004) 29 
8 See chapter 6, pp. 139-143   
9 Yu, (n 4) 356. See also Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-
Setting’ (2002) 5 Journal of World Intellectual Property, 765, 784. Although referring to the promotion of a 
possible coalition between Brazil, India, and Nigeria for effective negotiation in the WTO, Prof. Peter considered 
that a pooled collaboration promotes a pooled expertise to reduce the capacity challenges in developing countries 
10 Ibid, 361 
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Strategies premised on national action alone could thus entail high transaction costs in 
overcoming an endless array of technical legal obstacles, and they could require levels 
of organisational and administrative skills and drive that are seldom found in 
developing countries. Given a predictable lack of coordination among developing 
country governments, moreover, action by single states on a case-by case approach will 
remain vulnerable to strong legal and economic pressures by right holders, in the form 
of defensive actions to choke off critical sources of supply in addition to efforts to deter 
other states from seeking alternative sources of supply in the first place. Even when 
single battles are won over a specific medicine needed in any given country, the whole 
process must then be wound up and started over again for the next drug in the next 
country, with all the legal, economic and political cost to be repeated without end….a 
more promising strategy is to think in regional or sub-regional terms, with a view to 
standardizing procedures, to lowering the transaction cost of all participating countries, 
and to stabilizing the availability of medical supplies that all the participating countries 
are likely to need. 11 
Reichman’s excerpt highlights on high transaction cost, technical and legal obstacles, the 
defensive actions of the patent holders and the use of legal and economic pressures to challenge 
a single low-income state license. Against this context, he considers the use of regional blocs 
to strengthen procurement initiatives. A regional coalition therefore becomes a logical 
approach or a solution to leverage trade with the developed countries12 and the asymmetries 
between the global north and the south.13  
Using a south-south regional approach, RTA in LICs can significantly address the constraints 
of a single state use of the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement. Musungu et al in 
harnessing the benefits of a regional or south-south cooperation of the TRIPS flexibilities noted 
that: 
A regional approach to the use of the TRIPS flexibilities will enable similarly situated 
countries to address their constraints jointly by drawing on each other’s’ expertise and 
experience and by pooling and sharing resources and information. This approach has 
 
11 Jerome Reichman, ‘Procuring Essential Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions: The Prospect for 
Regional Pharmaceutical Supply Centres’. (UNCTAD Seminar Switzerland, October 18-20, 2006) 15 
12 Musungu (n 7) 35 
13 Tolulope Anthony Adekola, ‘Regional Mechanism Under Doha Paragraph 6 System-The Largely Untested 
Alternative Route for Access to Patented Medicines’ (2020) 15 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health 
Law and Policy, 61,67 
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several advantages. First, it creates better policy conditions for addressing the 
challenges of implementing TRIPS flexibilities which can be daunting for each 
individual country. Second, a common approach to improve access to essential 
medicines will enhance the efforts by developing countries to pursue common 
negotiating positions at the WTO and in other multilateral negotiations such as those 
on a substantive patent law at the WIPO. In addition, a regional approach coincides 
with the objective of enhancing south-south cooperation on health and development. 
Consequently, if strategically utilized, regional south-south frameworks will 
significantly help developing countries devise ways to which national constraints in the 
use of TRIPS flexibilities can be overcome.14   
Generally, a coalition amongst countries with similar needs, weak political will and technical 
challenges could mean combining weak capacities and abilities to withstand political, 
economic and trade pressure. Against this background, it is thought that a regional 
collaboration can provide effective counterweight and negotiating force against economic 
pressure or sanctions.15 
c) ENHANCED REMUNERATION 
Article 31bis(1) of the TRIPS recognises the payment of ‘adequate remuneration’ on 
‘reasonable commercial terms’ which is measured by the ‘economic value of the license to the 
importing state. It can be argued that, besides the concern that compulsory license overrides 
exclusive right, a patent holder is concerned that compulsory license implies diminished 
remuneration. More so, the economic value of the license to one LIC determines the amount 
of remuneration. The amount of remuneration may be far less than what is obtainable in a 
voluntary license arrangement or where a bigger economy issues the license. Consequently, 
remuneration to the patent holder(s) continues to present a challenge. 
In the absence of a uniform objective guideline(s) or standard for measuring the amount of 
remuneration, countries are left to determine the amount of royalty.  It is highlighted that, in 
the situation where a prior negotiation is not required before a license is issued, the decision to 
pay certain percentage as remuneration becomes a unilateral decision. Consequently, the Patent 
holder loses the opportunity to make an input on the terms of the license, especially with respect 
to the amount of remuneration. Overall, using the TRIPS standard, the eventual amount of 
 
14 Musungu et al (n 7) xiv 
15 Yu (n 4) 357 
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remuneration, is a reflection of purchasing power and the size of EoS generated in the issuing 
state. 
A patent holder holds a significant interest in compulsory license mechanism. This explains 
why reasonable or adequate compensation is quite imperative. As demonstrated in chapter 
6,16inadequate compensation can incentivise the patent holder to oppose the use of compulsory 
license. As Article 31bis(3) promotes a large-scale production and EoS, it can therefore be 
argued that a pooled procurement approach can imply a remuneration standard that reflects 
effective demand size and EoS. Notably, compulsory license targets a marginal price, and this 
is usually objectionable to the patent holder. However, a remuneration standard which is 
measured by the economic value of a regional license even at a marginal price, can generate a 
reasonable royalty.  
d) REDUCED DRUG FUNDING AND ON-PATENT DRUGS 
The US President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), the United Nation’s 
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Global Fund17 and other international 
donations continue to provide alternative means to leveraging drug prices. Incidentally, a 
decline in foreign aid has been seen over the years. For instance, the US government proposed 
to cut the US foreign aid and the PEPFAR funds in 2017. The budget cut proposed that the US 
aid for family planning would be eliminated, whilst the HIV/AIDS and Malaria funds to poor 
countries will be reduced by 17% and 11% respectively.18 The United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that $26.2Billion will be needed for global HIV/AIDS 
response for 2020 alone. With the decline in foreign aid, affected countries are to majorly 
finance the response19to the public health crisis.  
The 2017 WHO Essential Medicine List (EML) contains new HIV and TB drugs, sofosbuvir 
and velpatasvir combination therapy for Hepatitis C,20 in addition to dasatinib and nilotinib for 
 
16 See Chapter 6, p. 146-148 
17 WTO, WIPO and WHO, (n 5) 179 
18 Nurith Aizenman, ‘Trump’s Proposed Budget Would Cut $2.2 Billion from Global Health Spending’ (2017) 
NPR, May 25, 2017 https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/05/25/529873431/trumps-proposed-
budget-would-cut-2-2-billion-from-global-health-spending?t=1587360131908 Accessed 20 April, 2020 See also, 
Tim Wang and Sean Cahill, ‘Trump’s New Budget Sticks it to People Living with HIV’ Plus February 19 2018. 
https://www.hivplusmag.com/stigma/2018/2/17/trumps-new-budget-sticks-it-people-living-hivAccessed 
20/04/2020 
19  Avert, ‘Funding for HIV and AIDS’ (2019) https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/global-
response/funding#footnote8_1rzxqhy Accessed 20/04/2020 
20  WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 20th List (2017), 22 




chronic myeloid leukaemia21which are under patent protection.22 Two fixed-dose combinations 
dihydroartemisinin + piperaquine and artesunate + pyronaridine for antimalaria were also 
added to the list.23 Some of the TB, HIV and hepatitis C drugs as well as other medications are 
already patented. With respect to the patented leukaemia medicine, it is estimated that about 
181,000 people in Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have chronic myeloid 
leukaemia or acute lymphoblastic leukaemia.24 The concern remains that despite donations and 
discount programmes, most of the population still experience challenges accessing the drugs.25  
The increase in the number of on-patent medicines in the WHO EML and other patented 
innovative medicines that are not included in the EML may suggest that access to medicine 
challenge might continue to persist partly due to patent monopoly and affordability.26As LICs 
have insufficient manufacturing capacity for both generic and innovative drugs, the flexibilities 
within the TRIPS Agreement continue to hold strategic importance as useful tools for price 
reduction.27  
Notably, compulsory license may not provide a viable option where generic drugs are available 
in other countries or where the brand drugs are not under patent protection in the needing 
country.28 Alternative means may explain less reliance on compulsory licence to facilitate 
access to medicine. Nonetheless, compulsory license mechanism continues to hold relevance 
especially as new and incremental inventions happen and the output is patented in key generic 
manufacturing countries like China and India.29 Notably, in pursuit of stronger IPP, China 
amended the IP legislation to align with stronger IP provisions of high-income trading 
partners.30 This highlights the need for leading generic manufacturing countries like China and 
India to sustain an IPP regime that does not constrain generic supply.31  
 
21 Ibid, 28, 30 
22 Esteban Burrone et al, ‘Patent Pooling to Increase Access to Essential Medicines’ (2019) 97 Bulletin of World 
Health Organisation, 575,576. Seven new patented antibiotics were added to the WHO list of essential medicines. 
New breast cancer medicines: pertuzumab, tratuzumab and emtansine, Afatinib for lung cancer, abiratrone and 
enzalutamide for prostate cancer would be considered by the WHO essential model list committee for inclusion 
into the next WTO essential list. 
23 WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, (n 20) 
24 Burrone et al (n 22) 576 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 WTO, WIPO and WHO (n 5) 
28 Avert (n 19) 
29 Jyh-An Lee, ‘Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the US-China Trade War’ (2020) 43 Columbia Journal of Law and 
Arts, 147, 150 
30 Ibid 
31 Dianne Nicol and Olasupo Owoeye, ‘Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Facilitate Access to Medicines’ (2013) 91 
Bulletin of World Health Organisation,533,534 
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Overall, the justifications for Article 31bis(3) pathway accentuate the need for weaker 
economies to pursue a regional access strategy that can generate large-scale production, 
reasonable compensation, and wider access to medicine. The RCL strategic approach can 
reasonably address or overcome the highlighted issues. 
As earlier highlighted in chapter 6, a regional collaboration in Article 31bis(3) has not yet been 
exploited and it is meant to be implemented through RTAs.  Illustrating with the existing RECs 
in Africa, it is relevant to examine the specific roles of RTA in facilitating Article 31bis(3) 
pooled procurement. 
7.3 REGIONAL COLLABORATION AND THE ROLE OF RTA: ILLUSTRATING 
WITH THE REC IN AFRICA 
Article 31bis(3) can be exploited by developing countries and LDCs. The use of the mechanism 
is premised on a precondition that 50% of the REC membership must be made up of LDCs. In 
view of the LDC profile in Africa, it would seem that Article 31bis(3) is prima facie more 
supportive of the REC arrangements in Africa. The African continent is made of 55 countries, 
with 33 LDC status. Other geographical regions, whether predominately LDCs or not, can still 
exploit Article 31bis(3) mechanism despite having more developing country membership. 
However, developing countries must first demonstrate evidence of limited or no 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity with respect to the specific drug(s).32   
 
Chapter 433highlighted the HIV/AIDS disease burden and the disproportionate presence in 
Africa. Africa’s capacity to address this public health challenge through local production is still 
under way. Notably, some African countries possess some level of local pharmaceutical 
production capacity. However, most countries in Africa possess inadequate primary production 
capacity for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).34Consequently, the sustainability of 
African pharmaceutical supply has been largely reliant on foreign funding and importation.35 
Incidentally, as foreign aids to Africa continue to diminish, it has become unsafe to continue 
reliance on foreign aid. As demonstrated in chapter 6 of the thesis, developing countries are 
also becoming mindful of the trade implications of depending on foreign grants and aids.  
 
32 See Para. 1(2)aii Annex to the TRIPS Agreement.  
33 See Chapter 4, pp. 80-85 
34 Berger, M; Murugi, J; Buch, E; IJsselmuiden C; Moran, M; Guzman, J; Devlin, M; Kubata, B. Strengthening 
pharmaceutical innovation in Africa. Council on Health Research for Development (COHRED); New Partnership 




Article 31bis(3) would entail state collaborations within the existing regional economic blocs 
and IP organisations in Africa. The relevant entities that can play significant roles in Article 
31bis(3) scheme are: the African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI),36 Africa Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO), RECs and African Union (AU), 
7.3.1 REGIONAL IP ORGANISATIONS IN AFRICA 
ARIPO37facilitates IP cooperation amongst the member states who are mostly Anglophone 
African states. ARIPO does not recognise a unified or regional patent system yet. However, a 
patent application in ARIPO can apply to the member states that are designated or named in 
the application. 38 Consistent with the preamble to the Harare Protocol, ARIPO considers 
pursuing advantages that can be gained by pooling IP resources for common IP goals. With 
respect to compulsory licenses, the Protocol provides that an ARIPO patent is regulated by the 
applicable national laws of the member state on compulsory licenses.39  
The OAPI40recognises a regional patent.41Patent applications that are filed at the OAPI or in 
any member state is equivalent to a national patent in each member state.42 Additionally, an 
international patent filing that includes the designation of at least one-member state of OAPI 
amounts to national filing in other member states of OAPI that are parties to the PCT.43 Articles 
46-49 of the Bangui Agreement recognises non-voluntary license, the grounds and the fact that 
an application for compulsory license shall be made in a civil court where the patentee is 
domiciled.  
The OAPI and the ARIPO regional platforms would play a significant role in driving the 
objectives of Article 31bis(3). This is in view of Paragraph 5 of the TRIPS Annex. Paragraph 
5 highlighted the relevance of a system that grants a regional patent to the Article 31bis(3) 
 
36 Established in 1997 and regulated by the Revised Bangui Agreement of 1999. OAPI covers the francophone 
African states. OAPI is comprised of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, The 
Comoros, the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritius, the 
Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
37 ARIPO is governed by the Harare Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs 1984. ARIPO comprises of 
Botswana, Esatini, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
38 Section 1 Harare Protocol 1984 
39 Section 3(12) Harare Protocol 1984 
40 OAPI is established in 1977 and regulated by the Revised Bangui Agreement of 1977 (revised 1999). OAPI 
covers the francophone SSA comprising of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
The Comoros, the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritius, the 
Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
41 See Preamble to the Revised Bangui Agreement 
42 Ibid Article 7(1) 
43 Ibid Article 7(2)  
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mechanism. Notably, a regional patent system delivers the convenience of issuing a regional 
license on a regional patent, instead of issuing national licenses in different member states of a 
REC.  Evidently, the OAPI and the ARIPO as currently constituted need to devise a clearer 
mechanism that recognises a regional patent and compulsory license system that are not subject 
to further national conditions. In other words, there be should standardised compulsory 
licensing procedures at the OAPI and ARIPO where a regional license exists.    
7.3.2 THE RECS IN AFRICA 
Africa hosts about 8 RECs within the AU. These RECs form the building blocs of the African 
Economic Community (AEC)  that work towards continental economic integration within each 
region.44The East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA), the 
Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CENSAD) and the AU as the continental mother body.45   
EAC is the East African regional inter-governmental organisation and it consists of six partner 
states, namely: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the Tanzania, and Uganda. As at 2019, 
the EAC estimated population was 177million and a cumulative GDP of USD$193.7 
billion.46Currently, Kenya is the only developing country member state of the EAC whilst the 
rest are LDCs. With high burden of communicable diseases, the countries in EAC rely majorly 
on donor funding for the procurement of medicines.47 Most medicines in the EAC are privately 
funded by individuals. Incidentally, majority of EAC’s population have low purchasing power. 
The decision to purchase drugs further competes with pricing, availability challenges and the 
basics of life like food and shelter.48  
The SADC regional economic community is committed to regional integration, economic 
development, and security in Southern Africa. SADC comprises of 16 member states namely: 
 
44 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), ‘The Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) of the African Union’ https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/recs.shtml Accessed on 27/08/19 
45 Ibid 
46 The EAC ‘Quick Facts about EAC’ https://www.eac.int/eac-quick-facts Accessed on 07/07/2020 
47 Nirmalya Syam, ‘Regional Pooled Procurement of Medicines in the East African Community’ (South Centre 
Research Paper 53, 2014) 14 https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RP53_Regional-Pooled-
Procurement-of-Medicines-in-EAC_EN.pdf accessed 18/04/ 20 
48  Second East African Community Regional Manufacturing Plan of action, 2017-2027, p. 13 
http://eacgermany.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2nd-EAC-Regional-Pharmaceutical-Manufacturing-Plan-of-
Action-2017%E2%80%932027.pdf Accessed on 25/04/2020 
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Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As at 
2018, SADC has an estimated population of 345million as well as a cumulative GDP of 
US$721.3billion.49 Following the 2018 UN classification, eight countries of the 16 member 
states of the SADC are LDCs.50  
The COMESA is the economic community of eastern and southern Africa and it comprises of 
21 member states,5112 of which are LDCs. The COMESA has an estimated total population of 
520 million and a cumulative GDP of USD$235 Billion.52 The IGAD covers eight East African 
states and seven of which are LDCs save for Kenya a developing country. As at 2014, IGAD 
possesses a cumulative population and GDP of about 247million 53 and US$218.2 
billion54respectively. 
ECOWAS promotes economic development within the West African region. ECOWAS has a 
membership of 15 countries, 55 11 of which are LDCs. The ECOWAS has an estimated  
population of 385,334 million and a GDP of about US$716.7 billion.56 The ECCA is the central 
African regional community and it comprises of 11 member states, 6 of which are LDCs.57 
ECCA covers about 158.3million population with about USD$257.8Billion GDP.58 The CEN-
SAD covers the Sahel-Saharan states with 24 member states,5918 of which are LDCs. CEN-
SAD has a population of about 553million and a cumulative GDP of USD$1,350.7billion.60 
 
49  Southern African Development Communities’ ‘SADC Facts and Figures’ https://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/ Accessed on 28/08/19 
50 UN Committee for Development Policy, List of LDC 2018 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf Accessed on 27/08/19 
51 Burundi, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Comoros, Eritrea, Libya, Rwanda, Tunisia, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Seychelles, Uganda, Congo, Eswatini, Malawi, Sudan and Zambia. 
52 COMESA, ‘Overview of COMESA’ https://www.comesa.int/overview-of-comesa/ Accessed on 27/08/19 
53 IGAD, The IGAD Region, https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-region Accessed on 07/09/19 
54  UN Economic Commission for Africa, IGAD-Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 
https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/igad-intergovernmental-authority-development Assessed on 07/09/19 
55 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo 
56  UN Commission for Africa, ECOWAS- Economic of West African States 
https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states. Accessed on 27/08/19 
57 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, DR Congo, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome & Principe and Chad.  
58  UN Commission for Africa, ECCA- Economic Community of Central African States. 
https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states Accessed on 27/08/19 
59 Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, the Sudan Togo and Tunisia.  
60 CEN-SAD – The Community of Sahel-Saharan States. https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-
sahel-saharan-states Accessed on 27/08/19 
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The AMU covers North Africa region and it comprises of 5 member states (none of which is 
LDC), with an estimated total population of 94.2 million and a GDP of US$425.7Billion.61 
AU the mother body of African states, was officially launched in 2002 to replace the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the membership comprises of all the 55 countries in 
Africa.62 In the 18th ordinary assembly of Heads of states that was held in Addis Abba Ethiopia 
in 2012, AU adopted a decision to establish a Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). The 
CFTA was a plan to create single continental market for free movements of goods and services 
across different RECs.63  
As at 30 December 2020, 54 African states save for Eritrea, have signed the African 
Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in Kigali. About 34 African states have 
deposited instruments ratifying the AfCFTA with the AU Commission.64As at 2019, the AU 
population was about 1.2billion65 with a cumulative GDP of about US$1.755trillion. 66  In 
response to the public health challenge within the region, in the 2005 Gaborone Declaration, 
AU agreed to find ways to fully exploit the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha 
Declaration.67One of the commitment was using RECs to improve access to treatment and 
care.68 
As seen from the compositions of the RECs, the member states are predominantly LDCs who 
still have the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement’s transition period. The transition period for 
LDCs in Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement still extends to 2033.69 Within this period, LDCs 
who are members of the WTO, reserve the right to either recognise or refuse to implement 
 
61 https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/amu-arab-maghreb-union Accessed on 27/08/19 
62 African Union, https://au.int/en/overview Accessed om 30/08/19 
63 African Union, CFTA-Continental Free Trade Area, https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about Accessed on 07/09/19 
64Trade Law Centre, AfCFTA Launch of Operational Phase. 
https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/infographics/2605-status-of-afcfta-
ratification/file.html Accessed on 07/09/19 
65  African Union, ‘Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development’ 2020 
Handbook. P. 29 https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/31829-doc-au_handbook_2020_english_web.pdf 
Accessed 07/07/20 
66  The World Bank, ‘GDP (Current US$) Sub-Saharan Africa’ 2020 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZG Accessed 15/07/20 
67 African Union, Gaborone Declaration a Roadmap towards Universal Access to Prevention, Treatment and Care. 
In the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Conference of African Ministers of Health (CAMH2), Gaborone, Botswana 10-
14 October 2005 (CAMH/Decl.1(II)). http://www.commit4africa.org/commitment/gaborone-declaration-
roadmap-towards-universal-access-prevention-treatment-and-care Accessed on 07/09/19 
68 Ibid. 
69 Article 66, Council for the TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period under Art. 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
for LDC member states for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/73, 6 November 




certain IPP, especially pharmaceutical patent.70Twelve OAPI and eighteen ARIPO member 
states are LDCs and are also WTO members. As earlier demonstrated, more than half of the 
member states of the RECs in Africa are LDCs, save for AMU which comprises of only 
developing countries. 
Clearly, the regional structures in Africa, satisfies Article 3bis(3) preconditions. In view of the 
advantages these REC structures offer, the expectation is that the treaties establishing the RECs 
should recognise the need for collaborative actions, in the context of Article 31bis(3). This 
might take the form of efforts towards harnessing and developing an Article 31bis(3) compliant 
regional IP system, especially at ARIPO and OAPI level.  
Article 110(2)b of the COMESA Treaty recognises that COMESA can adopt a mechanism for 
joint action in combatting the outbreak of epidermis such as AIDS, Malaria and Hepatitis. 
Article 188(a) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC, recognises a joint action towards 
the prevention and control of communicable, pandemic, and epidemic diseases that endanger 
public health of the EAC population. The COMESA and the EAC joint policy can be elaborated 
to recognise the adoption of joint measures within the TRIPS Agreement to actualise common 
public health goals. Such approach as highlighted by Reichman, reduces transaction costs that 
are associated with the procurement of drugs by a LDC.71   
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AU 55 33 1.755T >1.2B 
EAC 6 5 193.7B 177M 
SADC 16 8 1721.3B 343M 
ECOWAS 15 11 716.7 B 385,334M  
CEN-SAD 28 18 1.350.7B 553M 
ECCA 11 6 257.8 B 158.3M 
AMU 5 0 425.7B 94.2M 
COMESA 21 12 235B 520M 
IGAD 8 7 218.2B 247.4M 
 
This table presents a cumulative GDP and population of each REC. The cumulative figures 
present a large market size that can generate a solvable demand. It is important to highlight 
that, only a segment of a population is be sick and in need of specific drugs. The aim is to 
aggregate the sick population into a large market size to enhance purchasing power and large-
scale production.  
It is also observed that, depending on the size of the REC in question, market aggregation can 
work differently and produce different outcomes. RECs that are predominantly LDCs like 
EAC, might produce a different outcome when compared to ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA or 
the AfCFTA. In view of the number of state memberships and the population of the individual 
states, these RTAs represent larger population and GDP.  
Notably, pooled procurement efforts have been recognised in some of the highlighted RECs. It 
is important to highlight previous joint actions or plans for pharmaceutical procurements, to 




7.3.3 PREVIOUS POOLED PROCUREMENT EFFORTS WITHIN THE REC IN 
AFRICA 
To facilitate the supply of affordable medicine, several pooled procurement approaches have 
existed in some RECs in the past. The essence was to offer a large geographical market that 
can generate greater demand and to also facilitate the establishment of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity within the region. 72 For instance, the SADC developed a 
pharmaceutical Business Plan for 2007-2013. This plan pursued a sustainable availability, 
access to affordable medicines goals and to facilitate trade in pharmaceuticals. Amongst several 
strategies to achieve these goals, SADC considered promoting joint procurements of medicine 
and a mechanism(s) that responds to emergency pharmaceutical needs within the region.73 
Amongst other agenda, the SADC considered the opportunities of TRIPS flexibilities and the 
use of paragraph 6 of the Implementation Decision to facilitate access to medicine.74 The plan 
extended to assessing IP and medicine legislations in member states, to determine the level of 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and to assist countries with negotiating trade 
agreements that undermine public health.75  
In pursuit of the business plan, the SADC established a pooled procurement strategy for 
essential medicines and health commodities for 2013-2017. The SADC’s regional pooled 
programme hoped to facilitate regional cooperation in the procurement of essential medicine 
and to ensure access to affordable and safe medicine.76Achieving a successful procurement 
with the SADC business plan, depended on technical strength, efficient management, 
availability of supplier, good information system and financial resources amongst other 
relevant factors.77 
 
72 Syam, (n 47) 13 
73SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2007-2013, 4 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s19282en/s19282en.pdf  Accessed on 29/08/19, See also EAC 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing plan 2017-2027 http://eacgermany.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2nd-EAC-
Regional-Pharmaceutical-Manufacturing-Plan-of-Action-2017–2027.pdf , Accessed on 08/09/19, ECOWAS 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan (ERPP) 2014 https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2016-
01/ECOWAS_Regional_Pharmaceutical_Plan_0.pdf Accessed on 08/09/19 
74  Ibid  
75 Ibid, 17. See also the  SADC  Pharmaceutical Business Plan launched in 2017 https://www.sadc.int/news-
events/news/sadc-launches-pharmaceutical-business-plan/ Accessed on 29/08/19 
76 SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health Commodities, 2013-2017. P. 7 
https://www.sadc.int/files/7614/1898/8449/SADC___Strategy_for_Pooled_Procurement_of_Essential_Medicin
es_and_Health_Commodities.pdf Accessed on 29/08/19 
77 Ibid, 10 
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In the execution of the pooled programme, SADC adopted one of Medicine Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) models of pooled procurement, namely, a ‘group contracting’ method.78 Using a group 
contracting method, the member states of SADC were to jointly negotiate prices, select specific 
suppliers and then purchase individually from the selected suppliers.79 The request for drugs 
under the group contracting model is usually open ended and it involves combining the efforts 
of more than one organisations into a tasks force to resolve challenges.80 Usually, the contract 
terms would specify whether the estimated quantities represent a guaranteed minimum 
purchase or if there is no guarantee of quantities in the contract.81 
It follows that the quantity of drugs that can be requested under this procurement model can be 
unascertained or estimated. Additionally, the arrangement can continue until the actual order 
or when the countries call off the procurements. There is no doubt that this procurement 
approach can deliver positive result as it involves a bulk or pooled purchase.82Incidentally, this 
approach may be at variance or odds with compulsory license. As highlighted in chapter 6,83 
para 2(b)(1) of the TRIPS Annex requires the importing country to request for only the number 
of drugs that will be necessary to meet the needs of the state. As discussed in chapter 6, this 
requirement was criticised in view of the fact that where there is need for further request, 
compulsory licensed must be re-issued and all the procedural requirements satisfied afresh. The 
limitation of this requirement becomes more evident in a pandemic scenario where it is difficult 
to pre-determine the quantity that would be needed.84   
On the other hand, the ‘central contracting and Purchasing’ is another procurement approach 
that has been considered by the SADC. The central contracting procurement requires the 
member states of SADC to jointly conduct tenders and award the purchase contract through a 
central entity that was set up for that purpose. This central entity is expected to manage the 
joint procurement for the SADC member states.85Using staged procurement approaches, the 
SADC contemplates the establishment of SADC Pooled Procurement Services (SPPS) to act 
 
78 Ibid 
79  Ibid, See also Elise Erickson, ‘Research Synthesis: Pooled Procurement’ (2018) Knowledge Portal on 
Innovation and Access to Medicine, 12 
80 James Mclean, ‘Group Contracting’ (1959) EM36 IRE Transactions on Engineering Management, 71,71 
81  MDS, Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Services: Policy and Economic Issues (2012), 38 
https://www.msh.org/sites/msh.org/files/mds3-ch39-contracting-mar2012.pdf accessed 10/08/21 
82 SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health Commodities (n76) 11. See also 
Elise Erickson, ‘Research Synthesis: Pooled Procurement’ 2018 Knowledge Portal on Innovation and Access to 
Medicine, 12 
83 Chapter 6, P. 142-143 
84 Ibid, P. 148-149 
85 Ibid, 11 
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as the independent regional coordinating entity to manage and coordinate the pooled 
procurement strategy.86 Under this model, the regional framework contracts with suppliers 
under which the member states still purchase directly from the suppliers.87 Following the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United Republic of Tanzania and SADC 
(that was signed in 2018 for the pooled procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies,) 
the SPPS was operationalised.88 The SPPS is amongst other things, required to assist the 
member states to share pricing, supplier’s information and negotiate for better prices for high 
quality medicines from supplies.89 Notably, it is still unclear whether SADC has used the SPPS 
as a central purchasing entity. 
Beyond the SADC, similar plans also exist in other RECs.90 The highlighted pharmaceutical 
plans, efforts and strategies, demonstrate the existing regional commitments towards 
facilitating access to medicine in Africa. These plans are still pursued and can also be 
elaborated or used to pursue a regional license under Art.31bis(3) TRIPS.    
Pharmaceutical plans and strategies can complement or be used to facilitate the flexibilities in 
the TRIPS. Notably, the establishment of SPPS has not been linked or seen to be used to exploit 
the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement especially compulsory license. As observed, 
when compulsory license under Art.31bis(3) is contemplated, the establishment of SPPS 
presents an opportunity for SADC member states to pool demand and import drugs 
jointly91through a central coordinating entity.   
As public health challenges continue in Africa, the potentials of the TRIPS compulsory license 
will continue to hold relevance. As already demonstrated, the RTAs in Africa, the LDC status, 
population and the cumulative GDP, present an appropriate structure for the use of Article 




88  SADC News 10 July, 2021, https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/major-milestones-achieved-sadc-
regional-integration-economic-social-and-political-developments/ Accessed 30/08/21 
89 SADC News, 27 September, 2018 https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-tanzania-discuss-sadc-pooled-
procurement-pharmaceuticals-services/  Accessed 30/08/21 
90 Second East African Community Regional Manufacturing Plan of action, 2017-2027, 18 
http://eacgermany.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2nd-EAC-Regional-Pharmaceutical-Manufacturing-Plan-of-
Action-2017%E2%80%932027.pdf Accessed on 25/04/2020 
91 Ellen ‘t Hoen and Pascale Boulet, ‘Procurement of Patented Medicines by SADC Member States’ A Report 
for SADC member states and the future SADC Pharmaceutical Procurement Services (SPPS) based on the Lesson 
learned during the Trade, TRIPS and Access to Medicines Project 2012-2014, p. 5,7 
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used to harness EoS, enhance purchasing power and even facilitate local production of 
pharmaceutical products.  
Notably, before an RTA contemplates a joint license, a checklist of issues should be considered.   
7.4 CONSIDERING A REGIONAL COLLABORATION: THE CHECKLIST 
Whether a REC should exploit a joint compulsory license largely depends on the specific 
circumstance(s) of each case, to determine the most appropriate and applicable flexibility to 
adopt.92  Some of the relevant checklists are: the patent status of the specific medication, 
transition period, possibility of parallel imports, country status either as developing or LDC 
and national/regional/international policies on compulsory license.93  
A due consideration of the highlighted elements and more, would mean an informed decision 
in addressing the access challenge, in the most efficient way possible. Adopting a compulsory 
license with the attendant complexities, where a direct generic import is possible, may be 
counterproductive. The Ellen ‘t Hoen, Kujinga and Boulet flow chart below on the 
consideration is quite instructive.  
 
92 Ellen F. M. ‘t Hoen, Tapiwanashe Kujinga and Pascale Boulet, ‘Patent Challenges in the Procurement and 
supply of generic new essential medicines and lessons from HIV in the Southern African Development 
Community’ (SADC) Region’ (2018) 11 Journal of Pharm Policy Practice. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6277991/ Accessed on 27/0819. For adapted flowchart, see 
Eduardo Urias and Syman Ramani, ‘Access to Medicine at the TRIPS: Is Compulsory Licensing an Effective 
Mechanism to Lower Drug Prices? A Review of the Existing Evidence’ (2020) 3 Journal of International Business 
Policy, 367, 370 
93 Jerome Reichman, ‘Procuring Essential Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions: The Prospect for 





Ellen ‘t Hoen et al (2018) 
The flow chart details the considerations and the available options for countries. Where a joint 
license is eventually considered, one of the hurdles remains the fact that Article 31bis(3) has 
not been used by any REC till date. Neither the Council of TRIPS, the TRIPS Agreement nor 
national legislations have established procedures on how to issue Article 31bis(3) license. On 
the other hand, there is also paucity of literature on how to coordinate Article 31bis(3) process 
within a region.  
Building on the proposals of Manu, Adekola, ‘t Hoen et al, Reichman, and Sisule et al, the 
subsequent sections examine the proposals for exploiting Article 31bis(3), the possible 
procedures, the usefulness, the legal/operational difficulties and the implications on the right 
holder as well as the remuneration standard to the patent holder.    
7.5 PROPOSALS FOR A JOINT LICENCE 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, challenges of harnessing Art.31bis to facilitate compulsory 
license by LICs necessitated the consideration of Art.31bis(3) against the background of the 
potentials to collaborative actions in facilitating a productive use of Art.31bis mechanism. As 
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highlighted in the literature review in Chapter 1,94 Manu, Adekola, Reichman, ‘t Hoen et al and 
Sisule et al advanced arguments for the use of Article 31bis(3) by LICs.  
Considering the factors that constrain the exploitation of compulsory license in LICs, especially 
in Africa, Manu considered the need for a common legal infrastructure within the region, to 
coordinate a regional license.95 Manu proposed a ‘pooled manufacturing system based on a 
voluntary but shared arrangement for the setting up of pharmaceutical plants across the 
various sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa’ for the production of medicines.96This proposal is 
premised on the assumption that past attempts at pooled procurement initiatives in Africa 
failed.97This failure accentuates the need to use the platform to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities. 
However, Manu focused on the use of the pooled manufacturing system for local production 
of drugs. He anticipates that a regional manufacturing plant would be established for local 
production of drugs. The argument is premised on the expectation that to facilitate adequate 
supply of medicines in Africa at affordable prices, the drugs ‘must’ be manufactured 
locally.98In this arrangement, even where compulsory license is issues, it should be for local 
production. 
On the other hand, Adekola considered that Africa and South East Asia could benefit from 
regional coalitions amongst the states making up each geographical region. With respect to 
Africa, he noted that the AfCFTA can provide a broad continental platform to use Article 
31bis(3) regional model. This regional platform as argued, enables African states to jointly 
issue a regional license to either import or produce generic drugs and thereafter distribute the 
drugs within the continent.99 The option for local production would involve the establishment 
of local manufacturing industries in any LDC that will be jointly owned by the contracting 
states of the AfCFTA. This opportunity as he argued, enables Africa to build and develop local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and the use of reverse engineering to exploit patented 
innovative drugs.100 
 
94 Chapter 1, pp 12-13 
95 Manu, ‘Essential Medicines and the Complexity of Implementing Nationally Based Compulsory Licensing: On 
the Need for A Regional System of Compulsory Licensing in Sub-Sahara African’ (2014) 36(1) European 
Intellectual Property Review, 28-30 
96 Ibid, 31 
97 Ibid, 29-30 
98 Ibid, 31 
99 Tolulope Anthony Adekola, ‘Regional Mechanism Under Doha Paragraph 6 System-The Largely Untested 
Alternative Route for Access to Patented Medicines’ (2020) 15 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health 
Law and Policy, 61,74-6 
100 Ibid, 75 
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With respect to the South East Asia, a smaller model for a pooled procurement was proposed. 
Adekola hypothesised a five-country regional model to use of Art. 31bis(3). The coalition 
might comprise of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and other developing countries within the 
region. It is expected that the drugs produced or imported by any of the countries under 
Art.31bis(3) mechanism can be redistributed to other member states.101 
The proposal also recognised that the regional alliances provide a useful tool for collective 
bargain for price reduction and voluntary license.102As argued, the seemingly fragile economies 
of the two regions strengthened the need to adopt a regional strategy of Article 31bis(3).103  
Against the backdrop of using Art. 31bis(3) regional mechanism by LICs, Reichman proposed 
the establishment of  a Regional Pharmaceutical Supply Centre (RPSC) (which should be 
situate in LDCs to benefit from the TRIPS transition period). Just like the SPPS, the RPSC 
would function as a collective purchasing organisation for a region. the four possible tasks of 
the RSPC were identified as follows:104 
i. The procurement and distribution of drugs within the region and beyond. In carrying 
out this task, RPSC would seek to standardise drug regulatory procedures within 
the region and stimulate increased investment, either by using existing production 
facilities or set up new production outfit. 
ii. Harmonisation of price regulation and the coordination of price policies. It is 
expected that a plan to impose a uniform price within a region would motivate major 
pharmaceutical companies within the region to become ‘low-bidders’ in the supply 
contracts that are offered by RPSC.  
iii. To manage and coordinate the issuance of a joint compulsory license within a REC 
or sub-region. 
iv. The stimulation of local production of specific medicines. This can be done with or 





104Jerome Reichman, ‘Procuring Essential Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions: The Prospect for 
Regional Pharmaceutical Supply Centres’. (UNCTAD Seminar Switzerland, October 18-20, 2006) 17. See also 
Fredrick Abbot and Jerome Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production 
and Diffusion of the Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provision’ (2007) 10(4) JIEL 921, 973-4 
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with pharmaceutical producers can stimulate a direct investment within the region. 
This can enhance the region’s manufacturing capability.  
v. Coordinate a ‘patent buy-out’ 105 from pharmaceutical companies to supply the 
regional markets.  
It is expected that all or any of these options can facilitate access to medicine in LICs.106Any 
of the highlighted tasks can promote better co-operation between the patent holder(s) and the 
national governments.107  
Ellen ‘t Hoen et al considered the potentials of using Article 31bis(3) pathway to address the 
public health challenges in SADC. This proposal was made because of disproportionate burden 
of communicable and non-communicable diseases in SADC.108The proposal recognised that 
since SADC satisfies Art. 31bis requirements, it can issue a joint license to facilitate access to 
medicines.109 The joint license can be issued under the any of the following variants:110 
a. where there is capacity for local production of the generic of the patented 
medicine in SADC, compulsory license under Article 31 can be issued for local 
production. Combined with Article 31bis(3), the drugs can be supplied to other 
SADC member states.  
b. In the absence of local manufacturing capacity and where the medicine is 
available from a cheaper generic source(s) outside the SADC, a member state 
of the SADC can issue compulsory license, import the drug and re-export within 
the region. Where this option is used, the countries where the generic is re-
exported, will issue compulsory licenses if the brand drug is under patent 
protection there. 
 
105 Kevin Outterson, ‘Patent Buy-Out for Global Disease Innovations for Low-and Middle-Income Countries’ 
(2006) 32 American Journal of Law & Medicines 159, 2. A patent buy out is consistent with the proposal that 
essential medicines in LICs should be sold at marginal cost (generic) pricing. Patent buy out proposes the outright 
purchase of a patent and the EMR for a patented global medicine from the patentee. This sale is intended to cover 
or limited to a geographic market. In this case, companies are reimbursed the lost R&D cost recoveries in the 
concerned market or region 
106 Reichman (n 104)  
107 Ibid 
108 Ellen ‘t Hoen, Tapiwanashe and Pascale Boulet, ‘Patent Challenges in the procurement and Supply of Generic 
new Essential Medicines and Lessons from HIV in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Region’ (2018) J Pharm Policy Pract.1,2 




c. Where there is no generic manufacturing capacity in SADC and there is no 
cheaper generic from another source, compulsory license can be issued under 
Article 31bis for the production, importation and redistribution of the generic 
drugs within the SADC. 
In recognising the need to explore Art.31bis(3) mechanism, Sisule et al further recommended 
the establishment of a regional Advisory Council on Trade Related Innovation Policies 
(ACTRIPS) to institutionalise regional R&D. Developing a regional pharmaceutical research 
and manufacturing capacity was further considered as one of the viable and sustainable means 
of facilitating a regional access to medicine. The ACTRIPS is expected to co-ordinate 
Art.31bis(3) mechanism where there is a regional patent. In the absence of a regional patent, a 
system for mutual recognition of a license that has been issued by a country member of a REC 
can be used. As argued, the ACTRIPS will act as a central purchasing agency that will manage 
the procurement of drugs for all the country members of a REC.111  
 
7.6 EXAMINING THE PROPOSALS FOR A REGIONAL LICENSE 
The following recognitions emerge across the proposals. First, the possibility that Art.31bis(3) 
should be exploited by RECs. Secondly, the need for a central coordinating entity like the SPPS 
as either the RPSC or ACTRIPS. Thirdly, the establishment of local manufacturing capacity 
within the region. Overall, where Art.31bis(3) is sought, RECs can either produce the generic 
drug locally or import.  
With respect to developing local manufacturing capacity, this is consistent with developing a 
more sustainable means of facilitating access to medicine. This is also consistent with para. 5 
of the TRIPS Annex that considered local manufacturing capacity as one of the aims that can 
be pursued with a regional licence. This thesis agrees with the idea that establishing and 
growing local manufacturing capacity for both generic and innovator drugs can provide a more 
sustainable solution to the access to medicine challenge. Using the compulsory license (which 
is an intervening measure) flexibility to facilitate access to innovative drugs provides short-
term solutions to access challenge. Consistent use of compulsory license to provide a long-term 
 
111  Sisule Musungu et al, ‘Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection through South-South 




supply of innovator medicines,112inadvertently promotes a routine use of the license and this 
might result to an abuse of the mechanism.  
Local production would mean a national (in this context regional) pharmaceutical companies 
that carry out production and sales activities within a country (a region).113 Significantly, 
having the capacity for local production is not a precondition to use Art.31bis(3). The absence 
of local production does not frustrate the use of the mechanism. However, with local production 
activities present some merits. Countries can form healthcare policies that are tailored to their 
needs.114The industry reasons for local production could range from the promises of job 
creation, technology transfer, self-sufficiency in drug supply, foreign exchange earnings and 
savings from export opportunities.115On the other hand, health policies that support local 
production include achieving lower prices of drugs, improving the supply of specific medicines 
and the improvement of quality of medicines.116  
Notably, drug producers are either integrated corporations, 117 innovative companies 118 or 
reproductive firms.119It is highlighted that local production in any of these categories would 
involve huge technical capacity and R&D investment. Most developing countries operate at 
the level of reproductive firms and often rely on the importation of API from other countries.120 
T he agenda to develop local production capacity has dominated regional pharmaceutical plans. 
For instances, the EAC 2017-2027 pharmaceutical plan (herein called Plan) underscores the 
prospects and the challenges of local pharmaceutical production within EAC. The Plan 
highlighted the dearth of the capacity to manufacture advanced formulations due to skill gaps 
in product development and formulation expertise. The Plan recognised four high-level targets 
for the development of EAC pharmaceutical sector, as follows: the possible reduction of the 
importation of pharmaceuticals from 70% to 50%, supporting the growth of product portfolio 
 
112 Thaddeus Manu, ‘Exploring a regional Pharmaceutical Innovation Network as a Possible Solution to the 
Market Failure in the Innovation of Essential Medicines for Tropical Diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa, (n 1) 112 
113 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) ‘Appropriate Industrial Technology for Drugs 
and Pharmaceuticals, (1980) UNIDO, New York, Monographs on Appropriate Industrial Technology, 10 
114 Ibid,3 
115 Warren Kaplan and Richard Laing, ‘Local Production of Pharmaceuticals: Industrial Policy and Access to 
Medicines’ (Discussion Paper, 32036, 2005) 8-11 
116 Ibid, 1 
117 Ibid, 5. Integrated corporations are the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that engage in all the stages of drug 
production processes to generate New Molecular Entities (NMEs) and then use subsidiaries and licensees to 
distribute medical chemicals.  
118 Ibid. Innovative companies produce patent-expired drugs. They are also able of discover and develop NMEs. 
119 Ibid. These firms do not have in-house research capacity. Ideally, they buy API either from international tenders 
or from the originator companies. They eventually sell the drugs either using the drug brand name or as generics 
using the International Non-proprietary names (INN). 
120 Ibid, 5  
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for more than 90%, the purchase of at least 50% of EAC’s procurement from EAC 
manufacturers and having at least five EAC companies that produce advanced pharmaceutical 
formulations. The Plan identified key strategies to achieving these targets and one of which 
was using public health-related flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement.121  
The EAC 2017-2027 Plan did reveal that, local drug production in EAC is still at the level of 
import, re-packaging, and the re-labelling of finished dosage form.122 
 
EAC 2017-2027 Pharmaceutical plan (2017) 
It is highlighted that these levels of pharmaceutical production, demonstrate the complexity or 
sophistication in pharmaceutical R&D. The EAC is predominantly at level 1 with some 
manufacturing activities at levels 2 and 3. Mainly, the local firms produce finished products as 
against manufacturing APIs which are key inputs for pharmaceutical formulation. The Plan 
recognised that the production of APIs is subject to availability of knowledge, technology, and 
a consolidated local market that can justify the investment. 123  EAC witnesses very little 
pharmaceutical R&D for innovator products and does not also produce biotech 
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products.124Incidentally, generic medicines alone cannot provide effective cure to emerging 
diseases or outbreak125because they require intense R&D efforts.  
Remarkably, the EAC scenario is the reality of most of the RECs in Africa. Drug production 
in Africa is predominantly at level 1 and progressing to levels 2-3 of pharmaceutical 
production. The production of API and medicines of higher values are still underway. This is 
due to the absence of high-level expertise and technology. These facts justify age long 
dependence on the importation of innovator and generic drugs to satisfy the health needs of the 
population. The weak economy of the countries in some RECs may not support the 
establishment of local pharmaceutical production as an immediate solution to facilitate access 
to medicine. This is especially where importation can provide a cheaper alternative.  
Agreeably, local pharmaceutical production no doubt can minimise the incidences of high 
prices as the possibilities of mark ups are limited, and the payments of import levies are absent. 
However, the extent it guarantees a lower price is subject to some relevant factors and some of 
them are where at least, the raw materials and the technical expertise can be sourced 
locally.126Local production would also provide a good advantage where the region has a good 
comparative advantage and large EoS.127 Due to the expectation or the assumption of lower 
price of locally produced goods when compared to the price of imported drugs, the idea of local 
production has become attractive.128 However, these advantages only become realities the case 
where the cost of investing in local production is less than the cost of importing from the open 
market.129 Nevertheless, to achieve a sustainable long term solution to the access challenge,  
RECs should pursue the development of local production capacity, beyond the level of 
‘reproductive’ firms. The gap in local production can then be augmented with importations.    
The absence of sufficient capacity for local production of generic drugs in most LICs makes 
the use of Art.31bis(3) for the import of generic drugs and the establishment of a regional 
coordinating entity significant. The responsibility of a coordinating entity to manage a joint 
licence is consistent with Article 31bis(3). The highlighted proposals presupposed the 
establishment of a legal infrastructure (like the SPPS) by a REC(s) that facilitate a joint license 
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from the member states of the REC for the import of generic drugs through Art.31bis(3) 
mechanism .  
As highlighted earlier, the SPPS has not been linked or seen to be used to exploit the flexibilities 
within the TRIPS Agreement (especially Art.31bis(3) compulsory license.). However, where 
Art.31bis(3) is contemplated, the establishment of SPPS presents an opportunity for SADC 
member states to pool demand and jointly import the needed generic drugs130 where local 
production is impossible. Through the SPPS acting as a central coordinating entity, the SPPS 
can then re-export to individual SADC members based on Art.31bis(3) arrangement.131The 
joint notification through SPPS can provide a commercially viable level of demand for the joint 
import of generic drugs.132   
Notably, Musungu et al, Manu, Adekola and ‘t Hoen et al’s proposals did not identify possible 
procedures for a joint license, limitations and the challenges (both legal and operational) to 
highlight the details of Article 31bis(3). This is at the risk of proffering a solution on the 
assumption that Article 31bis(3) mechanism is seamless, devoid of challenges that can frustrate 
the mechanism and the fact that Art.31bis(3) can resolve the challenges of Art.31bis.   
Incidentally, compulsory license is prima facie a complex process, more so a joint license and 
the establishment of a coordinating entity to facilitate the import or local production of drugs. 
On the other hand, as the system is still unexplored, the proposals for a regional license also 
overlooked the potential implications of the mechanism on the patent holders and innovation 
as well as considerations for remuneration or royalty that recognise a region-wide license. 
These discussions are crucial in view of the need to ensure a balance between access to 
medicine, the economic expectations of the patent holders and continued R&D investment. It 
is important to be clear on the impact of a regional license on the highlighted issues. 
Against the background of the proposal for a regional license and Article 31bis(3) 
requirements, RCL would involve the following key partners: the exporting country (country 
B), REC (importing/issuing countries), patent holder(s), a generic manufacturer(s) and the co-
ordinating entity (RPSC/ACTRIPS). It is expected that a joint license approach would mean a 
win-win situation133to the ‘central interests’ in Article 31bis(3) arrangement.  
 
130 Ellen ‘t Hoen and Pascale Boulet, ‘Procurement of Patented Medicines by SADC Member States’ A Report 
for SADC member states and the future SADC Pharmaceutical Procurement Services (SPPS) based on the Lesson 
learned during the Trade, TRIPS and Access to Medicines Project 2012-2014, p. 5,7 
131 Ibid, p. 5 
132 Ibid, p. 7 
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Following the need for a coordinating entity, it is relevant to offer an insight into the legal 
structure and operation.                              
7.7 THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF A COORDINATING ENTITY 
Reichman proposes that the RPSC would be managed by Board of Directors that will consist 
of health ministers of the member states of the REC. The Board takes decision on the specific 
medications the REC seeks to make available.134 The RPSC/ACTRIPS would be the legal 
creation of the treaty establishing the REC and under the control of a specified organ of the 
REC.135 Illustratively, the Council of Ministers in ECOWAS (in this case, 15 health ministers 
from all the member states) would have the responsibility of designing the operation and 
strategies of the entity around the objectives of wider access to medicine. 
With respect to compulsory license, whether for import or for local production, the RPSC acts 
as the central contracting and purchasing agent of the REC for the pooled procurement. The 
RPSC could consider array of options like coordinating and negotiating price reduction and 
voluntary licenses136as well develop policies to reduce the risk of trade diversion to other 
territories that are outside the issuing REC. The RPSC ensures that the TRIPS compulsory 
license procedural requirements in Articles 31 and 31bis are followed. 
7.8 PROPOSED PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ARTICLE 31BIS(3) 
PROCUREMENT STRATEGY  
Following ‘t Hoen et al’s flow chart, RPSC/ACTRIPS first decides on the specific medication 
to obtain at low-cost as well as assess the local production capacity within the region.137 In 
proceeding with the license, the RPSC/ACTRIPS can decide on any of the three situations 
highlighted by Ellen ‘t Hoen et al to determine whether the license should be issued for import 
or for local production.138Each member state of the REC assesses the patent situation in the 
respective states and at the regional level (where a regional patent exists).   
7.8.1 WHERE A JOINT COMPULSORY LICENCE IS CONSIDERED 
Consistent with paragraph 2a(ii) of the TRIPS Annex, the REC through the RPSC/ACTRIPS 
considers insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity for the specific drug(s), where 
 




138 ‘t Hoen et al (n 108) 
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developing countries dominate the REC. The RPSC/ACTRIPS also determines the grounds of 
the license. Thereafter, where the product is under a regional patent, a joint license can be 
initiated at the relevant regional IP organisation on the regional patent. In the absence of a 
regional patent and the medicine is under national patent protection, the member states of a 
REC where the drug is protected, will proceed to issue national licenses on the patent under 
Article31bis(2)139  
Notably, Musungu et al’s proposal argued that, in the absence of a regional patent, a system 
for mutual recognition of a license that has been issued by a country member of a REC should 
be developed. With this proposal, there would be no need for other member states to issue 
national licenses. The mutual recognition serves as compulsory license. ‘t Hoen et al’s 
approach suggest that a member state of a REC can issue compulsory license for the import 
and re-export of drugs within the region. Where this option is used, the countries where the 
generics are meant to be re-exported, would issue compulsory licenses if the brand drug is 
under patent protection there. 
Whichever approach is adopted, the national licenses (whether national or regional) are emitted 
to the RPSC to initiate a procurement or production.140 The licenses are pooled together into a 
defecto region-wide license. Armed with a defacto regional license, RPSC can also negotiate 
further with the right holder for price reduction141or proceed to conduct a bid to engage a 
generic manufacturer.  
Possible win-win outcome can result from the negotiation at the regional level. A concession 
with the patent holder to supply the entire regional market at a discount can emerge.142As 
argued by Reichman, with this outcome, it is possible for the patent holder to sell at a marginal 
price and still preserve the regional market share.143 Other possible outcomes of a regional 
negotiation include a tax rebate, establishment of a regional manufacturing plant in a LDC that 
can be managed by the right holder or a local partner. This outcome results to a possibility of 
technology and know-how transfer to the region. 144  
In proceeding with the license, the RPSC organises a bid for potential generic suppliers to 
tender for the production and export of the drugs to the REC. This is simultaneously followed 
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with a notification to the council of TRIPS on the intention to initiate Article 31bis(3) license 
and compliance with other TRIPS compulsory license requirements. In line with Article 31bis, 
where the specific medicine is under a patent protection in country B (the export country), the 
generic manufacturer would proceed to satisfy the compulsory license conditions and 
procedures in Country B. 
The outbreak of Covid 19 presents an opportunity for a REC to pursue a regional license. Even 
as Covid 19 vaccines are now available, effective and definite treatment is yet to emerge. 
Medical researchers continue to race towards finding definite Covid-19 treatment options. 
Pending when a proven treatment option for Covid-19 emerges, existing drugs are been tested 
for the possibility to provide a cure for the virus. Countries also continue to pursue measures 
to contain the devastating spread of Covid 19. Government efforts would imply taking 
measures not only to contain the spread of the virus but to ensure that treatment options are 
accessible and affordable.145  
7.9 POSSIBLE USE OF ART.31BIS(3) MECHANISM BY A REC TO FACILITATE 
ACCESS TO COVID-19 DRUGS 
Even in developed countries, patients continue to struggle with the Covid 19 treatment.146 In 
view of the evident under-resourced healthcare systems and financial constraints in LICs, this 
challenge will no doubt be more acute in LICs. Many individuals in LICs have a high risk of 
having severe Covid-19 due to compromised immune system systems from other existing 
conditions like malnutrition, TB or HIV.147   
As highlighted in Chapter 6, WHO announced a SOLIDARITY large scale trial to determine 
if remdesivir, lopinavir and ritonavir in combination, lopinavir/ritonavir plus interferon-beta 
and two Malaria medications: chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine promise new indications 
for the treatment of the Covid-19 virus.148  As part of Covid-19 response, Israel issued a 
compulsory license to import  the generics of Lopinavir 200mg/ritonavir50mg (which belongs 
to AbbVie’s Kaletra) in March 24, 2020 for covid-19 treatment. The license was issued to 
 
145 Hilary Wong, ‘The Case for Compulsory Licensing During Covid-19’ (2020) 10 Journal of Global Health, 1 
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sustain essential supplies and services.149 Significantly, following the Israeli’s license, Abbvie 
announced the intention to waive any restriction on the MPP’s licensee that would prevent 
generic companies from supplying lopinavir/ritonavir globally. Abbvie further noted that it 
would no longer enforce patents relating to adult or paediatric lopinavir/ritonavir globally.150 
This implies that generic manufacturers are free to produce the generic versions of Kelatra and 
countries remain also free to import the generics as well. 
The Isreali efforts demonstrate the significance of the TRIPS compulsory license during 
emergency health situation. Where patent on specific ARV drugs that has a secondary 
indication for Covid 19 virus poses a barrier to access, Art.31bis(3) can provide a ready strategy 
due to the potentials.   
Overall, it is highlighted that where Article 31bis(3) mechanism is skilfully managed towards 
the objective of paragraph 5 of the TRIPS Annex, it can offer a better outcome. However, there 
are still non-TRIPS or non-patent factors that also challenge access to medicine in LICs. Poor 
infrastructure (such as transportation, power supply), poor health facility, poorly trained 
medical personnel (in some cases), paucity or insufficient skilled health personnel.151These 
challenges are overwhelmingly present in LICs and individually or cumulatively, they continue 
to widen access gap. Patent is only one of the challenges of access to medicine in LICs. 
Consequently, where non-patent factors are not decisively addressed, the efforts to facilitate 
access to medicine are sabotaged. Proactive efforts at the national and regional levels are 
recommended to fix non-patent impediments to access. Otherwise, achieving a holistic solution 
to the public health challenge continues to be a mirage or unachievable.  
Despite the potentials and justification of Article 31bis(3) mechanism in providing a more 
efficient approach to Art.31bis mechanism in LICs, it may not provide a complete solution to 
all the challenges of Art.31bis efficiency. Consequently, it has some limitations. Additionally, 
there exist some legal and operational issues that can challenge the overall process and 
outcome.  
 
149 A permit to the State to Exploit an Invention Pursuant to Chapter 6, Art.3 of the Patent Law 5727-1967, 18 
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7.10 THE POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF ART.31BIS(3) 
So far, Art.31bis(3) has been presented as capable of generating sufficient EoS towards 
achieving the para. 6 objectives of the Doha Declaration. The justifications for Art.31bis(3) 
demonstrated the potentials to resolve the highlighted issues.152 Notably, Art.31bis(3) is only 
one part of the solutions towards facilitating access to medicine. Despite the potentials, it is 
noted that Art.31bis(3) does not resolve the administrative challenges arising from the  
procedural requirements of Art.31bis, possible political pressure and the TRIPS-Plus measures 
that are highlighted in chapter 6. For instance, data exclusivity and the limits on of compulsory 
licenses in FTAs (except where exceptions apply) will continue to determine whether 
Art.31bis(3) can be pursued or not. Art.31bis(3) does put an end to possible oppositions against 
the use of the mechanism.  
With respect to the RTA requirements and its membership, only few countries or regions can 
satisfy the requirements of Art.31bis(3). Notably, RTAs that qualify to take advantage of the 
mechanism may be limited. As of 2020, the cumulative notification of RTAs in force is 
565.153However, as of 15 June 2021, only about 349 are active.154  The number of LDC 
membership requirement may make it difficult for the RTAs that are unable to satisfy the 
requirement to use the mechanism.155  
7.11 THE LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES OF ARTICLE 31BIS(3) 
ARRANGEMENT 
Undoubtedly, leveraging on Article 31bis(3) regional coordination can result to enhanced 
purchasing power, facilitate local production of pharmaceutical products and generate EoS.  
Achieving any or all the objectives of Article 31bis(3) and paragraph 5 TRIPS Annex, would 
mean achieving paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. Despite these potentials, it can 
be rightly anticipated that a regional arrangement of this nature is not devoid of legal and 
operational challenges that must be decisively managed.  
The possible legal concerns arising from Article 31bis(3) mechanism can be enabling 
legislations, suitable remuneration for a regional arrangement, the possibility of trade diversion 
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into other territories, and the protection of patent incentive. On the other hand, sustainability 
of the system, limited technical expertise, drug quality and distribution can present some 
operational challenges to Article 31bis(3) mechanism. 
7.11.1 LEGAL CHALLENGES  
a)    ENABLING LEGISLATIONS 
 
Notably, compulsory license for export is only enabled by IP legislations in both exporting and 
importing countries, as well as the treaties establishing RECs. The licensee generic 
manufacturer must operate in a country with Article 31bis compliant domestic legislations.156 
So far, as at June 2021, 133 member states of the WTO have accepted the TRIPS amendment. 
Notably, about 31 member states are yet to deposit the instrument of acceptance for the protocol 
amending the TRIPS Agreement. Significantly, the deadline for the acceptance of the TRIPS 
amendment has been extended until 31 December 2021 to enable all the member states of the 
WTO to accept the amendment.157 
Before Art.31bis(3) can be used, the treaties establishing the RECs are also required to 
recognise Article 31bis joint measures and the establishment of the co-ordinating entity. For 
instance, Articles 110 and 61(2)(d) of the treaties establishing COMESA and ECOWAS 
respectively, recognise joint actions or co-operations towards public health in the communities. 
The provisions should be elaborated to recognise Articles 31 and 31bis of TRIPS.  
It is highlighted that several countries within a RECs and importing countries, would imply 
multiple and diverse domestic patent legislations. Countries might adopt different and 
advanced compulsory license procedural requirements or conditions. Different national 
compulsory license procedural requirements may significantly prolong the overall process. For 
the RECs, this is more significant, where there is no regional patent in place.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the procedural requirements or additional conditions in the 1985 
Canadian Patent Act significantly added to the major criticisms of the Canada/Rwanda use of 
Article 31bis mechanism.158When this is compared with multiple countries and IP legislations 
within a REC, it presents a more challenging situation. These differences can significantly add 
to the complexities of Article 31bis(3) mechanism. Countries within a REC should, to the 
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extent possible, strive towards a harmonised or standardised compulsory license procedural 
requirement. WTO member states should strive towards mirroring the TRIPS compulsory 
license minimum standard.   
Similarly, some states may have committed to FTAs that may constrain a country’s freedom to 
issue compulsory license.159As demonstrated in chapter 6, the obligations arising from the FTA 
commitments adds to the complexity of the mechanism.      
 
b)  DANGER OF RE-EXPORT  
 
Reichman raised a concern about the danger of re-export of medicines produced under a 
regional arrangement into other territories. The possibility of diversion threatens the R&D 
structure of the patent holder.160 Notably, RCL by one REC, invariably implies loss of a patent 
holder’s geographical market share. The expected Return on Investment (ROI) that has been 
allocated to the specific market (REC) may have been significantly disrupted by the license. 
The incidence or the possibility of trade diversion into other markets, would mean an 
encroachment into the pricing and ROI structure of the patent holder in other markets.  
Paragraphs 3&4 of the TRIPS Annex envisaged the challenge of re-export under Article 
31bis.161The REC member states are required to take reasonable and proportionate measures 
to contain the risk of trade diversion. It is highlighted that, where a regional license is involved, 
proportionality standard and financial means to contain the risk of re-export should be 
appreciable. Ideally, RPSC arrangement should be accompanied with appreciable efforts to 
contain the risk of trade diversion. Where necessary and in line with paragraph 3 TRIPS Annex, 
technical, and financial support from developed exporting countries can be sought on a 
mutually agreed terms and conditions. 
The possibility of trade diversion erodes the incentive structure for R&D and the patent 
holder’s market share in the countries of re-export. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the TRIPS 
requirement of special marking, labelling and packaging of drugs that are manufactured under 
compulsory license can increase the cost of the license. However, distinctive markings can play 
a significant role in detecting attempts at re-export.162 
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c) REMUNERATION UNDER A REGIONAL LICENSE 
As seen in chapter 6,163the amount of remuneration to the right holder under Article 31(h) of 
the TRIPS Agreement and in most domestic legislations, is based on adequate remuneration 
that takes into account, the economic value of the license to the importing state.164  This 
standard of remuneration may have envisaged the economic value in a single state action. The 
question is whether the Article 31(h) and 31bis(2) remuneration standard, envisaged Article 
31bis(3) scenario. This is against the background of a regional market share the patent holder 
will likely lose to a regional license. Notably, the standard of remuneration is determined by 
the export country or the REC (where the medicine is not under patent protection in the export 
country). However, both the export and importing states use the economic value of the license 
to the importing/issuing state as a standard.   
Notably, the target is to ensure that patent holder ends up with a reasonable remuneration. A 
reasonable remuneration must be seen to be based on objective standards. Ideally, an objective 
standard would take into adequate account, the loss to the patent holder, the economic strength 
of the REC, the EoS generated in the REC and other relevant factors.165 Where the amount is 
unreasonable, the loss to the patent holder would more profound and can be challenged. 
d)  PATENT INCENTIVES 
Chapter 2 of the thesis detailed the policy objective of patent mechanism, as rewarding an 
inventor and incentivising continuous innovation. Patent exclusive right is used to achieve 
these objectives. This means that a patent holder expects to exclusively derive or earn rents 
from innovative efforts, till the expiration of the patent term. Incidentally, compulsory license 
presents an exception to exclusive patent proprietary right. In view of this, it does appear that 
compulsory license can potentially diminish the rental expectation of the patent holder and 
might erode the incentive to continue further R&D investment. Notably, these are legitimate 
concerns that should be taken into account when considering adequate remuneration to the 
patent holder.  
As earlier demonstrated, a region-wide license involves a large market share, and this largely 
depends on the REC in question. RECs with larger geographical coverage like ECOWAS, 
COMESA, and SADC or the AfCFTA, would suggest larger market sizes. It could mean a 
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temporary loss of a regional market and this might threaten the incentive for continued 
innovation and R&D reinvestment. It is also possible that such license can significantly affect 
R&D investment on diseases that disproportionately affect the region. Patent holders can 
predict the possibility of compulsory license on such medicines in the future. 
However, as demonstrated in chapter 5,166it is reiterated that compulsory licenses do not break 
a patent, and pursuant to Article 31(d&e) of the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory license is non-
exclusive and non-assignable. The legal implication is that, the patent remains in force and the 
patent holder remains free to compete with the compulsory licensee in the issuing REC. The 
discussion in section 5.6 of chapter 5 on the implications of compulsory license, does not reveal 
a significant impact on innovation and the expectations of the patent holders where the license 
is issued LICs. This is not to undermine possible marginal impact of the license on the 
expectation of the patent holder. Notably, just like most rights, patent proprietary right is not 
absolute. Compulsory license presents an exception to it. However, the requirement to pay 
reasonable and adequate remuneration is a recognition of the need to bridge the loss of expected 
profit and to sustain patent incentive whilst pursuing access to medicine.  
Overall, the highlighted challenges present significant concerns. The potentials of Article 
31bis(3) to facilitate access to medicine can be undermined where these issues are not 
addressed. However, as highlighted, the challenges can be decisively and strategically managed 
by the issuing RTAs.  
   
7.11.2 OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES  
a) SUSTAINABILITY 
Sustaining RPSC/ACTRIPS and the activities may not be a walk in the park. Reichman was of 
the view that the RPSC would most likely rely on technical expertise, advice and financial 
supports from the members states of the REC, to carry out the designated functions. 167 
Adequate funding is a prerequisite to an efficient RPSC, local pharmaceutical production, 
generic procurement, training of technical experts, expense for out-sourced expertise as well 
as consultants that are engaged for capacity building.168 Ideally, RPSC should be primarily 
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built on a self-funded budget of the member states of the REC. Incidentally, This might be a 
significant challenge in resourced constrained regions 
In aligning with Reichman’s view, it is recognised that paragraph 5 of the TRIPS Annex and 
Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement recognise some degree of assistance in this regard. The 
TRIPS Agreement enjoins developed countries and the relevant intergovernmental 
organisations (IGO) to provide technical and financial support to developing and LDC WTO 
member states. This support may extend to supporting the establishment of domestic offices, 
agencies, and training personnel.  
Notwithstanding the recognition of technical support, it is further noted that, the expectations 
of donor assistance and interventions from IGO and developed countries (as the case maybe) 
can augment but cannot guarantee sustainability. It is recognised that donor assistance is 
usually unsteady hence, it cannot promise a sustainable means of financing the activities of 
RPSC/ACTRIPS. Another risk arising from the Paragraph 5 and Article 67 recognition, is 
increased use of asymmetric power to challenge the legitimate use of compulsory licenses. 
Reliance on such philanthropy, incentivises the use of trade pressure. 
It is further highlighted that, sustainable funding is quite central, especially in the face of 
dwindling donor funding. The major sustainable and predictable funding for the 
RPSC/ACTRIPS is a budget that is mainly funded through collective efforts of the members 
of the RTA.  The severity of this concern would also depend on the REC in question. This is 
in terms of level of development, GDP and number of state membership. RECs with a smaller 
membership of LDC status, more membership and higher cumulative GDP, may have more 
sustainable budget for the RPSC than the RECs with fewer membership, more LDC 
membership and smaller GDP. EAC capacity compared to ECOWAS, COMESA or SADC 
justifies this concern. It is therefore argued that, the absence of a sustainable source(s) of 
funding and support for capacity building; the long-term viability of the RPSC and its relevance 
to the access debate, can be threatened.  
b) DRUG QUALITY 
Where a REC pursues local production, but technical skills and expertise for pharmaceutical 
production are insufficient or cannot be guaranteed, the quality of drugs might be doubtful. 
Learning from the experience of Thailand (a middle-income country), the license was granted 
to the Thai’s Government Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO), a public laboratory to engage 
in local production. The drugs failed WHO pre-qualification for failing to comply with 
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international drug prequalification standards 169 and for the fear of being harmful to Thai 
patients.170  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers in Africa still find it difficult to attain WHO drug pre-
qualification, due to technical constraints.171 It is argued that Local production of innovator 
drugs or the generic version in Africa might produce similar outcome like Thailand. However, 
where sufficient capacity is successfully developed, a positive outcome is possible  
Notably, it is logically expected that a regional coalition will leverage existing skillset in the 
region and also engage external expertise or consultants for local pharmaceutical production. 
It is therefore possible to meet drug safety standard even when local production is pursued. 
However, where attaining WHO’s drug qualification is impossible as a result of capacity 
constrain, the option of compulsory license for export can be harnessed. 
 
C) TRADE AND INDUSTRY HOSTILITY 
It is expected that by pooling political wills, skill and capacity, regional coalition can withstand 
trade hostility against compulsory licenses. It is underlined that REC arrangements, do not 
necessarily mean the absence of the hostilities, threats and actual trade sanctions  against the 
use of compulsory license.172 However, a regional arrangement as earlier demonstrated, can 
foster political will to withstand possible pressure against the use of Article 31bis(3). A 
collaboration based on shared purpose, can balance the asymmetries existing between the 
global north and the south.173 
It is recognised that, the extent a REC with less capacity can create a formidable front and 
retain patent incentive may be doubtful. This is especially where the patent holders and the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers still reserve the liberty to shift R&D, from diseases that 
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d) DRUD DISTRIBUTION AND NON-PATENT FACTORS  
The complexities of drug distribution within the region and the significance of non-patent 
factors cannot be overlooked. Where they are unresolved at both regional and national levels, 
they can potentially impair regional procurement efforts. Notably, a REC cannot solely rely on 
the partnership or technical support from IGO, developing countries and NGOs to address this 
challenge. Non-patent factors as earlier highlighted significantly exacerbate the access 
challenge. A regional effort towards facilitating access to medicine can be sabotaged by the 
existing poor health infrastructure and non-IP barriers to access.    
Overall, the preceding discussions focused on the potentials of a regional license, the legal and 
operational challenges. Notably, these challenges can be effectively and reasonably resolved 
by RECs.  
How RCL can generate large scale production, EoS and effective demand have been seen. So 
far, the analysis demonstrates how the interests of the issuing REC and generic manufacturers 
can be reasonably satisfied. The array of options that are available to the RECs through the 
RPSC to facilitate access to medicine were also considered. With sufficient EoS, generic 
manufacturers are incentivised to produce under the license. As one of the central interests in 
the RCL scheme, it is relevant to examine the implication of a regional license on the patent 
holder. This is examined against the expectation that, facilitating the right of access to medicine 
through compulsory license, should be pursued in balance of patent proprietary rights and 
future innovation.   
 
7.12 POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE 31BIS(3) MECHANISM ON THE 
RIGHT  HOLDER 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6,174 Article 31bis(3) envisages 3 central elements and interests. 
These interests must be reasonably satisfied to achieve paragraph 6 objective of the Doha 
Declaration. So far, the potentials of predictable and solvable demand as well as a wider access 
to medicines in Article 31bis(3) have been seen. These are incentives to the generic 
manufacturer to produce at a large-scale under the license and also a benefit of wider access to 
medicine to the issuing REC. 
Incidentally, these benefits to the generic manufacturers and the issuing states (REC) may not 
necessarily translate to a benefit to the right holder. This is not unconnected with the concern 
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that, the right holder’s R&D prospects may have been disrupted as a result of the license. 
Notably, the hostility against the use of compulsory license, the TRIPS-Plus measures and the 
IP strategies that seek to advance IPP are trade strategies that are used to enhance and secure 
the patent holders’ profit expectations. 
Compulsory license generally and more so at the regional level may threaten the profit 
expectations of the patent holders and the incentive to develop new drugs. A regional coalition 
hopes to increase wider access to medicine. However, the question is at whose and what cost? 
The mechanism, even though an exception to IPR, can present a cost to the patent holder and 
this cost should not be overlooked. Article 31bis(3) license would ideally imply that the patent 
holder gives up a large portion of the property right for public use,175to a large geographical 
market. This is particularly significant, where a broad license is issued at AfCFTA RTA 
level.176A regional License at the AfCFTA level would cover the entire African region except 
Eritrea (until Eritrea accedes to the AfCFTA). The implication of this loss is reduced ROI 
expectation from the whole of Africa, so long as the license lasts.  
Chapter 6 highlighted on the instances where single state action compulsory licences of 
negligible market size were challenged by the patent holder(s). A regional license can prompt 
similar reactions from the patent holders. So long as the license lasts, the liberty to determine 
the prices of drugs or to voluntarily segregate a market for differential pricing no longer reside 
solely on the patent holder. Price of drugs are no longer determined by the forces of demand 
and supply in the open market (which is hitherto controlled by the patent holder) but by a REC. 
A regional license might therefore distort the ideal market structure that previously determine 
the prices and the availability of products.  
The profit prospects of the patent holder underscore or incentivise continued investment in 
R&D.177The expected profit from products embodying the patent may be disrupted once 
exclusive rights disappear.178The economics of pharmaceutical patent innovation examined in 
chapter 2179revealed that pharmaceutical innovation thrives more in a patent landscape. As 
patent holders are profit oriented, there are expectations to earn patent rent from the R&D 
 
175 Daniel Cahoy, ‘Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha’ (2008) 42 GA. Law Review 131, 133. 
See also Colleen Chien, ‘Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?  (2003) 18 Berkeley Tech. Law Journal, 853, 858 
176 Adekola (n 99) 
177  Jamie Feldman, ‘Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice’ (2009) 8 Journal of 
International Business and Law, 137, 141 
178 Ibid 
179 See Chapter 2, pp 40-41 
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investment. This supports the idea that pharmaceutical firms anticipate a market structure that 
enables the delivery of optimum patent rents or ROI.  
Chapter 5 of the thesis considered some empirical research on the possible implications of 
compulsory licence on patent holders, innovation and FDI. The empirical data however found 
that, the degree of impact would largely depend on the nature of the industry (whether patent 
reliant or not) and the level of economic development of the country.180As pharmaceutical 
innovation thrives largely on patent landscape, it makes the idea that the impact of compulsory 
license depends on the extent an industry relies on the patent mechanism to appropriate 
innovation, very relevant. Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry being largely patent 
reliant makes it probable that compulsory license might disrupt the R&D structure. 
However, the empirical evidence also noted that, the extent of the impact further depends on 
the level of development of the countries issuing the licence. This is measured in terms of 
whether a country is developed, developing or LDCs. The empirical data found that, 
compulsory license in developed and middle-income countries, can impact patent holders’ 
profit expectation and continued innovation. This degree of impact is based on the presence of 
significant drug manufacturing capacity and market demands. On the other hand, since other 
LICs and LDCs neither possess manufacturing capacity nor sufficient demand, compulsory 
license may not significantly affect the patent holder.181  
The empirical research could suggest that, since the member states of RECs in Africa are 
predominantly LICs and majorly LDCs, compulsory license may not significantly affect the 
patent holder. It is however highlighted that in terms of geographical coverage, the empirical 
data considered a single state/small market size compulsory license action. This explains the 
basis of the conclusion that the impact could be negligible. Compulsory license of a regional 
coverage might produce the same or slightly different result.   
The importance of the concern of a regional license on the patent holder stem from the fact 
that, the incentive for continued investment is funded by sales revenue.182The nature of a 
regional arrangement is to pool capacities in single markets into a large geographical market 
or coverage. This suggests that a regional license might distort the expectations of a patent 
holder from the concerned regional market. 
 
180 See Chapter 5, pp. 129-133 on the impact of compulsory license on innovation 
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182 Kevin Outterson, ‘Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription 
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Lukas Vanhannaeker noted that: 
In the light of the rationale and importance in terms of leverage in the market place 
that IPRs provide to an inventor or IPRs owner willing to enter a new market, 
compulsory licensing seems to operate in precisely the opposite way, which has led to 
virulent criticism of the mechanism. The main critique put forward by opponents to 
compulsory licensing consists in arguing that the expansion of the mechanism 
represents an important ‘’threat to property and security and also to innovation and 
growth’’ in the realm of intellectual property. Such government’s interference with 
IPRs ultimately leads to a risk that compulsory licenses reduce incentives to invent and 
thus innovation itself.183 
With respect to continued innovation, Bird and Cahoy also noted that future investment might 
be threatened by a compulsory license. They observed that: ‘You can compel a private company 
once. After that they will probably leave your boarders, and you lose the opportunity to get the 
success and the technology in the future’.184Consequently, resources could be diverted to R&D 
for the medicines with more likelihood of commercial success in developed countries185 where 
the likelihood of compulsory license is remote. The WTO on the integration between trade and 
competition policy therefore warned on the indiscreet use of compulsory license, given the 
implication on innovation.186 
Vanhannaeker and Bird et al’s arguments recognise that compulsory license does have an 
implication on the patent holder’s expectations and continued innovation. It is added that a 
regional license is not any different. However, as earlier noted in chapter 5 (section 5.3) 
compulsory license is not routinely or indiscriminately issued, it does not terminate a patent 
and also non-exclusive. The patent holder continues to compete in the same market with the 
generic drugs even though in a limited way. The brand drugs continue to serve the portion of 
the market that can afford to pay the market price for the brand drugs. On the other hand, the 
arguments need to also recognise the role of adequate remuneration in relaxing the impact of a 
license on the patent holder. 
 
183  Lukas Vanhonnaeker, Intellectual Property Rights as Foreign Direct Investment: From Collision to 
Collaboration (Edward Elgar 2015) 51 
184 Robert Bird and Daniel Cahoy, ‘The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Collective Bargaining Approach’ (2008) American Business Law Journal, 283, 290 
185 Feldman (177) 158 
186  WTO, Communication from Republic of Korea Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy, 23 October 1998, WT/WGTCP/W/105, p.3 para 6 
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It is further highlighted that, one of the important features of compulsory license that can 
assuage a right holder is a reasonable and adequate remuneration that is based on objective and 
predictable standard. The standard that manifestly takes into account the competing interests 
of the patent holder and the need for access, as well as continued innovation. This supports the 
idea that a remuneration standard should adequately recognise the stakes for both parties.  
7.13 TRIPS COMPULSORY LICENSE REMUNERATION STANDARD FOR   
ARTICLE 31BIS(3) 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the legal basis for the compensation of patent 
holders, where the use of TRIPS flexibilities conflicts with the exploitation of patent rights. 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interest of third 
parties. 
Article 30 emphasises that the limitations on exclusive rights should recognise the legitimate 
expectations of the patent holder(s). On the other hand, Article 31 TRIPS requires that patent 
holder’s compensation should be founded on ‘reasonable commercial terms’ and must be 
‘adequate’. 187 Article 31bis compulsory license further recognises that the payment of 
‘adequate remuneration’ should be measured by the economic value of the license to the 
importing state.  
As demonstrated in chapter 5, the TRIPS Agreement presupposes that an open access to 
patented inventions should be compensated. Incidentally, the question is how to determine 
‘adequate remuneration’ when compulsory license is issued. In the absence of legislative 
guideline(s), the interpretation is left at the discretion of national governments. Recourse is 
only had to the perceived economic value of the authorisation and countries have the liberty to 
adopt different considerations.  
As earlier seen, the payment of remuneration is directly linked to Article 7 TRIPS objectives. 
Article 7 recognises the need to balance the rights of producers and right to access. It can 
therefore be argued that remuneration is one of the central elements that can reasonably balance 
the rights of the patent holders and access. As demonstrated in chapter 6, the percentage of 
 
187 TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(b)(h)  
231 
 
remuneration that was offered by the Thai government was considered inadequate and this 
incentivised the resistance against the license. 188 This supports the view that amount of 
remuneration is a significant aspect of compulsory license.189 
7.13.1  COMPULSORY LICENSE NATIONAL REMUNERATION STANDARDS 
In the absence of TRIPS uniform remuneration guidelines, individual member states have the 
freedom to determine the standard of remuneration and other relevant consideration.  However, 
it has been recommended that, states should adopt transparent and predictable 
considerations.190States are further recommended to ensure that the guidelines are not too 
complex or present a barrier to the access challenge it seeks to address.191 
Regardless of level of development, states are free to adopt fixed rate. In 2004, Zambia paid 
2.5% royalty for compulsory license.192Mozambique royalty was set at ‘not exceeding 2%’ of 
the annual turnover of the compulsory licensee.193Similarly, Thailand issued its license at 
0.5%.194  
Some notable compulsory license remuneration guidelines and standards exist. Namely: the 
2001/UNDP, 1998/JPO and the Tiered royalty model (TRM). The 2001/UNDP recommended 
a 4% remuneration rate, and this can be adjusted upwards to 2%, where products with high 
therapeutic value are involved. It can also be reduced to as much as 2%, when the development 
of the product has been partly supported with public funds for up to 2-6%.195  
The 1998/JPO guidelines represent the Japanese remuneration guidelines. The recommended 
royalties are between 0-6% of the expected profit from the licensed products. This rate largely 
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depends on the following: the value of the invention,196utilization ratio,197increase/decrease 
ratio198and the exploration ratio.199  
The TRM guideline uses a global base royalty of 4%. The calculation is based on the price of 
the patented product in either the US or the European market. This means the calculation is 
determined by high income price. Afterwards, the royalty is adjusted on each countries’ ability 
to pay. This adjustment is premised on a nation’s per capita income, high disease burden and 
the personal income of the persons needing the treatment in the issuing state. Consequently, 
the eventual rate of royalty under the TRM, which depends on the status of the issuing state, 
will vary from state to state.200 
Notably, the 2001 UNDP and the 1998/JPO guidelines are based on the price of the generic 
drugs. The royalty rate does not discriminate between the high and low-income markets. In 
other words, a country’s ability to pay is not considered. Consequently, the royalty will not 
vary by country to country. 201 Notably, TRM guidelines produce a different effect because, 
the rate of royalty is unrelated to the price of the generic product. Although US and European 
market prices are used to determine the royalty rate, this is further adjusted upwards or 
downwards, depending on the disease burden and the per capita income of the issuing state. It 
follows that, where this remuneration standard is adopted, LICs are likely to pay less than high 
income countries.202     
Setting adequate remuneration standard is a task for domestic policy makers. This is directly 
linked with the need to fulfil international commitments towards trading partners and to 
safeguard the interest of the patent holder.203A compulsory license that is accompanied with 
reasonable compensation, balances the proprietary rights of the patent holder and public access.   
 
196 Value considers of the patent to the working of an invention which is measured as either high, medium or low. 
See Love (n 190) 69 
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Correa proposed that the level of remuneration to the patent holder should be adequate and not 
frustrate the essence of a compulsory license. 204Epstein and Kieff recommended that the 
amount of compensation should cover the production and distribution cost of the product in the 
host country.205They considered that an offer of compensation is unreasonable where they are 
far less favourable than those negotiated in a voluntary market, by other countries in the same 
economic class as the host country.206 
Notably, whether the amount of remuneration is reasonable or not is relative and subject to 
specific circumstances. Epstein et al approach to remuneration contain relevant elements but 
are quite ambiguous. It is highlighted that what is ‘adequate’ is also viewed differently by the 
patentee and the issuing state. The patent holder(s) know and measure the amount of adequate 
remuneration and likely to base it on their R&D expenditures and profit expectations. The 
importing state on the other hand, envisages a remuneration standard that reflects marginal 
pricing. A national guideline or legislation on the compulsory license however contains 
considerations that are used to arrive at adequate remuneration. When applied, the guidelines 
may or may not reasonably meet the expectations of the patent holder(s) or too high for the 
generic manufacturer. 
It is further highlighted that Esptein et al’s standard of remuneration may also defeat the 
essence of compulsory license as a tool for price reduction. A remuneration standard that covers 
the entire cost of production and distribution in addition to actual and future profits of the 
patentees is pro-patent and difficult to determine. Such standard of remuneration is as good as 
buying at the regular open market price. Compulsory license might therefore lose the important 
feature of price reduction. Additionally, there is a risk of excessively pre-empting the 
commercial success of the drug.   
With respect to developing countries, Reichman suggested that royalty should normally range 
between 4-8% of the generic price. Based on this, he proposed 7 factors that should be 
considered when determining the rate of royalty: 
a) the extent the R&D of the patented drug benefited from public fund in either the country 
of import or origin,  
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b) the extent the R&D was directed to developing countries or made in the issuing country.  
He argued that this factor would pull higher royalty,   
c) the per capita GDP and ability of the general public to pay for the drugs,  
d) the therapeutic value of the pharmaceutical product. That is the social impact of the 
invention, 
e) existence of crisis or emergency that threatens public health, 
f)  the extent the license would broaden consumer access and  
g) the vital need of national economic development.207  
It is reiterated that adequate remuneration should be based on objective standard. This standard 
remains the same even where prior negotiation with the patent holder either fails or not 
required. An objective standard considers the positions and the interests of the contending 
parties. Incidentally, it is quite difficult or impossible to arrive at a sum that completely 
compensates the patent holder’s R&D expenditure. It follows that a marginal impact on the 
patent holders’ expectations is usually or should be expected and accommodated, to enforce 
the right of access to medicine.  The overriding policy of increasing access to medicine should 
be borne in mind, especially where the patent holder’s pricing strategy informed the license. It 
has therefore been argued that in this sense, royalty should be modest, otherwise, the policy 
objective of compulsory license is undermined. 208  
To avoid double remuneration, the exporting country determines the remuneration where the 
license is granted for the same product(s) in the import country.209 There is a likelihood that a 
pro-patent remuneration standard that prioritises the patent holder’s interests and innovation, 
might be adopted. It is quite possible that such considerations might result to a higher 
remuneration standard. The rate can either be fixed or based on considerations that might 
undermine access to medicine. As earlier noted, higher remuneration invariably implies 
increased generic price.  
Overall, despite the highlighted guidelines, countries have the freedom to determine relevant 
considerations to take into account. The overall target is to arrive at a reasonable remuneration. 
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With respect to Article 31bis scenario, some national legislations recognise fixed rate and/or 
indicate guidelines for calculating adequate remuneration. 
7.13.2  ARTICLE 31BIS NATIONAL REMUNERATION GUIDE 
With respect to the Article 31bis scenario, Article 10(9)a-b EU regulation (EC) No. 816/2006 
(on compulsory license of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for 
export to countries with public health problems) provide that a licensee shall be responsible for 
the payment of adequate remuneration to the right-holder. The remuneration is determined by 
a designated competent authority in the EU member states. However, in the cases of national 
emergency, circumstances of extreme urgency and public non-commercial use, the licensee 
(generic manufacturer) is required to pay 4% of the total price paid by the importing country 
to the licensee. In other cases, the percentage of the remuneration shall be determined by 
considering the economic value of the use the license is authorised.  
The Australian Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act, 2015 requires that the patentee and 
the licensee shall agree on the amount of remuneration. In the absence of such agreement, the 
federal court will determine the amount it considers adequate, having regards to the economic 
value of the license to the importing countries.210 
The 1985 Canadian Patent Act provides robust model or approach to remuneration for Article 
31bis scenario. Section 21.08(1) of the Act recognises that the payment of royalty shall be 
determined in a prescribed manner. In making regulation for the payment of royalty, the 
Governor in Council is enjoined to consider the humanitarian and non-commercial reasons 
underscoring the license.211Upon the application of the patent holder(s), Canada federal court 
is empowered to make an order for payment of remuneration. The court reserves the power to 
make an order for the payment that could be higher than would otherwise be required to be 
paid to the patent holder.212The court’s order may require the payment of fixed amount of 
royalty. The court can also make an order for royalty to be calculated, subject to the terms the 
court finds suitable.213  
The Federal court only makes the order where the amount of royalty required to be paid is 
inadequate for the use of the invention. In arriving at the order for remuneration, the court takes 
into account the humanitarian and non-commercial reasons underlying the license as well as 
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the economic value of the use of the invention to the importing country.214Section 21 is read 
together with Section 8 of the Canadian Use of Patented Products for International 
Humanitarian Purposes Regulations SOR/2005-143, an annex to the Patent Act.    
The Regulation linked the rate and amount of royalty to the level of development of the 
countries issuing the license. This classification is based on the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) classification. On the royalty rate, Section 8(3) of the Regulations 
provides: 
If the country or the WTO Member to which the authorisation relates appears on the 
Index, the rate for calculating the royalty that is required to be paid to the patentee or 
to each of the patentees, as the case may be in respect of the authorisation shall be 
determined by: 
a) Adding 1 to the total number of countries listed on the Index. 
b) Subtracting from the sum determined under the paragraph (a) the numerical 
rank on the Index of the country or WTO Member to which the pharmaceutical 
product is to be exported: 
c) Dividing the difference determined under paragraph (b) by the total number of 
countries listed on the Index and 
d) Multiplying the quotient determined under paragraph (c) by 0.04 
Illustratively, with 189 countries in the UN 2020 HDI report,215 the royalty rate for Uganda 
which ranks 159 shall be:  
((1 + 189) − 159)
189
∗ 0.04 = 0.00656 
Where the name of the country or the WTO member the authorisation relates appears on the 
list of the UN Index, the amount of royalty is determined depending on the following 
categories in Section 8(4)a-b: 
a) When there is one patentee, by multiplying the total monetary value, 
expressed in Canadian currency, of the agreement pertaining to the 
 
214 Ibid Section 21.08(7)  
215  United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report, 2020 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking Accessed 10/12/2020 
237 
 
pharmaceutical products to be manufactured, sold and exported under the 
authorisation by the royalty determined in accordance with subsection (3) 
and; 
b) Where there is more than one patentee, by dividing the amount determined 
under paragraph (a) by the number of patentees. 
So, assuming the total monetary value of the agreement is $3,000,000, the amount to be paid 
by Uganda in a single patentee scenario will be:  $3,000,000 ∗ 0.00656 = $19,680. Notably, 
the quantity of the generic drugs, determines the amount of the royalty. 
The forgoing demonstrates that calculating the rate and the amount of royalty would largely 
depend on the: Human Development Index (HDI) of the importing country, the quantity of the 
Pharmaceutical products measured by the value of the generic license, the number of the 
patentees, the WTO membership of the importing country, the humanitarian and non-
commercial reason for the license and other relevant factors. Even though the principle behind 
this approach is unclear, the Canadian approach is quite predictable and might, depending on 
the status of the issuing state(s), result to a reasonable amount. 
It would seem that the national standard for calculating Article 31bis can also be applied to 
Article 31bis(3) scenario. As payment of remuneration is a domestic decision, countries are 
free to adopt a fixed rate or base the calculation on consideration they consider expedient. In 
any case, the policy objective of compulsory license should be borne in mind.  Even though 
payment of remuneration is used to balance the patentee’s right, it has been argued that royalty 
obligation should not undermine access to medicine. 216  Other words, the amount of 
remuneration should not be overly too much otherwise, the essence of the Doha Declaration 
would be undermined.217 
With respect to Article 31bis(3) and drawing from the highlighted remuneration guidelines, the 
following factors should be taken into account: the number of patentees, HDI status of the 
member states of the REC, the duration of the patent, the duration of the license, the ground(s) 
of the  license, the risk of trade diversion and the precautions to guard against it, the quantity 
of the drugs, the nature/importance of the drugs, the overriding policy objective of compulsory 
license and other factors that are relevant to individual case(s).   
 




It is underlined that the status of the members of a REC either as LDCs or developing countries 
is quite relevant. This is because, merely considering the aggregated GDP and the population 
within the REC may paint a scenario of a large market and economic viability. However, this 
might not be case where more than half of the members of the REC are LDCs. Overall, ensuring 
access to medicine in balance of the patent holder’s right, does not imply a remuneration that 
covers the entire cost of R&D. Once the amount of remuneration is seen to be reasonable and 
adequate, the balance between pharmaceutical patent proprietary right and the right of access 
to medicine is achieved. A remuneration standard should accommodate marginal to sustain 
policy objective of the Doha Declaration and Article 31bis. 
 
7.14  CONCLUSIONS 
The overall discourse demonstrates how Article 31bis(3) can be used by LICs to facilitate 
access to medicine. The gap in the demand and supply of drugs in the global south is 
undoubtedly more intense. Incidentally, effective demands are prerequisites for the supply of 
drugs, and this is lacking on a large scale in LICs. On the other hand, the presence of limited 
or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity has made it impossible for LICs to produce and 
satisfy the demands of the local markets. This limitation consequently justifies reliance on 
importation. With the increasing number of on-patent drugs in the WHO’s EML, LICs continue 
to pursue various options to make drugs available and affordable to the needing population. 
So far, the justifications for a regional solution to a regional challenge have been seen. Article 
3bis(3) demonstrates the potential to satisfy the expectations of the ‘central parties’ to Article 
31bis compulsory licence mechanism. Article 31bis(3) does present a viable solution to the 
self-insufficiency challenge of LICs which undermines their effective use of compulsory 
license. As seen so far, the objective of the Doha Declaration towards the effective use of 
compulsory license by LICs can be achieved through a pooled procurement. It follows that, 
despite the arguments that Article 31bis is problematic, it can still be exploited to satisfy the 
para.6 objective of the Doha Declaration.   
Public health related flexibilities complement national efforts on access to medicine. As 
demonstrated, the use of compulsory license has been subject to legal, economic, and political 
pressures from the patent holders and their national governments. However, even the absence 
of those oppositions may not guarantee a productive use of compulsory license where there is 
no solvable demand. Achieving EoS highlights that market expansion is integral to a productive 
use of the mechanism by LICs.  
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Article 31bis(3) drives EoS to enhance purchasing power, as well as facilitate local production 
of pharmaceutical products within a regional arrangement. These important elements play 
significant roles in attracting generic manufacturers to produce and export to a region. As seen, 
local production of innovator drugs in Africa is still being pursued. Until large scale local 
production becomes available, the optimum use of compulsory license and other public health 
related flexibilities continue to hold relevance. Through the REC framework, LICs can pursue 
regional pharmaceutical production or procurement plans.  
As demonstrated, Article 31bis(3) does not only generate solvable demand, it also drives funds, 
technical and managerial skills across countries. These benefits provide a stronger position for 
weaker economies during negotiations. It also makes a threat of compulsory license more 
credible. Despite these potentials, the outcome of Article 31bis(3) as improved access to drugs 
at an affordable price would however depend greatly on how the limitations, legal and 
operational challenges are managed. As seen, the highlighted challenges can also be addressed. 
Even when it seems that the pursuit of drugs at affordable price may be happening at the 
expense of the patent holder, the payment of reasonable remuneration introduces the necessary 
balance. Objective and predictable remuneration standard are adopted to arrive at reasonable 
remuneration that compensates the patent holder’s loss of profit. The eventual amount may not 
cover the entire cost of R&D. However, once the amount is reasonable and based on objective 
standard, the needed balance is achieved. 
Paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration largely depends on meeting the reasonable 
expectations of the central parties. This is measured in terms of sufficient EoS, wider access to 
medicine and reasonable remuneration. As seen, Article 31bis(3) generates large scale 
production, widens access to medicine and guarantees a reasonable remuneration to the patent 







This thesis sought to identify the challenges arising from pharmaceutical patent protection 
generally and under the TRIPS Agreement in the context of access to medicine. Against the 
background of paragraph 6 objective, this study also sought to demonstrate that low income 
countries (LICs) can exploit Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement, to facilitate access to 
medicine. 
Based on these aims, this research addressed this question: towards the effective use of 
compulsory license in LICs, can Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, maximise the Doha 
Declaration’s Paragraph 6 objective, in balance of the patent holder’s right?   
To answer this question, this study examined the following concepts: first, patent monopoly, 
pharmaceutical patent mechanism under the TRIPS Agreement and the implications on access 
to medicine. Secondly, public health challenge, the right of access to medicine, the obligation 
of states and the patent holding firms as non-state actors towards the fulfilment of the right of 
access to medicine. Thirdly, the potentials of compulsory license and the challenges 
confronting the effective exploitation of Article 31bis TRIPS compulsory license mechanism 
were considered. Lastly, based on the issues that emerged from the analysis of Article 31bis 
and illustrating with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, this thesis 
considered the proposal for a regional compulsory license under Article 31bis(3). This proposal 
was explored against the background of paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. 
Based on the foregoing, the sections below present the conclusions of the chapters, the 
contributions, significance, limitations and the recommendations of this study.   
8.2 PHARMECUTICAL PATENT MECHANISM 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined patent mechanism and the TRIPS Agreement’s pharmaceutical 
patent protection. As seen in chapter 2, most of the literature agreed that patent exclusive right 
generates market externalities and deadweight losses. Beyond patent protection, chapter 2 
expounded the strategies, and the practices patent holders adopt to further maximise their 
exclusive right. These chapters revealed that, certain practices can have the effect of broadening 




Drawing from the literature on law and economics of patent mechanism, the implications of 
patent protection on pharmaceuticals meant that, during the period of protection, downstream 
innovation and the production of generic drugs are either blocked or delayed. As such, patent 
holders enjoy a decisive competitive advantage that can often extend beyond the initial period 
of 20 years, if further patent practices are applied to amplify the market position of a patent.   
 
As competition is either limited or non-existent during the period of protection, the patent 
holder is empowered to segment the market and to sell the brand products at high or supra-
competitive prices. In most cases, patent on break-through or the innovator drugs, usually 
results in: (i) the patent holder being the sole or one of the few suppliers of the therapy for a 
specific disease, (ii) the patented drug has limited or no close substitute, and (iii) given the 
nature of the product; the demand is inelastic. These three factors clothe patent holders with 
extremely strong pricing power resulting in retail prices that are largely above marginal cost. 
Ultimately, this means that access to drugs can often be restricted to only the patients who can 
afford to pay ultracompetitive prices. Patients or individuals who are unable to pay, are unable 
to access patented treatment options. This challenge is especially acute in LICs, where majority 
of the patients privately fund their healthcare expenses.  
 
8.3 THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ACCESS TO MEDICNE 
 
In Chapter 3, the TRIPS pharmaceutical patent protection regime and its implications on access 
to medicine were analysed. The conclusion reached was that, especially for LICs, the TRIPS 
Agreement can exacerbate access to medicine challenge.   
 
Notably, Articles 27 and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement, require WTO member states to recognise 
pharmaceutical product and process patents for 20 years.  Pharmaceutical patents are included 
within the general TRIPS regime without exception. In effect, the TRIPS effaced the 
heterogeneity in pharmaceutical patents regimes, which existed up to 1994 across jurisdictions.  
 
Concurrently, Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement ensures that WTO member states implement 
this regime by subjecting their compliance to the WTO dispute resolution and enforcement 
mechanism. The analysis of Article 64 and the experiences of the highlighted countries in 
chapter 3 revealed that, subjecting drug innovation to IPP and the WTO enforcement 
mechanism, incentivised stronger states to resort to the use of trade protectionism measures 
against weaker nations. These measures were used to compel weaker states to refrain from 
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applying or adopting even TRIPS compliant measures to facilitate access to medicines. These 
incentives were found to be unlawful. Incidentally, these practices, are unlikely to cease in 
practice.  
Against this background, this thesis notes that, it is unsafe to subject medicine to the WTO 
trading rules. The demand for most breakthrough and brand drugs with little or no substitute is 
usually inelastic. The TRIPS enforcement rule and resistance against the use of legitimate IP 
measures, undermine access to medicine. It was therefore seen that, the combined effect of the 
proprietary patent right arising from the patent mechanism, patent strategies and the TRIPS 
requirements, strengthen the incentive for supra-competitive price of IP drugs. This effect 
clearly undermines consumer access to medicine.  
 
8.4 THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MEDICINE  
 
Chapter 4 focused on the right of access to medicine as derivative of human rights to health, 
and life, as well as customary international law.  The UN Treaties, Conventions, UN Assembly 
documents, national and regional human right legislations and case laws, all contain 
undertaking for signatory states to adopt measures to ‘Respect, Protect and Fulfil’ the right to 
health and life. Article 12 ICESCR imposes an obligation on state parties to ensure the 
prevention, treatment and control of epidemic as well as provide medical attention for the sick. 
As seen from decided cases, courts interpreted the obligations to provide medication as right 
to life and health. These decisions demonstrated the accountability of states towards access to 
medicine and reinforces the importance of medicines as consumer goods. This thesis notes that, 
the discharge of this obligation is seriously challenged in LICs due to inadequate funding, 
limited pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the business activities of patent holding drug 
manufacturers and pricing strategies.  
Isolating the activities of patent holding pharmaceutical firms, the 2003 UN Norms and 
Resolution 17/4 2011, acknowledged IP barriers to the actualisation of the right of access to 
medicine. These documents noted the impact of the business strategies of a patent holding firm 
on the price of drugs and the obligations of corporations to promote and respect human right. 
To amplify these issues, chapter 4 explored how the use of patent protection and evergreening 
practices influenced the price and the duration of Kelatra’s ritonavir and lopinavir ARV.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the right of access to medicine obliges states to prevent IP 
activities that would interfere with access to life saving drugs. On the other hand, the 
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pharmaceutical IP holding firms as non-state actors are to refrain from IP practices that result 
in supra-competitive prices and the practices that undermine state efforts towards access to 
medicine. This is especially in cases where the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement, are 
used or contemplated.  
 
Considered jointly, chapters 2, 3 and 4 highlighted the tension between patent proprietary rights 
arising from pharmaceutical patent protection and the right of access to medicine. These 
chapters revealed the need to balance these competing interests. This balance would involve 
the obligation to adopt strategies to facilitate access to medicine, without unreasonably 
jeopardising drug innovation, patent rights and R&D investment. Consistent with the 
obligations to adopt measures to fulfil the right of access to medicine in balance of the patent 
holder’s right, it was seen that public health measures co-exist with patent protection. Articles 
1, 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, highlight the freedom of the members states of the WTO 
to adopt measures that are necessary to protect public health, prevent the abuse of IPR and to 
contain IP practices that unreasonably restrain trade. One of such measures, is compulsory 
license. 
 
8.5 COMPULSORY LICENSING AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE 
Chapter 5 examined the compulsory licensing mechanism. It was shown that compulsory 
license can facilitate generic production and competition to induce price reduction, whilst the 
patent production on the brand drugs, still subsists. The economics of compulsory licensing, 
empirical evidence, and the various use of the mechanism reveal positive potentials. It was 
shown that, by licensing a competitor to produce and supply similar or generic drugs in the 
same market as the patent holder, compulsory license induces market competition.  Consumers 
are presented with alternative suppliers and substitutes. Articles 31 and the 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement provisions recognise the use of compulsory license for local production and the 
import of generic drugs, subject to the payment of adequate remuneration for the patent holder.  
 
In the analysis of Article 31 provisions, Chapter 5 noted the legal constraint therein, which 
challenge the full potential of compulsory license in LICs. It was seen that, Article 31(f) hinges 
the effective use compulsory license to local production capacity for generic drugs. The 
effective use of compulsory license under Article 31, largely depended on the presence of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Incidentally, the capacity for local pharmaceutical 
production is significantly limited or non-existent in most developing countries and particularly 
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the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Against this background, the WTO’s Council of 
TRIPS Doha Declaration, the Implementation Decision and Article 31bis legal solutions, were 
considered. It was seen that Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, pursues the effective use of 
compulsory license in LICs to overcome self-insufficiency challenge. Consequently, the 
Implementation Decision and the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in Article 31bis, 
recognised that developing countries and LDCs can import generic drugs through compulsory 
licence, where local pharmaceutical production capacity is non-existent or insufficient 
 
Article 31bis solution was seen to drive the paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration 
towards a significant and optimal use of compulsory licence, to maximise the highlighted 
potentials. However, in practice, Article 31bis has been subject to criticisms due to its 
cumbersome procedural conditions and the inability to generate sufficient Economies of Scale 
(EoS).  Against the background of the criticisms, chapter 6 of the thesis examined Article 31bis 
to determine the challenges and the extent of its practicality.  
 
8.6 CAN ARTICLE 31BIS LIVE UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF PARAGRAPH 
6 OBJECTIVE OF THE DOHA DECLARATION? 
Chapter 6 examined the procedural conditions in Article 31bis and the Annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement, the TRIPS Plus measures as negotiated in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), trade 
policies and market demand. These issues represent the procedural, substantive, political and 
economic issues, that potentially challenge the optimal use of Article 31bis. Chapter 6 revealed 
the complexities of Article 31bis procedures which legally challenge its implementation. The 
freedom of countries to attach advanced compulsory license conditions beyond the TRIPS 
minimum requirements, the absence of definite remuneration standards and the possibility that, 
Article 31bis may not respond promptly to emergency and pandemic situation.  
 
In highlighting trade politics, it was seen that the withdrawal of concessions and the use of 
threat and actual trade sanctions as retaliatory measures, can significantly discourage the use 
of compulsory license. Chapter 6 provided examples of oppositions against the WTO member 
states that issued or contemplated compulsory licensing. The countries’ experiences 
highlighted the use of trade protectionism measures and asymmetric power relationship 
between stronger and weaker countries. The power imbalance makes it difficult for smaller 
countries to contemplate the use of compulsory licence and other flexibilities, to facilitate 
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access to medicine. This challenge strongly highlights the importance of strong political will 
and the capacity for cross-retaliation to withstand trade oppositions.  
 
Against the backdrop of Articles 7, 8, 31bis(4) and 64(3) of the TRIPS Agreement and Articles  
22 and 23 of the DSU, chapter 6 revealed that trade opposition practices contravene the 
highlighted provisions and produce undesirable outcome. It was seen that asymmetric power 
relationship undermines the rights of nations to issue the license. Trade practices also 
challenges the autonomy of states under the TRIPS Agreement to adopt TRIPS compliant 
measures to facilitate access to medicine. Despite this challenge, these practices are unlikely to 
cease in practice. 
 
Chapter 6 further considered the implications of TRIPS-Plus measures on the use of 
compulsory license and access to medicine. The analysis revealed that, even though advanced 
IP measures can be legitimate under the first limb of Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement, they 
produce undesirable effect and can under certain circumstance(s), be inconsistent with the 
second limb of Article 1. Consequently, they can interfere with the policy space of the WTO 
member states under Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement to exploit the flexibilities within 
the TRIPS Agreement. The challenges arising from the measures were seen to significantly 
constrain the productive use of compulsory licenses and further exacerbate access to medicine 
challenge. Despite the challenges, the negotiation of these advanced IP measures in Free Trade 
Agreement (FTAs), are unlikely to cease in practice.  
Chapter 6 further examined the possibility that Article 31bis does not generate sufficient EoS. 
It was concluded that, in view of the seemingly small market sizes characterising most LICs, 
the concern that Article 31bis cannot generate the needed EoS to work efficiently, is valid. The 
analysis revealed that a solvable demand that supports large-scale production is integral to 
Article 31bis and generic production. However, the market sizes of most LICs hardly generate 
sufficient demand. As seen in Chapter 6, the Rwanda use of compulsory license to produce and 
import ARV ApoTriVir from Canada in 2004, demonstrated the relevance of a solvable 
demand, large-scale production and sufficient EoS in the overall outcome of Article 31bis 
mechanism. It was seen that, given the small size of the Rwandan market and other factors, 
Rwanda did not achieve the best possible outcome.    
The relevance of EoS is linked to generic manufacturers, as generic production thrives on 
effective demand that can generate large-scale production. The feasibility of large-scale 
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production incentivises a generic manufacturer to participate in the production and export of 
generic drugs under the license.  
Drawing from the analysis of Article 31bis challenges, Chapter 6 revealed that generic 
manufacturers, the patent holder(s) and importing/issuing/recipient country, are central 
parties/interests in Article 31bis mechanism. These interests must be reasonably satisfied, and 
this satisfaction means generating the following elements: large EoS for the generic 
manufacturer, reasonable remuneration for the patent holder(s) and a wider access to medicine 
for the issuing state. The satisfaction of these interests achieves a balance between the right of 
access to medicine and patent proprietary right.  
Despite the highlighted challenges that confront Article 31bis, the question became, whether 
Article 31bis can satisfy the highlighted interests or generate the elements? This question was 
answered in the affirmative. To arrive at this answer, chapter 6 highlighted the unique challenge 
of insufficient EoS from trade politics, TRIPS-Plus and Article 31bis procedural conditions. 
Chapter 6 considered the unlikelihood that TRIPS-plus measures, threats, and oppositions 
against compulsory license would cease in practice. It is also unlikely that the Article 31bis 
complex procedural requirements would be revised. 
 
Emphasising the centrality of EoS in Article 31bis mechanism, Chapter 6 concluded and argued 
that, in the absence of a solvable demand, even where a country overcomes the challenges 
arising from trade politics, TRIPS-plus and Article 31bis conditions, a productive use of Article 
31bis mechanism is still doubtful. Remarkably, this argument did not operate to undermine the 
severity or the credibility of other challenges, it only stressed the uniqueness of EoS challenge 
in the scheme of Article 31bis. It then follows that, with the right EoS, Article 31bis mechanism 
can be effectively exploited to facilitate access to medicine as envisaged by the Doha 
Declaration. 
Against the backdrop of EoS, chapter 6 concluded that a strategic use of Article 31bis in the 
current state, can generate the needed large-scale production in LICs, despite the market sizes. 
Consequently, Article 31bis could strive towards aggregating the negligible market sizes of 
LICs to generate large-scale production. Consistent with Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, Chapter 6 proposed that a regional, joint or pooled compulsory license strategy can 




8.7 THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGIONAL COMPULSORY LICENSE (RCL) 
Chapter 7 of the thesis examined the potential of Article 31bis(3) strategy. Illustrating with the 
existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, it was revealed that Article 
31bis(3) can provide a strategic means of generating sufficient EoS. The RECs in Africa clearly 
satisfy the requirement of Article 31bis(3) hence, the reason they were used to drive Article 
31bis(3) potentials. With Article 31bis(3), RECs can jointly issue compulsory licenses to 
import or produce generic drugs under determinate conditions. In justifying a pooled approach, 
Chapter 7 found that Article 31bis(3) can effectively leverage the challenges that confront the 
productive use of Article 31bis.  
As seen in Chapter 7, Article 31bis(3) legal framework promotes market aggregation to 
generate a solvable demand. A joint license under Article 31bis(3), aggregates the seemingly 
small market sizes of LICs to improve the economic value of a license. Chapter 7 further 
revealed that, a coalition amongst LICs under Article 3bis(3), provides an opportunity for 
weaker economies to form effective counterweight against political pressures and trade 
sanctions. 
Chapter 7 built on the proposals for a joint license by Sisule et al, Manu, Adekola, Ellen ‘t 
Hoen et al, and Reichman. These authors recognised Article 31bis(3) as a plausible option for 
LICs within a Regional Trade Arrangement (RTA). This study examined the proposals and 
agrees that, a REC through a coordinating entity can issue a regional license to import generic 
drugs or pursue local production of generic drugs (where the capacity exists). 
Except Reichman, other proposals did not consider possible processes for a joint license, the 
intricacies of Article 31bis(3), the limitations, legal and operational challenges of the 
mechanism. These proposals therefore risked the assumption that Article 31bis(3) process is 
simple, all beneficial and devoid of legal and operational challenges. Incidentally, compulsory 
license is prima facie a complex process, more so a joint license.   
Building further on Reichman’s proposal, Chapter 7 expounded the legal and operational issues 
that can contest Article 31bis(3) system and also influence the extent of its practicality. Despite 
the emerging issues, this study determined that, the highlighted challenges present scenarios 
that a REC can effectively resolve to maximise Article 31bis(3). 
The overall analysis of the use of Article 31bis(3) revealed the benefits of large or pooled 
market to the issuing states (RECs) and the generic manufacturer.  However, a regional license 
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would suggest that a patent holder is temporarily giving up the property right to a geographical 
market. The right to segregate markets for differential pricing will no longer reside on the patent 
holder. Consequently, it would seem prima facie, that a regional license distorts the market 
structure and the economic expectations of the patent holder from the concerned region. 
Notably, this can still drive the resistance against the use of a regional license   
Based on the forgoing, chapter 7 examined the possible impact of a regional license on patent 
holders and continued innovation. The analysis revealed that compulsory license in LICs have 
no significant impact on the patent holder.  With respect to Article 31bis(3) scenario, this study 
recognised that, even though a regional license is non-exclusive, non-assignable and  does not 
operate to terminate a patent, it may raise a concern on the economic expectation of the patent 
holder.  However, it was concluded that this concern can be addressed through the payment of 
adequate remuneration. Consequently, the analysis in chapter 7 identified reasonable 
remuneration as one of the elements that can balance the right of access to medicine and patent 
protection in Article 31bis(3) mechanism.  
Based on the requirement for reasonable remuneration and the freedom of states to adopt 
suitable remuneration guidelines, chapter 7 noted the need to adopt objective and transparent 
standards. Drawing from notable remuneration standards, states should consider (but not 
limited) the following: the number of patentees, Human Development Index (HDI) status of 
the member states of the REC, the duration of the patent, the duration of the license, the 
ground(s) of the license, the risk of trade diversion outside the issuing REC, the quantity of 
drugs to be produced under the license, the geographical coverage of the REC, the nature of 
the drugs, and other factors that are relevant to the grounds of the license.  
So far, using the RECs in Africa, the potentials of Article 31bis(3) demonstrated that Article 
31bis compulsory license can be exploited by LICs in satisfaction of paragraph 6 objective of 
the Doha Declaration. The overall analysis in chapters 6 and 7 also sustains the argument that 
compulsory license mechanism can balance the tension between pharmaceutical patent 
protection and access to medicine, as seen in chapters 2 and 3.  
Based on the overall analysis in this study, this thesis notes the contributions and the 
significance of this study, the limitation and the recommendations towards access to medicine 




8.8 TOWARDS A WIDER ACCESS TO MEDICNE  
This study revealed the incoherence between trade, health and IP policies of the WTO, WHO 
and WIPO respectively. These policies and organisations pursue different but interrelated 
goals. However, they have interreacted and have thus far demonstrated some degree of 
interference. The WTO TRIPS Agreement has been seen to interfere with the health objective 
of WHO towards access to medicine. Notably, the Paris Convention under the auspices of the 
WIPO as seen in chapter 2 only created an obligation for states to abide by national treatment. 
This is opposed to the mandatory obligation on the WTO member states under the TRIPS 
Agreement. Emerging from the TRIPS Agreement’s legal framework was the exploitation of 
patent exclusive right and the WTO trade advantages. They interfere with the right of access 
to medicine. Consequently, the need to reconcile and balance these policies has become 
compelling.  
Incidentally, this incoherence continues as the exploitation patent rights, IP strategies and trade 
practices within TRIPS Agreement’s WTO legal order continue. These incoherencies 
exacerbate public health and access to medicine challenges. Despite this, the TRIPS Agreement 
remains sensitive to these challenges hence, the reason it incorporates some flexibilities. The 
compulsory license flexibility balances the influence of pharmaceutical patent protection on 
consumer access to medicine, through generic competition. However, the extent compulsory 
license could be used to achieve this, largely depended on the innovative and the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity of the issuing states.  
Notably, the Doha Declaration in paragraph 6, recognised the scarcity of this capacity in LICs 
hence, the efforts towards a compulsory license strategy that can bridge this gap. Article 
31bis(3) represents a mechanism that was specifically tailored for LICs. As demonstrated in 
this study, public health challenge is a global concern, however, it has a disproportionate effect 
or application on the population in LICs. This has consequently created a regional challenge. 
Accordingly, LICs within a RTA, who share similar public health problems can consider a 
regional approach to this regional problem.   
8.9 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis made a threefold contribution:  
First, this study reinforces the literature on the use of Article 31bis compulsory license 
mechanism to facilitate access to medicine. It provides a broader context and more insights into 
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the legal, procedural, substantive, political and economic issues that challenge the use of the 
legal mechanism. These issues were substantively analysed to demonstrate how they challenge 
paragraph 6 objective of the Doha Declaration. 
Secondly, this study offered more insight on Article 31bis(3) access strategy. Significantly, 
since the 2003 Implementation Decision, Article 31bis(3)  has never been in use. Building on 
previous proposals for a joint license, this study examined the potentials of Article 31bis(3), 
the procedures, the limitations, legal and procedural challenges that can undermine the system, 
the possibility that the mechanism can be used to facilitate Covid 19 treatment, the possible 
implications on the patent holder and the remuneration standard for a regional license. Overall, 
this study gave a holistic view of how RCL affects the central parties to Article 31bis(3) 
mechanism. 
Thirdly, this study clearly analysed Article 31bis mechanism as capable of being exploited to 
providing some legal, economic and political solutions that can bridge the gap between the 
right of access to medicine and pharmaceutical patent protection.  
8.10 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
The insight from this thesis is expected to provide a good resource for regional organisations 
and LICs that are seeking to exploit regional compulsory license strategy, IP and access to 
medicine policy makers and access to medicine-based NGOs. This would be a great resource 
to African Union that is currently looking at exploiting a regional strategy (using the TRIPS 
flexibilities), to facilitate access to medicine. Accordingly, this study provides a contextual 
guide on the legal, trade and economic considerations that are relevant for a successful regional 
license. Within the academia, this study would provide a good resource for IP scholars that are 
interested in the TRIPS compulsory license and access to medicine research area.  
Despite the highlighted usefulness, this study is limited in scope. This thesis recognised that 
compulsory license under the TRIPS Agreement is broadly used to address public interest and 
anticompetition practices of the IP holders. However, this thesis focused more on the use of 
compulsory license for public health. By focusing on public health issues, this study addressed 
the public interest use of compulsory license. Consequently, pharmaceutical patent from the 
perspectives of Competition law and the implication on consumer access were not 
substantively considered. Even though they are beyond the scope of this study, a future research 
is recommended on this.  The essence would be to identify how patent monopoly is exploited 
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by pharmaceutical firms in the context of competition law, how the practices undermine access 
and how compulsory licenses can be implemented to stem anti-competition practices.   
This study is limited to pharmaceutical patent. This thesis does not assume that the issues 
arising from patent protection on pharmaceuticals apply similarly to other industries. In 
recognising that other factors threaten access to medicine, this research does not claim that all 
innovator treatment options are subject to patent protection. Where the drugs are not under 
patent protection, the influence of patent on the price might be doubtful.  
 
The potentials of Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement are illustrated with the existing 
REC structure or model in Africa to demonstrate how it can work in practice.  RECs in other 
regions that satisfy Article 31bis(3) criteria can exploit the mechanism. However, the outcome 
will largely depend on the peculiarities of the regional market. 
 
8.11 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the overall discourse, this thesis makes the following recommendations: 
1.  There is need for enabling legislations. The practicality of Article 31bis(3) depends or 
hinges on enabling legislations. Treaties establishing RECs, regional IP organisations 
and national IP legislations must recognise Article 31bis mechanism in the legal 
framework. In establishing the practicality of this recommendation, as noted in chapter 
7 that, as at June 2021, about 133 member states of the WTO have accepted the TRIPS 
amendment. However about 31 member states are yet to deposit the instrument of 
acceptance of the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement.  This demonstrates that 
this recommendation is achievable. With a TRIPS compliant IP legislation, it is 
impossible to exploit Art.31bis.  
2. As demonstrated in chapter 7, treaties establishing RECs should establish a Regional 
Pharmaceutical Supply Centre (RPSC) to coordinate Article 31bis license. The 
provision should detail the composition of RPSC, staffing, the mandates, obligations 
and sources of funding. It is important to ensure that a specialised independent body 
from the REC should drive the regional procurement and the local production of 
pharmaceuticals.  
3 Paragraph 5 of the TRIPS Annex recognises the relevance of a regional patent to the 
use of a regional license. Accordingly, regional IP organisations (especially the regional 
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IP organisations in LICS) should develop a mechanism for a regional patent. Where a 
regional patent is recognised, the grounds of compulsory license should be clarified and 
not made subject to national IP legislations of the member states. In terms of practicality 
and as noted in chapter 7, the Africa Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI) already 
recognises a regional patent. This proves that this recommendation is achievable 
through the amendment of the agreement establishing IP organisations. TRIPS-Plus 
measures that undermine the exploitation of TRIPS public health flexibilities and the 
right of access to medicine, should be avoided or qualified. As highlighted in Chapter 
6, the pursuit of TRIPS-Plus measures through FTAs is unlikely to cease in practice. In 
view of the relevance of FTAs to trade, countries continue to take advantage of FTAs 
for trade expansion. Regardless, RECs should adopt a mechanism where IP measures 
in FTAs are assessed to determine their impact on the right of access to medicine and 
the use TRIPS flexibilities, before a member state can commit to it. Where the measures 
prejudice public health flexibilities, the REC can make any of the following 
recommendations to the member state: withdrawal from the FTA, expunge the measure 
from the agreement and where applicable, recognise public health exceptions or 
qualifications to the measures in the FTA and IP legislations. 
4 As demonstrated in chapter 6, section 5 of the Malaysian 2011 Directive on data 
exclusivity and Article 18(1)(3) of the European Commission (EC) Regulation 
816/2006, exempt the application of test data protection, when compulsory license is 
issued. Chapter 6 also identified possible qualifications (where applicable) that should 
be applied against trade measures that undermine access to medicine and the TRIPS 
flexibilities. These instances lend credence to the fact that a mechanism that assesses 
IP measures and makes any of the highlighted recommendations, is not only useful but 
practicable.  
5. The council of TRIPS should also establish a mechanism or guidelines to ensure that 
IP measures in FTAs align with Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. As 
demonstrated in chapter 6, FTAs that restrict the use of public health flexibilities 
undermine the essence of the Doha Declaration. The importance of this mechanism 
stems from the fact that, developed countries or even generic manufacturing countries 
that commit to TRIPS-Plus standards, are unable to act as export countries for Article 





In establishing the practicality of this recommendation, it is noted that a similar 
mechanism was recognised in the 2013-2017 Pharmaceutical Business Plan of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). The SADC assists the member 
countries that are negotiating trade agreements to assess the possible implications on 
access to medicine. Notably, the WTO possesses the capacity to achieve or enforce this 
recommendation against the relevant member states. 
 
6. LICs individually and through regional alliance should continue to pursue local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, invest in capacity building and strategic 
partnerships that are not based on foreign aid. As noted, local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity provides long term and sustainable solutions to public health 
challenges. Using a regional alliance, local generic manufacturing plant should be 
situate in LDCs because of the benefit of the transition period. Within this period, LDCs 
have the freedom to delay the recognition of pharmaceutical patent and refuse the 
enforcement of existing patents on drugs.  
 
Notably, building regional manufacturing plants for pharmaceutical production (both 
generic and brand drugs) does require huge capital investment, human resources, 
technical and scientific expertise. However, as demonstrated in chapter 7, cumulative 
GDPs at the regional level, means that this recommendation is achievable. To actualise 
this, RECs can also take advantage of Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement on technical 
co-operation. On mutually agreed terms, developed countries can provide personnel 
training and technical assistance to developing countries and RECs towards this goal.  
 
7. LICs like the developed counterparts, should also take advantage of the first limb of 
Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement. Patent continues to serve legitimate policy 
objective. In pursuit of this objective, WTO members states adopt TRIPS minimum IP 
standards. However, using Article 1, most developed countries continue to advance 
their IPP standards beyond the minimum requirements. Developing countries can also 
use Articles 1 and 27 of the TRIPS Agreement to strengthen patentability standard for 
pharmaceutical products. Strengthened eligibility standard can guard against granting 
patent to weak inventions. This strategy contains the possibility of obtaining patent on 
minor incremental inventions. As demonstrated in chapter 2, indiscriminate use of 
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patent strategies like patent clusters, extend patent duration to delay generic 
competition. 
 
This recommendation requires only an amendment of patent eligibility criteria in the 
national and regional IP legislations. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the Indian Patent 
Legislation in section 3(d) through strengthened eligibility criteria, restricted the 
evergreening strategy of Novartis pharmaceutical firm.  
  
8. TRIPS-Plus measures and trade policies that interfere with the legitimate use of TRIPS 
flexibilities can be challenged by LICs at the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU). As demonstrated in chapters 3 and 6, unilateral trade measures and TRIPS-Plus 
measures produce undesirable outcomes and can also be illegitimate. In some cases, 
they contravene Articles 1,7,8, 31bis(4), 64(3) of the TRIPS Agreement and Articles 
22 and 23 of DSU. It follows that, using the DSU mechanism, LICs can individually or 
using Article 31bis(3) strength, challenge unjustified unilateral trade oppositions and 
TRIPS-plus measures that challenge the use of compulsory license. This way, the 
indiscriminate use of asymmetric power can cease or minimise.  
 
9. As highlighted in chapter 7, a holistic solution to the access to medicine challenge 
entails addressing non-patent barriers that challenge access to medicine and Article 
31bis(3) mechanism. LICs individually or through a regional mechanism should 
proactively resolve non-patent impediments to the procurement of essential medicine.  
 
10. With respect to remuneration and as demonstrated in chapter 7, countries are enjoined 
to adopt clear, objective and predictable remuneration standard and considerations for 
compulsory license. A remuneration standard that is based on what a state’s designated 
authority considers expedient, may not promote transparency. The standard should be 
seen to take into adequate account, the need to facilitate access to medicine and the 
economic expectation of the patent holder. As seen in chapter 7, the 1985 Canadian 
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